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Abstract of Thesis
The contents of this thesis examine British management of 
the sterling area between 1950 and 1958, covering the 
period between the devaluation of sterling in 1949 and the 
establishment of sterling convertibility in 1958. The main 
body of the thesis is comprised of five chapters which 
analyze different aspects of the sterling area system 
during this period. Long term lending from the UK to the 
overseas sterling area is examined with the conclusion that 
these capital flows were not a major drain on the British 
economy. The mechanics of movements in British short term 
liabilities to the rest of the sterling area are described 
and their effects on the British foreign exchange reserves 
is found to be positive or neutral for most of the period 
although the basis for this erodes as the decade draws to 
a close. The trade pattern of the sterling area members is 
analyzed and the changing policies to coordinate the trade 
of the area are described. The possibility that the 
existence of the sterling area inhibited the freedom of 
policy choices faced by the British authorities is explored 
with the conclusion that the major opportunities for a new 
direction in British external economic policy were 
abandoned for reasons other than the sterling area system. 
Finally, some possible alternatives to the sterling area 
system are analyzed and the thesis concludes that these 
were not plausible alternatives given the historical 
context in which economic policy decisions were made. The 
general conclusion of the thesis is that the sterling area 
system as it functioned in the 1950s was not the major 
burden or destabilizing factor for the British economy that 
contemporary observers and some current research have 
suggested.
PLEASE NOTE: References prefixed by PRO are from the Public 
Records Office, Kew, London. References prefixed BoE are 
from the Bank of England Archives.
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Chapter I Introduction
Doubts about the merit of British foreign economic 
policy have generated a voluminous literature aimed at 
resolving the conflict between domestic and external 
economic goals and untangling the inter-relation of 
economic policy and overseas political ambitions. The 
literature on the nineteenth century has focussed on the
r
rise and demise of Empire and the burdens this placed on 
the British economy, focussing especially on British trade 
and capital exports1. These same issues have arisen in the 
context of the relative economic decline of Britain in the 
twentieth century.
To a large extent, British external economic policy in 
the 1950s was determined by the evolution of Britain*s 
premier role in the international economy a century 
earlier. Thus, the importance of London as an international 
financial centre and many of the traditional economic ties 
with overseas countries were products of Britain's earlier 
status. Without this history, the position of the UK in 
the 1950s would have been very different. Nevertheless, 
the apparent problems of this period were also in many 
respects the product of the economic climate of that 
decade.
The period under review covers the years from the 
general devaluations in 1949 to the introduction of
10f the more recent literature, see e.g., S. Pollard, 
Britain's Prime and Britain's Decline: The British Economy 1870- 
1914. Edward Arnold, 1989. M.W. Kirby, The Decline of British 
Economic Power Since 1870. George Allen and Unwin, 1981.
9
external current account convertibility at the end of 1958. 
This was a unique period of adjustment and realignment of 
the international monetary system. Despite the Bretton 
Woods agreements which had been designed to create 
international economic stability, an increasing imbalance 
emerged between the recovering continental Europe and the 
deteriorating balance of payments of the USA. This trend 
was to ultimately bring an end to the Bretton Woods plans 
for the configuration of the international economy. In 
this context of global transition and imbalance, the role 
of the UK in the international economy was also undergoing 
a fundamental change from its pre-war position as the most 
important economic ally of the USA and as a pivot between 
Europe and America to a diminished role as the weakest of 
a group of middle power Western European economies. This 
transition was the result of relatively slow growth in 
output, productivity and competitiveness that manifested 
itself in recurring balance of payments crises through the 
1950s.
I.A. The Debate on the Sterling Area
The role of the sterling area, system is an aspect of 
this adjustment that provoked some research in the 1950s 
and 1960s but which has largely been relegated to 
generalizations in more recent literature. At the end of 
the 1950s and through the 1960s the growing awareness of 
the limits to international liquidity, of the disadvantages 
of national currencies as units of international reserves
10
and of the relative economic decline of Britain in the 
twentieth century provoked general literature on the reform 
of the international monetary system and specific studies 
of the role of sterling as an international currency. The 
literature on the sterling area from this period falls 
naturally into two groups. The first group engaged in a 
general critique of British economic policy since the 
Second World War in order to attribute blame for the 
apparent relative decline of the British economy2. For 
writers in this group, sterling area policy played a 
significant part in explaining that decline. The second 
group of writers was concerned more specifically with the 
problem of sterling as an international currency or with 
analysing the sterling area itself3. Through most of the 
1970s interest in the postwar sterling area was suspended 
as the international monetary system found its new shape 
but since 1980 scholars have begun to return to the issues 
of the 1950s and 1960s with the benefit of historical 
perspective.
2e.g. A. Shonfield, British Economic Policy Since the War. 
Penguin, 1958. J.M. Livingstone, Britain in the World Economy. 
Pelican, 1966. J. Cooper, A Suitable Case for Treatment; What to 
do about the Balance of Payments. Penguin, 1968. L.J. Williams, 
Britain and the World Economy. Fontana, 1971.
3A.R. Conan, The Sterling Area. Macmillan, 1952. A.C.L. 
Day, The Future of Sterling. Oxford, 1954. P.W. Bell, The 
Sterling Area in the Postwar World? Internal Mechanism and 
Cohesion 1946-52. Oxford, 1956. J. Polk, Sterling; Its Meaning 
in World Finance. Council on Foreign Relations, 1956. Conan, The 
Rationale of the Sterling Area. Macmillan, 1961 and The Problem 
of Sterling. Macmillan, 1966. F. Hirsch, The Pound Sterling; A 
Polemic. Victor Gollancz, 1965. B.J. Cohen, The Future of 
Sterling as an International Currency. Macmillan, 1971. S. 
Strange, Sterling and British Policy? A Political study of an 
International Currency in Decline. Oxford, 1971.
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The sterling area system was generally focused around 
three types of relations? the sterling balances, 
international trade and long term capital flows. This 
provides a convenient framework in which to survey the 
existing literature. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of 
this literature is the unanimity of opinion as to the 
burdens and risks of the system for the UK and the 
necessity for reform4. Without being based on any more 
detailed research than that of Bell's study of the 
mechanics of the sterling area between 1946-1952, the 
assumption that the sterling area system posed an 
unnecessary burden on the British economy has been adopted 
by most of the subsequent writers on the decline of the 
British economy.
On the problem of the sterling balances and the 
stability of the sterling area system, there was general 
agreement that the ratio of reserves to short term 
liabilities (as represented by the sterling balances) was 
inadequate and that this contributed to the weakness of 
sterling through potential runs on the central reserves5. 
A prominent exception to this consensus was A.R. Conan who 
argued that the ratio of reserves to liabilities commonly
4For other reviews of opinions on the sterling area see 
e.g., Conan, The Rationale of the Sterling Area.. M. FG. Scott, 
"What Should Be Done About the Sterling Area?", Oxford University 
Bulletin of Statistics. Vol. 21, No. 4, November 1959.
5Bell, The Sterling Area, p. 414-417., Day, Future. p. 60-
61., Williams, Britain, p. 179., A.P. Thirlwall, The Balance of 
Payments; The UK Experience. Macmillan, 1956., p. 148-9. G. 
Maynard, "Sterling and International Monetary Reform" in P. 
Streeten and H. Corbet eds., Commonwealth Policy in a Global 
Context. Frank Cass, 1971. p. 145.
12
used to describe British solvency was inappropriate. A 
better picture of Britain's international position, he 
argued, would include all British overseas assets and not 
just the foreign exchange reserves in the Exchange 
Equalization Account6, On this basis, Conan calculated 
that the UK had regained its international creditor status 
during the 1950s7. The Radcliffe Committee shared this 
belief but still concluded that "the relationship between 
reserves and liabilities was clearly far from satisfactory 
throughout the post war period and remains so"8.
The sterling balances were related to British long 
term investment in the sterling area in three ways that 
were not fully consistent. First, it was alleged that 
British overseas investment was financed through short term 
lending to the UK (especially by the Colonies) in the form 
of sterling balances9. Thus, "the United Kingdom was in 
the unhealthy position of borrowing short and lending 
long"10. This implied both exploitation of the Colonies11 
and a precarious British international banking position12.
6Conan, Rationale, p.13-14.
7Ibid., p.123-128.
8Reoort of the Committee on the Working of the Monetary 
System. Cmnd. 827, HMSO, 1959. Henceforth cited as Report of the 
Radcliffe Committee.
9Bell, The Sterling Area, p. 368, Polk, sterling, p.234.
10Bell, The Sterling Area, p. 368.
11A. Hazlewood, "Colonial External Finance Since the War", 
Review of Economic Studies. Vol. XXI, No. 54. Dec. 1954. pp. 31- 
52.
12Cooper, A Suitable Case, p. 221.
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Secondly, it was asserted that the UK was forced to 
continue the policy of investing freely in the RSA or risk 
a run down of sterling balances by the RSA to replace the 
British investment13. Alternatively, it was argued that 
the accumulation of the sterling balances was largely due 
to the large long term capital flows from Britain which 
offset the current deficits of the rest of the sterling 
area (RSA) with the UK14. In this argument, Britain's 
sterling liabilities would be lower if the UK had not 
pursued a policy of free capital flows to the RSA. This 
must be balanced against the fact that in this event, UK 
overseas assets would not be as great.
Underlying these arguments there was a general 
presumption that large overseas investment in the sterling 
area was a burden on the British economy15. Among these 
writers, Andrew Shonfield made the most searing and 
influential condemnation of the sterling area system. For 
him, the two greatest obstacles to Britain's economic 
growth in the post war period were excessive overseas 
military expenditure and overseas investment16. On the 
second, Shonfield argued "that the British economy is 
robbed of necessary nourishment, that its growth is 
stunted, as a result of this too vigourous pursuit of
13Strange Sterling, p.191-92, Shonfield, British Economic 
Policy, p. 128, Cooper, A Suitable Case, p.221.
14Conan (1966) , p. 81.
15Strange, Sterling, p. 150-51, Shonfield, British Economic 
Policy, p. 108.
16Shonfield, British Economic Policy, p.123.
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overseas investment”17. The Radcliffe Committee looked at
the possibility of capital controls because such investment
was competitive with domestic investment and undermined the
effort to rebuild the reserves18. The Report concluded,
however, that overseas investment was an essential part of
the UK's commitment to Commonwealth development and that
such investment generated demand for British exports and
expanded supplies of primary products19 so "there would
certainly be no automatic gain to the reserves equal to the
fall in overseas investment"20.
The Radcliffe Committee concluded, therefore, that
although there have been occasions when the 
functioning of the sterling area has thrown an 
added strain on the reserves and when the capital 
requirements of the area have added to the total 
load on the reserves of the United Kingdom, we 
are satisfied that it is in the interest of this 
country to maintain existing arrangements21.
On the trade relations of the sterling area, it was
generally agreed that discrimination was to the advantage
of the UK rather than the RSA since the RSA was forced to
restrict its manufactured imports from cheaper markets22.
The UK, in contrast, was able to have free access to the
sterling area raw materials and benefited from greater
17Ibid., p. 108.
18Report of the Radcliffe Committee, p.265.
19Ibid., p.266.
20Ibid.
21Ibid. . p.240.
22"The Sterling Area Is History and Mechanism", Planning. 
Vol XVIII, no. 331, 1951. p. 63., Day, The Future. 102-3., Bell, 
The Sterling Area. 407.
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manufacturing exports to the RSA. However, Susan Strange 
argued that the discriminatory exchange controls had 
featherbedded* British exporters in soft RSA markets 
rather than forcing them to face the competition in the 
faster growing markets of Europe and North , America23. 
Conversely, others noted that the strength of the trade 
relationships of the sterling area weakened through the 
1950s as the RSA became less reliant on the British market 
for their exports24. The complementarity of trade 
relations had also declined as RSA trade surpluses with the 
NSA could no longer be relied on to balance UK deficits 
with the NSA25.
An important theme, especially in more recent 
literature, has been that the sterling area inhibited 
British policy. Thus, the UK was prohibited from allowing 
a devaluation of sterling to improve the British balance of 
payments because this would hurt the RSA who held their 
reserves in sterling26. According to this scenario, the 
British government must have feared that such a move might 
lead to the collapse of the system in circumstances which
23Strange, Sterling, p.70.
24Day, The Future, p. 75., Bell, The Sterling Area, p. 401-
7., Cooper, A Suitable Case, p. 239-40.
25G. Maynard, "Sterling and International Monetary Reform", 
p. 142.
26Hirsch, The Pound Sterling, p.39. Strange, Sterling, 
p.300, Cohen, The Future, p.144, Cooper, A Suitable Case, p.88., 
Pollard, The Wasting, p. 34, Williams, Britain, p.179., S. 
Brittan, Steering the Economy: The Role of the Treasury. Pelican, 
1971. p. 446. S. Newton and D. Porter, Modernization Frustrated: 
The Politics of Industrial Decline in Britain Since 1900. Unwin 
Hyman, 1988. p. 130-31.
16
were not to the British advantage. As a result of the 
restrictive policies necessary to protect the value of the 
pound, it was argued that domestic industrial growth was 
inhibited, with serious long term consequences for the 
British economy. As early as 1954, A.C.L. Day warned that 
the financial benefits to the City that the system 
generated should not be exaggerated since "Britain's wealth 
depends primarily on the competitive strength of her 
manufacturing industry, and only secondarily on the profits 
of international banking and merchanting"27. Thus, he 
argued that the interests of domestic industry should not 
be sacrificed to the international status of the pound and 
the operation of the sterling area. Shonfield also argued 
that the real rationale for continuing the sterling area 
system was the ambition to strengthen the pound as an 
international currency28. He asserted that these ambitions 
were founded on reasons of prestige rather than economic 
benefit because he calculated that the net earnings of the 
City that were related to sterling's international status 
amounted to only perhaps £40m p.a.29. For these reasons, 
it was argued, British support of the sterling area system 
was economically misguided.
27Day, The Future, p.154. See also Williams, Britain, p.
180.
28Shonfield, British Economic Policy, p.150.
29Ibid., p.160. B.J. Cohen in The Future of Sterling came 
to the same figure as an estimate of the net amount of the City's 
earnings arising from the use of sterling as an international 
currency, p.116. W.M. Clarke suggests this is an underestimate. 
The City's Invisible Earnings. Institute of Economic Affairs, 
1958. p. 101-2.
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The argument that a quest for prestige was the motive
for the UK's adherence to the sterling area system was made
also by Susan Strange. Her thesis was that the problems of
the British balance of payments in the 1960s were due to
the unsteady transition of sterling from a primary
transactions and reserve currency to a less prominent
international role. Thus, her book stressed the political
aspects of currency management. In this story, the
sterling area represented the economic vestiges of Empire
and "the retreat from Empire has been, in monetary as in
military policy, a slow and grudging one"30. The existence
of the sterling area disguised the fact that sterling's
reserve role was over by 1958. Strange concluded that the
most damaging aspect of the sterling area was that
while the monetary arrangements between sterling 
area countries in this post-war period may have 
reinforced, and thus helped to prolong British 
influence outside Europe, they also served to 
lull the British themselves into a false sense of 
immunity from the ultimately inescapable winds of 
change31.
Thus, the literature of this earlier generation of 
writers, which extended over twenty years, ranged from a 
catalogue of aspects through which the sterling area could 
potentially be a burden to Britain, to arguments that the 
very fact that these burdens were not borne in the 1950s 
undermined the British economy in the longer term.
The idea that the interests of industry were 
sacrificed to the financial houses in London who benefited
30Strange, Sterling, p.75.
31 Ibid., p.69.
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from the international use of sterling has insinuated its 
way firmly into the recent history of the economic decline 
of Britain32, Like Shonfield, they contend that low levels 
of domestic investment inhibited the growth of the UK 
economy. Thus, Stephen Blank, drawing heavily on
quotations from Shonfield and Strange as evidence, argued 
with respect to British sterling policy that "the result of 
the government's commitment to maintain Britain's 
international position was continuing domestic economic 
stagnation"33. Sam Aaronovitch argued that for the British 
government,
the priorities were unmistakable; to 'put the 
pound first', to deal with the balance of 
payments by deflating the economy whenever a 
threat existed. In this sense, the state was 
occupied with a policy that directly damaged the 
growth of accumulation within the UK itself34.
Also, Sidney Pollard argued that in order not to
"disappoint those who used the City of London as their
banking centre, devaluation was ruled out repeatedly and
32See Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire. Pelican, 1968 for an 
application of this to the pre-1914 period. For post 1945, see 
Stephen Blank, "Britain: the Politics of Foreign Economic Policy, 
the Domestic Economy and the Problem of Pluralistice Stagnation", 
International Organisation. Vol. 31, No. 4, Autumn 1977. pp. 673- 
727. A. Glyn and B. Sutcliffe, "The Rivalry of Financial and 
Industrial Capital" in D. Coates and J. Hillard eds. The Economic 
Decline of Modern Britain: the Debate Between Left and Right. 
Wheatsheaf, 1986. D. Coates, "The Character and Origin of 
Britain's Economic Decline" reprinted in Coates and Hillard, The 
Economic Decline. Also Williams, Britain, p. 180.
33Blank, "Britain: the Politics of Foreign Economic Policy", 
p. 715.
/
34S. Aaronovitch, "The Relative Decline of the UK" in 
Aaronovitch et al eds., The Political Economy of British 
Capitalism: A Marxist Analysis. McGraw-Hill, 1981., p. 68.
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much more harmful measures to the economy prefered 
instead"35. Thus, he found the sterling area "a specific 
point of vulnerability for Britain"36
In a 1983 article Bernard Stafford surveyed the 
alternative view. He noted that there is little empirical 
evidence to prove that the ratio of investment to output is 
directly related to faster rates of economic growth37. He 
also surveyed the international comparative studies which 
imply that the 'stop-go' cycle in British policy in the 
1950s and 1960s was not extraordinary and that greater 
fluctuations of output were associated with faster growth 
rates elsewhere in Europe38.
It is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis to 
explain the relative decline of the British economy in the 
twentieth century. The purpose of this survey has been to 
show that over the past thirty years there has been a 
broadly based consensus that the external position of the 
British economy has inhibited domestic growth. The 
sterling area system fits into this scenario in that it was 
the mechanism through which large investment flows were 
sent abroad, large short term liabilities were accumulated
35S. Pollard, The Wasting of the British Economy. Croom 
Helm, 1982. p. 34.
36Ibid.
37B. Stafford, "Theories of Decline", Socialist Economic 
Review 1983. reprinted in Coates and Hillard eds, The Economic 
Decline of Modern Britain. 1986. p. 346.
38Ibid.. p.348. Stafford gives more weight to the strength 
of the British Labour movement in relative British economic 
decline.
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and trade discrimination was pursued. Sterling area 
management was not, however, synonymous with the pursuit of 
re-establishing sterling as an international currency. 
Indeed, it has been argued that the sterling area weakened 
sterling and that the existence of the sterling area made 
a regional rather than a global role for sterling 
necessary39. Nevertheless, the sterling area is most 
commonly judged to have been a net burden to the British 
economy.
Although interest in the role of the sterling area in 
the 1950s has played a part in the more recent literature 
on the economic decline of Britain, this has not been 
accompanied by more detailed research on the functioning of 
the system. As a result, the arguments about the sterling 
area written in the 1980s bear a close resemblence to those 
of thirty years earlier. It is the purpose of this thesis 
to fill this gap in understanding of the details of the 
sterling area system by taking advantage of the release of 
British government documents to give more insight into the 
formulation of sterling area policy.
I.B. The Evolution of the Postwar Sterling Area
The evolution of the sterling area reflected the 
changing role of sterling in the international economy. 
Due to the pre-eminence of the UK in trade, shipping and 
finance in the nineteenth century, sterling was widely
39See e.g. J. Polk, Sterling; Its Meaning in World Finance.
1956.
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accepted as the primary currency both for denominating 
international transactions and for national reserves. As 
a result, the nineteenth century gold standard was, in 
effect, a sterling exchange standard. After the First 
World War, Britain's pre-eminence as an economic power 
faltered and sterling's role in the international economy 
shrank as a result.
By 1928, Britain's sterling liabilities to foreign 
governments and traders amounted to four times the level of 
reserves40. In the sterling crisis of 1930-31 the 
conversion of these balances virtually exhausted British 
reserves and contributed to the forced abandonment of the 
gold standard in September 1931. The group of countries 
which continued to peg their exchange rates to the now 
fluctuating pound became known as the sterling bloc. This 
regional group included the Dominions (except Canada) and 
Colonies, Egypt, Iraq and British protectorates in the 
Middle East as well as Portugal, Thailand, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Latvia41.
Unlike the post-war sterling area, the sterling bloc 
was not formalized by a common exchange control system or 
by pooling of reserves and all sterling assets were fully 
convertible to other currencies and gold. The members did 
not share a common trade policy or coordinate monetary and
40I.M. Drummond, The Floating Pound and the Sterling Area. 
1931-39. Cambridge University Press, 1981. p.5.
41The League of Nations included Argentina and Japan as 
unofficial members of the interwar sterling bloc. League of 
Nations, International Currency Experience. 1944. p.47.
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fiscal policies or meet to discuss their common interests. 
The Empire members and Canada shared a discriminatory trade 
system but the Treasury repeatedly rejected proposals to 
share policy determination with the Empire countries42 and 
indeed failed to keep them informed of British policy which 
would affect the sterling exchange rate. In common with 
the post-war sterling area, however, the stability of 
exchange rates among members was financed by plentiful 
credit from London.
With the onset of the Second World War, inter-war 
international monetary and trade relations were suspended 
and some of the sterling bloc countries broke their fixed 
exchange rates with sterling. As part of the war effort, 
all British payments to non-residents in foreign exchange 
or gold were subject to approval by the Treasury although 
on 3 September 1939 this restriction was ammended to 
specifically exclude all countries which agreed to keep 
their currency reserves in London and to enforce exchange 
control in common with the UK. This formalized the 
sterling area into a legally defined group of * scheduled 
territories' listed in the Exchange Control Act of 1947. 
The scheduled territories included the Commonwealth (except 
Canada), the Colonies, Burma, Iceland, Ireland, Iraq (from 
1952), Jordan, Libya and the Persian Gulf Territories43.
The imposition of exchange controls in 1939 was the 
first of two developments that led to the formalization of
42Drummond, The Floating Pound, p.24.
43Egypt was a member of the sterling area until 1947.
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the sterling area after the war. The second was the
accumulation by the UK of substantial sterling liabilities
to some members of the sterling area. The distribution of
sterling balances from 1945-1950 is presented in Table I.A.
Table I.A.
Sterling Balances of the Sterling Area
£m
Australia, New Zealand,
1945 1946 1947 1948 1950
S. Afr. 305 266 255 379 491
India, Pakistan, Ceylon 1358 1314 1218 957 790
Caribbean Area 54 58 54 57 58
African Colonies 205 217 253 314 346
Middle East - 1 1 8 8
Far East 142 193 198 195 201
Other 284 286 260 255 282
Total 2348 2335 2239 2165 2176
Notes: Source. Bank of Enaland Statistical Abstract. No. 1,
1970.
India accumulated most of these wartime assets. In an 
exchange of letters between the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and the Secretary of State for India in 1940 it was agreed 
that the UK should pay for the reorganisation of the Indian 
Army and the cost of British armed forces in India as well 
as the costs of extra Indian forces drafted especially for 
the war effort. These expenditures by Britain were made in 
the form of sterling liabilities to India which could be 
claimed after the War. The rate of accumulation of these 
liabilities accelerated after India was chosen as the 
arsenal and headquarters of the British Near and Middle 
East Command in 1940 and by subsequent Indian price 
inflation. By 1945, India had accumulated £l,321m worth of 
sterling balances from a pre-war total of only £40m44.
44R.S. Sayers, Financial Policy 1939-1945. HMSO, 1956. 
p.259.
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Similar wartime expenditure in other parts of the sterling 
area accounted for the accumulation of liabilities in these 
countries.
The post-war sterling area system was defined by three 
characteristics. Members pegged their exchange rates to 
sterling, maintained a common exchange control against the 
rest of the world while enjoying free current and capital 
transactons with the UK and, thirdly, maintained national 
reserves in sterling which required pooling of foreign 
exchange earnings. For the most part the members also 
shared a historical political and/or economic allegiance to 
Britain although this was not a defining requirement of 
membership.
The sterling area exchange controls on transactions 
with the rest of the world were fairly complex. Their main 
purpose was to restrict convertibility of sterling into 
dollars in the context of the post-war dollar shortage and 
to conserve foreign exchange. Payments of residents of the 
sterling area to non-residents were subject to the 
discretion of the monetary authority of each member, or 
delegated to 'authorized dealers' which were generally 
large commercial banks ultimately responsible to the 
central monetary authority. The exchange controls applied 
to non-residents varied considerably, giving rise to the 
allegation that in the early 1950s there were fifty-seven 
varieties of sterling45. By 1950, the world was 
essentially divided into four areas as shown in Table I.B..
45Strange, Sterling and British Policy, p.65.
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Transfers of sterling within each area were generally
allowed without specific permission. The exception to this 
was the bilateral group. Sterling payments to account of 
these countries were allowed automatically only between 
sterling area residents and the specific bilateral country. 
Transfers among bilateral countries were allowed only by 
'administrative transferability'
Table I.B.
The Sterling Account System
April 1952
Sterlina Area American A/C Transferable A/C Bilateral A/C
Australia USA Austria Argentina
New Zealand Bolivia Chile Belgium
South Africa Central America Czechlosovakia Brazil
India Venezuela Denmark China
Pakistan Ecuador Egypt Formosa
Ceylon Phillipines Ethiopia France
Burma Cuba Finland E . Germany
Iceland Colombia W. Germany Hungary
Iraq Dominica Greece Iran
Jordan Italy Israel
Libya Netherlands Japan
Persian Gulf Norway Lebanon
Territories Poland Paraguay
British Colonies Spain Peru
Sweden Portugal
Thailand Roumania
USSR Switzerland
Syria
Tangier
Turkey
Uruguay
Yugoslavia
which required the express permission of the Bank of
England. Generally, these countries ran balance of 
payments surpluses with the sterling area and were 
unwilling to accumulate sterling beyond a certain level, so 
their sterling transactions were most closely controlled. 
With the development of the EPU, administrative 
transferability for bilateral OEEC countries became
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virtually automatic after 1950.
A second group of countries were designated as members 
of the Transferable Account Area. Payments of sterling 
from one transferable sterling account to another were 
allowed freely, as were payments between transferable 
account and sterling area account. Transfers were not 
permitted from transferable account to bilateral or 
American accounts. The American account countries were 
members of the dollar area who were free to exchange their 
sterling earnings for dollars and vice versa or to use 
sterling in payment to transferable account or to the 
sterling area.
This division of the uses of sterling into various 
special accounts with varying degrees of restriction was 
designed to inhibit the convertibility of sterling into 
dollars while maximizing the usefulness of sterling in 
international transactions. Thus, no sterling was freely 
convertible to dollars except that earned by American 
account countries. Residents of the sterling area could 
obtain dollars only with permission of their monetary 
authorities.
Capital account transactions were similarly 
restricted. British direct investment outside the sterling 
area was subject to Capital Issues Committee control. 
Permission was granted only where the investment promised 
to generate foreign exchange earnings, exploit technology 
or generally help the sterling area balance of payments. 
Foreign investment in the sterling area was also restricted
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since the repatriation of capital was limited to the amount 
of the initial investment.
The proceeds of non-resident sales of sterling 
securities were allowed to, be reinvested only in other 
quoted sterling securities. In practice there developed a 
market in 1 security sterling* to allow non-residents to 
repatriate the proceeds of their investments. The proceeds 
of a sale of a sterling security could thus be exchanged 
for dollars in New York at a discount on the official 
exchange rate and prospective buyers of sterling securities 
would use the market to acquire security sterling for their 
purchases of securities. Residents of the sterling area 
were allowed to sell non-sterling securities freely to 
eachother but purchases of non-sterling securities from 
non-residents for sterling was prohibited in order to 
prevent conversion of resident sterling through security 
trading. This last provision led to the development of the 
largest leaks in the sterling area exchange control system.
Due to Hong Kong*s entrepot trade and Kuwait*s oil 
production, these two members of the sterling area operated 
free markets in sterling against dollars which were 
tolerated by the British authorities. As they were still 
members of the sterling area, UK residents could use 
resident sterling to purchase dollar securities freely from 
Hong Kong and Kuwait residents. The Hong Kong or Kuwait 
trader could then exchange this sterling for dollars on the 
free market to purchase more dollar securities. Thus,
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resident sterling was exchanged for non-resident 
securities. The so-called Hong Kong and Kuwait Gaps were 
finally closed in 1957 when British purchases of non­
sterling securities from overseas residents of the sterling 
area were prohibited. In general, however, the ring of 
exchange control was fairly consistent and remained a 
defining characteristic of sterling area membership.
The third defining characteristic of the sterling area 
was the pooling of foreign exchange reserves. As part of 
the exchange control system, private residents were 
required to surrender foreign exchange earned from their 
transactions with the non-sterling area in return for 
balances in their national currency. These foreign 
exchange earnings were used partly to settle RSA deficits 
with the UK46. The excess was sold by the members' 
monetary authorities to the Bank of England in return for 
sterling assets in the form of Treasury Bills, or 
government securities. The monetary authorities of the RSA 
could then draw foreign exchange from the central reserves 
at any time. The purpose of the 'dollar pool', as it was 
known, was to conserve the amount of foreign exchange 
needed to support the sterling area. This was based on the 
principle that the pooled foreign exchange assets of the 
area as a whole would be less than if each member had to 
keep a cushion of reserves of its own. Thus, the 'idle' 
surpluses of members were available to cover the non-
46Thus the UK could earn foreign exchange from its surpluses 
with the rest of the sterling area (RSA).
29
sterling deficits of others. This principle is sometimes 
forgotten in analyses of the sterling area which seek to 
argue that the reserves of the system were not adequate to 
cover all potential claims of the members. The main 
purpose of reserve pooling and the sterling area system as 
a whole was to coordinate these claims in the interests of 
all members and so allow a smaller volume of foreign 
exchange to insure against fluctuations of the system vis 
a vis the rest of the world. As long as the it was in the 
interest of each member to remain part of the dollar pool, 
the system was fairly secure. Given that the British 
Colonies were the most persistent contributors to the 
dollar pool, this security seemed assured at least until 
the end of the 1950s when Colonies began to achieve 
independence.
Related to the dollar pooling aspect of the post-war 
sterling area was the problem of the sterling balances. At 
the end of the War, these liabilities amounted to five 
times the level of British foreign exchange reserves so 
they could obviously not be liquidated immediately. As 
part of the American Loan agreement of 1946, the UK had 
agreed to deal with the overhang of liabilities by a 
combination of blocking, funding and cancellation. In the 
event, such a solution was not possible. Dealing with all 
sterling balance holders collectively was considered 
inappropriate by the British authorities because of the 
different ways the balances had been accumulated and the 
political problems of treating all holders equally. While
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to the Americans the sterling balances represented war 
debts which should be written off, the British felt obliged 
to honour their debts to their allies in the Commonwealth. 
In July 1947 partial blocking arrangements were negotiated 
with India and Iraq followed by similar arrangements with 
Ceylon and Pakistan47. Despite these agreements the 
sterling balances of India, Pakistan and Ceylon together 
were run down by £428m from the end of 1947 to the end of 
1949. There was an offsetting increase in the sterling 
balances of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, mostly 
due to speculative short term capital inflows into these 
countries especially after the sterling devaluation of
1949. It was widely believed that Australia would revalue 
the Australian pound to a par with sterling but these 
expectations proved unfounded. By the first quarter of
1950, the level of sterling area sterling balances was 
£2,541m or slightly more than the 1945 level. The central 
reserves, meanwhile, amounted to only £900m. This excess 
of short term liabilities to the sterling area over the 
central reserves became one of the major preoccupations of 
British sterling area policy.
These then were the characteristics of the sterling 
area in the 1950s. It was a fixed exchange rate system, 
bound by common exchange controls against the rest of the 
world while the members enjoyed relatively free current and 
capital flows within the area. The pooling of foreign
47P.W. Bell provides a useful summary of these agreements at 
the end of his Chapter 2 of P.W. Bell, The Sterling Area in the 
Postwar World. 1956. pp.39-42.
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exchange reserves generated sterling balances and the need 
for periodic discriminatory trade controls to protect the 
central reserves. Britain was the centre of the system and 
managed it by supplying long term capital investment, 
accepting unlimited short term sterling liabilities and 
purchasing sterling area exports without restriction.
I.e. The Sterling Area and the Theory of Currency Areas
In the 1960s, academic interest in the theory of 
optimum currency areas was sparked by a brief article by 
R.A. Mundell48. More recently, the costs and benefits of 
monetary integration have received greater attention in the 
context of plans for European monetary union49. In part, 
the issues of the sterling area system would seem to fit 
into part of this debate and it is worth exploring the 
theoretical discussion of currency areas to establish the 
extent to which this is so for the 1950s.
First, the sterling area was not a currency union. 
All members had their own national currencies, although the 
degree of independence varied. In the case of the 
Colonies, national currencies were virtually
48R.A. Mundell, HA Theory of Optimal Currency Areas", 
American Economic Review. Vol. 51, September 1961, pp.657-65.
49See e.g., H.G. Johnson and A.K. Swoboda eds., The 
Economics of Common Currencies? Proceedings of the Madrid 
Conference on Optimal Currency Areas. George Allen and Unwin, 
1973. R.Z. Aliber ed., The Reconstruction of International 
Monetary Arrangements. St. Martins, New York, 1987. D.E. Fair 
and C. de Boisieu eds., International Monetary and Financial 
Integration - The European Dimension. Netherlands, 1988.
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interchangeable with sterling because Colonial monetary 
systems were based on 100% sterling reserves. The 
properties of the sterling area system do, however, 
approximate a currency area defined by W.M. Corden as "an 
area within which exchange rates bear a permanently fixed 
relationship to each other" and where there is a "permanent 
absence of all exchange controls, whether for current or 
capital transactions, within the area"50. The members of 
the sterling area operated firmly fixed exchange rates with 
eachother, denominated their trade in sterling and for the 
most part enjoyed free payments on current and capital 
account. The exceptions to these general rules were some 
trade restrictions within the area (e.g. Australia imposed 
quantitative restrictions on sterling area imports after 
1952) and some capital controls (e.g. in 1956 South Africa 
imposed controls on capital flows to the UK in response to 
the increases in the British Bank Rate).
Despite these exceptions, the sterling area had many 
of the prerequisites for a successful currency area 
described in the theoretical literature51. Thus, it is 
argued that open economies will benefit from fixed exchange
50W.M. Corden quoted in E. Tower and T.D. Willet, The Theory 
of Optimum Currency Areas and Exchanqe-Rate Flexibility. Special 
Papers in International Economics, No. 11, 1976. p. 2.
51The criteria for an optimal currency area are surveyed in 
Y. Ishiyama, "The Theory of Optimal Currency Areas: A Survey", 
IMF Staff Papers. Vol. 22, 1975. pp. 344-383, H.R. Heller,
"Exchange Rate Flexibility and Currency Areas', Zeitschrift fur 
Wirtschaft-und Sozialwissenschaften. 1979. pp 115-135, and E. 
Tower and T.D. Willett, The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas and 
Exchanqe-Rate Flexibility. Special Papers in International 
Economics, No. 11, 1976.
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rates since the stability of the domestic price level will 
be more affected by fluctuations in the exchange rate than 
closed economies52. Also, aggregate demand policies are a 
cheaper means of balance of payments adjustment when the 
marginal propensity to import is high than when it is low 
so that the opportunity cost of the loss of devaluation as 
a policy option is not as great in open economies53. A 
second criterion is a high degree of capital market 
integration to allow capital flows to finance imbalances 
between members of the currency area54. A third criterion 
is the degree of diversification of production55. 
Countries with more diversified production will suffer less 
pressure on their exchange rate from a fall in demand for 
one of their tradeable goods than an economy which only 
produces a few products. A diversified economy will thus 
find the fixed exchange rates of a currency area less 
costly. A fourth criterion is a high degree of policy 
coordination or integration among members of a currency 
area since the pursuit of widely differing inflation, 
unemployment and growth targets will tend to drive the
52Heller, "Exchange Rate Flexibility", p. 118. Ishiyama,
"Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", p. 350. Tower and Willett, 
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, p. 13-14.
53Ibid. See also Tower and Willett, Theory of Optimum
Currency Areas, p. 42.
54Heller, "Exchange Rate Flexibility", p. 120. Ishiyama, "
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", p. 355-6.
55Heller, "Exchange Rate Flexibility", p. 119. Ishiyama,
"Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", p. 353-4. Tower and Willett, 
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, p. 49-50.
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members' exchange rates apart56.
In the context of the sterling area, most members had 
relatively open economies, measured in the value of foreign 
trade to GNP and they shared a high volume of trade among 
members relative to trade with the rest of the world. This 
will be shown in Chapter III. Secondly, there was 
relatively free movement of capital within the area and 
there was a high degree of financial market integration in 
both short and long term securities so there was ample 
facility for capital flows to smooth short term balance of 
payments disequilibria among members. The possible costs 
to the UK economy of this financial integration will be 
addressed in Chapter II and Chapter IV. On product 
diversification, the members diverged. Thus, if the 
theoretical considerations hold, it was more advantageous 
for the diversified British economy to be part of a 
currency area than the less developed overseas members 
whose exports were concentrated in a few primary products. 
Against this interpretation is the fact that the smaller 
members of the sterling area also tended to have more 
'open' economies which would benefit more from association 
with a currency area. Finally, one of the essential 
criteria of optimal currency areas is the coordination of 
economic policy. This was the object of a series of 
Commonwealth Economic Conferences and Finance Ministers1 
Meetings which were the formal fora for the management of
56Ishiyama, "Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", p. 357-9. 
Tower and Willett, Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, p. 15-16.
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the sterling area. Through these conferences, Britain 
tried to coordinate first a common external trade policy 
and later an internal deflationary policy for all members. 
The degree to which these attempts were successful will be 
considered in Chapter III.
The experience of the sterling area diverges from the 
literature on currency areas in that the latter deals with 
the situation of a country making a positive decision 
whether or not to join such a system. This reflects the 
emphasis on the theoretical potential for European union 
rather than a historical/empirical analysis57. To the pros 
and cons of currency areas in the case of the sterling area 
in the 1950s must be added the dismantling costs of the 
existing system that had emerged gradually and the relative 
cost of practical alternatives. This will be addressed in 
Chapter VI. Also, the sterling area differed from most of 
the scenarios in the literature in that the exchange rate 
between the area and the rest of the world was fixed rather 
than floating58. Thus, the adjustment of the sterling area 
as a whole was made less flexible and the need for adequate 
central foreign exchange reserves was an over-riding 
preoccupation of the management of the system.
With the achievement of most of the criteria discussed
57Heller notes that the bias in the literature has been 
"entirely theoretical in nature”, "Exchange Rate Flexibility", 
p. 117. With a decade of experience of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism under study, this bias is weakening.
^Alternatively, it could be argued that the sterling-dollar 
exchange rate was variable until February 1955 through the 
fluctuating transferable sterling market.
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in the literature, the sterling area should have reaped the 
theoretical benefits of a currency area. These include 
economizing on reserves59, eliminating speculative capital 
flows between members60 and increasing the usefulness of 
money as a medium of exchange and a store of value, thus 
taking advantage of economies of scale and reduced 
transactions costs61. More fundamentally, a currency area 
must be judged on the extent to which it promotes the 
economic goals of its members. In the case of the UK in 
the 1950s these were price stability, full employment, 
balance of payments stability and growth. The goals of the 
rest of the sterling area focused more on growth and 
development. The final chapter of the thesis will return 
to an assessment of the sterling area as a currency area.
While the theory on currency areas gives some broader 
context to the study of the sterling area, the main thrust 
of this thesis is to provide an up to date and more 
complete account of the economic relations among the 
members of the sterling area and to draw some conclusions 
about the impact of the system on other aspects of British 
policy and on the range of alternatives dismissed along the 
way.
The thesis is built around the three key relationships 
of the sterling area system. Chapter II examines the
59Tower and Willett, Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, p.
12-13. Ishiyama, "Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", p. 363.
60Ishiyama, "Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", p. 362.
61Ishiyama, "Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", p. 362.
Tower and Willett, Theory of Optimum Currency Areasr p. 6-8.
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mechanics of movements in the sterling balances and their 
implications for the British economy and British policy. 
Chapter III examines the trade relationships of the 
sterling area and British attempts to coordinate policy. 
Chapter IV analyzes the long term investment flows from 
Britain to the rest of the sterling area. The next two 
chapters are more policy oriented. The first determines 
how the sterling area inhibited British policy in other 
spheres and the second examines the alternatives to the 
sterling area and the process toward convertibility. The 
final chapter draws the evidence together and concludes 
that the role of the sterling area in British policy in the 
1950s was both more complex and less important than 
previous accounts have argued.
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Chapter II The Sterling Balances Problem
Britain*s accumulation of enormous sterling liabilities 
to the Commonwealth and Colonies profoundly affected the post­
war configuration of the sterling area system. In 1945, these 
liabilities amounted to £3.6b, 65% of which was owed to
sterling area members as defined in 19501. Immediately after 
the war Britain failed to come to any lasting agreements with 
her sterling area creditors despite American pressure to 
settle the problem. The reasons for this are described fully 
elsewhere2. It suffices for the present chapter to note that 
there were complicated political reasons against unilateral
action by the UK either to cancel her debts or fund them.
Under the terms of the 1947 Anglo-American Financial
Agreement, the UK was under an obligation to fund, block or 
cancel the balances and in August 1947 a partial blocking 
arrangement was concluded with India, followed by similar 
arrangements with Pakistan and Ceylon in February and June 
1948. By 1950, despite a substantial rundown by India,
Pakistan and Ceylon (£568m between 1945 and 1949), British 
sterling liabilities to the sterling area still amounted to 
£2. 6b or more than twice the level of UK foreign exchange
1UK External Liabilities and Claims in Sterling: 1945-62 (Old 
Series). Bank of England, 1968. I am deliberately excluding Egypt 
from this analysis. Egypt left the sterling area in 1947, in part 
due to her large sterling assets.
2 See for example, L.S. Pressnell, External Economic Policy 
Since the War. Volume I, HMSO, 1986.
39
reserves in this year3. Because of the apparently fragile 
ratio of reserves to liabilities, the problem of the sterling 
balances was the most constant preoccupation of British 
sterling area policy throughout the 1950s.
Most of this chapter will be concerned with identifying 
what comprised the sterling balances, the mechanics of their 
movements and their effect on the central reserves. The 
conclusion that is drawn is that movements in the RSA sterling 
balances did not pose a major destabilizing burden on the 
central reserves. Changes in the ratio of reserves to 
liabilities were more directly related to changes in the 
British economy vis a vis the non-sterling area due to the way 
sterling area sterling balances were accumulated and run down.
The analysis will also address the possible effects of 
the sterling balances system on the Colonial holders of these 
balances. There was a significant contemporary debate over 
whether the Colonies were exploited by the sterling area 
system and in particular by the accumulation of sterling 
balances. This will be analyzed by looking at the British 
attempts to accelerate Colonial development through 
liquidating their sterling balances. The failure of this 
policy suggests that the liquid part of the Colonial sterling 
balances was relatively small and the resistance to 
development originated in the conservative fiscal and monetary
3UK External Liabilities. Bank of England, 1968.
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policies of the Colonial governments themselves.
II.A. Identifying the Sterling Balances
An analysis of the sterling balances by country or even 
by type of fund should be a fairly straightforward procedure. 
In fact, however, no published series exists of a complete 
breakdown by holder or by type of fund for this period. The 
preference in published sources has been for regional 
groupings which include individual members of the RSA whose 
balances followed very different paths4. The paucity of 
published data is due in part to the reluctance of the Bank of 
England and the Treasury to draw public attention to the size 
of the liabilities relative to reserves and also to avoid 
making details of individual members* holdings public in case 
this should precipitate a spending spree5. The Bank of 
England, furthermore, was reluctant to reveal detailed figures 
which they received from RSA commercial and central banks to 
the Treasury for reasons of customer confidentiality. As part 
of the Monthly Report on External Finance, however, figures 
for most sterling area members were calculated for meetings of 
the Overseas Negotiations Committee. The complete quarterly 
series is presented in Appendix I.
4See e.g. Bank of England 1968 series or Memorandum on the 
Sterling Assets of the British Colonies. Colonial Office Paper 298, 
HMSO, 1953.
5Note from H. Brittain to T.L. Rowan HMT 11 May, 1953. PRO 
T236/3352•
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The first important distinction to be made in an analysis 
of the sterling balances is between the three major 
geographical categories of holders; Colonies, Independent 
Sterling Area (ISA) and Non-Sterling Area (NSA). Figure II.A. 
shows the relative sizes of sterling area and non-sterling 
holders and Figure II.B. shows movements in Colonial and 
independent sterling area balances.
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II.A.i. Colonial Sterling Balances
The value of Colonial sterling balances almost doubled 
between 1950 and 1958 from £673m to £1.28b. As a result of 
the Korean War boom between 1950 and 1952, Colonial sterling 
balances increased by £400m in these three years. After this 
rapid increase, the level of Colonial balances recovered and 
grew fairly steadily by about £100m p.a. until the second 
quarter of 1956. The drop in Colonial balances in 1956 was 
due to the slump in many raw material prices which followed a 
boom in industrial raw material prices in 1955. From the 
second quarter of 1956, Malaya and the African Colonies 
especially suffered from declines in the world prices for 
rubber, tin, cocoa and copper6. After a fall in this quarter 
of some £170m the level of Colonial sterling balances remained 
fairly constant, declining slightly towards the end of the 
period. By the end of 1958, Colonial sterling balances 
accounted for about half of sterling area sterling balances 
compared with 27% at the end of 1949.
A complete breakdown of Colonial sterling balances by 
holder and type of fund is not available in published sources. 
An estimation of the distribution by classes of funds and by 
colony was, however, constructed by J.G. Littler in 1956 for
Commonwealth and Sterling Area Statistical Abstract. No 78,
1957., HMSO, Dec. 1958.
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Liabilities to the Colonies" by J.G. Littler, 2 March 1956. PRO
T236/4253.
the Colonial Office in the Digest of Colonial Statistics is 
flawed by changes in the composition of the territories 
included and by the grouping together of Colonies into 
territorial groups rather than individual members8. Using 
these two sources of data, however, a general picture of the 
composition and distribution of the Colonial balances can be 
determined. Figure II.C. shows the components of total 
Colonial sterling balances for 1949-55 and Figure II.D. shows 
the balances of these Colonies excluding the Gold Coast 
(Ghana) , Malaya, Singapore and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
for 1956-58.
The largest component of Colonial sterling balances in 
1950 was currency reserves. Colonial monetary systems were 
based on 100% sterling backing for the local money supply. In 
fact, most Colonies kept 110% reserves to allow for changes in 
the value of their investments which were managed by currency 
boards in London or by Crown Agents for the Colonies. Because 
of this statutory link to sterling, currency reserves tended 
to grow directly with Colonial money supplies and therefore 
with the size of Colonial economies. With the raw material 
boom of 1950-52, therefore, currency reserves grew from £236m 
at the end of 1949 to £363m by the end of 19529, an increase
8Piaest of Colonial Statistics. Colonial Office, HMSO, London.
9Littler, Treasury Paper, 2 March 1956. PRO T236/3562.
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of 54% in three years. Those Colonies whose currency reserves 
grew fastest were, not surprisingly, those that benefited most 
from the Korean War boom. These included Malaya, whose tin 
and rubber trade generated an increase in currency reserves of 
£22m between 1950 and 1952 and Nigeria with an increase of 
£25m. As a proportion of total Colonial sterling balances, 
currency reserves declined from 36% at the end of 1949 to 32% 
in 1958.
Sterling Balances of Colonies
By Type of Fund 1 9 5 6 -1 93 8
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Figure III.D.
Government reserves accounted for 32% of Colonial 
sterling balances in 1950 but grew to 42% by the end of 1955
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declining to 33% by 1958, These in turn were divided into 
general reserves and special funds. General reserves were 
mainly the result of budget surpluses due to substantial 
government taxation of exports combined with a conservative 
spending policy. In Nigeria, for example, government taxation 
between 1948 and 1962 averaged 35% of the fob revenue of 
cocoa, 48% of palm oil, 42% of palm kernels and 52% of 
groundnuts10. In turn, the government ran budget surpluses 
averaging almost £5m p.a. from 1950-58 or 10% of government 
revenue11. By 1955 Nigeria had accumulated government 
reserves (including special funds) amounting to a total of 
£107.4m or twice as much as annual government expenditure 
compared with only £30.lm at the end of 194912. The Gold 
Coast and Singapore were in a similarly liquid position. 
Malta and Uganda had reserves three times their annual 
expenditure, Brunei twelve times and Hong Kong 150%13. For 
the Colonies as a whole, government general reserves grew from 
£60.4m at the end of 1949 to £346.6m at the end of 1955.
The motives behind this dramatic accumulation of 
government assets are uncertain. Part of the Colonial
10S .0. Olayide, D. Olatubosun, S.M. Essang, Nigerian Foreign 
Trade and Economic Growth 1948-64. University Press Ltd., Ibadan, 
1982. p. 83.
^ ibid.. p. 84.
1211 The Pattern of Colonial Sterling Assets and UK Sterling 
Liabilities to the Colonies” by J.G. Littler, 2 March 1956. PRO 
T236/4253.
13ibid.
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governments* conservative reserve policy was attributed to 
potential instability in revenue due to fluctuations in raw 
material prices and undeveloped local money markets14. In 
1953 a Working Party of Bank of England and Treasury officials 
endorsed the Colonial policy of accumulating four to six 
months* revenue in reserve each year for these reasons15. In 
fact, however, the fears of the Colonial governments of a 
collapse in revenue were not realized and general reserves 
continued to increase in every year of the period. That this 
very conservative approach to expenditure persisted to the end 
of the 1950*s, while the Colonial governments had not been 
obliged in any year to run down these large reserves, suggests 
some accumulation for accumulation's sake as well as a 
response to a real risk of fluctuations in the international 
economy.
As well as general reserves, the Colonial governments 
controlled a series of special funds. These included 
statutory sinking funds for government loans, post office 
savings bank funds, pension funds, renewal funds, development 
funds and various other reserves for specific purposes. There
was a considerable increase in this category of government
\
balances, the total rising from £150m in 1949 to £264m by
14Working Party on Colonial Sterling Assets, Report on the 
Financial Aspects of the Assets, 4 Sept. 1953. PRO T236/3562.
15ibid.
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195516. The largest categories were post office savings bank 
funds (£78m in 1955), sinking funds (£38m in 1955) and 
development funds (£68m in 1955)17. The savings bank funds 
increased with export earnings and therefore with the fortunes 
of the market for raw materials. The growth in sinking funds 
reflected the increasing volume of loans from the UK.
Most development funds were established in 1951 with the 
proceeds of the raw material boom and they continued to 
accumulate at least through 1955. The distribution of 
government funds specifically ear-marked for development is 
presented in Table II.A. Colonial development may have been
Table II.A.
Colonial Government Development Funds
£M
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Gold Coast 0 0 8.0 10.5 13.6 24.0
Uganda 1.3 0.7 0.5 4.5 10.9 10.0
Singapore 0 0 0 0 5.8 9.0
Hong Kong 0 0 0 4.5 4.5 8.0
Nigeria 0 0 1.0 7.7 6.9 8.0
Cyprus 0 0 1.8 2.2 2.6 3.5
Tanganyika 0.7 1.8 3.0 3.9 2.1 2.5
Kenya 1.0 2.3 4.2 8.5 7.0 2.0
Bermuda 0 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.9
Zanzibar 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Total 3.0 5.2 18.8 43.2 54.1 68.2
Sources "The Pattern of Colonial Sterling Assets and UK 
Sterling Liabilities to the Colonies" by J.G. Littler 2 
March, 1956. PRO T236/4253.
retarded at the beginning of the period by shortages of 
capital goods supplies and technical assistance from the UK. 
This excuse, however, should have weakened as the decade
16Littler, 'The Pattern', 2 March 1956. PRO T236/4253.
17ibid.
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progressed and the supply problems associated with rearmament 
worked their way through the British economy. The reason why 
the Colonies accumulated such surpluses rather than spending 
them on development will be discussed later in this chapter.
The two remaining categories of Colonial sterling 
balances also grew in response to the trade fortunes of the 
Colonies. Funds with British banks operating in the Colonies 
accounted for 23% of Colonial sterling balances in 1950 and 
19% by 195818. These were comprised of the reserves and 
working balances of these banks, held in London primarily as 
British Treasury Bills. They were determined, then, by levels 
of deposits, liquidity policy and working balances required 
for trade. In this way they were linked to British banking 
practice and the fortunes of Colonial trade.
The final category of Colonial sterling balances was 
marketing board assets which accounted for 7.5% of Colonial 
sterling balances in 1949, 8% in 1955 and 6% by 1958. Raw 
material marketing boards were most prominent in the West 
African Colonies of the Gold Coast and Nigeria where they 
accounted for about 25% of these Colonies* sterling balances. 
Cocoa marketing boards were set up in the Gold Coast and 
Nigeria in 1947 and Nigerian palm oil, groundnut and cotton 
marketing boards followed in 1949. The purpose of the boards 
was to stabilize producer prices given the volatile 
international market for these products. The boards fixed
18Colonial Digest of Statistics. 1959.
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producer prices, prescribed grades for production, appointed 
buying agents and sold the product on the international 
market.
The sterling assets of these boards are shown in Figure 
II.E.19. They absorbed most of the profits of the raw
Colonial Marketing Board Assets
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material boom of 1950-51 and largely maintained these assets
19The figures include some miscellaneous official funds but are 
primarily marketing board assets.
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through to the end of the 1950's. The amount of assets owned 
by Colonial marketing boards was the same in 1957 as in 1952, 
immediately after the Korean war boom. The marketing boards 
themselves, then, appear to have been subject to the same 
cautious spending policy as Colonial governments.
When the marketing boards were set up, it was established 
that the profits generated by their transactions would be 
allocated primarily for price stabilization and secondarily 
for development and research related to improving the 
production or distribution of their product. By 1952, all of 
the Nigerian marketing boards had given responsibility for 
managing their development projects to the Nigerian Regional 
Development Board20. According to a formula accepted by each 
Nigerian marketing board, they allocated 22.5% of their 
surplus for that year for development projects and 7.5% for 
research projects managed by the Regional Development Board. 
The remaining 70% of the profits were designated for 
individual product price stabilization funds21. In 1950 the 
Nigerian Palm Oil Produce Marketing Board furthermore 
guaranteed a minimum £800,000 contribution in any year. The 
Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board did not follow such a formal 
development programme, instead it periodically provided loans
20The Nigerian Groundnut Marketing Board and Oil Palm Produce 
Marketing Board allocated their development funds to the Regional 
Development Board from 1949.
21The Nigerian Cotton Marketing Board did not allocate a fixed 
sum to the Regional Product Development Boards. Instead it took 
part in cotton-related projects on an ad hoc basis.
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to the Colonial Government for particular development
projects. The development funds allocated by the marketing
boards from 1950-1958 are shown in Table II,B. In 1954
the product-specific marketing boards of Nigeria were absorbed
into three regional marketing boards which loaned
Table II.B.
West African Marketing Boards 
Contribution to Development
£M
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
ligeria 
Groundnut 2.8 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.4
Oil Palm 1.7 3.2 2.1 0.8 0.8
Cocoa 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.1 1.7
Cotton 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.3
Eastern Region 
Western Region 
Northern Recrion
1.2
6.8
2.1
0.2
4.8
0.5
2.2
0.8
1.2
1.6
1.3
0.3
Total 5.4 5.8 4.3 2.8 4.2 10.1 5.5 4.2 3.2
Gold Coast
Cocoa 2.2 3.5 4.0 2.4 2.0 0.3
Source: Annual Reports of the Nigerian Groundnut Marketing 
Board, Oil Palm Produce Marketing Board, Cocoa Marketing 
Board, Cotton Marketing Board, Eastern Region Marketing Board, 
Western Region Marketing Board, Northern Region Marketing 
Board and the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board.
substantial sums directly to the Nigerian government and to
regional development corporations. In 1955 the new regional
boards accepted an obligation to contribute a total of £14m to
the Nigerian government's loan programme for large scale
development schemes. Over the nine years, these Nigerian
marketing boards contributed over £45m to local development
and amassed general reserves of £73.4m.
The limiting factor in the marketing boards' contribution
to development seems to have been that the annual allocations
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were related to annual surpluses and not to the level of 
reserves. Thus, the contribution to development in 1950 
amounted to 10.6% of reserves but in 1958, when prices were 
falling, the contribution amounted to only 4.0% of reserves.
After 1951, the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board stopped 
adding to its price stabilization fund (it was stable at £51m 
until 1957) and took up substantial amounts of local 
government securities including over £6m worth of local 
railroad and harbour development securities in 1954-55 and £2m 
worth of a general Development loan in 1956. The Gold Coast 
contribution to local development in Table II.B. excludes the 
contents of their own Rehabilitation Scheme Fund which spent 
about £10m on Swollen Shoot disease over the period. From 
1950-1958 the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board spent over £14m 
directly on development and accumulated a stabilization fund 
of £45m of which £33.7m was invested in British government 
securities.
Altogether, Colonial sterling balances represented an 
increasing proportion of total sterling area sterling 
balances, rising from 30% at the end of the war in 1945 to 54% 
by 1958. About half of the Colonial balances were held in 
East and West Africa where marketing boards exaggerated the 
effects of the raw material boom on sterling holdings. The 
Gold Coast and Nigeria alone held 30% of Colonial sterling 
assets in 1956. The share held by the Malayan area increased 
slightly to one quarter by 1958 while the West Indies and Hong
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Kong each held a constant proportion of about 10%. The 
geographical distribution of the Colonial sterling balances 
was thus fairly constant and tended to reflect the pattern of 
concentration of the raw materials boom of the early 1950s 
through to the end of the period.
II.A.ii. The Sterling Balances of the Independent Sterling 
Area
The sterling assets of the independent sterling area 
(ISA) declined by one third between 1950-58 to £1.3b. About 
90% of ISA sterling balances were held as government reserves 
or by central banks. The rest were held as funds of UK banks 
operating overseas22.
India, which had accumulated the largest wartime 
balances, was still the largest sterling asset holder in 1950, 
accounting for £804m or 42% of ISA balances23. By the end of 
1956, however, Indian sterling balances accounted for only 26% 
of the ISA total or £412m24. By this time Indian sterling 
balances were already below the amount considered by the 
Indian authorities to be a working minimum25. The main 
determinant of the level of Indian balances in the 1950's, as
22"Sterling Balances Part Is Amount and Characteristics" 
Appendix II by L.P. Thompson-McCausland, 30 January, 1956. BoE 
OV44/30
23Report on External Finance, BoE EID3/98-106.
24 Ibid.
25"Commonwealth Government Borrowing in the UK in Relation to 
Sterling Balances" 6 May, 1957. PRO BT213/96
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with Pakistan and Ceylon, tended to be development 
expenditure. In 1956-58, heavy spending on development pulled 
sterling balances for these three countries down £598m or to 
one quarter of the 1955 level.
Australia was the next largest independent sterling asset 
holder in 1950, holding 26% of ISA balances in that year. As 
in India, the level of sterling balances in 1956 was 
considered by the Australian authorities to be below the 
minimum desired level. The Australian Prime Minister made 
several public statements during 1954 and 1955 which indicated 
that £200m was then considered an absolute minimum sterling 
reserve26 but in the first quarter of 1956, the volume of 
Australian sterling assets had fallen to £174m. The level of 
sterling balances held by Australia and New Zealand tended to 
follow the vagaries of the balance of payments situation. In 
this sense the balances of these countries most closely 
represent working foreign exchange reserves. None of the 'old 
dominions' were large wartime accumulators. In 1945 South 
Africa, Australia and New Zealand together held £305m or 22% 
of the balances held by India, Pakistan and Ceylon in that 
year27.
Increases in Middle Eastern sterling balances partly 
offset the decreases in other ISA holdings. Through the mid
26ibid.
27The sterling balances of India and Pakistan were divided in
1948.
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1950s the oil producing territories became rich, earning 
sterling in amounts that their development plans had 
difficulty absorbing. Between 1950 and 1956 Iraq's sterling 
assets more than doubled from £52m to £127m28. The sterling 
assets of the Persian Gulf Protectorates, which included 
Kuwait, increased from a mere £3m at the end of 1951 to £260m 
by the end of 1958, becoming the second largest independent 
sterling holder after Australia.
The general picture of sterling area sterling balances is 
of a gradual increase in total volume to 1955 except for the 
slump of 1952. There followed a gradual decline to 1958 
although the balances recovered their 1955 level by 196229. 
Within this apparent stability, however, was a significant 
regional shift. The major wartime creditors, India, Pakistan 
and Ceylon, operated at a fairly stable reduced level until 
1952 and again until 1956 when their assets came close to 
exhaustion. The older dominions of Australia, South Africa 
and New Zealand were not major wartime creditors but had built 
up their assets by 1950 to 26% of the total. Their balances 
fluctuated around a declining trend, never recovering from the 
drop associated with the slump of 1952. Colonial sterling 
balances offset this decline in the ISA since the collapse of 
raw material prices in 1952 was not associated with a quick
28"Middle East Sterling Area Territories" 28 March 1956 OV44/31
and "UK Sterling Liabilities" 21 February, 1952. BoE ADM14/30
29ibid.
spending of sterling assets as was the case in the ISA.
II.A.iii. The Sterling Balances of the Non-Sterling Area
The final category of sterling balance holders was the 
non-sterling area (NSA). These balances differed in both 
volume and character from those of the rest of the sterling 
area. NSA balances were held mostly by private holders after 
1953 and tended to be the working balances of traders. 
Britain excercised no control over these assets and they were 
assumed, therefore, to be linked most closely with the volume 
of trade in sterling and to confidence in the pound. The NSA 
balances declined only £97m between 1950 and 1958 although 
this disguises speculative runs in 1952 and 1955-5730.
What the data suggest is that through the early part of 
the 1950*s, more specifically through the boom and bust of 
1950-52, RSA sterling balances were transformed from the 
extraordinary wartime accumulations of the post-war era to the 
natural product of the functioning of the sterling system 
given the legacy of British Colonial policy which persisted in 
encouraging conservative economic policies through the 1950's.
Having established what the sterling balances consisted 
of and the significance of their geographical distribution, it 
remains to identify the mechanics of movements in the balances 
and their possible effect on the British economy.
30UK External Liabilities. Bank of England, 1968. Unless 
otherwise specified the term 'sterling balances' will refer to RSA 
balances only.
II.B. The Mechanics of the Sterling Balances System
Movements in sterling balances were linked to the
relative balance of payments position of the RSA with Britain
on the one hand and the with NSA on the other. The RSA would
run a deficit with the UK suppported by a surplus with the
rest of the world while the UK used its surplus with the RSA
to offset its deficit with the rest of the world. The result
was that the sterling area as a whole was in overall balance
with the rest of the world. This idyllic situation was not,
however, how the system functioned in the 1950's, when the
sterling area as a whole was more often than not in deficit
with the NSA. What is important for the analysis to follow,
however, is that the UK did run a surplus on current and long
term capital account with the RSA in every year and the RSA
did run a surplus with the NSA.
In November 1955, the Governor of the Bank of England
wrote to Sir Edward Bridges
It is felt, I think, both in the Treasury and the 
Bank that it is time we had a really thorough "New 
Look" at our sterling area arrangements to see 
whether the structure which has proved appropriate 
to the war period and the post-war transitional 
period does not now need some radical change31.
In response, a Treasury-Bank Working Party on the Sterling
Area was set up. Not surprisingly, no 'radical change' in
policy emerged but the mechanics of the sterling balances
system did come under examination.
31Letter from C.F. Cobbold to Sir Edward Bridges, 18 November
1955. BoE OV44/30.
As the Bank of England representative on the Working 
Party, L.P. Thompson-McCausland embarked on a four part study 
of how the sterling area sterling balances moved relative to 
the central reserves and offered a series of policy options 
for the future management of the system. This was the most 
complete study of the sterling balances undertaken by the 
British authorities in the 1950s. In Part I, he prepared a 
descriptive paper on "The Technical Position of Sterling as it 
Affects the Sterling Area"32. In this, he distinguished 
between the trading and banking roles of sterling for sterling 
area members. The distinction was somewhat unclear but seems 
to have been made between sterling balances that had been 
accumulated by selling or "depositing" foreign exchange in 
London and movements in sterling balances that did not result 
in equal movements in reserves, which were attributed to 
sterling*s trading role. The distinction was, strictly 
speaking, a false one since all sterling balance movements 
were the result of foreign transactions of the RSA and were in 
this sense the result of *trading*. The distinction seems to 
have been made to better point out the logic of Thompson- 
McCausland *s policy recommendations which will be discussed 
below.
From the point of view of the RSA, Thompson-McCausland 
noted that sterling had not lost its usefulness for commercial
32"The Technical Position of Sterling as it Affects the 
Sterling Area" 24 November 1955, circulated to the Working Party on 
13 December 1955. BoE OV44/30.
61
purposes, especially since the re-opening of London commodity 
markets. As a central banking reserve, however, sterling 
appeared increasingly vulnerable. The usefulness of sterling 
in this capacity depended on the stability of its value (hence 
the importance of a fixed exchange rate) and its availability, 
which made any blocking arrangements for sterling balances 
inappropriate. The threat to sterling as a reserve currency 
was that mistrust and friction would cause a seepage of 
resources out of the UK reserves and into independent gold and 
dollar pots in the RSA.
From the point of view of the UK, the trading role of 
sterling appeared secure since the UK was in consistent 
current surplus with the RSA. However, this surplus was 
offset by substantial long term investment by the UK in the 
RSA rather than by a decrease in UK liabilities to the RSA. 
Thompson-McCausland warned that large targets for current 
account surpluses were not enough if they were swallowed up 
into ever larger capital flows. This call for limiting 
investment in the sterling area was to become a theme in the 
Bank's analysis of the sterling balances problem.
The interests of the UK in sterling's banking role 
occupied most of Thompson-McCausland1s paper. He noted that 
reserves and liabilities up to the time of writing in 1955 had 
tended to move co-cyclically which indicated in his terms that 
the movements were due to 1banking1 transactions of the RSA. 
That is, the accumulation of sterling assets matched
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1deposits' of foreign exchange in the central reserves. The 
freedom of the RSA to exchange their sterling assets for hard 
currency meant that "the reserves have been used more in their 
true quality as banking reserves for the sterling area than as 
emergency funds to cover the UK's own troubles"33. The 
reserves loss due to RSA banking movements which resulted in 
declines in sterling balances did not, therefore, reflect a 
fundamental problem in the UK economy. What was damaging were 
changes in the ratio of liabilities to reserves, i.e. 
increases in sterling liabilities greater than increases in 
reserves. Thompson-McCausland dubbed this ratio the 
"position" of the British economy with respect to the rest of 
the world.
Part II of the Bank's study of the sterling balances, 
entitled "The Significance of Movements in the Balances" was 
more technical34. The distinction between 'trading'
transactions (i.e. those associated with the current and 
investment account of the balance of payments) and 'banking' 
transactions was retained. Since the RSA was always in 
deficit with the UK and in surplus with the rest of the world, 
settlement with the UK was made by sales of the foreign 
exchange earned from the NSA and supplemented by a rundown in 
sterling balances when the RSA was in overall deficit. When
33 Ibid.
34"The Sterling Balances Part II: The Significance of Movements 
in the Balances", by L.P. Thompson-McCausland, 19 March 1956. BoE 
OV44/31.
the RSA was in overall balance, the UK earned the foreign 
exchange revenue of the RSA as payment for the RSA deficit 
with the UK and there would be no change in sterling balances. 
The banking1 part of the movements came when the RSA was in 
overall surplus. The deficit with the UK would be paid in 
foreign exchange and the rest of the surplus with the NSA 
would be 'deposited* in London in return for sterling assets.
One element of this analysis deserves notice at this 
point. As Thompson-McCausland pointed out, the UK earned 
foreign exchange through its normal current and investment 
account surplus with the RSA. He went on to claim that this 
meant that the idea of a 'pooling arrangement' or 'central 
reserves' was not appropriate to the sterling area system. At 
a meeting of the Sterling Area Working Party on 25 April 1956, 
he argued that the terms 'pooling' or 'central sterling area 
reserves' should not appear in the final report of the Working 
Party35. According to Thompson-McCausland's analysis, 
however, the UK reserves benefitted from the 'deposits', or 
pooling, of surplus foreign exchange earnings by the RSA. 
Furthermore, Thompson-McCausland's analysis assumed that the 
RSA settled with the UK in foreign exchange first and ran down 
sterling balances only to cover the residual. This was the 
case only given the agreement of RSA monetary authorities not
35Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Sterling Area Working 
Party, 25 April 1956. BoE OV44/31.
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to retain substantial separate foreign exchange reserves, that 
is, only given the concepts of central reserves and foreign 
exchange pooling.
The distinction that Thompson-McCausland was trying to 
establish was the assymetry between increases and decreases in 
sterling area sterling balances. This assymetry in turn 
depended on the RSA running a surplus with the NSA and a 
deficit with the UK. An increase in sterling balances 
occurred when the RSA was in overall surplus and represented 
a 'banking* transaction. Thus, foreign exchange earnings were 
exchanged for sterling assets and the reserves and sterling 
balances moved up together. In this case there was no change 
in the 'position' of the UK economy (the ratio of reserves to 
liabilities) . Any visible change in the 'position' was due to 
the UK's own balance of payments with the NSA. Running down 
of sterling balances occured when the RSA deficit with the UK 
was greater than the surplus with the rest of the world. In 
this case the RSA exchanged its foreign exchange earnings for 
sterling, thus contributing to the central reserves and also 
liquidated existing sterling assets to pay their debt to the 
UK. When sterling balances were run down, therefore, the 
reserves increased more or decreased less than otherwise 
because the RSA was contributing. The UK's sterling 
liabilities were reduced and the 'position' of the UK economy 
improved as long as the UK deficit with the rest of the world 
did not exceed the sum of the RSA surplus with the non-
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sterling area and the rundown in sterling balances.
The moral of Thompson-McCausland1s analysis of sterling 
balance movements was that the UK should try to reduce 
sterling balances and improve the UK *position* by running 
larger balance of payments surpluses with the RSA. Again, he 
emphasised that aiming for a current account surplus was not 
enough since the substantial long term capital flows from the 
UK to the RSA worked against a reduction in sterling 
liabilities36. In Part IV of his study, * General
Conclusions1, he attributed most of the deterioration in the 
'position* of the economy to UK investment in the sterling 
area. He calculated long term investment amounted to £818m 
from 1950 to 1955 which offset a surplus on UK current account 
with the RSA of £618m, leaving the 'position' £200m worse 
despite an increase of £144m in reserves37.
How far Thompson-McCausland's analysis of the mechanics 
of the sterling area reflected reality can be determined by 
examining balance of payments figures for the RSA and the UK. 
These are presented in Table II.C.
It is evident in Table II.C. that the RSA balance of 
payments did follow Thompson-McCausland' s pattern of a surplus 
with the NSA and a deficit with the UK throughout the period. 
Also, changes in sterling balances are equal to the sums of
36 Ibid.
37The Sterling Balances Part IV: General Conclusions, L.P.
Thompson-McCausland, 27 March, 1956. BoE OV44/31.
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Table II, C.
The Sterling Balances and the Balance of Payments 
of the Overseas Sterling Area
£m
RSA 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Balance with NSA 
Gold Sales in UK 98 77 71 78 138 176 220 223
Other 368 165 111 219 36 -33 -61 -98
Total 466 242 182 297 174 143 159 125
Balance with UK 
Current a/c -283 -320 -348 -152 -267 -214 -306 -360
Long Term Cap. 208 165 161 201 201 129 190 295
Misc. Capital -10 -10 10 -30 10 30
Balancing Item______________ -79 -80____ 8 -73 -76 -246
Total -75 -155 -276 -41 -48 -188 -182 -281
Sterling Balances
391 87 -94 256 126 -45 -23 -156
UK Reserves 575 -344 -175 240 87 -229 42 13
Notes: Source, UK Balance of Payments 1946-1957. HMSO, 1959. 
The figures for changes in sterling area sterling balances do 
not correspond with more complete data used elsewhere in this 
chapter. In 1950 and 1951 the figure for long term capital 
includes the balancing item and miscellaneous capital.
the RSA balances of payments with the NSA and the UK after
allowing for Errors and Omissions in a balancing item. Little
can be deduced from the absolute value of the balancing item
since it represents the net value of various flows of
indeterminate magnitude in both directions. Consistent with
Thompson-McCausland*s analysis, rundowns in sterling balances
cannot be obviously associated with similar movements in
reserves. In 1952 the reserves were adversely affected by NSA
sterling balance withdrawl amounting to £247m and a deficit of
the UK with the NSA of £140m. In 1955, again, the UK deficit
with the NSA of £341m and the decline in NSA sterling balances
by £51m show that the movement in RSA balances were not a
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major cause of reserve drawings in this year.
Table II.C. shows clearly the contrast between the 
experience of 1950-54 and that after 1955. The system 
depended mostly on Colonial foreign exchange earnings from 
1950-1954, which are reflected in large "other” surpluses with 
the NSA in Table II.C. From 1955 the system depended mostly 
on South African gold sales. Until 1955 (except for the slump 
of 1952) the balance of payments surplus of some RSA countries 
more than covered the deficits of others. This is reflected 
in the increase of Colonial sterling balances offsetting the 
decreases of most of the ISA. For the last three years under 
review, the Colonies fell into deficit with the NSA and an 
overall surplus with the NSA was only achieved through sales 
of South African gold in the UK. These sales provided a 
surplus above the foreign exchange needed by the RSA but this 
surplus was not enough to cover deficits with the UK. The 
result was net declines in sterling balances. Because there 
was an overall surplus on NSA account, however, the net 
declines in sterling balances represent sterling drawn to 
settle with the UK rather than a net drain on reserves.
The central reserve pooling that Thompson-McCausland was 
so eager to dispense with, therefore, acurately describes the 
system that operated among the overseas sterling area members 
and that cushioned the net effect on the central reserves. 
Thus, sterling area members that ran surpluses with the NSA 
(the Colonies to 1955 and South Africa and the Middle East
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thereafter) provided the foreign exchange to meet the 
'withdrawals* of deficit members. There was no threat to the 
sterling balances system as long as the RSA as a whole 
maintained a balance or surplus with the NSA since this meant 
that the RSA was generating enough foreign exchange for their 
own purposes.
The difference between the system before and after 1955 
was that, unlike the Colonies, South Africa had virtually no 
sterling balances. By selling gold, South Africa was just 
meeting her balance of payments needs rather than accumulating 
'deposits' for use by others and herself in the future. In 
this sense the future of the sterling balances system was more 
precariously dependent on UK surpluses with South Africa than 
when the Colonies had supported it. By 1955 the Colonies were 
beginning to make net withdrawals and the system needed new 
depositors. Still, the Colonial sterling balances after 1955 
proved less liquid than those of the ISA in the early 1950s 
since they were tied to conservative Colonial government 
policy and statutory currency reserves. As a result, the 
withdrawals were not as dramatic and the impact of this change 
in the structure of the sterling balances system in 1955 did 
not make itself felt until the 1960s. This analysis of what 
was happening within the RSA and the changing character of the 
sterling balances system was not captured in Thompson- 
McCausland 's study. He did, however, warn that the pattern 
would change after 1955 with the end of the certainty of
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Colonial surpluses to support the system38.
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Figure II.F.
Figure II.F. shows movements in the *position1 of the UK 
economy. There was initially an improvement in the external 
position as a result of the Korean War boom due to increases 
in the reserves outstripping increases in sterling balances. 
This reflected the still fairly healthy balance of the UK with 
the non-sterling area through 1950. During the course of
38The Sterling Balances Part IV: General Conclusions, 27 March
1956. BoE OV44/31. His policy proposals in the wake of these 
warnings will be discussed later.
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1951, however, the UK balance with the non-sterling area fell 
into severe deficit and the external *position' deteriorated 
sharply despite reductions in sterling balances. The position 
improved fairly steadily for the next two years during which 
time the sterling balances increased relatively slowly and the 
reserves improved. In 1955 there was the second reserves 
crisis of the 1950s which was reflected in a deterioration of 
the external position although it recovered by the first 
quarter of 1956. The only dramatic negative change for the 
rest of the period was in the third quarter of 1957 in 
response to the speculative crisis of that year. During 1958 
the level of reserves increased due to the UK's healthy 
balance of payments and sterling balances declined which was 
reflected in a vast improvement in the external position. Due 
to the general stability of the level of sterling balances 
after 1952, changes in the external position of the UK tended 
to reflect changes in the UK balance with the non-sterling 
area and speculative runs on the reserves.
Table II.D.
Sterling as a Percentage of ISA Reserves
%
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Australia 82 66 65 70 64 49 58 65 55
South Africa
24 22 23 8 19 7 8 - -
New Zealand 64 61 62 73 69 61 72 63 66
Ceylon 89 
India 73
73 78 67 73 67 56 53 47
69 69 67 67 68 56 44 33
Pakistan 78 79 52 57 59 62 53 50 44
Iraq 95 80 81 86 91 84 80 71 66
Notes; Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics for
gold and dollar reserves? Monthly Report on External Finance, 
BoE EID3/97—104 for sterling reserves.
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Table II.D. shows another changing aspect of the sterling 
area reserves system and confirms Thompson-McCausland's 
assessment of the erosion of sterling as a reserve currency. 
Thus, the proportion of sterling in the reserves of the 
largest independent sterling area countries was generally 
declining through the 1950s. Table II.E. helps show that 
identified increases in gold and dollar reserves were not the 
main contributor to the declining proportion of sterling in 
ISA reserves. Between 1950 and 1958 the ISA accumulated £54m 
worth of independent dollar reserves and £115m of gold which 
amounted to only 10% of their cumulative surplus with the NSA 
and therefore of their contribution to the central
Table II.E.
Gold and Dollar Reserves of Sterling Area Countries
$USm 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Australia
$ 19 39 47 59 48 75 84 85 79
Gold 88 
New Zealand
112 112 117 138 144 107 126 162
$ 3 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
Gold 29 
South Africa
32 33 33 33 33 33 33
i
33
$ 44 7 24 38 33 53 53 38 30
Gold 197 190 170 176 199 212 114 217 211
India
$ 56 62 65 99 87 73 76 82 77
Gold 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247
Pakistan
$ 11 13 14 10 4 6 20 13 6
Gold - 27 27 38 38 48 49 49 49
Ceylon
$ 8 19 14 17 19 33 41 34 34
Gold - - - - - - - - -
Iraq
$ 3 13 14 14 10 15 17 20 18
Gold — — — — — 8 14 20 34
Notes: Source, International Financial Statistics. IMF, 1960.
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reserves. A more significant shift was the decline of
sterling balances while gold and dollar balances remained
constant or increased slightly. This was the case, for
example, with India whose gold reserves of £247m were a
statutory part of her currency reserves. The level of Indian
sterling reserves was fairly constant at just under £700m
until the second quarter of 1956 when increased spending on
the second five year plan began. By the end of 1958, Indian
sterling reserves were drawn down to £156m due to unexpected
costs in the Plan and this accounts for the quick decline of
sterling as a proportion of reserves in Table II.D. South
Africa, which held no sterling reserves after 1956, was a
unique member of the sterling area in that she was never
expected to hold substantial sterling reserves since she was
a gold producer.
The case of Australia is the most striking instance of
the general trend toward diversified reserves. In June 1953
J. Flett at the Treasury reported a conversation with Leslie
Bury, the Australian alternate representative to the IBRD and
IMF. In this talk
Mr. Bury, 'off the record' said quite frankly that 
at the time they had started to build up this 
[dollar] account in New York they were influenced 
by a desire to show the Americans that while the 
sterling area as a whole seemed to be on the verge 
of bankruptcy, Australia at least had some dollars 
to her own name. This he thought had influenced 
the IMF in agreeing to a further Australian drawing 
and might improve their chance of refinancing their 
New York loans. Mr. Bury added that it was too 
much for us to expect that every sterling area 
country would rigourously observe the rules of the
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club in their entirety39.
Between July 1955 and December 1957 Australia sold £8.9m of 
gold against dollars and less than £0.1m against sterling. 
This was reflected in an increase in Australian dollar 
reserves of $10ra in these three years. At the same time, 
however, Australia*s sterling reserves increased by £120m.
The British attitude to independent gold and dollar 
reserves was settled at the fourth meeting of the Sterling 
Area Working Party in 19 5 640. No strict formula for a 
correct maximum level of these reserves was considered 
appropriate since they had been accumulated in a variety of 
circumstances and were used for various purposes. It was 
agreed that the British side should not take the initiative in 
discussing these independent reserves as this might cast doubt 
on the strength of sterling. Finally, the Working Party 
concluded that, while the RSA should be encouraged to use the 
reserves to meet current deficits, the best way to limit the 
growth of these reserves was to follow policies which 
strengthened general confidence in sterling and therefore its 
usefulness as a reserve currency.
After spending months tracing the movements of the 
sterling balances, L.P. Thompson McCausland offered several 
policy recommendations based on his conviction that the best
39Note by J. Flett, 3 June 1953. BoE OV13/60.
40Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Sterling Area Working 
Party, 25 April 1956. BoE OV44/32.
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way to improve the liquidity position of the UK economy was to 
reduce liabilities rather than aim at increasing the 
reserves41. The first suggestion was that lending to the RSA 
and the Colonies should be reduced to allow Britain's current 
surpluses to reduce liabilities. The second recommendation 
was to arrange a deal with the IMF to allow drawings on the 
British quota when sterling balances were run down. This 
would offset the direct effect of drawings of NSA sterling 
balances on the reserves and the indirect effect of RSA 
sterling balances on the reserves through confidence in 
sterling42. Finally, the Middle East should be encouraged to 
continue to denominate their transactions in sterling since 
these members promised to replace the Colonies as accumulators 
of sterling balances. He also argued in his concluding paper 
that his analysis had emphasized the need to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate and that the focus of policy should be the 
'position* of the British economy as he defined it, not just 
the current account of the balance of payments.
The proposal to negotiate a special facility to draw on 
the IMF to offset declines in sterling balance was considered 
by the Working Party but rejected because of the complications 
it would cause for UK drawings for other purposes.
The proposal to limit capital flows to the RSA was
41The Sterling Balances Part IV: General Conclusions, 27 March. 
BoE OV44/31.
42Ibid.
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included in the final Sterling Area Working Party Report43. 
The Working Party accepted the need to limit capital flows to 
the RSA both to allow for decreases in sterling balances and 
also because this investment claimed resources that might 
otherwise be used to generate exports directly44. The Report 
argued, however, that overseas investment linked the sterling 
area and the Commonwealth together, that the UK had made a 
political commitment at the Commonwealth Economic Conferences 
of 1952 and 1954 to continue such investment and finally that 
the Colonies as dependents of the UK had a right to 
development. British government capital was a small 
proportion of the total and direct controls on private 
investment in the RSA would disrupt sterling area relations. 
The over-riding difficulty seems to have been summed up in the 
statement that "the political difficulties would be most 
serious if it appeared that as a result of our policies a 
substantial check was being imposed on sound economic 
development in the Commonwealth"45. Instead, the Report 
recommended using general fiscal and monetary policy to reduce 
the flow of investment abroad.
L.P. Thompson-McCausland's lengthy analysis alerted the 
British authorities to fact that the functioning of the
43"Problems of the Sterling Area", Report of the Sterling Area 
Working Party, 25 June 1956. BoE OV44/32.
44Ibid.
45Ibid. The British policy on overseas investment in the 
sterling area is discussed in Chapter IV.
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sterling balances system was changing in the 1950's and this 
was associated with the end of sterling's role as an
international currency. However, although the Sterling Area 
Working Party Report presented an updated and more detailed 
description of how the sterling area worked, its most
important function seems to have been to establish that no 
significant change in British policy was necessary or
appropriate.
II.C. The Sterling Balances and Development
The link between development and the sterling balances 
was historically a logical one. At the end of the Second 
World War India and Pakistan, who were the largest holders of 
sterling assets, considered them to be development
reserves46. By the time the Colonies became the major
overseas holders of sterling securities, the British
government was committed to a continuing flow of long term 
capital to the Colonies in the form of grants and London 
market issues. The Bank of England and the Treasury perceived 
this situation of lending long to the Colonies and borrowing 
short to be unsustainable in the long run. The link between 
sterling balances and development in this later stage, then, 
derived from a perception that Britain was in a precarious 
banking position.
The first attempt to link sterling balances and
46Report of a statement by the Indian Prime Minister in 
Telegram from UK High Commissioner in India to Commonwealth 
Relations Office, 22 March, 1951. PRO T236/2753.
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development began in 1949 in the context of the continuing 
Tripartite Discussions in Washington47 and the development 
planning of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. The British expected 
to be asked in Washington about their progress in funding or 
blocking the sterling balances as required by Article X of the 
1946 American Loan Agreement. At the first meeting of the 
Treasury-Bank of England Working Party on Sterling Balances in 
October 1949, Herbert Brittain suggested persuading the 
Americans to provide dollar aid to members of the sterling 
area against cancellation of perhaps twice the corresponding 
amount of sterling balances48. This proposal was fleshed out 
during subsequent meetings. India, Pakistan and Ceylon, as 
the largest sterling holders, were singled out as the targets 
of the proposal and it was hoped that other sterling area 
countries would agree to this special treatment of these 
countries on the grounds of their more urgent need for 
development49. The Bank of England, through their
representative L.P. Thompson-McCausland, argued that a 
solution to the sterling balances problem should not be 
dependent on American contributions to South East Asian
47These discussions arose out of paragraph 13 of the Communique 
of the Tripartite Economic Discussions between the UK, USA and 
Canada in September, 1949.
48Working Party on Sterling Balances Minutes 4 October, 1949. 
PRO T236/2639•
49Minutes of the third meeting of the Working Party, 25 
October, 1949. PRO T236/2639. It was hoped that the Americans 
would accept this logic as well considering the strategic 
importance of these countries to the West.
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development plans since this implied at least an eighteen 
month delay to get through Congress if the commitment were 
ever extracted from the Americans. He suggested that the 
major sterling balance holders should be approached 
immediately to arrange a strict funding and release schedule 
on the assumption that American aid would be forthcoming and 
if it were not then the funding arrangement could be 
rescheduled50.
Finally, in March 1950 the Working Party on the Sterling 
Area51 and the Working Party on South East Asian Development 
submitted a joint report to the Cabinet52. This detailed the 
proposal which was later to be submitted to the Americans in 
an ammended form. Along the lines of the Bank’s proposal, the 
sterling balances were to be dealt with in two stages. Stage 
I called for negotiations with the ISA on a funding 
arrangement which would assume that some American aid would 
follow. It was recognized that India, especially, was 
unlikely to engage in any funding negotiations without at 
least the near promise of getting some direct benefit in 
return. Stage II of the plan was to begin talks immediately 
with the Americans to arrange dollar aid for South East Asian 
sterling balance holders. These countries would in turn send
50Minutes of the Working Party 10 March, 1950. PRO T236/2639.
51The name of the Working Party on the Sterling Balances was 
changed on Feb. 8, 1950. PRO T236/2698.
52,fSterling Balances and South East Asia” 14 March 1950. PRO 
T236/2639.
the sterling equivalent to Washington to be transferred to the 
British Treasury who would put this sterling against the 
National Debt. In this way, the writers of the joint report 
hoped to achieve a cancellation of perhaps £60m p.a. of 
sterling liabilities over several years53. On the 6 of April 
the British Ambassador in Washington was instructed to start 
a tentative approach to the Americans along these lines. Two 
days later the ISA governments were informed that the British 
would be discussing sterling balances in the context of 
development but no details of the plan were revealed. 
Finally, on April 17 the details of the British proposal were 
given to Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State but the 
Americans delayed over replying to the proposal through the 
rest of April. On April 23 the Americans leaked the proposals 
to the press which provoked angry responses from India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon who resented not being consulted on 
negotiations for cancellation of their assets54. Finally, on 
5 May 1950 Acheson spoke to T.L. Rowan of the Treasury in 
Washington and rejected the British attempt to link sterling 
balances with South East Asian development55.
53ibid.
financial Times, 24 April, 1950. This was no doubt a 
deliberate attempt by the Americans to bury the proposals. PRO 
T236/2691. Telegrams from India and Pakistan, Note: "The Views of 
the Government of India on the Tripartite Talks, 27 April, 1950. 
PRO T236/2691.
55Telegram T.L Rowan to the Foreign Office, 6 May, 1950. PRO 
T236/2691.
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Stage II of the plan was thus abandoned and Stage I would 
soon follow it. First, the Indians made it obvious that they 
were unlikely to agree to any funding scheme that was not 
linked to development aid. This was probably the greatest 
obstacle to any funding arrangement at this time. All the 
other obstacles had existed when the plan had been devised and 
had not been considered insurmountable. One consideration was 
that funding was not suitable for many kinds of sterling 
balances such as commercial bank reserves and currency 
reserves which had to be kept in fairly liquid form. Also, 
under Article VI of the 1946 American Loan Agreement, Britain 
could not request a waiver of interest payments in any year 
unless she reduced releases of sterling balances. If sterling 
releases were set in advance, this limited the flexibility of 
the British to request a waiver in the future.
This first attempt to link sterling balances to 
development, then, ended in failure. Instead, the Columbo 
Plan was finalised in the Autumn of 1950. India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon agreed to six year development plans, part of which 
were financed by agreed drawings on their sterling balances. 
Thus India was to draw £35m p.a. amounting to 15% of their 
planned expenditure, Pakistan £4m p.a. and Ceylon £3m p.a. 
Although a step forward for South East Asian development, this 
was not successful as a sterling balance solution since it 
covered only a quarter of India*s sterling balances. Releases 
of £42m p.a. under the Columbo Plan seem a rather poor
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alternative to the hoped for cancellation of £60m p.a. under 
the scheme involving the Americans.
The next major attempt to link the sterling balances 
problem with development was suggested in the context of the 
huge accumulation of sterling assets by the Colonies during 
the boom of 1950-1. In December 1951, Mr. Whitehead, Finance 
Minister in Southern Rhodesia, suggested that the raw material 
needs of the sterling area as a whole should be identified and 
an organisation set up to coordinate the development of these 
raw materials funded in part by an effort "to mobilize a large 
part of the sterling balances in London which are at present 
idle, including a portion of the commercial balances and also 
public funds such as part of the reserves of the various 
Colonial currency boards or central banks of Commonwealth 
Countries."56. This idea of pooling sterling balances for 
development was taken up by C.F. Cobbold, Governor of the Bank 
of England, who moulded it into a plan for a Commonwealth 
Development Fund to spice up the upcoming Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers* Conference57. The UK would contribute from the 
funds already set aside for development (e.g. the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation) while the RSA would contribute their
'excess* sterling balances. Canada and the USA would be asked!
to provide dollars for necessary dollar imports. The
56Telegram from UK High Commissioner in Southern Rhodesia to 
Commonwealth Relations Office 20 December, 1951 BoE OV44/50,
57Paper by Governor Cobbold 25 December, 1951. BoE OV44/50.
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prospects for additional development capital, therefore, again 
depended on American aid. Cobbold wrote that this would 
immobilise a large part of the sterling balances and at the 
same time meet RSA wishes for development58. This seems to 
assume that the Fund would be spent at a slower rate than each 
member would otherwise have run down their sterling 
balances59.
The Governor*s plan came up against stiff opposition 
within the Bank of England. L.P. Thompson-McCausland pointed 
out that RSA countries would want to spend their sterling 
balances on their own development rather than that of other 
members and the decision on where the funds should go would 
introduce a divisive element into sterling area relations60. 
J. Fisher made explicit the Fund*s underlying purpose of 
blocking agreed amounts of sterling against dollar aid and 
pointed out the difficulties of getting the USA and Canada to 
agree to contribute61. Fisher did not, however, extend this 
to point out that the plan was the same in this essential 
feature as the failed attempt two years earlier to get the UK 
to provide dollars against cancellations of sterling balances
58lbld.
5,It is R.N. Kershaw who finally points out that the sterling 
balances would be spent rather than blocked if the plan were a 
success. Note by R.N. Kershaw, Jan. 2, 1952. BoE OV44/50.
60L.P. Thompson-McCausland note "Governor*s Draft", 2 January, 
1952. BoE OV44/50.
61 J. Fisher note 2 January, 1952. BoE OV44/50.
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by India and Pakistan. Fisher cut through the altruistic tone 
of the Governor’s proposal to expose that "the UK interest is 
to stimulate primary production from dollar loans and then tap 
the resulting increase in dollar exports (by the Colonies) by 
selling capital goods for industrial and welfare development 
to the Empire for sterling"62. The focus of development from 
the British point of view was thus on raw materials while the 
RSA were more interested in welfare and industrial 
development. This was yet another area of potential conflict.
Cobbold absorbed this advice and the plan was revised. 
The Fund was changed to a Commonwealth Board of industrial and 
financial experts who would decide what products were needed 
in the sterling area and where to develop them as well as 
advising on financial and commercial aspects of proposals63. 
The Governor’s plan thus came to visualize a much more 
intimate and formal association of interests among sterling 
area members which implied a complete adjustment in the 
character of the system. The sterling balances aspect was 
included in a later draft which added that the member 
governments would also set aside or 'segregate' part of their 
sterling balances for ten year development plans in their own 
areas64. The plan was finally sent to the Treasury in
62ibid.
63Note by Governor for Commonwealth Working Party 25 January, 
1952. BoE OV44/50.
^Governor's note for Treasury, draft. 27 January, 1952. BoE 
OV44/50•
February 1952 where it seems to have received a cool reception 
since it did not surface in discussions with the Commonwealth 
representatives65. Even in its revised form the Governor's 
plan did not avoid the difficulties which had been raised 
earlier in the Bank. The new plan rested on the rather naive 
belief that the RSA would not recognize this attempt to block 
their sterling balances and that sterling area members would 
agree to the political and economic compromises required by 
centralized direction of development for the area as a whole. 
This put too much faith in the common interest of the RSA 
members among themselves as well as with the UK. Given these 
obstacles, it is extremely unlikely that the IBRD or the USA 
would have become involved to the extent of supplying 
additional funds so any net benefit to RSA development would 
have been unlikely.
The idea of somehow pooling sterling assets to direct 
them at development, however, did not die at this stage. Four 
years later Parliament debated a proposal to establish a 
Commonwealth Development Agency or Bank66 which was based on 
the principle that by pooling 'excess' sterling reserves 
available for development, the RSA would have a better chance 
of attracting credit abroad. The debate prompted the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to circulate such a
65The Governor did discuss the plan informally with the New 
Zealand representative, Mr. Holland, who supported it as a possible 
way for New Zealand to join IBRD and IMF. BoE OV44/50.
66Report on the debate on 30 November, 1956. BoE 0V44/56.
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proposal to the various Commonwealth High Commissioners. Not 
too surprisingly, the responses were that such a pooling of 
reserves into a centrally administered organisation was 
neither desireable nor practicable67.
The idea lived on in the Treasury until April 1958 when 
it was revived by T.L. Rowan as a possible fillip to the 
upcoming Montreal Commonwealth Conference68. By the time the 
Treasury had taken up the idea of pooling balances to get 
control of them, however, the Bank of England had dropped it. 
In a •personal1 letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Heathcoat Amory, Governor Cobbold tried to temper Rowan's 
enthusiasm by alerting his superior that "I see that 
suggestions for a Commonwealth Development Bank are coming to 
the fore again...I ought just to emphasize that, while the 
suggestion has obvious presentational attractions, it bristles 
with practical difficulties"69.
It is not easy with hindsight to distinguish even the 
'presentational attractions1. It is curious that this type of 
plan, which had few foreseeable benefits for the RSA and 
several drawbacks, such as the loss of control of their 
foreign assets and a certain source of dispute between 
members, was repeatedly brought out as an exciting long term
67Telegrams BoE OV44/56.
^Report of a conversation between T.L. Rowan and Governor 
Cobbold 23 April, 1958. BoE OV44/56.
69Letter from Cobbold to Amory 29 April 1958. BoE OV44/56.
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concept to revive the flagging Commonwealth economic 
conferences. It is perhaps a deeper comment on the quality of 
sterling area relations that Britain could offer no other new 
incentive to hold the attentions of the RSA. Indeed, by the 
mid-1950s it seemed the sterling area members had little to 
discuss beyond repeated calls from Britain for short term 
restrictions in times of crisis and calls from the RSA for 
development capital.
The final set of policy initiatives to be discussed was 
the possibility of changing aspects of Colonial monetary 
systems to remove sterling balances from the UK liabilities 
account and to release them for Colonial development.
When the Colonies were accumulating millions of pounds 
worth of sterling assets every year at the beginning of the 
1950s, there emerged a general public feeling that the 
sterling balances system (and the Colonial currency reserves 
system, especially) exploited the underdeveloped Colonies. 
This view was expounded most vociferously by Arthur Hazlewood 
and opposed by Ida Greaves70. Hazlewood's general objection 
was that the Colonial system, and the accumulation of Colonial 
sterling balances in particular, represented forced Colonial 
lending by the Colonies to the UK at the expense of their own 
development. Ida Greaves' contention reflected the official 
opinion that the Colonial sterling balances were accumulated
70See e.g. the debate in The Economic Journal. Dec. 1952, Dec. 
1953 and Sept. 1954.
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for specific long term commitments rather than being 'idle' 
balances. They guaranteed the value of local currency in 
relation to sterling and enhanced the creditworthiness of the 
Colonies. The sterling balances were thus important to the 
longer term stability and growth of the Colonies.
The possibility of mobilizing the Colonial sterling 
balances for development arose in response to the apparently 
precarious banking position of the UK lending long to the 
Colonies and borrowing short term. A second factor was the 
growing resistance of the London capital market to new 
Colonial stock issues. In November 1951, the Cabinet 
suggested that some consideration should be given to the use 
of sterling balances for local investment to reduce calls on 
the London market71. The Colonial Office immediately 
composed a note to the Treasury protesting that very little of 
the Colonial balances were ’disposable* or available for other 
investment and that the Colonies would still need every penny 
that the London market could provide given their urgent need 
for capital, even if more existing assets were invested 
locally72. The note concluded with two limited suggestions 
for investigation. The first was the investment of Colonial 
sterling balances in eachother*s Colonial issues and the
71 Cabinet Minutes 20 November, 1951. PRO T236/3351.
72Note from Poynton in the Colonial Office to Johnston at HMT 
21, November, 1951. PRO T236/3351.
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second was a decrease in the statutory currency reserve73.
Three weeks later the Colonial Office suggested a Working 
Party should be set up of Treasury, Bank of England, Crown 
Agents and Colonial Office representatives to look at Colonial 
sterling balances and the related issue of the absorptive 
capacity of the London market for Colonial loans74. The 
second part of the Working Party agenda was dropped by the 
Treasury to avoid having to deal with Colonial Office pressure 
to ensure a priority on the London market for Colonial 
issues75. In the end the Working Party was postponed 
(perhaps due to preoccupation with the 1951-52 reserves 
crisis) and was not revived until a year later.
In March 1953 the Bank of England took the initiative and 
suggested that it was time for a further look at the 
possibility of greater local investment of Colonial sterling 
balances76. The Working Party on Colonial Sterling Assets 
was set up in May and reported in September. After two years 
of being on the agenda, the conclusions of the Working Party 
on the question of local investment of sterling balances are 
somewhat disappointing. The Working Party produced two 
reports dealing with 'The Economic Significance of the Assets'
^ibid.
74Note Poynton to Johnston, 10 December, 1951. PRO T236/3351.
75Treasury Note 28 November, 1951. PRO T236/3351.
76Note Cobbold to E. Bridges, 6 March, 1953. PRO T236/3351.
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and 'The Financial Aspects of the Assets'77. Despite its 
promising title, the Economic Significance report contained 
few new insights. Its major conclusion was that the current 
charge that the UK was exploiting the Colonies by forcing them 
to accumulate assets78 was unfounded since the sterling 
balances were not blocked and the Colonial governments 
themselves were responsible for amassing reserves for future 
development. Nevertheless, the report went on to suggest that 
the Colonies should perhaps start spending their reserves 
since these charges were politically damaging to the UK. 
Other arguments for an orderly run down of sterling balances 
were that large sterling balances weakened confidence in 
sterling and that development spending should start while the 
Colonies were still under British guidance to lessen the 
impact of future 'irresponsible spending' by new governments. 
Finally, the report argued that Colonial development spending 
would enhance the Colonies as a market for British goods. The 
report concluded that no major change in British policy was 
necessary because sterling balances were unlikely to continue 
to increase in 1953 and 1954 since raw material prices were 
falling and development spending was expected to increase. In 
this, the Working Party underestimated the conservative nature
77Working Party on Colonial Assets "Report on the Economic 
Significance of the Assets" 11 Sept., 1953 and "Report on the
Financial Aspects of the Assets" 4 Sept., 1953. PRO T236/3562.
78See e.g. A. Hazlewood, "Sterling Balances and the Colonial 
Currency System" Economic Journal Vol LXII No. 248, Dec..1952. pp. 
942-45.
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of marketing board and Colonial government policy. In fact, 
as noted above, Colonial sterling balances continued to grow, 
by 7% in 1953 and 11% in 1954.
The Report on the Financial Aspects of the Assets79 is 
not much more satisfactory. The major implication of the 
report is that little could be done to ease the pressure on 
the London Market or to increase the amount of development 
capital available for the Colonies. The report reiterated the 
conclusion that the Colonies should be encouraged to invest 
part of their sterling balances in their own development and 
then went on to offer suggestions for which funds should be 
targetted. The Report first recommended no change in the 
Colonial policy of keeping four to six months* revenue in 
reserve every year although by the end of 1952, the basis for 
the data used for the report, government reserves had reached 
39% of Colonial sterling balances. The investment policy of 
the marketing boards was also deemed sound. At the end of 
1952 89% of these funds were invested in British government 
securities - none was invested in Colonial issues80. In any 
case marketing board assets amounted to only 10% of Colonial 
sterling balances.
The final two recommendations of the report advocated 
more positive (if limited) action. The first was that the
79Working Party on Colonial Assets "Report on the Financial 
Aspects of the Assets", 4 Sept. 1953. PRO T236/3562.
80"West and East African Currency Boards: Make-up of Assets", 
7 April 1954. BoE 0V67/2.
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Colonies should be encouraged to make use of the existing 
statutory right to invest up to one third of post office 
savings bank funds in new local public issues. In 1951 (the 
latest figures available to the Working Party) only 6% of post 
office savings bank funds were invested in local issues81. 
This suggestion, while on the one hand only asserting the 
status quo, also pertained to only 5% of Colonial sterling 
balances. Even if all Colonies had invested their savings 
bank funds locally, this would only have released £22m.
The final recommendation of the report, however, was more 
promising. In accordance with the original Colonial Office 
suggestion in 1951, it was decided that the Colonies should 
consider reducing the sterling backing of local currencies. 
The working party suggested a maximum 20% fiduciary element 
(the actual proportions were to be determined by the Colonial 
authorities themselves) which would release these sterling 
funds for local investment. This promised to release up to 
£70m of British liabilities for local investment or about 6% 
of Colonial balances in 1953.
Altogether, the recommendations of the report amounted to 
relatively little in terms of easing the pressure of 
accumulating Colonial assets. Nor, as stated above, did they 
promise any net easing on the London market or a significant 
increase in funds available for development purposes.
81 Colonial Office Note "Investment of Post Office Savings Bank 
Funds" 20 June, 1953. BoE OV44/83.
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Liquidating sterling assets, whether currency reserves or 
savings bank funds, required selling British securities on the 
market and taking capital out. This pressure of sales on the 
market would have partly offset any reduction in the frequency 
of issues of new Colonial stocks. Indeed, it was recognized 
that there was no guarantee that the Colonial demands on the 
market would have been smaller or less frequent82. Also, a 
reduction in currency funds managed by the Crown Agents would 
have reduced their purchasing power for new Colonial issues 
for which they were the major buyer. The net impact of these 
initiatives on the volume of development funds available to 
the Colonies was, therefore, ambiguous.
The attempts to link sterling balances to development 
must be regarded as failures. They did not go far in 
increasing development resources or in reducing sterling 
balances. This failure was sealed by the general refusal of 
the Colonial governments to entertain the suggestion of a 
fiduciary element in the currency reserves. In September 
1954, the Governors of the Colonies were finally canvassed 
about their willingness to reduce their currency reserves but 
the response was unenthusiastic83. This may have been for 
several reasons. In 1951, the Colonial authorities were 
advised by the Crown Agents that any reduction in the sterling 
backing of their local currency would have negative effects on
82Financial Aspects Report PRO T236/3562.
83Despatch to Governors 10 September, 1954. PRO T236/3562.
93
their international credit rating84. As the London market 
tightened up, the Colonies were increasingly looking elsewhere 
to satisfy their capital needs and their international credit 
standing was an important determinant of their access both to 
the London market and to other foreign investors.
A second possible motive for the Colonies* reluctance to 
spend their sterling balances while repeatedly complaining of 
being starved for capital is a more strategic one. It 
certainly did not make sense to give the UK an excuse to start 
limiting capital flows to the Colonies (whether official or 
otherwise) by releasing sterling assets for local investment. 
Many Colonies who were rich in sterling were approaching 
independence in 1953 (e.g. Gold Coast, Malaya) so their
special claim on the British government and on the London 
market would be over soon enough. This, of course rests on 
the assumption that those making the decision to hang on to 
all of their Colony's sterling assets while maximizing their 
access to the London market either believed that they would 
still be in a position to spend the balances after 
independence or were amassing them in trust for the future 
independent regimes. The motives of the Colonial governments 
are confused by this ambiguity. What is not ambiguous is that 
the Colonial authorities wanted to maintain the Colonial 
currency system. There was no precipitous rundown of sterling
^Conference of the Technique of Development Finance, Tenth 
Meeting, 14 June 1951. PRO CA0G9/149.
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balances when Malaya and Ghana achieved independence in 1957 
which suggests that their large sterling reserves were not as 
liquid as the British authorities feared. This reinforces Ida 
Greaves' assessment that the sterling balances were tied to 
long term commitments (such as sinking funds) and that the 
Colonial currency reserve system was considered important as 
evidence of economic stability to attract foreign investment.
This ends the discussion of the attempt to solve the 
sterling balances problem by linking it to sterling area 
development. The enthusiasm with which the British 
authorities clung to this type of package solution to two main 
problems in the sterling area system was thwarted by a lack of 
necessary cooperation from the United States or from the RSA. 
In the end the British had nothing to offer the RSA as an 
inducement to decrease their claims on the UK once it became 
clear that the Americans would not offer direct dollar support 
to the sterling area system. The efforts to change the 
Colonial sterling balances system to release some of the 
balances for expenditure on development was inhibited by the 
limited amounts that could be released and by Colonial 
resistance to erosion of their currency reserves.
II.D . Conclusions
The sterling balances in the 1950's have been shown not 
to have been the dangerous and volatile factor in the British 
external economy that many contemporary observers believed. 
Changes in sterling balances did not have a detrimental effect
95
on the reserves as long as the RSA had a surplus with the NSA 
and the UK had a surplus with the RSA. Indeed, the increases 
in sterling balances until 1956 strengthened the reserves.
The danger of the system lay in the possibility that the 
ISA would choose to diversify their own reserves by exchanging 
their sterling balances for dollars or gold. During the 1950s 
there was evidence of the beginning of such a trend but the 
method of diversifying reserves was to retain part of each 
year's dollar earnings and running down sterling balances to 
settle with the UK. This type of settlement did not draw on 
the reserves and did strengthen the 'position' of the British 
economy.
The year 1955 marked a change in the character of the 
sterling balances system. In this year the diversification of 
Australian reserves accelerated, the Colonies' accumulation of 
sterling balances finally reached its peak and the RSA surplus 
with the NSA (a main determinant of the stability of the 
system) came to rely on Middle Eastern surpluses and South 
African gold sales. Given the nature of the Colonial balances 
and the conservative policies of the Colonial governments and 
of the independent regimes which succeeded them in the later 
1950s, this weakness in the sterling balances system did not 
manifest itself until nearly a decade later.
96
Appendix to Chapter II
STERLING BALANCES
Monthly Report on External Finance BoE EID/98-106
Pak not incl funds with Fed Res Bk of India 
WAfr not incl I of WAf Mktg Bds until III 1950 
EAfr incl Aden fr II 1952 
Rhd&Nya is NRhd & Nyas until II 1954 
Malaya is Mal&Sing from IV 1957
IV 1949 381 50 57 822 100 53
I 1950 435 57 78 830 98 49
II 472 69 79 803 100 51
III 451 59 68 794 87 55
IV 499 57 78 804 97 68
I 1951 592 83 88 823 146 75
II 626 104 73 796 159 72
III 531 93 42 771 159 74
IV 403 66 59 730 150 76
I 1952 290 57 61 679 142 72
II 235 55 61 663 101 63
III 220 54 52 682 59 58
IV 293 59 57 694 57 52
I 1953 337 84 39 693 66 47
II 378 103 22 681 65 41
III 365 95 9 675 64 40
IV 404 95 19 697 65 35
I 1954 413 118 15 708 67 40
II 384 127 30 696 59 48
III 333 101 33 687 52 49
IV 332 78 54 691 60 52
I 1955 296 85 39 685 66 60
II 264 97 22 677 66 62
III 217 77 15 679 62 64
IV 214 54 21 687 73 67
I 1956 174 71 14 680 92 67
II 191 112 14 528 90 57
III 206 102 18 475 80 54
IV 259 88 24 412 77 52
I 1957 323 99 12 412 79 48
II 378 123 3 360 69 36
III 375 99 -5 290 59 37
IV 387 60 -4 254 62 39
I 1958 359 59 -19 221 58 38
II 329 69 -9 183 52 29
III 293 72 -7 155 40 32
IV 295 79 5 156 43 30
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202
200
205
211
202
184
178
179
177
176
186
196
197
194
202
209
207
198
206
209
202
185
179
173
174
156
163
171
174
172
180
174
179
179
187
193
Iraq Jordan PGulf Libya Burma
49 0 0 0 46
49 5 0 0 44
50 5 0 0 51
50 15 0 0 55
52 15 0 0 51
53 15 0 0 56
52 15 0 0 63
47 15 0 0 66
51 14 3 1 62
51 13 15 1 64
48 13 18 6 67
55 14 16 6 68
60 14 15 6 71
65 13 16 5 79
74 14 52 6 89
75 15 45 6 82
83 15 38 7 73
87 15 37 9 69
91 16 52 10 59
94 17 58 10 48
103 19 70 11 40
103 20 64 10 36
113 21 93 10 28
117 22 106 11 23
116 22 136 11 26
120 24 143 13 37
124 24 157 13 39
129 25 164 14 43
127 27 169 15 46
124 26 157 16 39
108 29 185 16 37
103 30 189 15 36
96 29 203 15 31
91 31 206 16 28
90 31 245 15 37
90 33 256 17 41
101 33 260 18 40
Rhd&Nya Iceland
I 1949 1
I 1950 1
II 1
III 1
IV 1
I 1951 1
II 0
III 0
IV 43 1
I 1952 50 0
II 46 0
III 52 0
IV 50 1
I 1953 50 0
II 49 0
III 72 0
IV 68 0
I 1954 68 0
II 116 0
III 121 1
IV 125 1
I 1955 117 1
II 121 1
III 115 0
IV 114 0
I 1956 105 0
II 94 0
III 113 0
IV 109 0
I 1957 100 1
II 100 1
III 100 0
IV 87 -1
I 1958 76 -1
II 89 -1
III 97 -1
IV 91 0
Total
Indep WAfr Ghana 
1769 156
1848 168
1881 169
1840 252
1933 253
2134 283
2144 309
1976 333
1838 329
1672 339
1552 350
1522 357
1625 351
1691 384
1768 399
1745 407
1808 400
1853 431
1886 462
1810 475
1845 488
1794 500
1760 510
1687 513
1714 507
1714 502
1599 472
1586 467
1576 452
1610 461
1617 460
1508 451
1432 274 160
1342 268 171
1338 268 174
1305 264 169
1344 259 167
I 1949
Malayat 
Borneo HK 
106 68 I 1949
BWI Malta 
68 47
I 1950 109 67 I 1950 72 46
II 111 81 II 75 47
III 136 92 III 77 46
IV 164 94 IV 78 47
I 1951 190 101 I 1951 79 47
II 226 112 II 79 47
III 257 121 III 79 46
IV 252 116 IV 81 47
I 1952 256 123 I 1952 84 47
II 260 125 II 87 48
III 278 122 III 92 49
IV 283 120 IV 91 51
I 1953 285 113 I 1953 95 52
II 289 121 II 105 53
III 286 122 III 113 53
IV 282 133 IV 107 54
I 1954 291 132 I 1954 115 55
II 295 128 II 121 56
III 308 134 III 123 57
IV 305 135 IV 123 56
I 1955 325 136 I 1955 129 59
II 332 153 II 135 61
III 351 135 III 124 60
IV 364 132 IV 119 60
I 1956 380 134 I 1956 127 62
II 311 125 II 118 55
III 322 135 III 116 55
IV 314 135 IV 111 55
I 1957 325 131 I 1957 118 57
II 312 135 II 130 57
III 305 126 III 134 59
IV 306 132 IV 125 60
I 1958 314 136 I 1958 126 61
II 313 143 II 129 63
III 318 144 III 124 63
IV 321 146 IV 125 63
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I 1949 673 2442 1693 4135 603 0.25
I 1950 693 2541 1664 4205 709 0.28
II ' 727 2608 1641 4249 865 0.33
III 860 2700 1544 4244 984 0.36
IV 905 2838 1590 4428 1179 0.42
I 1951 979 3113 1528 4641 1342 0.43
II 1071 3215 1640 4855 1381 0.43
III 1141 3117 1636 4753 1168 0.37
IV 1084 2922 1586 4508 834 0.29
I 1952 1107 2779 1488 4267 607 0.22
II 1148 2700 1409 4109 602 0.22
III 1192 2714 1338 4052 602 0.22
IV 1202 2827 1321 4148 659 0.23
I 1953 1245 2936 1288 4224 774 0.26
II 1286 3054 1284 4338 845 0.28
III 1307 3052 1304 4356 888 0.29
IV 1302 3110 894 4004 899 0.29
I 1954 1352 3205 1217 4422 959 0.30
II 1351 3237 1285 4522 1078 0.33
III 1384 3194 1280 4474 1036 0.32
IV 1394 3239 940 4179 986 0.30
I 1955 1419 3213 1380 4593 953 0.30
II 1458 3218 1311 4529 957 0.30
III 1446 3133 1265 4398 838 0.27
IV 1447 3161 884 4045 757 0.24
I 1956 1473 3187 1215 4402 813 0.26
II 1301 2900 1121 4021 852 0.29
III 1309 2895 1086 3981 831 0.29
IV 1286 2862 1228 4090 762 0.27
I 1957 1315 2925 1231 4156 789 0.27
II 1309 2926 1228 4154 850 0.29
III 1282 2790 1234 4024 661 0.24
IV 1270 2702 1213 3915 812 0.30
I 1958 1286 2628 1256 3884 989 0.38
II 1287 2625 1277 3902 1099 0.42
III 1276 2581 1321 3902 1114 0.43
IV 1280 2624 1349 3973 1096 0.42
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Chapter III. Sterling Area Trade Relations
The trade policy of the sterling area system was a 
central part of Britain’s management of the sterling area in 
the 1950s, By manipulating sterling area trade flows the UK 
hoped to ease the effects of the international dollar crisis, 
run down Britain's sterling liabilities in the least painful 
way and provide the UK with a surplus to support its 
traditional deficit with the non-sterling area (NSA), During 
the 1950s, however, these hopes were not realized. The 
international dollar crisis receded, although Britain's 
foreign exchange reserves remained low, and the British 
surplus with the RSA dwindled as the decade progressed. It 
did not prove possible to coordinate a longer term sterling 
area trade policy and the sterling area did not turn out to be 
a dependable market to offset declines in British 
competitiveness elsewhere. By the mid-1950s Britain's trade 
policy focused increasingly on her own problems and less on 
those of the sterling area as a whole.
In the early 1950s, Britain's efforts to balance sterling 
area trade with the rest of the world were based on the 
pursuit of a triangular balance between the UK, the rest of 
the sterling area (RSA) and the non-sterling area (NSA). In 
this way the UK could support a persistent trade deficit with 
the NSA through the sterling area system. In the 1930's, 
protectionism had weakened Britain's competitive edge in 
Europe and North America while, with the help of Imperial
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Preference, British exports were increasingly concentrated on 
what were to become sterling area markets. Excluding Canada, 
the rest of the Empire bought 34.5% of British exports in 1930 
and 41.5% in 19381. Increased imports from Europe, especially 
of manufactures, tended in turn to push Britain into deficit 
with more developed countries2. Given this pre-war pattern, 
sterling area trade with the rest of the world could be 
balanced in the post-war period if RSA members were able to 
earn an export surplus with the NSA and the UK earned a 
surplus with the RSA. The RSA surplus with the NSA would 
cover their deficit with the UK and hard currency would flow 
from the RSA to London to finance the UK deficit with the NSA.
For this pattern to work two requirements had to be met. 
First, there had to be a continuing strong demand for sterling 
area raw material exports in the NSA. The second requirement 
was that the RSA should satisfy their demand for manufactured 
imports by importing from the UK rather than the NSA. Close 
historical ties between the RSA and UK traders and the 
shortage of hard currency in the sterling area system to buy 
NSA exports combined to guarantee the second requirement 
immediately after the end of the war. Postwar reconstruction, 
followed by the Korean War boom sustained a high demand for 
sterling area raw material exports which satisfied the first
1D.H. Aldcroft and H.W. Richardson, The British Economy 1870- 
1939, Macmillan, 1969. p. 70.
2Ibid. p. 71.
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requirement. By 1955, however, the RSA fell into a trade 
deficit with the NSA and relied on gold sales to maintain the 
balance of payments surplus with the NSA. As the decade 
progressed British exports were not adequate in supply or 
quality to meet the import needs of the RSA. By the end of 
the 1950s the independent members of the sterling area were 
becoming less willing to pool what hard currency they earned 
or to continue to hold their claims on the central reserves in 
sterling3. As a result of these developments the UK was 
unable to sustain a coordinated trade policy with the RSA. 
Instead, the UK urged the RSA countries to adopt deflationary 
domestic policies to improve their balance of trade with the 
NSA.
This chapter will review the pattern of sterling area 
trade and the policy devised by British officials. The first 
section will show that the trade pattern of the sterling area 
was essentially a series of bilateral relationships between 
the UK and the various members of the RSA. The second section 
will establish that Imperial Preference was not a sterling 
area policy and therefore quantitative the use of import 
restrictions and demand management will be the focus of this 
analysis. The next five sections will review the imposition 
of import restrictions and their subsequent relaxation. The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of the costs of the 
sterling area to British export competitiveness.
3See Chapter II, The Sterling Balances Problem
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III.A. Was There a Sterling Area Trade System?
Table III.A. shows the pattern of trade between the UK,
the RSA and the NSA. These figures show that a complementary
triangular balancing system did not exist in the 1950's.
Table III.A.
The Balance of Trade of the UK and RSA
£m 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
JK
X to NSA 1238 1460 1500 1460 1490 1660 1950 2080 2000
M fr NSA 1434 2220 1710 1570 1680 2020 2090 2180 2060
Balance -196 -760 -210 -110 -190 -360 -140 -100 -60
X to RSA 1016 1280 1330 1210 1330 1410 1460 1460 1430
M fr RSA 956 1250 1240 1320 1330 1410 1370 1390 1280
Balance 60 30 90 -110 0 0 90 70 150
RSA
X to UK 956 1250 1240 1320 1330 1410 1370 1390 1280
M fr UK 1016 1280 1330 1210 1330 1410 1460 1460 1430
Balance -60 -30 -90 110 0 0 -90 -70 -150
X to NSA 1524 1990 1550 1440 1440 1630 1770 1940 1700
M fr NSA 1394 1780 1580 1320 1410 1700 1840 2090 2190
Balance 130 210 -30 120 30 -70 -70 -150 -490
:a
X to NSA 2762 3450 3050 2900 2930 3290 3720 4020 3700
M fr NSA 2828 4000 3290 2890 3090 3720 3930 4270 4250
Balance -66 -550 -240 10 -160 -430 -210 -250 -550
Notes: Exports (X) and Imports (M) f.o.b. RSA = sterling area 
other than UK. NSA = non-sterling area. Source: International 
Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook for 1951-58. UK 
Balance of Payments 1947-57. HMSO, 1959 and OEEC, Direction of 
International Trade. Area Summary, for 1950.
The UK did earn export surpluses with the sterling area in
every year after the war until 1953 and then again from 1956
to the end of the period. Even in those years in which the UK
was in surplus with the sterling area, however, this was not
enough to offset the UK trade deficit with the rest of the
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world except for 1958. Nor was the RSA balance with the rest 
of the world consistently healthy enough to pull the sterling 
area as a whole into balance. The RSA trade supluses with the 
NSA gradually diminished into deficits from 1955 onward.
UK Exports % To
RSA Do I lar Area OEEC
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Figure III.A.
Figures III.A. and III.B. show British trade with the 
RSA, the Dollar Area and non-sterling OEEC as proportions of 
total British trade. The percentage of exports directed at 
the sterling area was somewhat higher than imports from the 
area but both followed a generally declining trend through the 
period except for slight revivals in 1953-55. Exports to the
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UK Imports % From
RSA Do I lar Area OEEC
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Figure III.B.
dollar area grew from 12.6% to 17.5% of total exports while 
the export share of the OEEC was more stable arriving at 24% 
by 1958. In 1954-5 when exports to the dollar area fell due 
to the American recession it was the sterling area which was 
the fastest growing substitute market rather than Europe. By 
1958 the sterling area was still the UK's greatest market 
group absorbing over 45% of British exports.
The story for the UK's imports is slightly different. 
The dollar area was a greater source of imports than it was a 
market for exports and the sterling area took a smaller role
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as a result. Still, dollar area exports took up only about 
20% of the UK's import bill while the raw material exports of 
the sterling area took up about 40%. Non-sterling OEEC 
accounted for about 21% of Britain's imports.
It is commonly noted in support of the contention that 
complementary trade was a fundamental feature of the sterling 
area system, that sterling area members conducted half of 
their trade with eachother. Figures III.A. and B. verify 
this for the UK. Table III.B. shows trade with the sterling
Table III.B.
Trade of Members of the Sterling Area with Other 
Members as a Percent of Total Exports and Imports
0%-34% 35%-45% 46%-55% 56%-65% 65%+
Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp_____Exp Imp
Icel Icel
Iraq Iraq
Pak Pak
India India
Col Col
Austr Austr
Ceylon Ceylon
S. Afr S. Afr
Burma Burma
Irel Irel 
N.Z. N.Z.
H.K. H.K.
Malaya Malaya
Gld Cst Gld Cst
Nigeria Nig. 
Rhod Rhod
Source: Direction of International Trade. OEEC. Percentages 
are averages for the period 1950-58.
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area as a proportion of total trade for the Colonies and for 
ten independent members of the sterling area4. What is 
immediately obvious from this table is that the sterling area 
played a varying role in the trade of sterling area members. 
The peripheral independent members, Iceland and Iraq, 
conducted the least of their trade with other sterling area
members. The Colonies of Malaya and Singapore and Hong Kong
also fall into the lowest category of trade with the sterling 
area. Their trade was more aligned to Far Eastern markets 
than to the sterling area. India and Pakistan also fall into 
a category of lower intra-area trade than most sterling area 
members. For India, German and American imports were 
important, together accounting for 30% of India*s total 
imports by 1958. Indian exports, however, were more focussed 
on sterling area markets, averaging 53% p.a. of total exports 
over the eleven years shown. For Pakistan, the sterling area 
played a smaller role for both imports and exports and both 
averages for the period fell below 40% p.a..
For the rest of the members, trade with the sterling area 
took up at least 45% of their total world trade. South
African imports from and exports to other sterling area
members hovered around 50% of total. For Australia and 
Ceylon, imports from the rest of the sterling area pushed 
above 60% p.a. on average for the period. Sterling area trade 
figured especially prominently in Burma, Ireland and New
4The excluded independent members are Libya and Jordan.
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Zealand. The outstanding examples were Irish exports to the 
sterling area which averaged 86% of total exports p.a. and New 
Zealand imports from the area which accounted for 76% for her 
total imports p.a. on average. The three largest African 
Colonies also fall into the higher categories of trade 
concentrated in the sterling area. The Colonies in total 
conducted about half of their trade with other members of the 
sterling area (including inter-colonial trade). The five 
Colonies figuring individually in Table III.B., however, 
attest to the wide variation among Colonies.
The conclusion from Table III.B. is that while the 
sterling area as a whole conducted the bulk of its trade with 
fellow members of the system, there was a fairly wide 
variation in the strength of these trade ties for individual 
members.
Table III.C shows that behind the high figures for intra­
area trade there was a strong bilateral pattern between the UK 
and the individual members of the sterling area. Rather than 
generating trade among members, the sterling area system 
reinforced the dependence of the RSA on trade with Britain. 
Iceland and Ireland, among the independent members of the 
system, did not participate in trade with the sterling area 
outside the UK hardly at all. Ninety-nine percent of Irish 
exports to the sterling area represented trade with the UK. 
The same percentage of Icelandic imports from the area during
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this period were from the UK. The preponderance of the UK in
Icelandic exports and Irish imports is somewhat less, 81.3%
Table III.C.
Trade of RSA with UK as a Percentage of 
Total Intra-Area Trade
0%—45% 46%—55% 56%-65% 66%-75% 75%+
Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp
Burma Burma
Ceylon Ceylon
India India
Pakis Pakis
Colon Colon
S. Afr S. Afr
Austr Austr
N.Z. N.Z.
Iraq Iraq
Irel Irel 
Icel Icel
H.K. H.K.
Malaya Malaya
Rhod Rhod
Niger Niger 
G.Cst G.Cst
Source: Direction of International Trade. OEEC. Percentages 
are averages over 1950-58.
and 86.1% respectively. Non-UK sterling area imports into 
Ireland were mainly from Australia and India. Icelandic 
exports to the RSA went mainly to British Africa during the 
second half of the 1950's. More than 75% of South African 
imports from the sterling area came from the UK while only 57% 
of her exports to the area were destined for the UK. This 
divergence between export and import markets was primarily due 
to the relatively large amount of South African exports to 
neighbouring African territories. Rhodesia and Nyasaland was 
South Africa's primary African market, absorbing 15% of total 
exports in 1955-58 or 31% of exports to the sterling area,
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while the sterling Colonies in the Northwest and Northeast of 
Africa took almost no imports from South Africa. The non­
sterling Colonies of Mozambique and the Belgian Congo were the 
next two largest African markets for South African exports. 
Only 12% of South African exports to the sterling area went to 
members other than the UK and Rhodesia and Nyasaland. To the 
extent that Rhodesia and Nyasaland can be considered a natural 
regional trading partner of South Africa, South Africa's 
intra-area trade outside the UK may be attributed more to a 
regional African pattern of trade than as evidence of a 
genuine sterling area system of trade. The half of South 
Africa's trade that occured outside the sterling area was 
fairly evenly divided between the USA and non-sterling OEEC, 
with the USA as the major source of imports and the non­
sterling OEEC as the major export market outside the UK.
The bilateral relationship between the UK and individual 
members of the sterling area system was strong also for New 
Zealand and to a lesser extent for Australia and Iraq. About 
93% of New Zealand exports to the sterling area went to the UK 
and an average of 70% of the rest went to other members in 
Oceana, primarily Australia. 72% of New Zealand sterling area 
imports came from the UK. The rest came primarily from 
Australia and to a lesser extent from sterling Asian 
countries. For New Zealand, then, the large figures for 
intra-area trade shown in Table III.B. were also based on a 
bilateral relationship with the UK, combined with a naturally
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close relationship with Australia. Australian trade was less 
concentrated in the UK than was the case for New Zealand but 
the UK still absorbed two thirds of Australian exports to the 
sterling area and only slightly less of her sterling area 
imports. Australian other sterling markets for exports and 
imports were in sterling Asia5, especially Ceylon, Malaya and 
India as well as New Zealand. Australia's largest export 
markets after the UK were Japan and France, neither of whom 
were members of the sterling area6.
Until 1957 Iraq's exports to the UK comprised 80% of its 
total exports to the sterling area. In 1957 exports to Aden, 
a sterling area Middle Eastern dependency, expanded to over 
one third of Iraq's exports to the sterling area. Slightly 
less of Iraq's imports from the sterling area came from the 
UK, the other import markets in the area being Ceylon and 
India. Still, sterling area imports other than from the UK 
represent less than 12% of Iraq's imports during the period. 
Her main sources of supply other than the UK were the USA, 
Germany and Japan which together accounted for one third of 
Iraq's total imports by 1958. Iraq's trade ties to sterling 
countries other than the UK, then, seem weak except for 
exports to Aden, a natural regional trading partner.
5Sterling Asia includes India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma as 
well as the Asian colonies, such as Hong Kong and Malaya and 
Singapore.
6Together Japan and France absorbed 15-20% of Australian 
exports between 1951-58.
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The Asian sterling countries, Pakistan, India, Ceylon and 
Burma all appear in the left half of Table III.C., with larger 
proportions of their sterling area trade going to countries 
other than the UK. Hong Kong and Malaya and Singapore, the 
two Asian Colonies presented individually in the table, also 
follow this pattern. For the most part this was due to a 
large proportion of Intra-Asian trade. Close to 80% of 
Burmese exports were destined to sterling Asia. In the same 
period close to half of Burmese sterling imports came from the 
UK and almost all the rest were from sterling Asia. The UK 
and sterling Asia together accounted for almost 90% of 
Pakistan exports to the sterling area and 90% of sterling area 
imports.
Ceylon trade followed a slightly different pattern than 
was the case for Burma or Pakistan. A larger proportion of 
sterling area exports went to the UK than for any of the other 
Asian members (55%), while only 9.5% of her sterling area 
exports went to other Asian members. For imports, however, 
Ceylon had a much weaker relationship to the UK with only 25% 
of sterling area imports coming from the UK. The pattern of 
bilateralism with the UK combined with regional trade within 
Asia is therefore evident for 75% of Ceylon's imports but only 
65% of her exports. Ceylon's other major sterling exports 
were tea to Australia and South Africa. Together these two 
countries absorbed 15%-25% of Ceylon's exports to the sterling 
area. Since the sterling area produced 75-80% of the world's
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tea7 it is unlikely that trade in this commodity was generated 
by the existence of the sterling area system. This trade 
would probably have occurred even in the absence of the common 
monetary basis of the trading partners. While Ceylon's export 
trade appears to be diversified among sterling area members, 
this was due primarily to product specialisation. It is 
possible, of course, that if Australia and South Africa had 
been forced to pay hard currency for Ceylonese tea they would 
have restricted their imports.
About half of India's sterling area exports and imports 
represent trade with the UK. Of the rest of its sterling area 
trade, about half again was with sterling Asian countries. 
The remaining 25% of India's trade with the sterling area was 
divided among Australia, the Persian Gulf and Kenya. 
Australian exports to India were mainly wool and wheat in 
exchange for Indian cotton goods and tea. The Persian Gulf 
dependencies figured prominently in India's trade figures 
because they supplied India's petroleum needs. Kenya exported 
raw cotton, plant dyes and sodium carbonate in exchange for 
Indian finished cotton and jute products.
In summary, this analysis of the general pattern of 
intra-area trade shows the strong domination of the UK both as 
an export market and as a source of imports for all the non- 
Asian members. The non-UK trade of the non-Asian members of
7The Commonwealth and the Sterling Area Statistical Abstract. 
London, HMSO.
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the RSA was predominantly with their sterling neighbours eg. 
Australia and New Zealand, Iraq and Aden, South Africa and 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For the Asian members, the UK figures 
somewhat less prominently due primarily to a large intra-Asian 
trade but they generally fall into the same pattern as other 
RSA countries, combining a bilateral relationship with the UK 
with regional trade.
The sterling area system seems to have reinforced 
members' trade relationships with the UK and perhaps
strengthened regional trade with partners who also happened to 
be sterling area members rather than generating a genuine 
intra-sterling area trade network. This is perhaps not 
surprising given the size of the British economy relative to 
the individual members of the RSA, the scarcity of
manufactured goods in the RSA and the need for sterling area 
raw materials in the UK. This pattern is consistent with the 
basis of the triangular balance described at the beginning of 
this chapter as the goal of British sterling area trade policy 
in the early 1950's. This triangular pattern involved a 
complementary exchange of manufactured goods for raw materials 
between the UK and the RSA on the one side and the trade of 
the UK and RSA with the non-sterling world on the other.
III.B. Imperial Preference v. Discriminatory Import 
Restrictions
There were two major strands of policy affecting sterling
area trade during the 1950s. The first was Imperial
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Preference as arranged under the Ottawa agreements of 1932. 
The second was quantitative restrictions against dollar and 
other non-sterling imports coordinated by sterling area
i
members during the early 1950*s. It will be argued in this 
section that Imperial Preference was not a sterling area 
policy nor an essential part of the sterling area system. 
Quantitative import restrictions, in contrast, were operated 
as a uniquely sterling area instrument designed specifically 
as an integral element of the sterling area.
Certainly the economic policy of the Commonwealth 
overlapped with sterling area policy, just as the political 
motives for the sterling area overlapped with the political 
importance of the Commonwealth. Imperial Preference was 
designed not only to encourage mutual trade and to 
discriminate against non-Empire countries but also to 
strengthen the political ties of the Commonwealth. In turn, 
the sterling area system was arguably a vital part of 
Britain's efforts to solidify the Commonwealth through the 
1950s. While Imperial Preference overlapped with the sterling 
area system both as regards economic purpose and geography, 
however, there are several reasons why it should not be 
considered a tool of sterling area policy.
Imperial Preference emerged from the Ottawa Commonwealth 
Conference of 1932 as a system to foster trade among 
Commonwealth countries and the Empire. Under a series of 
agreements, Commonwealth countries agreed to impose lower
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tariffs against eachothers* goods than those imposed against 
imports from the rest of the world. The Ottawa agreements 
excluded what were then members of the sterling monetary 
system (the Sterling Bloc) such as Portugal and Scandinavia 
and included all members of the Commonwealth including Canada. 
At its inception, then, Imperial Preference was deliberately 
not part of the prevailing sterling monetary system, but 
rather part of the political union of the Commonwealth.
The system of Imperial Preference persisted through the 
1950s and excluded all non-Commonwealth members of the new 
sterling area except Ireland, which had a special status 
because of the close integration of the Irish economy with the 
British economy. The tariff preferences also included Canada 
which was then part of the dollar area, while the dollar was 
discriminated against by the sterling area as a whole. The 
geographical coverage of Imperial Preference thus differed 
from that of the sterling area in such a way as to bring the 
aims of this policy into conflict with the aims of the 
sterling area system.
The rules of the postwar sterling area system were 
designed to support sterling as both a trading and reserve 
currency in the presence of the postwar dollar shortage. This 
was the basis of the willingness of members to impose common 
exchange restrictions against the non-sterling world 
(including Canada), to pool their foreign exchange reserves 
and to maintain sterling balances-. The imposition of
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quantitative restrictions on non-sterling imports by the 
sterling area was based on the same general principles as the 
rest of sterling area policy. Quantitative restrictions were 
imposed on dollar imports by almost all members of the 
sterling area in concert in the early 1950s to preserve the 
foreign exchange reserves of the area as a whole while 
Imperial tariff preference continued to be offered in theory 
to imports from Canada. As late as 1956, only India and 
Pakistan did not offer preference to Canadian exports8. In 
fact, however, quantitative import restrictions, and the 
necessities of the sterling area system that they reflected, 
over-ruled Imperial Preference in the case of Canada. These 
import controls, which amounted in many cases to a virtual 
prohibition of dollar imports, also played a larger and more 
direct role in diverting trade from outside the sterling area 
to trade among its members in the 1950s than did the tariff 
margins of Imperial Preference. In its 1953 report on the 
sterling area, the Bank for International Settlements asserted 
that "trade quotas and foreign exchange restrictions are now 
of considerably greater importance than differential tariff 
rates"9.
It might be argued that Imperial Preference continued to 
be important to members of the Commonwealth who were also
Economist Intelligence Unit, The Commonwealth and Europe.
EIU, London, 1960. p. 17.
9Bank for International Settlements, The Sterling Area. Basle,
1953. p.
members of the sterling area. Indeed, the largest traders of 
the sterling area were also privy to Imperial Preference and, 
therefore, it might be assumed that Imperial Preference, while 
not a sterling area policy, still may have had an important 
impact on sterling area trade. In fact the effectiveness of 
Imperial Preference had been deeply eroded by the 1950s. Most 
of the preference offered by the UK had been based on specific 
duties of X shillings per volume of a particular import. 
Between 1932 and the 1950s inflation had therefore eroded much 
of the benefit that overseas Commonwealth exporters enjoyed in 
the British market10. This effect was increased by changes 
in the pattern of trade away from imports on which preference 
was given and an increase in trade on non-preferential goods 
such as raw materials. By 1953 the average preference margin 
on trade between the UK and the Commonwealth imports and 
exports was only 5-6%11. The actual rate of preference on 
individual items was higher of course since only about half of 
Commonwealth trade was covered by Imperial Preference by this 
time12. While preference may still have been important for 
particular items or industries, therefore, there was probably
10In 1957-8 Australia and New Zealand, whose exports to the UK 
had been particularly pinched by inflation eroding UK preference 
margins, negotiated trade agreements with the UK allowing a 
reduction of ad valorum preferences offered to imports from the UK.
11D. MacDougall and R. Hutt, "Imperial Preference: A 
Quantitative Analysis”, Economic Journal. No. 254, Vol LXIV, June
1954, pp. 233-257. p. 256.
12 Ibid.
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little aggregate effect on Commonwealth or sterling area 
trade.
While Imperial Preference was not completely separable 
from the sterling area, it was essentially not a sterling area 
instrument. Furthermore, in the 1950s the impact of this 
tariff system on sterling area trade was eroded by inflation 
and changes in international tariff policy and swamped by 
sterling area quantitative import restrictions. An analysis 
of sterling area trade policy in the 1950s therefore must 
concentrate on the imposition and effects of the quantitative 
restrictions and other measures rather than on the 
preferential tariff policy left over from the 1930*s.
III.C. The Sterling Area Quantitative Restrictions: 1949-52
The system of quantitative import restrictions devised by 
the British and copied in the rest of the sterling area 
involved discrimination in varying degrees against non­
sterling imports for the purpose of conserving the central 
foreign exchange reserves of the area. As a consequence of 
this discrimination, the restrictions encouraged the RSA to 
satisfy their import needs within the sterling area. As was 
shown earlier, however, the primary relationship of almost all 
sterling area members was with the UK so encouragement of 
intra-area trade meant encouraging UK exports to the RSA. In 
the context of the triangular pattern described at the 
beginning of this chapter, discriminatory import restrictions
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encouraged RSA trade deficits with the UK and inhibited RSA 
deficits with the NSA. On the other side of the triangle the 
UK would find it easier to run surpluses in the protected 
markets of the RSA while decreasing her deficit with the NSA 
to generate an overall balance. In the event, the sterling 
area import restrictions proved insufficient to achieve this 
balance. This section will outline the operation of this 
policy and the causes of its failure.
Import controls on private trade in the UK were 
administered through a licensing system established during the 
war. Importers were granted licences which determined both 
the amount of a particular good which could be imported as 
well as the allowable areas of consignment. There were four 
main categories of license, Open General License (OGL), Open 
Individual License (OIL) , Specific License and Global License. 
OGLs allowed imports of a specific good by any importer up to 
any value. The only limitation under this category was the 
area of consignment. OILs were issued to individual traders 
usually for six months for specific goods with no quantitative 
restriction but they were also subject to discrimination by 
the origin of the good. Specific or Individual licenses were 
akin to OILs except restrictions were placed on the amount of 
the good imported as well as area of consignment. Global 
licences had no restrictions whatsoever.
Most independent members of the sterling area operated a 
licensing system similar to the UK. New Zealand, in addition
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to quantitative restrictions, also controlled all imports 
through an Exchange Allocation scheme13. Pakistan
supplemented its quota system by controlling the extension of 
trade credit for all imports except a few essentials14. 
After 1954 Ceylon discriminated, not only in favour of soft 
currency imports, but also in favour of native Ceylonese 
importers as against foreign firms operating in Ceylon15.
Table III.D.
Colonial Dollar Allocations and Actual Expenditure
$m
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Dollar Allocation 346 216 157 192 209 179 166
Total Imports 337 241 128 169 197 168 216
Notes: Figures are cif and exclude oil imports and imports of
machinery by oil companies. Source, PRO BT241/332.
The Colonies were given annual foreign exchange
allocations decided by the UK after reviewing each colony's 
needs for the coming year. The dollar allocations and actual 
expenditure for 1948-54 are presented in Table III.D. where it 
will be noted that the Colonies underspent their allocations 
in five out of seven years.
13Commonwealth Economic Conference Preparatory Meeting of 
Officials, Report on the Short Term Balance of Payments Outlook, 
Appendix II, 11 October, 1952. PRO T236/3295.
u Ibid.
15C.E. Thurogood, UK Trade Commissioner in Ceylon, Overseas 
Economic Surveys: Economic and Commercial Conditions in Cevlon. 
HMSO, London, 1955. p. 15.
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Ill.C.i. Quantitative Restrictions 1949-50
The coordination of sterling area import controls which 
set the tone for the early 1950s began at the Commonwealth 
Economic Conference of July 1949. At the beginning of July 
1949, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, 
had sent messages to all the sterling area finance ministers 
and Colonial governors which outlined his belief that sterling 
area dollar imports in 1949-50 would have to be cut by 25% 
from their 1948 value or from $2,185m to $l640m16. The 
Chancellor therefore asked, without prejudice to the outcome 
of the upcoming conference, that the finance ministers should 
be prepared to submit estimates of dollar earnings and 
expenditure for the coming year bearing in mind the British 
stimates of possible sterling area dollar expenditure17. Two 
days later, the Chancellor announced that the moratorium on 
British dollar imports begun in June would be continued for at 
least three more months18.
On 9 July 1949, the Economic Policy Committee of the 
Cabinet approved a Treasury paper on the British objectives 
for the conference which proposed a new approach to the
16Telegram from CRO to UK High Commissioners in Commonwealth, 
31 June, 1949. Telegrams to the Colonies were sent on 4 July, 1949 
to the same effect. PRO T236/1868.
17Ibid.
18Telegram from CRO to Commonwealth High Commissioners 5 July, 
1949. PRO T236/1868.
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sterling area balance of payments problem19. Under the plan, 
the sterling Commonwealth would agree on the total sterling 
area dollar imports possible, allowing for estimated earnings 
and overseas aid and then negotiate dollar import programmes 
within this limit. This sterling area dollar programme, the 
paper suggested, should then be under continuous subsequent 
review to allow for changes in the state of the international 
economy. The new multilateral approach, it was suggested, 
"should certainly minimise the chances of any individual 
country getting away with dollar expenditure which the 
sterling area as a whole cannot afford"20. The policy paper 
went on to suggest that any member unwilling to go along with 
such a reccomendation might be threatened with banishment from 
the sterling area and a consequent withdrawl of the right of 
convertibility of their sterling balances. This last threat 
was especially directed toward India who, it was thought, 
might resist such an infringement on her sovereignty21.
Facing an escalating dollar drain in the middle of July 
1949 while the Commonwealth finance ministers were meeting in 
London, Sir Stafford Cripps led the way by announcing a cut of 
25% on the 1948 value of British dollar imports, which 
amounted to a cut of some $400m. A few days later, the
19Economic Policy Committee Paper, 9 July 1949. PRO T236/1868.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
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Conference of Commonwealth Finance Ministers then meeting in
London issued a joint communique stating that
immediate steps necessary to check the continuing 
heavy drain on the central reserve of the sterling 
area were discussed, and the Ministers concerned 
agreed to recommend to their Governments action 
comparable in its results to that already decided 
upon by the United Kingdom22,
The sterling area finance ministers dutifully went home 
with this undertaking and British precedent behind them and 
suspended almost all licences for dollar imports. In the 
third quarter of 1949 sterling area imports from the USA fell 
$148m and a further $28m to the end of the year. This 
coordinated import policy was too little too late for the 
immediate crisis, however, and in September sterling was 
devalued to $2.80/£.
In April 1950 the Chancellor of the Exchequer commended 
the efforts of other sterling area countries to restrict 
dollar imports in 1949-50 in a telegram which concluded that 
"the reductions in dollar expenditure have played a highly 
significant part in the recent improvements in our dollar 
position. If we are to pull through we must continue to act 
together in this way"23. The way was thus set for the 
restrictions to be continued, even though the sterling area 
trade deficit with the USA had fallen to $22m in the first
22The Economist. July 23, 1949. p. 204.
23Telegram Chancellor of the Exchequer to Commonwealth finance 
ministers, 3 April 1950. PRO T236/3166.
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quarter of 1950 from $159m in the first quarter of 194924.
There followed telegram replies from the sterling area finance
ministers pledging their countries' willingness to continue
the measures adopted in July 1949 through to June 1951. The
Indian Finance Minister's reply was initially reluctant,
pointing out that "the continued limitation of dollar
purchases after June 1950 will cause further strain on the
Indian Economy" but he concluded that
nevertheless in the common interest of the general 
sterling area position we are prepared to fall into 
line with other commonwealth countries and to limit 
our total dollar expenditure on dollar imports 
during the year July 1950 to June 1951 to the 
maximum of 75% by value of our expenditure during 
the calendar year 194825.
The 25% reduction in sterling area dollar imports agreed 
in 1949 was, in the end, achieved through 1950. In fact, 
American trade figures record that sterling area imports from 
the USA in 1950 were only 63% of their 1948 value26. Table 
III.E. shows the percentage changes in imports from the USA 
and Canada for most sterling area countries.
The experience of individual members varied quite widely 
although dollar imports fell for most members. Particularly
24A.K. Cairncross, Years of Recovery? British Economic Policy 
1945-51. Methuen, 1985. p. 204.
telegram from Indian finance minister C.D. Deshmukh to 
Commonwealth Relations Office, 6 April, 1950. PRO T236/3166.
26Pirection of International Trade. OEEC. December, 1950.
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Table III.E.
Sterling Area Imports from the USA and Canada
$m
Member 1948 1950 % Change
India 340 235 -31
Pakistan 26 35 +35
Ceylon 26 12 -54
Australia 172 150 -13
New Zealand 71 42 -41
South Africa 582 174 -70
Burma 7 3 -52
Iceland 16 8 -50
Eire 57 75 +31
Colonies 379 242 -36
United Kingdom 1616 1095 -32
Total of Above 3292 1996 -39
Source: Direction of International Trade Statistics. OEEC.
striking is South Africa*s drop of 70% over the 1948 value. 
This is in part influenced by the abnormally high level of 
dollar imports in 1948 although the drop in 1950 over 1949 was 
still 54%. The figure for Pakistan is in turn affected by a 
very low level of American imports in 1948. The value of 
imports in 1950 was 19% lower than the 1949 value. Pakistan 
did not devalue its currency with the rest of the sterling 
area in 1949 which also affected dollar imports. Ireland was 
a direct recipient of ERP aid so its dollar expenditure did 
not directly affect the central reserves and its imports were 
not subject to the same restrictions as the rest of the 
sterling area in 1950.
Overall, the drop in dollar imports from 1948 to 1950 is 
impressive indeed, but the question for the present purpose is 
the extent to which this drop was due to the sterling area
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import controls of 1949-50. First, 1950 was a bad year in 
general for American exports. A quantum index with 1948 as 
the base year shows that the volume of North American exports 
fell from an index of 100 in 1948 to 90 in 195027. The 
corresponding dollar price index shows that North American 
export prices fell from 100 in 1948 to 92 in 1950. The fall 
in the value of North American exports was, thus, fairly 
evenly distributed between price and volume. The fall in 
American export prices was due to the general fall in the 
price of manufactured goods, which were the predominant 
exports from the USA to the sterling area. Table III.F. shows 
that between 1948 and 1950 the terms of trade moved against 
the developed world and in favour of underdeveloped areas such 
as the RSA due both to increases in the price level of raw 
materials and decreases in the price of manufactures28. To 
some extent the fall in the price of American exports may have 
been affected by falling demand due to sterling area 
restrictions but it is more likely that sterling area policy 
coincided with a particularly cooperative international price 
pattern to reduce the value of dollar imports.
The other major influence in 1949, of course, was the
27The quantum and price indexes used in the following analysis
are from Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 1952. United 
Nations, New York, 1953 unless otherwise stated. They reflect 
prices in terms of dollars.
28ibid.
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Table III.F.
Terms of Trade Index 1953=100
Region 1938 1948 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Developed
107 101 98 94 97 100 98 98 99 98 102
Undeveloped
75 90 106 112 100 100 106 105 102 98 98
Stlg Area 93 95 104 103 96 100 101 100 98 97 98
RSA 80 91 111 117 99 100 102 101 97 95 91
Aus/NZ/SAfr
80 91 118 116 90 100 94 89 88 88 74
Stlg Asia 83 93 110 124 107 100 103 107 102 98 100
Notes: RSA is non-European sterling area and so excludes Eire
and Iceland. Prices are in terms of US Dollars. Source.
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 1959. United
Nations, New York, 1960.
devaluation in September of sterling and all other RSA 
currencies except the Pakistan Rupee. This 30% devaluation 
had the effect of making dollar imports more expensive for 
sterling area importers which would no doubt have made a 
significant contribution to a reduction in dollar imports even 
in the absence of the sterling area controls. It is
interesting to note that Pakistan, which did not devalue in 
1949 increased its imports of American goods in 1950 over 
1948.
The conclusion for the 1949 restrictions, then, is that 
price movements in terms of dollars accounted for about half 
of the fall in American exports to the world and that the 
sterling devaluation no doubt accounted for much of the rest 
of the decline in the value of imports from the dollar area 
1948 and 1950. The quantitative restrictions thus appeared to 
have been overwhelmingly successful because they coincided
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with these other favourable changes in the international 
economy.
In most cases there was some diversion of RSA trade of 
which the UK was the primary beneficiary. UK exports to the 
sterling area increased by 35% or £263m between 1948 and 1950 
which accounts for most of the drop in RSA imports from the 
USA. Only in Pakistan, Australia and to a lesser extent in 
some Colonies did some of the foregone imports from the dollar 
area express themselves in an increase in imports from the 
non-sterling OEEC. For the rest, imports in 1950 fell 
absolutely from their 1948 level.
Ill.C.ii. The Korean War Boom 1950-51
Three months after the second sterling area resolution to 
reduce dollar imports the Korean War erupted, generating a 
dramatic increase in the world demand for raw materials for 
re-armament. Sterling area exporters of such war materials as 
tin, jute, rubber and wool, in particular, benefitted. The 
price indexes of selected commodities are presented in Figure 
III.e. In 1950, the sterling area produced about 35% of the 
world*s tin, 99% of the world's raw jute, 50% of the world's 
rubber and 58% of the world's wool29. These were all raw 
materials for which the USA was a net importer. In 1950, the 
RSA together exported 40% of world exports of tin, 100% of 
world exports of jute, 60% of world exports of rubber and 70%
29The Commonwealth and the Sterling Area Statistical Abstract 
no. 74, 1950-53, London, HMSO, 1955.
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Figure III.C.
of world exports of wool30. As a result of rising prices and 
volumes, the value of sterling area exports to the NSA as a 
whole increased by 52% or almost £1 billion during 1950. Of 
this increase one third was to the dollar area, 38% was to the 
OEEC and the rest to other non-sterling countries31.
Here was the first postwar opportunity to achieve the 
triangular balance sought by the British if the RSA imports
30Ibld.
31Ibid.
from the non-sterling area could be restrained. The RSA 
earned sizeable surpluses with the NSA and was able to 
contribute substantial foreign exchange to the central 
reserves to offset the British deficit with the NSA. This 
surge in export earnings by the RSA, however, inevitably had 
a deteriorating influence on the willingness of the RSA to 
restrict their non-sterling imports. At a meeting near the 
end of September 1950, the sterling Commonwealth finance 
ministers reviewed the sterling area import restrictions in 
the context of the changed balance of payments situation. 
Before the meeting convened, Mr. Ninmo, a member of the 
Australian delegation, warned M.T. Flett of the Treasury that 
the Australian delegation had been instructed that in the 
interests of introducing greater flexibility into the 
Australian import programme, the Australians were not to take 
part in any dollar import agreements that specified cuts using 
a percentage formula similar to that agreed in July 194932. 
It seemed to Flett that the Australians might accept a 
gentlemen*s agreement1 regarding import restrictions33 but 
he had to report the next day to Mr. Ninmo that the 
Chancellor, Hugh Gaitskell, was not ready to abandon a 
percentage formula34. Another obstacle was that inflation
32Note from M.T. Flett to H. Wilson Smith, 18 September, 1950. 
PRO T236/2757.
33Ibid.
34Note by M.T. Flett, 19 September, 1950. PRO T236/2757.
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had made it more difficult for members to hold their imports 
to 75% of the 1948 value. As a result, the' meeting of 
Commonwealth Ministers was at first unable to agree to a 
public statement on dollar import restrictions. They were 
agreed only on two general points. These were the need to 
increase the sterling area's reserves and that the measures 
taken in July 1949 had been important in improving the 
sterling area's position35.
Three alternative formulas for a commitment on dollar 
imports were devised by the UK and presented to the RSA. 
These were first to continue to limit dollar imports to 75% of 
the 1948 value with additions for exceptional stockpiling 
needs, secondly to limit dollar imports by a percentage less 
than 25% to allow for price increases or thirdly to make a 
more vague statement that dollar imports should be limited to 
essentials on a basis no less stringent than the 1949 
policy36. The first option was unacceptable to most 
delegates because of inflation as well as the need for re­
stocking and the second option was supported only by India and 
Pakistan who wanted an explicit ceiling on dollar expenditure 
to impose discipline on their own Departmental spending. The 
third option would have satisfied Ceylon and New Zealand but 
it was rejected by Australia because of its reference to the
35Note of Meeting of Commonwealth Ministers on General Economic 
and Trade Questions: Dollar Import Policy, 20 September, 1950. PRO 
T236/2757.
36Ibid.
1949 policy. The final communique of the meeting was, 
therefore, very much less specific, stating only that the 
members were
agreed on the need to persevere with measures 
designed to increase the dollar earnings of the 
sterling area, whether by exports or by the 
provision of dollar-earning services. The
Ministers of the sterling area countries agreed 
upon the need to maintain strict economy in dollar 
expenditure37.
Hugh Gaitskell continued to hope that a more concrete
undertaking could be negotiated after the conference was
finished38 but by the end of October he was forced to report
to the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet that
It will be seen, therefore, that we have failed to 
secure anything approaching the sort of formula 
which my colleagues authorised me to aim at and 
that the agreement that eventually emerged is weak 
enough to permit a really substantial upswing on 
dollar expenditure by the independent sterling
In the event, the Chancellor's fears were realised as RSA 
imports from the dollar area increased significantly through 
1951, especially for those members who benefitted from the 
Korean War boom. Table III.G. shows the growth in exports to 
the USA from Australia, India, Malaya and Singapore and 
Pakistan from 1948-52. These four sterling area members were 
major benificiaries of the raw material boom of 1950-51.
37Communique, 22 September, 1950. PRO T236/2757.
38Letters from H. Gaitskell to C.D. Deshmukh, Mr. Jayawardena, 
Mr. Doidge (N.Z.), 4 October, 1950. PRO T236/2757.
39Report by Chancellor of the Exchequer for Economic Policy 
Committee, 25 October, 1950. PRO T236/2757.
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Table III.G.
Comparison of Half-Yearly Trade With USA
% % 
$m 1948 1949 1/2 1950 1/2 1951 chge 1/2 1952 chge
Australia
M 132.9 150.4 62.5 80.0 28% 152.0 90%
X 122.6 96.9 69.4 261.0 276% 91.4 -65%
India
M 328.7 284.1 101.1 164.1 62% 453.4 176%
X 217.2 197.8 94.6 166.7 76% 136.4 -18%
Malaya
M 98.3 49.3 12.3 28.8 134% 36.7 27%
X 215.4 181.4 112.2 240.2 114% 123.4 -49%
Pakistan
M 24.0 38.5 14.0 15.3 9% 26.0 70%
X 48.1 40.1 21.2 26.6 25% 11.9 -55%
St. Area
M 2003.1 1863.5 667.4 896.7 34% 1142.3 27%
X 1385.0 1155.5 688.5 1250.5 82% 1029.9 -18%
UK M 743.2 821.8 291.9 438.0 50% 564.0 29%
X 285.9 224.6 130.0 227.3 75% 265.1 17%
2/2 1950 2/2 1951 % 2/2 1952 %
Australia M 55.9 91.3 63% 98.1 7%
X 75.0 81.8 9% 66.1 -19%
India M 110.5 251.5 128% 127.4 -49%
X 119.8 116.1 -3% 116.4 0%
Malaya M 16.7 43.7 162% 23.0 -47%
X 230.2 166.1 -28% 91.1 -45%
Pakistan M 18.9 6.1 -68% 10.5 72%
X 22.7 3.5 -85% 10.4 197%
UK M 300.4 629.2 109% 330.2 -48%
X 227.1 202.6 -11% 235.7 16%
St. Area M 602.9 1306.9 117% 715.3 -45%
X 912.8 927.7 2% 831.7 -10%
Source: Direction of International Trade. OEEC •
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Australia exported 66% of sterling area exports of wool and 
India accounted for 76% of the area's cotton exports40. 
Malaya and Singapore provided for 88% of the 
sterling area tin exports and 83% of the area's natural rubber 
exports41. Pakistan exported most of the raw jute in the 
sterling area42. These five commodities alone rose from one 
quarter of RSA total exports in 1949 to one third in 1950 and 
37% in 195143.
Table III.G. also shows the acceleration of dollar imports 
for these countries and the sterling area as a whole during 
1951 and the first half of 1952. In the first half of 1951, 
exports were still rising faster than imports for all four 
countries except Malaya. Malaya's rubber exports were subject 
to dramatic price increases over 1950 while for most other 
products, the price boom really only took off in 195144. As 
a result, Malaya had greater dollar earnings to spend over the 
first half of 1951 than the other countries. For the sterling 
area as a whole, imports in the first half of 1951 rose 34% 
over the same period the previous year but exports were 
increasing at more than twice this rate, generating a surplus
40The Commonwealth and the Sterling Area Statistical Abstract. 
No. 78, HMSO, London, 1958.
41Ibid.
42Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44See Figure III.B.
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with the USA of $354m. The four RSA countries shown in the 
table together ran a surplus of $406.3m, offsetting a UK 
deficit of $211m. In the second half of 1951 this relatively 
healthy situation changed. The rate of increase in dollar 
imports for the sterling area as a whole more than tripled 
while exports to the USA were almost at the same level as in 
the second half of 1950. In India, Malaya, Pakistan and the 
UK, exports to the USA suffered an absolute fall. Only 
Pakistan succeeded in reducing its imports commensurately but, 
even so, could not avoid falling into a dollar deficit for the 
half year. Australian exports increased slightly, but this 
was not enough to offset the growth in imports. Still, the 
four countries together only accumulated a deficit of $25m in 
the second half of 1951 which was more than adequately covered 
by their surplus in the first half of 1951 to give them net 
earnings of $381m from the USA over the year as a whole. 
These four major raw material producers, then, were able to 
continue their spending spree through the first half of 1952, 
despite sharp drops in their export earnings after the price 
boom collapsed in the second half of 1951. The sterling area 
as a whole, however, was in a much less healthy position, 
accumulating a deficit in the second half of 1951 of $379m 
bringing the deficit over the year as a whole to $25m.
The major culprit in the payments crisis of 1952 was the 
UK itself. Imports from the USA doubled in the second half of 
1951 over the same period in 1950, pushing the UK into a
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deficit for the year of $637m with the USA. Through 1950, the 
UK ran up a deficit with the NSA amounting to £196m and earned 
a surplus with the RSA of only £60m. It is not surprising 
then that the British authorities were eager to preserve and 
conserve the much more favourable trading situation in the 
RSA.
Over the course of 1950, the triangular balance seemed 
almost achievable if the dollar earnings of the RSA could be 
directed into the proper channels and their deficit with the 
UK was forced to expand. The surplus of the RSA with the NSA 
was needed by the UK to cover its deficit and to help bolster 
the still weak foreign exchange reserves of the area. The RSA 
was therefore urged to contribute their dollar earnings to the 
central reserves to be used in the short term to cover the 
UK's deficit. In the longer term, the RSA would hold sterling 
balances against future deficits and import more of her 
manufactured needs from the UK. The key to this solution was 
the continuation of dollar import restrictions so that the 
RSA's trade surplus should not be spent on RSA imports from 
the dollar area.
In January 1951, the British Treasury began to prepare a 
campaign to re-emphasize the need for dollar economy. The 
campaign was dubbed "The Darkening Picture" and was to be 
comprised of telegrams to sterling area finance ministers and
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a presentation at the Commonwealth Liaison Committee in 
London45. The telegram from the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
to the sterling finance ministers pointed out that the 
improvement in the area*s dollar account had been due to the 
exceptional circumstances of rearmament but that this 
favourable situation would soon end46. British dollar 
expenditure was expected to increase in 1951 due to supply 
shortages in the non-dollar area, coupled with the need to 
replace stocks and expected increases in international 
prices47. These factors together, it was estimated, would 
cost the UK alone an extra $490m in 195148. In addition, the 
UK would have to start payments on the 1946 American Loan. 
The Chancellor, therefore, correctly anticipated a dollar 
deficit by the end of 1951 and concluded by urging dollar 
economy and prudence49.
Nine days later, R.W.B. Clarke was sent to appear at the 
Commonwealth Liaison Committee meeting of 24 January 1951, 
where he gave a speech specifically designed for the sterling
45|,Timetable for fThe Darkening Picture*", 5 January, 1951. PRO 
T236/3287•
46Telegram Commonwealth Relations Office to Commonwealth 
Finance Ministers, 15 January, 1951. PRO T236/3287.
47Ibid.
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
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Commonwealth representatives "to make their flesh creep"50. 
Clarke reviewed the Chancellor’s pessimistic predictions for 
1951 and went on to present estimates that a full 40% of the 
improvement in the sterling area’s gold and dollar position 
had been due to the reduction in dollar imports by members and 
only one third was due to increased export earnings51. The 
rest was due to capital inflows and reduced payments to non­
dollar countries52. The lesson from these figures was that 
dollar restrictions were vital to continue to strengthen 
reserves.
The estimate Clarke used for the dollar account in 1950 
was an increase of dollar reserves of $2,336m in 1950 over 
19 4 953. Of this figure, then, $9 3 4m was attributed to 
reductions in dollar imports. A more recent publication puts 
the increase in gold and dollar reserves at £575m or $1618m54 
and this figure will be used to assess Clarke's analysis. In 
1950, sterling area imports from the dollar area fell by $216m 
which was only 13% of the increase in reserves in 195055. 
Exports to the dollar area increased by $994m or 61% of the
50"Timetable for 'The Darkening Picture'", 5 January, 1951. PRO 
T236/3287.
51Minutes of CLC meeting 24 January, 1951. PRO T236/3287.
52Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54The Balance of Payments 1946-57. London, HMSO, 1959.
55The Commonwealth and Sterling Area Statistical Abstract, no. 
78, HMSO, London, 1958.
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increase in the area's reserves56. Both these calculations 
and Clarke's estimates allow that about 73% of the increase in 
reserves was due to improvements in the balance with the 
dollar area but the weight attributed to import restrictions 
is considerably different. Clarke's speech would have had 
very different lessons to tell if he could only attribute 13% 
of the dollar account improvement to reductions in dollar 
imports and not 40%. In any case, the urging by the Treasury 
to restrain dollar expenditure was to fall on deaf ears in the 
RSA during 1951 and the prospects for a triangular balance 
became even more remote.
The response to the Chancellor's telegram in January 1951 
was less enthusiastic than in April 1950. The Indian Finance 
Minister, C.D. Deshmukh painted a bleak outlook for Indian 
dollar imports in 1951. In a telegram to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office he cited three changes in India's economy 
which threatened to increase dollar expenditure57. Delivery 
dates from non-dollar countries (including the UK) had proved 
uncompetitive with dollar sources of supply in recent months. 
Delays in the delivery of dollar raw materials due to the 
imposition of export controls in the USA had artificially 
lowered the figures for dollar payments in 1950 that would 
have to be borne in 1951. The final development was the poor 
crop of 1950 which would inflate India's food imports from all
56lbid.
57Telegram, 7 February, 1951. PRO T236/3166.
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sources. In the event, India*s imports from the USA almost
doubled to $416m in 195158.
The response from Finance Minister Jayawardena of Ceylon
was scarcely more promising, allowing only that
as a member of the sterling area and of the 
Commonwealth, Ceylon is anxious to assist sterling 
area as a whole to maximum extent by contributing 
to dollar pool its share of dollar earnings with 
due regard however to Ceylon*s own need for 
consumer and capital goods from dollar area as well 
as for foreign reserves to strengthen its 
currency59
Ceylon had always been a dollar earner for the sterling area 
but the resolve to continue to support the area’s dollar pool 
was weakening.
News from the UK High Commissioner in New Zealand was 
even less promising. On 12 February 1951, he reported that 
the New Zealand Treasury was up against strong opposition from 
other official departments in supporting dollar economy60. 
The government had decided to accelerate the removal of 
quantitative restrictions as a result of pressure from older 
established manufacturers who felt they could withstand the 
competition and who wanted their younger competitors who 
relied on protection to be forced out of business to release
58See Table III.G.
59Telegram from UK High Commissioner in Ceylon to Commonwealth 
Relations Office, 12 February, 1951. PRO T236/3287.
60Telegram from UK High Commissioner in New Zealand to 
Commonwealth Relations Office, 12 February, 1951. PRO T236/3287.
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scarce labour61. The responsibilities of New Zealand as a 
member of the sterling area do not appear to have figured in 
the decision. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, R.A. Butler 
pencilled on the bottom of the telegram, "I don't like this at 
all"62. Here was a blatant example of the discipline of the 
trade system beginning to crumble.
On the same day, the New Zealand finance minister, Mr. 
Bowden proposed by telegram that a Commonwealth Ministerial 
meeting be called to discuss "the merit in the general 
adoption by sterling area countries of the greatest possible 
relaxation in the discriminatory application of controls 
against dollar imports under a carefully selected range of 
commodities"63. At the same time, however, Bowden noted that 
an end to discrimination would require a joint decision by the 
sterling area and promised that New Zealand would not take 
unilateral measures to relax dollar discrimination64. The UK 
High Commissioner in New Zealand had, of course, already 
informed the British that the New Zealand government intended 
just such unilateral action through licensing changes65.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63Quoted in a minute by A.K. Potter, 15 December, 1951. PRO 
T236/3287•
64 Ibid.
65Telegram from UK High Commissioner in New Zealand, 12 
February, 1951. PRO T236/3287.
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This telegram from the New Zealand finance minister put 
the UK in a very difficult position. Even before the 
preparation of 'The Darkening Picture' campaign encouraging 
restraint in dollar expenditure by the RSA, the Programmes 
Committee in the UK had recommended more liberal treatment of 
British imports of machinery from the dollar area which would 
cost an extra $20m p.a. as well as OGL's on some minor dollar 
materials66. The RSA had not been informed of this decision 
and to reveal it at the same time as the 'Darkening Picture' 
campaign would have been embarrassing. The UK was preparing 
to allow raw material and machinery imports from the dollar 
area to help domestic industry while urging the RSA in effect 
to delay their industrialisation by restricting such dollar 
imports and helping the UK to support its deficit. A.C. 
Sparks of the Treasury therefore advised that a Commonwealth 
ministers meeting should be avoided to prevent too deep an 
analysis of British policy67. Instead, the RSA should be 
urged to lessen discrimination only where the dollar cost 
would not be high68.
The sterling area import controls also under attack from 
the IMF and the GATT at the end of 1950. In response to the 
1949 programme, which comprised an intensification of
Minute by A.K. Potter 15 February, 1951. PRO T236/3287.
67Note on "New Zealand Import Control" by A.C. Sparks, 17 
February, 1951. PRO T236/3287.
68Ibid.
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discrimination, the GATT requested consultations with several 
members69 of the sterling area under Article XII of the 
Agreement and also requested •advice* from the staff of the 
IMF under Article XV. These consultations took place at the 
Fifth Session of the GATT at Torquay in November 1950.
The views of the IMF were influenced by the improvement 
in the balances of payments of several members since the 
import restrictions had been imposed. Accordingly, their 
advice to the GATT was that the restrictions on dollar imports 
could not be immediately relaxed by India and Pakistan but 
that Australia, Ceylon, New Zealand, Southern Rhodesia and the 
UK should begin to relax their restrictions, although this 
should be done "with due caution"70. This analysis 
undermined the basic principle of the sterling area which was 
that the policies of the members should be in the interests of 
the area as a whole and not strictly in response to individual 
circumstances. The IMF recommendations received support from 
the 'hard currency' countries such as the USA, Canada, Belgium 
and Cuba71 but were disputed by sterling area representatives 
from Australia, the UK and New Zealand especially. The 
sterling countries argued that the balances of payments of the
69The members were Australia, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia and the UK.
70J.K. Horsefield, ed., The International Monetary Fund 1945- 
1965; Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation. Vol. 2, 
Analysis, p. 230.
71 Ibid., p. 340.
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individual members could not be the basis of recommendations 
on quantitative restrictions because of the importance of the 
regional association and the sharing of central reserves and 
that the restrictions could be justified on the grounds that 
they strengthened the central reserves and "thereby helped to 
create conditions under which sterling could be made 
convertible and discrimination eventually eliminated"72. It 
was also argued that the balance of payments of the members 
would deteriorate through 1951, especially given rearmament 
commitments73. In the end neither the IMF nor the GATT had 
the authority to impose changes in sterling area policy but, 
as noted above, the restrictions on dollar imports were 
gradually relaxed in response to RSA surpluses. In the
second half of 1951, the gold and dollar reserves began to 
fall, slipping $600m in the third quarter of 1951 and a 
further $900m to December74. Sterling area sterling balances 
were run down by $865m or 10% in the second half of 1951 as 
export earnings fell against import expenditure75. Finally, 
in November the UK was forced to retreat on its position on 
European liberalisation and a wide range of imports were
^ Ibid.
^Secretariat of the Interim Commission for the International 
Trade Organisation, GATT in Action? Third Report on the Operation 
of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade. January 1952. p. 15.
^ International Financial Statistics. Vol. IV and Vol. VI, 
I.M.F.
75 Ibid.
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removed from OGL. An emergency meeting of Commonwealth 
Finance Ministers was called for January 1952. At this point 
it will be useful to have a brief digression on the sterling 
area and British European trade policy.
III.D. The Sterling Area and European Liberalization
At the same time as the UK was exerting pressure on 
dollar imports, the British government was considering 
relaxing import controls against OEEC countries. On 4 July 
1949, two weeks before the announcement of the 25% cut in 
dollar imports, British pressure on the OEEC was successful 
and the OEEC passed a resolution requiring its members to 
progressively and reciprocally free their trade restrictions 
against eachother. On 2 November, a further resolution was 
passed calling for the freeing of one half of OEEC trade. 
This process of liberalisation continued until by November 
1951, 90% of Britain's 1948 private trade with the OEEC had 
been freed of restrictions.
This period of European trade liberalisation from 1949-51 
gives an interesting insight into the impact of the RSA on 
British trade relations with Europe as well as the place of 
the RSA in the delicate balance of trade relations with the 
USA on the one hand and Europe on the other. The 
liberalisations of 1950-51 brought the conflict between 
sterling area policy with respect to dollar goods and British 
policy with respect to European goods into the open. Most
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sterling area countries did not officially discriminate 
between European and UK imports so their trade policy had 
always been strictly discriminatory against the dollar. The 
UK, in contrast, had undertaken to avoid discrimination both 
as a member of GATT and as a requirement of the American Loan 
Agreement of 1946.
It was originally hoped by the British that the RSA would 
deprive themselves of dollar imports but not be privy to 
European liberalisation. At the end of October 1949, the 
British Colonies were advised not to make trade concessions to 
Europe76. The explanation from the Board of Trade was that 
"as... the Area participants have not followed our line of 
liberalising unilaterally, but are keeping their concessions 
in reserve as bargaining counters, we are going to advise the 
Colonies to make no relaxations for the time being"77. This 
advice was directly contrary to agreed OEEC policy which asked 
participants to urge their dependent overseas territories to 
follow them in liberalisation with Europe78. The British 
were anxious that no other members of the RSA should extend 
further trade concessions until the impact of the UK 
relaxations became more clear79. Also, liberalisation by the
76Telegram from J.A. Nasmyth, Board of Trade, to UK High 
Commissioner in Southern Rhodesia. 29 October, 1949. PRO T236/2552.
^Ibid.
78Ibid. Agreed by OEEC 13 August, 1949.
79Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Colonial 
Governors, 14 December, 1949. PRO T236/2552.
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Colonies or the ISA threatened the precarious balance of
British policy with respect to the USA and Canada.
During Tripartite talks in Washington earlier in 1949,
the British representatives had asked the Americans if the
British commitment to non-discrimination in Section IX of the
Anglo-American Financial Agreement would present an obstacle
to UK relaxations of trade restrictions against Europe80.
The reply from the USA and Canada as expressed in the joint
communique from the talks was that the discriminatory aspects
of liberalizing European trade
should not be considered since the UK's shortage of 
dollars should not, in itself, force the UK to 
reduce its purchases from areas with which it does 
not have a shortage of means of payment81.
The American Congress raised no subsequent objections to this
line "provided that there would be no appearance of
discrimination against the United States of America for the
sole or primary benefit of the sterling area commonwealth
countries"82. The question of whether the Colonies or other
sterling area countries could be included in the European
trade liberalisation scheme without raising objections in the
American Congress over Article IX was very uncertain. The
Colonies were, therefore, advised at the end of 1949 that, as
goods were imported fairly freely from Europe already and the
80Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to 
Governors of the Colonies, 14/12/49. PRO T236/2552.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
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UK did not know if such liberalisation would necessitate a 
further approach to the Americans, no action on the part of 
the Colonies was desired83.
Soon after this advice was sent to the Colonies, the 
British came under pressure from the independent sterling area 
to represent their interests in European liberalisation. At 
this time only Australia and New Zealand discriminated against 
Europe in favour of the UK but the entire RSA was concerned 
that bilateral liberalisation by OEEC members would involve 
discrimination against the RSA84. At a meeting of 
Commonwealth representatives prior to the GATT meeting in 
Geneva at the beginning of 1950, the Australian and New 
Zealand representatives raised the issue of extending OEEC 
liberalisation to the RSA. They saw three ways in which they 
could pursue this goal. They could raise the issue at GATT, 
have the UK raise it in the OEEC or pursue bilateral 
agreements with individual OEEC countries85. The British 
authorities were very reluctant to have the topic discussed in 
GATT as it would bring the UK into a public confrontation with 
the USA and Canada over sterling area dollar discrimination. 
In July 1949, the Board of Trade had noted that
83 ibid.
84Commonwealth Economic Committee meeting 30 January, 1950. PRO 
T236/2552.
85Board of Trade paper for the Cabinet European Economic 
Cooperation Committee 20 February, 1950. PRO T236/2552.
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While so long as the US and UK Governments only are 
concerned it may be possible to pass over in 
silence our breaches of Section IX, the naked truth 
that we are going to discriminate...against the 
dollar area is bound to come out very nakedly 
indeed in any multilateral discussions86.
A letter from the UK High Commissioner in Canada in February
1950, reported that the Canadians had "indicated to me in fact
that the point at which liberalisation came to be extended by
OEEC countries to the sterling area Commonwealth would be when
they would start to be actively concerned from the point of
view of the impact on their actual trade"87.
The Board of Trade prepared a paper on the subject for
submission to the Cabinet European Economic Cooperation
Committee at the end of February 1950. The paper expressed
the belief that European exports to the RSA were likely to be
larger in the event of liberalisation than RSA exports to
Europe and that therefore, "up to the present we have not been
anxious to see the Sterling Area Commonwealth brought into the
Western European liberalisation field"88. The note went on
to argue that increased imports from Europe by the RSA
threatened their trade surplus, weakened the defense against
cheap sterling since most violations occured in trade with
Europe, and focused attention on sterling area discrimination
^ o t e  by the Board of Trade 8 July, 1949. PRO T236/1868.
87Letter from UK High Commissioner in Ottawa, 10 February, 
1950. PRO T236/2552.
88Board of Trade Note for the European Economic Cooperation 
Committee, 20 February, 1950. PRO T236/2552.
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against dollar imports89. Finally, the Board of Trade was 
still not fully confident of the effects of British 
liberalisation on the sterling area balance of payments and 
advised that ideally any move to liberalisation by the RSA 
should wait until the effects of the European Payments Union 
could be assessed. The paper warned, however, that the UK had 
no choice but to agree to liberalisation of OEEC imports by 
Australia and New Zealand given their threat to throw the 
issue open to GATT90. The UK should therefore assist these 
countries in bilateral negotiations except with the harder 
currency countries of Belgium, Switzerland and West Germany91 
to ensure that reciprocal concessions were obtained. The 
Commonwealth governments themselves, however, had to appear to 
be the primary actors in such negotiations to prevent it 
seeming that the UK was seeking the agreements in her own 
interest. Australia and New Zealand already licenced imports 
quite freely from the soft currency countries of Europe in any 
case, and were preparing to make this policy official through 
OGLs. Part of their motive in pressuring the UK to act in 
their interest was, therefore, to gain concessions for these 
relaxations. The Cabinet accepted the Board of Trade advice, 
noting that "as it would be impossible to prevent the Southern
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91The UK herself had not extended liberalisation to these three 
countries.
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Dominions from liberalising their imports from participants it 
would be best for the UK to cooperate with them from the 
outset"92.
Australia and New Zealand representatives did not at first 
accept this response from the UK, insisting instead that the 
UK should mention the wish of some RSA countries to join in 
liberalisation in an OEEC meeting93. In the end, however, 
they were convinced to accept the UK offer and refrain from 
raising the issue of discrimination in either the OEEC or 
GATT94. After this precedent setting case the UK had 
established two distinct spheres of trade policy, the dollar 
controls of the sterling area and the liberalisation of trade 
with Europe. The threat of American pressure, however, 
continued to cloud their position.
In early 1951 the UK was forced to consider relaxing its 
import restrictions because of pressure from the USA over the 
discriminatory effects of European liberalisation. At the end 
of April 1951, immediately after the Torquay round of tariff 
negotiations was completed, the US State Department asked the 
UK to stop action on their lists of goods for European 
liberalisation to allow discussions on broader liberalisation
92Minutes of European Economic Cooperation Committee of the 
Cabinet, 21 February, 1950. PRO T236/2552.
93Telegram Foreign Office to UK Delegation to OEEC, 23 
February, 1950. PRO T236/2552.
94Telegram from UK Delegation to GATT to Foreign Office, 10 
March, 1950.
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policy in the context of the rising trend of UK reserves95.
The State Department * s case was that as UK reserves were
rising the UK should begin to observe their promises in
Section IX of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement and in
GATT to eliminate trade discrimination96. The UK was under
an obligation to the OEEC to liberalise trade with Europe and
the State Department wanted this liberalisation to be on a
non-discriminatory basis with the USA97. The response of the
UK representatives in Washington was that the UK was
reluctant to make a new departure in policy at this 
stage, the more so because such a departure by the 
UK would set an example to other sterling countries 
who might be less able than the UK to control the 
results. The UK, which was faced with increasing 
debt to these countries, would probably be less 
able than in the past to excercise restraint on 
them98.
Here then was some recognition of the weakening force of 
British exhortations to the RSA to restrain their dollar 
imports while their export earnings and sterling balances were 
rising. The other important aspect of this British response 
was the fear that UK relaxations would lead to sterling area 
relaxations. If the UK were to relax restrictions on dollar 
imports to feed domestic industry or to pacify the Americans,
95Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, 25 April, 1951. 
PRO BT241/235.
96Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, 26 April, 1951. 
PRO BT241/235.
97Ibid.
98Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington, 9 May, 1951. PRO 
BT241/235.
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there was little chance that the RSA could be persuaded to 
continue to restrain their imports and contribute their dollar 
earnings to the central reserves to support the British 
deficit. The sterling area system was thus a justification 
for continued dollar discrimination by the UK.
The British also threatened the State Department that if 
the US pressed their point, the UK would have to suspend the 
European liberalisation program rather than end dollar 
discrimination. In this event the reasons for the change in 
UK policy would be made public and the USA would be blamed for 
restricting the development of multilateral European trade".
While the British waited for the American reaction, the 
Import Licencing Committee of the Board of Trade compiled a 
list of raw materials on which relaxations might be made, 
amounting to an increased expenditure of £13m or $36m over the 
1951 programme100. As the reserves position deteriorated 
through 1951, however, Treasury officials rejected the ILC 
proposals, arguing that Ministers would reject the relaxations 
as "merely concessions to the USA" and because of the 
deteriorating trade position101. Instead, the Treasury 
suggested waiting until the UK's external position 
deteriorated as expected and the American case dissolved on
"ibid.
100Note by Import Licencing Committee, 22 May, 1951. PRO
BT241/235.
101 Letter from Arthur Sparks to A. Burgess (BT) , 31 May, 1951.
PRO BT241/235.
its own102. The Treasury*s predictions proved correct and 
when the sterling area balance of payments worsened in the 
second half of 1951 the American pressure was withdrawn.
The prospect of the UK or another member of the sterling 
area leading the collapse of sterling area dollar discipline, 
seen above as an excuse given to the USA for continued 
discrimination by the UK, was a recurring feature in British 
policy. In the case of car imports from the USA in 1951, for 
example, the genuine needs of the Colonies were almost 
sacrificed to the need for discipline in the system as a 
whole. In August 1951, Nigeria asked to be allowed to import 
500 American cars which were particularly suited to the rough 
Colonial terrain, on the basis of essentiality. The request 
was denied by the Treasury on the basis of the weakening 
dollar position103 and because if the imports were allowed, 
"the independent countries of the sterling area will certainly 
also take note of these relaxations and be all the more ready 
to follow the lead now given by New Zealand" 104 who had 
announced that they would be importing £1.5m worth of American 
cars in 1951. Earlier, A.K. Potter had argued that "if we 
invite the Colonies to submit their requests for the import of 
American cars, this might have indescribeable repercussions in
102Ibid.
103Letter from W.L. Atkinson to A.M. Jenkins, 16 August, 1951. 
PRO T236/3563.
104Minute by W.L Atkinson, 21 September, 1951. PRO T236/3563.
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the independent Sterling Area Countries"105. In the end the 
Colonial Office finally convinced the Treasury to overturn its 
decision, arguing that the restrictions on dollar imports 
imposed on the Colonies had gone far enough given their 
development needs and their consistent contribution to the 
dollar pool106. The discipline of the sterling area was 
safer by this time since export earnings had collapsed for 
most of the RSA but the episode serves as an example of the 
perceived fragility of the commitment of the RSA to their 
responsibility to support the UK deficit through trade 
restrictions and the enforced inflexibility of the British 
position as a result.
III.E. Return to Restrictions 1952
In December 1951, the Treasury Working Party on the 
upcoming Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference compiled a 
paper on "Objectives and General Policy"107. There were four 
main objectives. First, to convince the members that the 
sterling area was good for them and that the UK was determined 
to earn a balance of payments surplus for the area after being 
in deficit over the past few years. The second was to get an
105Note from A.K. Potter to H. Brittain, 2 August 1951. PRO 
T236/3563.
106Letter from Poynton to H. Brittain, 2 October, 1951. PRO 
T236/3563•
107Treasury Working Party on the Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers1 Meeting, "Objectives and General Policy" PRO T236/3064.
undertaking from members that they would adopt internal and 
external measures to correct their economies and cease being 
drains on the dollar reserves. The third objective was to 
organise longer term plans for closer economic cooperation to 
strengthen sterling and the last objective was to agree on a 
strongly worded communique expressing the area's resolve to 
strengthen sterling. With regard to import controls, the 
Treasury Working Group argued that "the present situation is 
not conducive to the 1949 treatment by a uniform cut of 
imports from the dollar area" because the sterling area was in 
deficit with the non-dollar world as well108. The RSA was to 
be persuaded to achieve or to increase their surpluses with 
the whole NSA by cutting imports from their trade creditors.
The survival of the sterling area was described by the 
Working Party as depending on a sustained surplus of the 
sterling area as a whole with the NSA to increase the reserves 
base109. To achieve this the UK, the Colonies and the 
independent sterling area each had distinct roles to play. 
The UK was aiming at an overall surplus achieved through a 
surplus with the RSA and a balance "at best" with the NSA110. 
The Colonies were already in surplus with both the dollar area 
and the sterling area and this was to be continued through 
ceilings on dollar imports. The independent sterling area was
108Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110Ibid.
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to contribute a surplus with the NSA to offset their deficit
with the UK. This pattern, of course, describes the
triangular balance discussed at the beginning of this chapter.
It was also argued that this pattern had been the goal of
British policy-makers since the imposition of controls in July
1949. The Treasury Working Party concluded that
if the pattern of multilateral trade is to be 
preserved, this is the only means by which the 
whole sterling area can get its indispensable 
surplus with the outside world, for UK and Colonies 
cannot both have a surplus with the ISA and have a 
surplus with the rest of the world111.
Here, then, is implicit acceptance that the UK was chronically
unable to earn a surplus with the NSA and that this deficit
would have to be borne by the RSA primarily through running
larger deficits with the UK and by depriving themselves of NSA
imports as the terms of trade moved against their exports.
The task of the RSA in this pattern was considerably more
difficult than that assigned to the UK. With the end of the
Korean War boom, international demand and prices for the
primary goods produced by the RSA had fallen drastically and
the prospect of increasing exports to the NSA was unlikely.
At the same time, by restricting imports of manufactures and
machinery, the RSA was restrained from developing new
industrial products to export to the NSA. Indeed the longer
term policy of the Treasury Working Party was remarkably
shortsighted in recommending an emphasis on the development of
111Ibid.
raw materials and food as targets of investment in the RSA 
rather than industrialisation or "social advance and the 
provision of amenities"112.
The British task was merely to continue to generate a 
surplus with the RSA and avoid too deep a deficit with the 
NSA. The priority for British exports was to be RSA markets, 
both to allow the UK to achieve an overall surplus and also to 
supply the RSA with the goods which they would otherwise 
import from the NSA. In July 1949, this second motive for 
directing UK exports to the RSA was acknowledged by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer who stated that "we cannot 
possibly bring the sterling area along with us unless we are 
able to supply them and temper the dollar cuts"113.
The basis of the triangular balance was the perceived 
comparative advantage of the RSA for producing raw materials 
and the UK for manufactures. Unfortunately this comfortable 
solution for the UK was not sustainable as the terms of trade 
turned against primary product producers and the RSA was 
unwilling to continue to suppress the demand of their 
consumers and industries for goods from the NSA.
There was some dispute among British authorities as to 
the correct line to take at the conference to achieve both a 
solution to the present crisis and an overall balance with the
112Ibid.
113Chancellor1 s Paper for the Economic Policy Committee Draft 
7 July, 1949. PRO T236/1868.
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rest of the world in the longer term. The Bank of England
criticised those government officials "who seem to have no
other kind of solution to present sterling area difficulties
but a further round of intensification of controls and import
restrictions"114 adding that "this policy has been tried
consistently in the past with no great success and in our
opinion is likely to have an unfortunate psychological effect
on the independent members of the sterling area if put forward
as the sole solution to deal with the present emergency"115.
Instead, the Bank suggested putting emphasis on the need to
take internal deflationary measures to bring the expenditure
of individual members within their means.
The Economic Section, on the other hand, was more
concerned with the immediate crisis. Robert Hall, director of
the Section, wrote that
it does seem to me that the immediate task will be 
to convince the members of the Conference that the 
sterling area will break up from loss of reserves 
unless the current drain on the reserves is 
stopped? and that the only way to do this is by 
sharp reductions in expenditure on dollars and the 
currencies of OEEC countries116.
In the long term, Robert Hall agreed that internal measures
were the root of the solution but he argued that if this
approach were stressed the RSA would say that their internal
114Letter Beorge Bolton to Herbert Brittain, 2 January, 1952. 
PRO T236/3070.
115Ibid.
116Letter R.L. Hall to Herbert Brittain, 2 January, 1952. PRO 
T236/3070.
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economies were their own affair and/or that they were already 
doing all that they could in this area. In any case, due to 
time lags internal measures would not get the sterling area 
out of the immediate crisis117.
In the end, the agreed approach was to emphasise the need 
for internal measures to get the sterling area ‘houses in
order1 but at the same time to declare the need for an
immediate reduction in non-sterling expenditure. At the first 
preliminary meeting of officals, Herbert Brittain described 
the British vision of triangular balance and went on to 
discuss how this must be achieved118. The goal was for the 
sterling area as a whole to attain a balance with the rest of 
the world by the second half of 1952. In the context of the 
triangular balance, this required that the RSA earn surpluses 
with the NSA, including at least a balance with the dollar 
area. The Treasury estimated that at the current rate of 
spending, the sterling area deficit with the NSA would amount 
to £550m in the second half of 1952. This estimate was
comprised of a deficit of the UK of £410m plus a deficit of
the independent sterling area of £371m partly offset by a 
surplus in the Colonies of £25m119. To achieve at least a 
balance with the NSA various strict measures would have to be
117Ibid.
118Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference, Preliminary
Meeting of Officials, Minutes, 8 January, 1952. PRO T236/3067.
119Ibid.
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taken by each sterling area member. Internal deflationary 
measures were vital because the sterling area as a whole was 
living beyond its means and inflation was rampant. Internal 
deflation could not be relied upon alone, however, due to the 
extreme urgency of the present situation and some immediate 
cuts in imports were necessary. Herbert Brittain reviewed the 
steps that Britain had taken in the past few months including, 
on the internal side, an excess profits tax and the tightening 
of credit through a rise in Bank Rate and stricter policy in 
the Capital Issues Committee against investment intended to 
increase production of goods for the domestic market. The UK 
had also, however, taken direct measures designed to cut 
imports by £13Om, mostly from Europe.
The response of the RSA delegates to this call to action 
was mixed. Most countries had already taken steps to reduce 
domestic inflation, although the officials agreed in their 
report to their Ministers that further measures were 
needed120. The imposition of import controls, however, was 
more controversial. Only Southern Rhodesia had followed the 
UK in imposing controls on the NSA as a whole rather than just 
on dollar imports. India and Pakistan felt they had already 
imposed the strictest controls on NSA imports that they could 
support. Australia and New Zealand had recently taken a 
mixture of internal and external policies designed to help
120Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference, Report of 
Officials, 12 January, 1952. PRO T236/3068.
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their situation and Australia, in particular, was unwilling to 
commit itself to further measures until the effects of these 
policies had time to make themselves felt. Ceylon was already 
in surplus with the NSA and was more interested in the longer 
term viability of the sterling area than its immediate 
problems. The South African government was against direct 
controls but in any case met her own dollar needs out of gold 
production.
The report of the officials' meetings agreed to the need
to bring the sterling area into balance with the NSA in the
second half of 1952 and recommended that
for this purpose, it was agreed that all members 
should seek to improve their situations vis-a-vis 
the rest of the non-sterling world as a matter of 
urgency, by the imposition, where that was decided 
to be necessary, of emergency import restrictions 
on goods from these sources121.
The concluding statement of the Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers nine days later echoed the report of officials but 
stated more firmly that, although they were commited to 
balancing their accounts, "this cannot be attained by negative 
and restrictive methods alone, or merely by the imposition of 
cuts on imports from certain parts of the world"122. The 
methods for correcting the situation would be at the 
discretion of the individual governments and would vary 
according to individual curcumstances but would follow three
121Ibid.
122Statement of Commonwealth Finance Ministers, 21 January, 
1952. PRO T236/3068.
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general steps. The first was to ensure that the internal 
economy was sound and to combat inflation. The second was to 
increase exports and foreign earning power, for example by 
long term borrowing outside the sterling area. The third step 
was that "so far as other methods do not fully achieve the 
desired results, it will be necessary, as a temporary measure, 
to reduce imports"123. Import controls were thus relegated 
to third place in sterling area policy.
What the public statement did not reveal was that in 
unofficial meetings, the Chancellor had given each member of 
the RSA a target to achieve in contributing to the sterling 
area balance. This involved the UK running a deficit with the 
NSA of £200m balanced by a surplus of the RSA with the NSA 
amounting to £200m124. In March 1952, as the situation 
worsened, the targets were revised to allow the sterling area 
as a whole to achieve a surplus of £200m125. Each member of 
the RSA was told that this would be made up of an RSA surplus 
of £300m and a UK deficit of £100m but the revised targets for 
the RSA add up to significantly more than this, leaving the 
British task somewhat easier if a surplus of £200m was the 
goal. These targets are presented in Table III.H.
123 Ibid.
124Telegram CRO to UK High Commissioners in the Commonwealth
for Commonwealth finance ministers, 4 March, 1952. PRO T236/3360.
125 Ibid.
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Sterling area trade policy had, therefore, changed from
Table III.H.
Targets for Second Half of 1952 
Balances at Annual Rate
Balance with NSA Balance with $Area Change over
1951
Australia +£70m -£25m -65%
New Zealand +£25m -£8m -50%
Pakistan +£55m -£10m -35%
Ceylon + £31m + £5m -60%
South Rhodesia +£15m +£16m -
India - -£10m -35%
South Africa +£50m ] -19%
Colonies +£94m ]+£53m? -15%
Other RSA +£40m ]
+£380m _
UK -£180m -19%
Sterling Area +£200m
Source: Telegram, Chancellor of the Exchequer to Commonwealth 
Finance Ministers, 4 March, 1952. PRO T236/3360.
a uniform import cut for every member of the area to cuts in
overall deficits with the NSA according to each member's
earning potential. The public statement of the Finance
Ministers did not commit them to import restrictions but the
RSA was unlikely to achieve their targets by the second half
of 1952 without them126.
After the Conference, the Indian government accepted the
target set for them and stopped import of dollar food grains
126There would also, of course, be a delay expected from import 
restrictions. The Australian delegation believed that restrictions 
against dollar imports took eight to eleven months to take effect 
because of the long distance involved. Undated, unsigned note from 
Australian delegation to Chancellor of the Exchequer, January 1952. 
PRO T236/3360.
168
and raw cotton. Other restrictions were put on the import of 
goods with healthy domestic stocks or where non-sterling 
countries were the major sources of supply and after March, 
the collapse of Indian export prices slowed inflation127. In 
March, Australia imposed widespread import restrictions 
against both sterling and non-sterling imports. In April, New 
Zealand introduced an exchange allocation scheme which allowed 
importers only 80% of their 1950 allocation of foreign 
exchange. This only affected imports from the sterling area 
and the OEEC which were free from license rectriction. Dollar 
area imports and imports from Japan were already subject to 
license with their own foreign exchange allocations128. 
Pakistan at first turned to internal measures, tightening 
credit and increasing the duty on cotton textiles in mid-1952 
from 30% to 60%. This did not restrain her foreign exchange 
expenditure, however, and in August 1952 non-sterling OGLs 
were retracted for all imports except machinery, capital 
goods, drugs and other essentials. In November the remaining 
OGLs were removed and all imports were subject to specific 
licensing. Existing import controls were tightened in Ceylon, 
which was already in surplus and in South Rhodesia which had 
taken measures in late 1951 along with the UK to restrict 
imports from the entire NSA. Ireland also reduced imports
127Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference, Preliminary
Meeting of Officials, 16 November, 1953. PRO T236/4000.
128 Ibid.
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from the NSA from $17m to $7m and South Africa rearranged her 
complicated licensing procedure to be more strict. The 
Colonies were asked to keep their NSA imports at their 1951 
level of $192m.
As a result of these policies and the fall in 
international prices, the sterling area was able to achieve 
balance for the second half of 1952. The UK moved from an 
overall deficit of £17lm on current and long term capital 
account to a surplus of £31m including a marginal trade 
surplus of £23m, recovering from a trade deficit of £230m in 
the first half of 1952129. The RSA also moved into a slight 
current account surplus with the NSA from a deficit in the 
first half of the year of some £160m. This was due mostly to 
a drop in NSA imports by 25% (35% drop in imports from the 
dollar area). The drain on the central reserves of £232m in 
the first half of 1952 was halted and reserves increased £57m 
in the second half of the year. The turnaround from the first 
to the second half of 1952, then, was dramatic indeed.
W.M. Corden calculated the effect of the British 
restrictions of 1951/2 and noted that there were aspects of 
the British economy in 1952 which helped the controls seem to 
be effective, including the large stocks built up in 1951 
which reduced the need for some imports in 1952 as well as a
129UK Balance of Payments 1946-57. 1959.
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recession in consumer demand130. These observations are 
reinforced by the fact that UK imports from the RSA, which 
were not controlled, fell along with imports from the NSA 
which indicates a slackened demand for imports in the UK even 
in the absence of controls. Corden does not extend his 
analysis to 1953 when the NSA imports into the sterling area 
were squeezed further. The decline was greatest in 1952 for 
the UK but the RSA reduced NSA imports more in 1953 than 1952. 
This perhaps reflects the longer distance between the RSA and 
large NSA markets like the USA and Europe which would entail 
longer contracts and more goods in the pipeline*, both of 
which delay the effects of import controls. Also, most RSA 
countries did not take action until the end of the first 
quarter of 1952 which would further delay the effects of their 
policy. There were, however, other reasons not directly 
connected to the controls imposed by the RSA which would 
reduce imports in 1952/3.
1951 was a year of stockbuilding, not only for the UK, but 
also for Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa 
which facilitated their ability to restrict their imports and 
might also have made imports less in 1952/53 than in 1950/51 
even in the absence of direct controls. There were also 
important price changes during these years. The price index 
of sterling area imports fell in 1953 almost as much as the
130W.M. Corden "The Control of Imports: A Case Study",
Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies. Vol XXVI, No. 3, 
September 1958. pp. 181-225.
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quantum index for sterling area imports, just as in 1950. In 
particular, the prices of manufactured goods finally fell in 
1953 after rising in 1952. For 1953, therefore, price changes 
again account for a significant part of the decline in the 
value of NSA imports into the sterling area. Again, to some 
extent the reduction in the sterling area market may have 
depressed the prices of some NSA exports but it is more likely 
that the quantitative restrictions of 1952/53, like those of 
1949, were favoured by exogenous changes in international 
prices.
XIX.F. End of Quantitative Restrictions
A Commonwealth Economic Conference was called for 
November 1952 to review the progress on the sterling area 
balance of payments situation and to introduce the Collective 
Approach programme as a path to sterling convertibility. At 
this conference, coordinated import controls were pushed 
further into the background of sterling area trade policy. 
The Preparatory Meeting of Officials completed a Report on the 
Short Term Balance of Payments Outlook in October 1952, which 
observed that the improvement in sterling area balance of 
payments had been due to reductions in imports rather than 
increases in exports131. Imports had been reduced due to the 
fall in international prices and export earnings as well as by
131 Commonwealth Economic Conference, Preparatory Meeting of 
Officials, Report on the Short Term Balance of Payments Outlook, 11 
October, 1952. PRO T236/3295.
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drawing on existing stocks132. The report emphasized that
this trend had been encouraged by the internal measures
adopted by the RSA and that
the role of such policies in maintaining and 
improving the Sterling Area*s Balance of Payments 
with the rest of the world is likely to be of 
crucial importance both in its effect on imports 
and in increasing competitive power and production 
for exports133.
It was frequently noted that import controls were a short
term measure whose effectiveness could not be relied upon for
too much longer. In a brief for the Chancellor on the Balance
of Payments outlook, Paul Vinter of the Treasury suggested
that the Chancellor
should not as on some past occasions, suggest 
precise targets for imports or for the non-sterling 
balance, but rather that he should...lay the 
predominant stress on the need for substantial 
increases in exports from the Sterling Area at 
competitive prices134.
The Treasury added in a later brief that specific balance of
payments targets for members of the Area were not necessary
since most members were individually in enough trouble to
induce them to maintain strict control on their domestic
economies135. On the external side, import controls were not
to be abandoned but rather kept as they were, except for
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134Brief for the Chancellor by P. Vinter, 14 November, 1952. 
PRO T236/3295•
135Treasury Brief on the Short Term Balance of Payments 
Outlook, 19 November, 1952. PRO T236/3295.
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relaxations by Australia in favour of British exports136. In 
the longer run, in conjunction with the approach of 
convertibility, it was felt that discrimination should be 
gradually relaxed. The British approach was to concentrate 
the attention of the conference on anti-inflationary policy to 
reduce demand for imports and to release goods from domestic 
consumption for export.
There was, then, a distinct change of spirit in the 
British attitude toward sterling area trade policy. The 
priority given to restricting dollar imports had been relaxed 
at the January conference and the emphasis had begun to shift 
to general balance of payments considerations with special 
regard to the importance of trade policy, rather than trade 
policy in isolation. By December, the immediate crisis had 
passed and no emergency measures had to be urged on the RSA. 
The Conference was preoccupied with the longer term issues of 
convertibility and development and this made itself felt in 
discussion of trade policy. The emphasis was on longer term 
solutions such as the coordination of internal policy to 
effect a general decrease in demand pressure and an increase 
in exports to make the sterling area viable on an ongoing 
basis in preparation for the eventual freeing of trade and 
payments restrictions.
136Ibid. Australia's import restrictions will be discussed 
below.
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The final communique of the Conference accurately 
reflected these changes in the character of sterling area 
policy. Internal stability of members was described as the 
key to the external balance of the area as a whole, while it 
noted that "the level of the reserves is as yet too low to 
warrant any substantial relaxation of the restrictions on 
imports from outside the sterling area”137. The triangular 
balance was to be achieved through more positive means, then, 
such as efforts to "expand the earning power of all sterling 
countries" while imports were held to a minimum138. This was 
to take place partly by strict internal policies and partly by 
the more careful direction of development funds to "projects 
which directly or indirectly contribute to the improvement of 
the area's balance of payments with the rest of the world" by 
increasing their competitive power in world markets139.
Ill.6. Relaxation of Discrimination: 1953-1955
A major obstacle to the triangular balance after 1952 was 
the failure of the UK to earn a trade surplus with the RSA. 
In October 1952, the British presentation to the Commonwealth 
Economic Conference Committee on the Short Term Balance of 
Payments Outlook had reminded the sterling area delegates that
137Commonwealth Economic Conference, Final Communique, Cmd 
8717, HMSO, December 1952.
138Ibid.
139Ibid.
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"it is recognised as an essential part of the agreement [of 
January 1952] that the UK should remain in surplus with the 
overseas sterling area"140. By the second half of 1952, 
however, the UK was already running a trade deficit with the 
RSA which was to continue until the second half of 1953. This 
reverse in the basic component of the triangular scheme was 
mostly accredited to import restrictions in the RSA and 
justifies a short discussion of Australian import policy in 
1952.
III.G.i. Australian Trade Policy
On 8 March 1952, facing an accelerating drain on reserves 
and poor export prospects, the Australian government imposed 
severe quantitative restrictions on imports from all sources. 
Specific goods were divided into either Category 'A* imports 
or Category * B' imports. Category 'A' included various raw 
materials and semi-manufactures which were limited to 60% of 
the value of similar imports in 1950-51. Category 1B* goods 
were mainly consumer goods, including most textiles and all 
clothing, and were to be cut to 20% of their 1950-51 value. 
It was estimated by the Board of Trade that the UK supplied 
75% of the non-dollar category *B* goods141. Some other 
items such as capital goods and other essentials would be
140Committee on the Short Term Balance of Payments Outlook, 
Minutes, 2 October, 1952. PRO T236/3295.
141Note by Mr. Leckie, April 1952. PRO BT11/4958.
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subject to administrative control and licensed individually. 
These arrangements covered all non-dollar, non-Japanese 
imports, including UK goods. Dollar imports were licensed 
separately.
Mr. Wilson, an Australian delegate at the Finance 
Ministers meeting in January 1952, had warned that Australia 
would have to cut sterling area imports to bring its balance 
of payments into order. R.W.B. Clarke of the Treasury had 
responded at the time that the UK did not advocate import cuts 
among sterling area members. Any reduction in imports from 
sterling sources should be the result of internal monetary 
policies, not direct controls142. This was a rather naive 
attitude since a full 62% of Australian imports came from the 
sterling area in 1951 and 45% from the UK alone143. 
Australian imports from dollar sources were already restricted 
to essentials so a reduction in imports which excluded the 
sterling area would require an almost complete embargo on 
European goods to be at all effective and this might invite 
retaliation.
The Board of Trade tried to resist the practical 
necessity for Australian restrictions against UK exports but 
eventually had to concede144. What the British found
142Minutes of Preparatory Meeting of Officials, 9 January, 
1952. PRO T236/3067.
143OEEC, Direction of International Trade.
144Brief for meeting with Australian Prime Minister, May 1952. 
PRO BT11/4958.
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particularly offensive in the Australian policy was the lack 
of consideration for the balance of payments needs of the 
sterling area as a whole. A.L. Burgess objected that the 
Australian position was "in complete contradiction to the 
whole concept of the sterling area" because it acted on the 
principle that a member should restrict imports based only on 
their individual balance of payments rather than on the 
situation of the area as a whole145. The January conference, 
however, had committed each member to balancing its own 
economy vis-a-vis the rest of the world as a contribution to 
the viability of the area as a whole and the Australians 
believed their new policy was part of this commitment146. 
Australia found it could not continue to run such a large 
trade deficit with the UK even though the British surplus was 
integral to the triangular balance which the British sought 
for the sterling area. In 1951, the UK had a trade surplus of 
£300m with Australia and a surplus with the whole sterling 
area of only £30m. Britainfs surplus with the RSA was, 
therefore, very dependent on access to the Australian market.
Despite all the attention focussed on Australian 
restrictions in 1953-54, other sterling area countries were 
also restricting their imports of British goods as part of 
their balance of payments programme. New Zealand*s exchange
145Report by A.L. Burgess, 4 June, 1952. PRO BR11/4958.
146Press Statement by R.G.Menzies, 15 March, 1952, in J.G.
Crawford, Australian Trade Policy 1942-1966: A Documentary History.
Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1968. p. 511-513.
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allocation scheme covered imports from the UK and the RSA from 
March 1952, until it was abolished in September 1954. New 
Zealand was an important market for automobile exports and for 
textiles, both of which were especially strictly controlled in 
1952-53147. New Zealand imports from the UK were almost 
halved in the first quarter of 1953 over the same period a 
year earlier148. The Pakistan import controls of 1953 were 
also directed against UK imports. As in the Australian and 
New Zealand cases, imports from the dollar area were treated 
more strictly but the controls on all but industrial capital 
goods along with trade pacts with Japan pushed UK imports from 
21% of total in 1951 to 16% in 1953149.
These other examples of the 1952-3 trade controls 
affecting sterling area trade obviously did not generate the 
excitement of the Australian controls of March 1952 because 
the British interest in these markets was not as great. From 
the end of 1951 to the end of 1953, before temporary 
relaxations of the restrictions began to have effect, 
Australian imports from the UK fell by £334m or 35% while her 
exports to the UK rose by £l58m150. By the end of 1953 
Australia had a trade surplus with the UK of £153m compared
147Economic Review of New Zealand. Economist Intelligence Unit, 
May 1953. p. 11.
148Ibid.
149Pirection of International Trade. OEEC.
150Ibid.
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with a deficit in 1951 of £339m. This change in the fortunes 
of UK trade with Australia, her largest trading partner, 
necessarily had a great impact on Britain's ability to earn an 
adequate surplus with the RSA on which the triangular balance 
depended, and in 1953 the UK actually ran a trade deficit with 
the RSA.
III.G.ii. Reduction in Trade Barriers
The conclusion of the December 1952 Conference had 
signalled a change in policy from restricting imports to 
emphasis on expanding exports. Quantitative discriminatory 
restrictions on imports were less palatable among the sterling 
area's trading partners in Europe and North America as the 
sterling area recovered from the 1951-52 crisis and reserves 
began to increase. It was also in keeping with the general 
movement in European relations that the British trade barriers 
which had been restored in the wake of the crisis should be 
removed once the crisis had passed and Britain's balance in 
the EPU improved.
The years after 1952 were also influenced by increasing 
reliance in Britain on the indirect effects of monetary policy 
on the balance of payments in general. The nature of export 
policy, dealing as it does with indirect incentives and 
controls on domestic investment and consumption rather than 
the direct controls associated with import policy, made it 
more difficult for the UK to strictly coordinate sterling area
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policies. As a result, British policy grew more focussed on 
stimulating her own exports to the NSA to help her balance of 
trade and the vision of the trade pattern of the sterling area 
as a whole as a possible solution to Britain*s chronic trade 
deficit with the NSA faded. One final influence in British 
sterling area trade policy after 1953 was the fact that the 
urging from the UK to impose direct import controls in 1952 
had resulted in the RSA imposing controls on imports from the 
UK as well as the rest of the world. This route no doubt 
seemed a self-defeating one for the UK after 1953. In 
sterling area discussions the issues of development and 
convertibility gained precedence.
British trade policy was to relax imports of raw 
materials and foodstuffs and then machinery to allow British 
industry to become more competitive before relaxing controls 
on consumer goods151. Import relaxations moved gradually at 
the end of 1952 and accelerated through 1953 and 1954. In 
1953, over 35% of imports from the dollar area were coming 
unrestricted into the UK compared to only 3.3% in 1952152. 
By November 1953, the UK had freed 75% of its trade with the
151Working Party on the Effects of Ending Dollar 
Discrimination, Paper by J. Leckie, 30 June, 1955. PRO BT230/380.
152M.F.W. Hemming, G. Miles and Ray, "A Statistical Summary of 
the Extent of Import Control in the United Kingdom since the War”, 
Review of Economic Studies. Vol XXVI No. 70, Feb. 1959. p. 103. 
Based on trade controls existing on 30 June in each year.
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OEEC, compared with only 46% in April 1952153. This European 
liberalisation helped the sterling area to weather the 
American recession of 1954.
London markets for various commodities were also reopened 
to trade in commodities from all sources154. The London 
market for lead was reopened in November 1952, zinc in January 
1953, grain and animal feed in June 1953, copper in August 
1953 and raw cotton later in 1954. Only the markets for wool 
futures and grain were forced to deal on a dollar for dollar 
basis, to restrain traders from using the market to convert 
sterling to dollars. This affected the usefulness of these 
markets, especially the grain market where most supplies were 
mostly from the dollar area.
These relaxations in British import restrictions were in 
large part designed to stimulate production for export by 
giving industry access to cheaper raw materials. The 
commodity markets also contributed to the current account 
through invisible merchanting earnings and were seen as a step 
toward the rehabilitation of London as a major trading centre. 
The sterling area was not ignored in the decisions to relax 
imports of specific items. The projected foreign exchange 
cost to Britain was carefully calculated to include any
153P.B. Kenen, British Monetary Policy and the Balance of 
Payments 1951-1957. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 
1960. p. 94.
154An attempt had been made to to this in August, 1952 but 
applications for dollar imports far exceeded the expected demand 
and the attempt was abandoned.
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diversion of imports from RSA sources and the interests of RSA 
producers were sometimes also considered before action was 
taken. In the case of hardwood, for example, the UK made 
special allowance for dollars to be made available to Colonial 
producers to purchase capital goods which would allow them to 
become competitive with dollar suppliers once discrimination 
was ended155. In 1955 and 1956 the UK concluded agreements 
with Australia and New Zealand guaranteeing purchases of their 
wheat and meat to protect them from NSA competition in the 
British market. In general, however, the trade relaxations of 
the UK in this period were made in the more immediate 
interests of the British economy.
It was in the field of development that Britain tried to 
exert influence over the pattern of sterling area trade. The 
Commonwealth Economic Conference of December 1952 had 
stipulated that sterling area development was to be directed 
at projects which would help the sterling area balance of 
payments and the finance ministers* meeting in January 1954 
had reasserted the sterling area's determination to "take 
appropriate steps both individually and in concert with 
eachother to sustain production and trade and the sound 
development of resources"156. This allowed the Capital 
Issues Committee to ration scarce London capital to projects
155Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Gold 
Coast, Nigeria, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore High 
Commissioners, 25 November, 1954. PRO BT241/332.
156Quoted in The Banker. Vol CII, No. 337, Feb. 1954. p. 67.
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that were export generating or at least dollar saving in the 
interests of the sterling area balance of payments. In March 
1953, for example, an application from the New Zealand 
government to float a £4.5m issue on the London market to 
finance construction of an Auckland Harbour bridge was turned 
down. A few months later, however, an issue of £10m was 
allowed for the Murupara pulp and paper scheme which promised 
to save some $16m p. a. for the sterling area157. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit described this turnaround as 
"clearly in keeping with the decision of the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers last November to put the emphasis of 
development on projects designed to aid the balance of 
payments"158.
III.G.iii. Reduction in Discrimination
A second new aspect of RSA trade policy after 1954 was 
the movement away from discrimination. The UK efforts in this 
regard through the liberalisation of dollar imports have been 
discussed above. The change in the policy of other sterling 
area countries away from discrimination between sterling and 
non-dollar sources has also been detailed above. The biggest 
change, however, came from South Africa and Pakistan as they 
abandoned dollar discrimination in 1954 and 1955 respectively.
157Economic Review of New Zealand. Economist Intelligence Unit,
London, January 1953. p. 9.
158Ibid. May 1953. p. 7.
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In May 1953, the South Africans informed Lord Swinton, 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, that they 
proposed to begin to dismantle import restrictions and end 
dollar discrimination as of the beginning of 1954 in the 
interest of ending distortions in the South African 
economy159. South Africa was not a member of the dollar pool 
but since they met their dollar requirements out of gold 
sales, the ending of dollar discrimination meant that less 
gold would be offered to the UK on an annual basis. From 1948 
to 1951 South Africa had sold an agreed minimum of gold to the 
UK to contribute to the central reserves, plus the excess 
after settling her own foreign exchange needs. In 1952, South 
Africa agreed to reimburse the UK for the South African 
deficit in the EPU. In 1953, South Africa had guaranteed £50m 
worth of gold for sale to the UK. This slice of South 
Africa's gold production was in part guaranteed by the South 
African policy of restricting 1953 dollar imports to their 
1952 level while reducing the value of total imports to give 
the impression of reducing dollar discrimination without 
increasing dollar expenditure160. South Africa was under 
considerable international political pressure over the 
apartheid system and was anxious at this time to avoid
159Letter from Mr. Geyer, South African High Commissioner to 
Lord Swinton, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Reslat ions, 4 May 
1953. PRO BT11/4950•
160Treasury Paper on South Africa, 21 May, 1953. PRO BT11/4950.
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attracting American displeasure in the IMF or GATT over trade 
discrimination.
The British authorities were understandably concerned for 
the fate of British exports to South Africa and were also 
determined to maintain some entitlement to part of South 
Africa's annual gold production. The Treasury therefore 
outlined three objectives for negotiations with the South 
Africans. The first was to secure as much gold as possible 
for 1954, and secondly to make sure that South Africa's plans 
were consistent with her relationship with the sterling area 
and would not have serious repercussions on other sterling 
area governments' policies regarding dollar discrimination. 
The third object was to get the South Africans to remove 
existing restrictions on traditional UK exports to South 
Africa161. The methods to achieve these objectives were 
either to "get tough" and threaten to expel South Africa from 
the sterling area, depriving her of free access to the UK 
financial markets and excluding her exports from the UK 
market, or to "rely on persuasion"162. The Treasury believed 
that the first option was too fierce since relations had so 
far been cordial and such an attitude would invite retaliation 
which would put at risk the UK's interest in South African 
gold mining and threaten her position in the South African 
market. Relying on persuasion, then, the UK was able to
16lIbid.
162 Ibid.
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secure the annual £50m sale of gold for the central reserves. 
On the repercussions for other RSA governments, the Treasury 
wrote that
the present South African proposals can be regarded 
as generally in line with ultimate sterling area 
policy of removing restrictions and freeing world 
trade, but the sterling area is not yet in a 
position to dispense with discrimination against 
dollar imports163.
The British stressed the need for sterling area discipline in
negotiations with the South Africans in June 1953 but they
were not impressed164. Nevertheless, the threat to sterling
area discipline was not considered to be too overwhelming
since South Africa had traditionally had a special status in
the system as a gold producer and was not part of the dollar
pool which was the rationale for coordinated discrimination.
Nor indeed was it in the interest of most other RSA countries
to relax dollar discrimination given their own external
imbalances165. On the relaxation of restrictions on UK
exports, South Africa gave an undertaking to give
consideration to priority relaxation on items in which the UK
had a special interest166. Finally, on 19 October 1953, P.R.
Botha announced in GATT that South Africa would be ending
163 Ibid.
164Draft report for Herbert Brittain by M.T. Flett, 9 June 
1953. PRO BT230/244
165 Ibid.
166Letter from C. Kemp UK Trade Commissioner in Cape Town to 
R.C. Bryant, Board of Trade, 26 January, 1955. PRO BT241/161.
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discrimination as of January 1954, and was congratulated by 
the Canadian and American representatives167. The effect on 
South African dollar imports, however, was not very damaging 
to the sterling area. As a percentage of total imports, those 
from the USA and Canada grew only from 23% to 25% from 1953 to 
1956 and declined thereafter168.
At the beginning of 1955 Pakistan also ended 
discrimination against dollar imports. At the end of August 
1954, facing political and economic crisis, the Government of 
Pakistan approached the USA for substantial aid. In October, 
$75m was granted to allow imports of capital goods, 
agricultural commodities and a wide range of scarce essentials 
from the USA. In June 1954, Pakistan had embraced the general 
sterling area export drive, introducing an Export Incentive 
Scheme which increased import licenses to industrial importers 
for raw materials and machinery for use in producing goods for 
export. As of January 1955, with American dollars in the 
offing, these import licences were declared valid for imports 
from all countries. The licences covered basic raw materials, 
spare parts and capital goods for the industrial sector and 
more limited imports for established and registered commercial 
importers. At the end of January a list of twenty-two items 
was published to be imported specifically against aid from the
167Minutes of GATT 8th Session 21 October, 1953, Summary record 
of the 17th meeting, 19 October, 1953. PRO BT11/4950.
168OEEC, Direction of International Trade.
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USA. These were mainly raw materials and semi-manufactures 
for industry. Between the end of 1953 and the end of 1955, 
Pakistan imports from the USA and Canada grew from 5% of total 
imports to 12% but much of this increase was funded by 
American aid and not the central reserves.
Other sterling area countries also relaxed their 
restrictions on dollar imports in less spectacular fashion. 
India relaxed dollar import licencing and increased quotas 
gradually through 1954-5 to allow greater imports of cheaper 
machinery and raw materials from the dollar area to help 
Indian industrialisation. By 1956, however, the adverse trade 
balance could no longer be ignored and consumer goods imports 
were cut in April and more wide ranging import controls were 
introduced in July 1957.
The movement to non-discrimination was motivated by 
politics as much as economics. Australia and South Africa 
were concerned to disentangle restrictions on their domestic 
industry but were also preoccupied with the strength of their 
political stance in GATT and IMF and their popularity with the 
USA. Pakistan was influenced by her position as a recipient 
of American aid which made it politically difficult to 
continue to discriminate against American exports as well as 
less necessary. The Indian relaxations, however, had resulted 
from the desperate need for imports from the cheapest market 
for their development effort.
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The liberalisation by the UK was motivated by the need to 
increase the competitiveness of British industry as well as 
the recognition that freer trade was a desireable and 
necessary companion to the steps toward convertibility which 
were taking place through 1954 and 1955. By this time, the 
publicity surrounding the international talks on the 
Collective Approach to convertibility and tangible steps 
toward convertibility taken in March 1954 had virtually 
committed Britain to gradual trade liberalisation and 
continued progress to convertibility. Opinion in both the 
Treasury and the Bank of England was convinced that this route 
was the only feasable approach to long term stability of 
sterling169.
The principle of discrimination was, thus, gradually 
disappearing from sterling area trade policy. Imports from 
the NSA to the independent RSA increased from 48% of total 
imports in 1953 to 53% by 1955 but despite liberalisation, 
imports from the dollar area alone fell from 19% in 1953 to 
17% by 1955170. Because the erosion of discrimination 
coincided with an American recession and a subsequent drop in 
exports from the USA, the liberalisation of dollar imports for 
South Africa and Pakistan and the more liberal licensing of 
dollar imports in other sterling area countries had little
169See Chapter VI.
170Balance of Payments Yearbook, IMF.
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immediate impact on the geographical composition of RSA trade.
XIX.H. Abandonment of a Sterling Area Trade Policy: 1955-58
After the boom years of 1953 and 1954, the sterling area 
was rocked by a series of crises of varying intensity and 
cause through 1955, 1956 and 1957. At the Commonwealth
Finance Ministers* Meeting at Instanbul in September 1955 the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer explicitly informed the RSA that 
although the sterling area's balance of payments had run into 
deficit, the UK did not intend to revert to import controls 
rather than credit restriction and other internal measures and 
recommended similar internal solutions to his RSA 
colleagues171. This was the first real test of the sterling 
area's commitment to indirect measures of trade policy. The 
response of the RSA was less enthusiastic than the Chancellor 
may have wished. The Australian finance minister reported 
that the wool crop was expected to be poor in the coming 
season which would restrain the inflationary boom that 
Australia was experiencing, but he added that internal 
measures were not going to be sufficient to correct the 
balance of payments172. Import restrictions had already been 
tightened in October 1954 and April 1955 but after the 
Istanbul conference there was a further tightening in category
171Minutes of first meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers, 
16 September, 1955. PRO D035/5633.
172Minutes of Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Meeting, 16 
September, 1955. PRO DO/5633.
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1B ■ goods designed to reduce imports by a further £80m p.a.. 
The South African representatives reported that their balance 
of payments was in a satisfactory situation due to strict 
import controls but that they would not hesitate to cut 
imports further if the need arose173. New Zealand 
representatives reported that they were coping so far with 
balance of payments problems through credit controls but that 
direct import controls would have to be considered soon174. 
New Zealand had adopted a policy of moving away from 
quantitative restrictions and replacing them with tariffs for 
protective purposes. This was continued after Istanbul, 
except in the case of woollen textile imports which were cut 
to 50% of their 1954 value in 1956, affecting both UK and NSA 
trade. India*s imports were already very strictly controlled 
as part of her Five Year Plan but good crops had lessened her 
balance of payments problems. The Second Five Year Plan, 
however, was due to start which emphasised heavy industry and 
would require greater capital goods imports175. The RSA, 
then, appear to have kept their faith in direct import 
controls as a short term palliative to their balance of 
payments problems and in some cases (e.g. Australia) as an 
alternative to strict internal measures.
173Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175Ibid.
Ceylon and New Zealand had embraced the British zeal for 
internal restraint most strongly. Ceylon had introduced an 
'austerity budget' at the end of July 1953 which provoked 
riots over its fiscal strictness. The government held firm, 
however, and taxes and import duties were increased and food 
subsidies were cut until the balance of payments began to 
recover in May 1954176. In New Zealand credit control was 
excercised with "dedicated ferocity" by even British 
standards177. Restraint was excercised by the establishment 
of a central capital issues control administration and by 
repeated increases in the reserve ratio of trading banks and 
restriction of import credits. Bank rate was also raised from 
1 1/2% in July 1954 to 7% in October 1955178.
Other countries did not follow internal restraint to such 
lengths. Pakistan was continually on the brink of revolution 
and famine through the middle 1950s so internal economic 
management took second place to emergency measures. Australia 
relied heavily on import restraint to correct her balance of 
payments. The Indian economy was strictly controlled but 
expansionary due to the government's commitment to 
industrialisation through successive 5-year plans. In
176Economic Review of Cevlon. Economist Intelligence Unit, 
London, May 1954.
177Economic Review of New Zealand. Economist Intelligence Unit, 
October, 1955. p. 2.
178Bank Rate changes had little effect on other interest rates 
due to the structure of the New Zealand financial market. Ibid.
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February 1956, the South African government imposed direct 
controls on capital flows from South Africa to the UK instead 
of squeezing domestic credit by raising South African interest 
rates in response to increases in the UK Bank Rate179.
In the event, the payments problems of 1954/55 were not 
solved through direct trade policy. Both the UK and the RSA 
continued to run deficits with the NSA from 1955-58, due 
primarily to increases in imports. RSA imports from the NSA 
rose by £780m or more than 50% between 1954 and 1958, which 
was the same value as the cumulative trade deficit over these 
four years. To some extent the sterling crisis of 1955 was 
due to speculative movements which, though not of course 
unrelated to the sterling area's trade position, were partly 
solveable in the short term through psychological rather than 
economic means. The relevant measures in 1955 were the 
Chancellor's steady denials that the exchange rate of sterling 
would be reduced from its $2.80 parity, first in the House of 
Commons in July and then at Istanbul in September. The years 
1955 and 1956 were testing years also for British monetary 
policy with Bank Rate raised twice to 4 1/2% in 1955 and then 
to 5 1/2% in 1956 while at the same time a wide range of 
domestic credit restrictions were activated. These measures, 
however, were not completely successful and although the 
British balance of trade improved significantly after January
179Economic Review of South Africa. Economist Intelligence 
Unit, March 1956, p. 3.
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1956, the central reserves did not recover their 1953/54 level 
before the Suez crisis disrupted sterling area payments once 
again.
What seems evident from the point of view of sterling 
area trade is that the adverse balance of 1955 was due much 
more to British deficits than to drains in the RSA. The RSA 
supplied almost half of the sterling area's exports to the NSA 
and was responsible for only 16% of the sterling area's 
deficit with the NSA (see Table III.A.). On overall balance 
of payments both the Colonies and the ISA had slight surpluses 
with the NSA over 1955 while the UK was in deficit by £300m on 
current and long term capital account, excluding aid180. The 
run down in reserves of £23 0m, £200m in the second half of 
1955 alone, can largely be attributed to the poor British 
trade performance from mid 1954 to the end of 1955, as well as 
to speculative pressures related to doubts about the sterling 
exchange rate.
By the time of the 1956 crisis, the heart seems to have 
gone out of sterling area trade policy coordination, both in 
Britain and in the RSA. India, Ceylon and Pakistan were 
increasingly being courted by West Germany, Eastern European 
countries and Japan as trading partners to replace the UK. 
India made trade agreements with Roumania and China in the 
Spring of 1954 and with East Germany in December and received
180IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook. IMF. The RSA surplus 
includes gold sales, which represent revenue not evenly distributed 
in the RSA.
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substantial technical and financial aid from the USSR in 
1955/56. Ceylon had concluded trade agreements with China in 
1953 and 1954 and concluded trade pacts with Poland and 
Czechlosovakia in early 1956. In March 1953, Pakistan 
concluded its first trade agreement with Japan for cotton and 
through 1954 sought bilateral agreements with Western and 
Eastern Europe to secure a market for her exports and 
agreements to allow deferred payment for her imports which the 
UK was unwilling to do. West Germany, in particular, 
increased its share of Pakistanfs trade, creating a market for 
German capital exports by developing industry in Pakistan and 
buying an increasing share of Pakistan goods to supply her 
with foreign exchange. Australia was increasingly orienting 
her economic relations to the USA and the IMF as potential 
sources of capital which was not available in the UK and then 
to earn the foreign exchange to repay dollar loans. Up to 
1957, Australia received $317m from IBRD to purchase dollar 
imports. Australian relations with the UK in 1956 were almost 
completely monopolised by negotiations to revise the Imperial 
Preferences between the two countries in Australia's favour. 
This was accomplished at the end of the year.
British policy after 1955 also moved further away from the 
preoccupation with the sterling area that had characterised 
the early 1950s. As noted above, trade between the sterling 
area and the rest of the world was gradually freed, making the 
area less of a discriminatory bloc. The move to de facto
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external convertibility in February 1955 reinforced this 
trend. The resilience of European trade to the effects of the 
American recession may also have had an influence in the 
declining importance of the sterling area to British trade 
policy. The healthy trade of Western Europe in 1954 had 
perhaps banished the spectre of American economic instability 
and with it the need to maintain a protective trade cushion in 
the sterling area.
The payments crisis of 1956 was essentially restricted to 
a speculative run on sterling and a temporary interruption in 
British and RSA trade due to the closure of the Suez Canal so 
similarly temporary solutions were sought by the British 
authorities. The UK drew £200m from her IMF quota and standby 
funds of $440m were arranged with the IMF and the American 
Export-Import Bank. This supported the reserves through to 
mid-1957 when a second speculative crisis rocked sterling due 
to rumours of imminent convertibility at a flexibile rate and 
to the imbalance among European economies. The Chancellor, 
Peter Thorneycroft, used internal deflationary measures to re­
establish confidence in British policy and sterling in 
September 1957. The trade figures in Table III.A. show that, 
unlike 1955, these two crises had little directly to do with 
the trade position of the UK or the RSA.
III.I. The Sterling Area and UK Export Competitiveness
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It was widely believed in the 1950s that the RSA provided 
British traders with an easy market based on traditional 
trading relationships and RSA holdings of expendable sterling 
assets. In 1956, for example P. Harris of the Board of trade 
reported that this was the view of the Board of Trade, the 
Treasury and the Economic Section181. D.H. Robertson wrote 
in 1954 that British traders were able to "lie back on the 
featherbed of mutual trade" with the sterling area rather than 
moving into more competitive world markets such as America and 
Europe182. The triangular vision of sterling area trade 
implied that the UK could earn foreign exchange indirectly 
through exports to the RSA so direct competition in the NSA 
was not necessary. This scenario on its own would not have 
been damaging to British export interests except for the fact 
that the RSA's imports grew much more slowly than the world 
average. Between 1948 and 1958, the RSA's total imports 
increased by 38% from $9803m to $13,563m183. Over the same 
period world imports grew by 71% which suggests that the RSA 
was, indeed, a relatively slow growing market for exports. 
North American imports grew by 84% over the same period but
181 P. Harris, "UK Export Trends", 1 October, 1956. PRO 
BT241/266.
182D.H. Robertson, Britain in the World Economy. George Allen 
and Unwin, London, 1954. p. 75. This sentiment was also expressed 
in the Board of Trade Journal. Vol 175, No. 3209, 8 August, 1958. 
p. 268-9.
183The figures for this analysis are from the OEEC's Direction 
of International Trade series.
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this was mostly due to large increases between 1948 and 1951. 
From 1951 to 1958 American imports grew only 23%. The 
Continental European market in contrast absorbed almost twice 
the value of imports in 1958 as in 1948 due to their 
industrial recovery after the war and the removal of trade 
restrictions. Figure III.D. shows the growth of imports for 
these three areas. RSA imports grew roughly in line with 
North American imports after 1951 although at a lower level.
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The trade figures for the 1950s show that, contrary to 
contemporary belief, British traders were quite successful in
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penetrating the competitive American market. British exports 
to the USA and Canada almost doubled between 1950 and 1958 and 
grew to 15% of total British exports184. Britain's 
performance in the faster growing Continental European market, 
however, was less successful. British exports to Western 
Europe increased only by 46% and remained a fairly constant 
proportion of Britain's total exports (23-25%). Figure III.E. 
shows that Britain's share in the European market remained
184Pirection of International Trade. OEEC.
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below 10% after 1951, declining after 1953 to 7.7% while 
intra-continental European trade expanded by 16% from 1951. 
The real issue of the 1950s in this context is why the British 
share of the European market fell during the 1950s. In the 
longer term this was the forerunner of a more damaging trend 
in Britain's export power.
The belief that this decline in market share for British 
exports was due primarily to undue concentration in the slowly 
growing RSA market has been abandoned by subsequent 
studies185. In the Brookings Institution investigation of 
the British economy in the 1960s Lawrence B. Krause concluded 
that "while the large concentration in the slowly growing 
sterling area markets has been somewhat unfavourable, it has 
been offset by a desireable product concentration"186. Thus, 
the benefits to British industry of having a large market for 
high growth manufacturing exports offset the effects of the 
slower overall growth in the RSA market. Krause's study 
concluded that Britain's slow economic growth and lack of 
price competitiveness were the primary causes of her falling 
world market share in the early 1960s187. An earlier study
185R.L Major, for example attributed only 9% of the decline in 
Britain's world market share during 1953-66 to the combined effects 
of commodity and area pattern changes. "Note of Britain's Share in 
World Trade in Manufactures, 1954-1966", National Institute 
Economic Review. No. 44, May 1968. pp 50-56.
186Lawrence B. Krause, "British Trade Performance" in R.E. 
Caves ed. Britain's Economic Prospects. Brooking Institution, 
Washington, 1968. p. 215.
187Ibid., p. 222.
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of price competitiveness in industrial markets showed a marked 
decline in British export price competitiveness in the 
European market between 1953-63188. Price and cost movements 
were, thus, probably responsible for much of the loss of 
Britain*s market share in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
price elasticity of demand for exports would be less during 
the periods of quantitative trade controls in the early 1950s 
but the European market did not really recover until after the 
controls were relaxed189.
While the relatively slow growth of the RSA market was 
not directly responsible for the loss of British competitive 
power it is still possible that the RSA provided a *soft' 
market for British exports which allowed her traders to sell 
inferior goods with respect to price and quality and still 
maintain their market while their competitors were forced into 
the harsher climate of American and European markets which 
demanded cheaper goods of better quality. In this case the 
existence of the sterling area system allowed the British 
manufacturing sector to fall behind European competitors in 
productivity and competitiveness. The * softness* of the RSA 
market, however, should not be exaggerated. Figure III.F. 
shows that Britain's share in the RSA market increased in the 
first half of the 1950s but that after 1954 British exporters
188R.L.Major, "Note on Britain's Share".
189Between 1951 and 1953 total European imports fell by $700m 
and then increased by $llb between 1953 and 1958. Direction of 
International Trade. OEEC.
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competed less successfully with foreign traders. This 
coincides with the relaxation in discrimination in RSA import 
controls and the acceleration of British exports to the USA 
and Canada.
British goods were also uncompetitive with respect to 
delivery dates, especially to the far off markets of Australia 
and New Zealand. Thus, in 1952, the Economist Intelligence 
Unit warned that "delivery dates are of vital significance and 
America, Germany and Japan can often deliver more quickly and
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at competitive prices"190. Quality and service were other
aspects of weak competitive power of British exports as is
evident in the following quotations from Economist
Intelligence Unit research. With respect to British car
exports, the EIU reported in 1957 that
Recently there has been considerable discussion on 
the prospects for British cars in Australia. 
Considerable criticism has been levelled at many 
types as "dust-boxes" and unable to stand up to 
poor roads, and there are recurrent complaints of 
poor after-sales attention and inadequate supply of 
spares191.
With respect to British textile exports, the UK Trade
Commissioner in Sydney warned in a speech to the Manchester
Chamber of Commerce that
competition from other textile producers was 
strengthening and designs from Switzerland, Italy 
and Germany are often considered more attractive 
than those from the UK192.
In the later 1950s and early 1960fs the UK was further forced
out of the RSA market because of the increasing amount of
American exports tied to American aid193.
After 1954 and the easing of discriminatory trade
controls by the RSA, the share of British exports in the RSA
market fell to 40%. Figure III.G. shows imports from the UK
190Economist Intelligence Unit, Economic Review of Australia. 
October, 1952. p. 2.
191 Ibid., April 1957. p. 6.
192Ibid. , p. 10.
193Krause, "British Trade Performance", in R.E. Caves ed. 
Britain!s Economic Prospects. Brookings Institution, Washington, 
1968. p. 216-17.
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as a percent of total imports for selected RSA countries and
the Colonies. The downward trend after 1954 was most marked 
in Australia, Britain*s largest trading partner, which 
contributed to most of the overall decline in Britain*s market 
share in the RSA. Similar declines were also, however, 
apparent for New Zealand and the Colonies. Britain*s share 
of India *s market also slipped after 1954 but had a short 
reprieve in 1956 before tumbling to 1958. Ceylon*s imports 
from Britain declined as early as 1953 and stagnated through 
to 1958. Britain's share of Pakistan's imports was very 
erratic but it too declined after 1954.
Britain's share in RSA imports of manufactured goods 
alone fell considerably faster than for overall imports. From 
1954 to 1960, the British share of manufactured imports into 
the non-European sterling area fell from 47.5% to 43.1%194. 
R.L. Major's calculations show that almost all of this was due 
to the general loss of British competitiveness in the goods 
exported to the RSA195. The loss in the RSA market was about 
the same as Britain's overall loss of market share in 
manufactures trade which dropped from 20.9% to 16.8% in the 
same period196.
Contemporary observers were aware of increasing 
competition in RSA markets. The import restrictions imposed 
by Australia and some other RSA countries against UK exports
194R.L. Major "Notes on Britain's Share in World Trade", p. 51.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
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in 1952/3 focused British policy on the development of non­
sterling markets and highlighted the danger of relying on the 
RSA to be a secure market indefinitely. Thus, through 1953 
Peter Thorneycroft, as President of the Board of Trade, gave 
a series of speeches to British industrialists and the House 
of Commons warning that the imposition of restrictions in the 
sterling area
requires a willingness on the part of our exporters 
to make the determined efforts necessary to 
establish themselves in newer markets that are open 
to our goods197
Lord Lloyd exhorted the Plymouth Mercantile Association that
if we encounter import restrictions in our 
established markets we cannot afford simply to sit 
down and wait until they are removed. We must go 
out and seek new business in the new markets that 
are open to our goods198
Apart from the tightening and relaxation of 
discrimination by the RSA, there are other reasons for the 
changing fortunes of British exports in the RSA market. 
G.D.N. Worswick argues that the constraint on Britain's 
overall exports in the early 1950s was primarily a shortage of 
supply199. This was due to the recovery and rearmament 
programme and to the high international demand for raw 
materials. The British steel shortage, especially, raised the
197Draft of speech for Thorneycroft for Queens Speech Debate, 
30 October, 1953. PR0241/266.
198Draft speech for Lord Lloyd by the Board of Trade, 23 
September, 1953. PRO BT241/266.
199G.D.N. Worswick, "Trade and Payments" in Sir A. Cairncross 
ed. Britain's Economic Prospects Reconsidered. 1969. p. 71.
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problem of the UK continuing to supply the RSA market. In the
estimates for 1952 steel exports a conflict arose between the
need to sell scarce supplies to the RSA and the need to export
to Europe in accordance with British bilateral agreements. In
1951, priority was given to the European agreements but this
provoked protests from the RSA, especially Australia. It was
believed in the Board of Trade that the future of the sterling
area's multilateral trading system was at stake if European
importers were treated more favourably than the RSA in 1952.
A Board of Trade note from R.H. King to K. Anderson in the
Treasury expressed the fear that
for the sterling area mechanism to continue to work 
in its present form, the other members need to feel 
sure that, in return for the raw materials and 
foodstuffs they send us, they will be able to 
obtain the greater part of their import needs of 
semi-manufactured and manufactured goods essential 
to their economy200
There is, then, evidence that the lower share of British
exports to the RSA in the early 1950s was in part due to
supply shortages in Britain.
It has been argued, then, that the RSA was not a very
soft market after 1953/4 and was competing for scarce British
supplies in the earlier 1950s. Earlier studies have shown
that the relatively slow growth of the RSA market was not
responsible for much of Britain's loss of market share. The
problems of British export competitiveness must, therefore, be
200Note drafted by J.A. Bergin for R.H. King to K. Anderson 10 
September, 1951. PRO BT11/4722.
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found in her own productivity and cost levels rather than 
blamed on the sterling area system.
III.J. Conclusions
Quantitative restrictions were essentially short term 
emergency restrictions to tide the economy over until longer 
term and more fundamental measures could take effect. This 
aspect was recognised in repeated sterling area statements 
that import restrictions were a short term solution and that 
internal measures were necessary in the longer term to make 
the sterling area viable. From 1953, the discriminatory 
element of the restrictions weakened and they became 
entrenched instead in the economic policy of the RSA as 
instruments of protection and as successive short term 
solutions to the longer term problem of developing trading 
power. Internal deflation never really took hold in the RSA 
as an alternative to direct import control because of the 
desire for expansion and development in most of these 
countries and because the financial and credit systems in the 
RSA were less developed so the effects of monetary policy and 
credit control were even less predictable than in the UK.
The goal of British trade policy in 1949-52 was the same 
as that of the RSA i.e. emergency rationing of scarce hard 
currency. From 1953, the process of trade liberalisation took 
hold in Britain and with it there was increased emphasis on 
the need for internal deflation and demand management to
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replace direct import controls. This was based on the 
recognition that import controls alone would merely divert 
domestic consumption to domestic production and so compete 
with exports as well as contributing to inflationary pressure 
as demand for domestic goods increased. This approach to the 
balance of payments in the 1950s became known as the 
absorption approach. It was believed that deflationary 
internal measures could be used to allow an increase in saving 
or decrease in investment necessary to correct the balance of 
payments problem in the medium term. From 1953, as direct 
controls became politically unsustainable, internal deflation 
on its own was increasingly relied on to correct the balance 
of payments generally and, of particular interest here, to 
help the balance of trade by reducing domestic demand for 
imports and for goods which could be exported. This policy 
was urged on the RSA governments as well.
All RSA members undertook some form of demand management 
through a mixture of credit control and fiscal policy. These 
measures were not, however, sufficient to obviate the need for 
direct import controls to avoid recurring balance of payments 
crises. The attempt by the UK to switch the RSA from direct 
controls to internal deflation policy was not altogether 
successful. This was due not only to the lack of consistency 
and enthusiasm with which the RSA governments imposed internal 
restraint but also to the inappropriateness of strict internal 
controls to these RSA economies. The RSA countries were, in
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general, undeveloped economies and this had three consequences 
for the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal restraint. The 
first was that the governments of these countries were in most 
cases committed to general economic development of their 
nations, both industrially and with respect to general 
amenities and the standard of living. This was inconsistent 
with the strictly balanced budgets and restraint on investment 
which was urged from Whitehall. Most countries, therefore, 
applied instruments of domestic restraint less firmly than was 
possible in the UK and some, such as India and Australia, 
chose to continue to rely on direct import controls rather 
than foresake the development of secondary industry. The 
second characteristic of RSA economies in which they differed 
from the UK was in the sophistication and efficiency of their 
financial markets which, as noted previously, made the impact 
of monetary policy even less reliable or predictable than in 
the UK. Thus, we have seen that enormous Bank Rate increases 
in New Zealand had little effect on the credit conditions of 
the New Zealand economy.
Thirdly, due to the relatively undeveloped state of most 
RSA economies their exports were concentrated in a few primary 
commodities while they imported a wide range of consumer 
goods, capital goods and food. The 'absorption approach1 to 
balance of payments problems embraced in the UK and urged on 
the RSA was, thus, much less appropriate to these less 
developed economies. Rather than discouraging the consumption
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of goods which might be exported, this was actively encouraged 
in some RSA countries. The diversion of resources from raw 
material exports to secondary production for the domestic 
market was the active policy of the governments of the poorer 
RSA countries such as India, Pakistan and Ceylon who were 
actually driven to tax some of their natural raw material 
exports to divert them to the domestic market for development 
purposes. In Australia and New Zealand, import controls and 
tariffs were increasingly used for protectionist purposes to 
help develop domestic manufacturing industry such as textiles 
in order to use their own raw materials such as wool. 
Although all RSA members agreed to the need for strict 
internal deflation, they were either unable to fulfil their 
commitments, given the need for development or, as in Ceylon 
and New Zealand, even very strict internal measures proved 
insufficient to correct their balance of trade problems as the 
terms of trade turned against primary producers.
Figure III.H. shows the terms of trade of the UK and the 
RSA seperately. These indexes move generally
countercyclically throughout the 1950s. They move together 
only in 1955 when there is little change in either and in 1953 
when a slight increase in the terms of trade of the RSA 
coincides with a massive increase for the UK. These 
offsetting movements had the benefit of softening the effects 
of the often violent fluctuations in prices which 
characterised the 1950s. The terms of trade for the sterling
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area trading system as a whole were thus less extreme than for 
either part of the area alone.
The sterling area system was important to the UK as a 
soft currency source of raw materials. In judging the 
contribution which the RSA trade balance made to instability 
and drains on reserves in the early 1950s it must be 
remembered that the RSA provided the UK with essential raw 
materials from a source which did not cause a direct drain on 
the British reserves. If the UK had been forced to pay hard 
currency for these materials either the reserves position
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would have been in much more straightened circumstances or the 
recovery of British industry and manufacturing would have been 
delayed or made even more dependent on American aid with its 
attendant conditions. In 1953-55 when the UK trade balance 
with the RSA deteriorated, the RSA's sterling balances were 
growing steadily. In this sense, the RSA was giving Britain 
credit to cover her raw material imports.
The net effect of the RSA trade balance on the central 
reserves is thus difficult to determine. It certainly could 
not be said, however, that the existence of the sterling area 
trade system was the source of the apparent weaknesses in the 
British balance of payments, nor was it the source of the 
recurring need for restrictive measures. This reinforces the 
conclusions of Chapter II. The extent to which the sterling 
area system contributed to the weakness of the British balance 
of payments through long term capital flows will be addressed 
in the next chapter.
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Chapter IV, Long Term Capital Flows within the Sterling
Area
After the sterling crisis of 1947 and the indefinite 
suspension of convertibility, free capital flows emerged as 
an important component of the sterling area system. This 
chapter will discuss how the principle of free long term 
capital flows to the sterling area manifested itself in 
British policy and how management of the sterling area was 
affected by this policy through the 1950*s.
IV.A. Capital Flows and British Policy
The principle of free of capital flows from the UK meant 
that there were no direct controls on private investment in 
the sterling area. In practice the British authorities were 
able to exert some control over the nature and timing of 
some of this investment if not over the volume of capital 
flowing abroad. The Capital Issues Committee vetted all 
private applications to the London market for investment in 
the sterling area, defering to the Treasury, Board of Trade 
and Colonial Office as to the likely benefit of the project 
for the UK or sterling area balance of payments. Sterling 
area central governments had the exclusive privilege of 
floating official loans in London. The timing of the 
government issues accepted by the CIC was under the further 
control of the Bank of England who maintained a list of 
pending applications ranged in order of priority. In some
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cases, depending on the conditions prevailing in the market, 
the Bank would rearrange this list, so delaying the issues 
of particular governments.
Until 1952 the requirement for capital raised on the 
London market for sterling area investment was that it had 
to be for specific projects which promised to benefit the 
British balance of payments. This was not especially 
limiting provided that such projects promoted British 
exports, restricted imports, exploited foreign expertise or 
gained control of scarce raw materials which were useful to 
British industry.
In 1952, sterling area access to the London market was 
widened. At the Commonwealth Economic Conference in 
December of that year, the British government committed 
itself to a 'Special Effort* to encourage capital flows to 
the rest of the sterling area. Applications from 
sterling area governments and from private investors to the 
London market for capital destined for sterling area 
countries were to be accepted on the basis of their effect 
on the general sterling area balance of payments rather than 
on their effect on the UK directly. Thus, any application 
which promised to encourage sterling area exports or to 
promote production which replaced non-sterling imports would 
be allowed. The communique also explicitly recognized the 
need for basic development in some regions. As part of the 
'Special Effort' the Commonwealth Development and Finance
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Company was established with £15m sucscribed by the Bank of 
England and ninety-one British business concerns to channel 
private capital into development projects in the sterling 
area and Canada. The CDFC was enpowered to borrow up to 
twice the original capital stake but by March 1957 they had 
committed only £l4m1.
The 1 Special Effort1 was reconfirmed and extended at the 
Commonwealth Economic Conference of January 1954. From this 
time sterling area governments could float loans on the 
London market for general development programmes as well as 
specific projects.
To this point, at least, it appears that official policy 
consisted of a broad commitment by the British authorities 
to encourage investment and British financed development in 
the sterling area. Behind the scenes, however, there was 
serious doubt among officials at the Treasury and the Bank 
of England about the wisdom of encouraging capital flows to 
the sterling area. In January 1953, immediately after the 
much heralded announcement of the 'Special Effort', a debate 
rose between R.W.B. Clarke, an under-secretary at the 
Treasury, and Robert Hall, Director of the Economic Section 
of the Cabinet. In response to requests from the Economic 
Secretary for a policy paper on sterling area investment, 
both submitted reports in early 1953.
1 'UK Investment in the Sterling Commonwealth', May 6 1957. PRO 
BT213/96.
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Clarke's paper contended that the UK would never attain 
the level of exports necessary for an adequate current 
surplus if investment continued to be directed overseas2.
He calculated that Britain needed an annual current surplus 
of £300-£350m to meet existing obligations on the capital 
account. This was proving a difficult target to meet and 
Clarke argued that in this climate no further capital claims 
should be introduced. He suggested a tight monetary policy 
to direct resources into domestic export industries and 
concluded "what has to be done is to put as many obstacles 
as possible in the way of sterling area borrowing"3.
Robert Hall's response three days later argued that 
increasing overseas investment and export credit facilities 
to stimulate demand for British exports was the only way the 
UK would ever achieve the necessary current surplus4.
Based on earlier Treasury working party reports that 
predicted a £300-£600m slack in the British economy in 1953, 
Hall argued that exports were demand constrained rather than 
limited by under-investment in the domestic economy5. 
Furthermore, he argued that the British economy should be 
able to expand enough to allow for both sufficient domestic 
and foreign investment. While recognizing that in the short
2Paper by R.W.B. Clarke 26 January, 1953. PRO T229/543.
3Ibid.
4Paper by Robert Hall, 2 February 1953. PRO T230/226
5Ibid.
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run the external capital position of the UK was 
'precarious1, Hall asserted that this did not affect the 
economy's capacity for long term overseas investment. Sound 
investment in the sterling area was a long term solution to 
the balance of payments problem by increasing invisible 
earnings and developing non-dollar sources of British 
imports, thus reducing the dollar deficit. In the short 
term, commercial credit should be increased to combat 
international illiquidity and to stimulate demand for 
British exports. A freer overseas investment policy would 
only prompt a drain on reserves if British investment 
stimulated dollar expenditure by the rest of the sterling 
area. In this case, Hall suggested that the British 
authorities should try to come to an arrangement with the 
sterling area to further limit dollar expenditure. The 
bottom line, however, was that investment in the sterling 
area would ultimately strengthen the British balance of 
payments and a tighter monetary policy would be 
ill-advised6.
The debate continued through February 1953 with the 
Economic Section of the Cabinet promoting a wide 
interpretation of the 'Special Effort' and the Treasury 
pressuring to conserve resources for the domestic economy. 
Near the end of February a paper expressing both views was 
prepared for the Economic Secretary with some favourtism
6Ibid.
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alloted to Robert Hall's view7 and this bias was reflected 
in the widening of sterling area access to British capital 
announced in January 1954. The debate over the advantages 
and disadvantages of British investment in the sterling 
area, however, continued.
Much of the contemporary literature seems to have sided 
with Otto Clarke's analysis. As noted in Chapter I, A.C.L. 
Day, writing in 1954 warned against the dangers of devoting 
too many resources to overseas investment and "failing to 
realize that Britain's wealth depends primarily on the 
competitive strength of her manufacuturing industry, and 
only secondarily on the profits of international banking and 
merchanting"8. Shonfield, in his tract on British economic 
policy published in 1958, stated more categorically that 
British economic growth was "stunted as a result of this too 
vigourous pursuit of overseas investment"9. On the eve of 
the 1954 Commonwealth Economic Conference, The Economist 
also warned its readers that the financing of sterling area 
development could only be at the expense of the British 
economy10.
7Treasury Paper, 24 February, 1953. PRO T229/543.
8A .C.L . Day, The Future of Sterling. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
2nd ed., 1956 (first edition 1954). p. 154.
9A. Shonfield, British Economic Policy Since the War. Penguin
Books, London, 1958. p. 125.
10The Economist. 16 January, 1954. p. 183.
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That the Treasury, especially, continued to have 
reservations about the wisdom of free capital flows to the 
sterling area is apparent in the negotiations for the 
renewal of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act during 
1954 and 1955. Throughout the prolonged discussions of how 
much official money should be allotted for the programme 
over the next four years, the Treasury stood firm against 
Colonial Office warnings about the potential for unrest and 
hardship which would result from the combination of a 
further restriction on the amount of official funds 
available to the Colonies coupled with a tightening of the 
London market against Colonial issues11. Instead, the 
Treasury emphasized the need for Colonies to fund their own 
development or to look for non-British sources of finance. 
The figure for the four year development allocation was thus 
whittled down from £120-£130m suggested in June 1954 to only 
£80m by March 1955. The unwillingness or inability to 
afford extra capital for the CDC is evidence of the 
weakening of Britainfs most basic financial commitment in 
the sterling area, namely the development and welfare of her 
colonial territories.
In 1956, the Treasury-Bank of England Sterling Area 
Working Party concluded that ideally sterling area
11Note of a Colonial Office/HMT meeting 9 June, 1954. PRO 
C01025/75.
investment should be cut12. The reasons given were first 
to force the RSA to use their existing sterling balances to 
finance their investment thus reducing UK liabilities, and 
secondly that overseas investment drained resources away 
from British industry13. Otto Clarke's interpretation of 
the effects of overseas investment was thus still held in 
the Treasury and shared by the Bank of England. While on 
this basis investment flows ought to be cut, the report 
recognized that there were other circumstances which made 
such a policy less attractive. The report noted that the 
current surplus was in part dependent on the invisible 
earnings and exports generated by overseas investment. More 
emphasis was given to the assertion that these capital flows 
linked the sterling area together, that the British 
government had a political commitment to continue investment 
after the Commonwealth Economic Conferences of 1952 and 1954 
and finally that the Colonies at least had a right to 
development as dependencies of the UK14. Since direct 
controls were impossible for these essentially political 
reasons, the report concluded that high interest rates 
should be allowed to curb overseas investment since they 
would not appear to be directed uniquely at sterling area
12|IReport of the Sterling Area Working Party" 25 June,
1956. BoE OV 44/32.
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
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borrowing. The implication of the Report was that the 
relatively free capital flows to the RSA were an economic 
burden that had to be borne for political reasons. The 
accuracy of this assessment will be examined later in this 
chapter.
The premise that capital flows were a cohesive force in 
the sterling area was based on two assertions. First, it 
was believed that freedom of capital flows was a major 
attraction of membership for the rest of the sterling area. 
Secondly, if investment flows from the UK were severely 
restricted, the rest of the sterling area would be forced to 
look elsewhere for capital. This would encourage them to 
accumulate non-sterling reserves to pay back loans and, on 
the principle that trade follows investment, their trading 
patterns would be gradually aligned away from British 
exports. These two considerations were connected through 
the sterling balances problem since if capital flows were 
further restricted this might precipitate a wholesale 
running down of sterling balances both to replace the lost 
development capital and to diversify of reserves as the RSA 
realigned itself to the USA. These fears were apparently 
limited to the consequences of severe rationing of capital 
flows since official British policy was to encourage the RSA 
to seek out new sources of development capital as far as 
they were able. It should be noted that the RSA was not 
particularly successful in attracting foreign investment
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from outside the UK. Whether this would have been the case 
if British capital had been officially curtailed, however, 
is not certain.
The conclusions of the 1956 Sterling Area Working Party 
report were repeated through to the end of the 1950s. Three 
days after the report was completed, a more general Economic 
Policy Review was commissioned by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer which reiterated the Working Party conclusions15.
In May 1957, the Treasury and Bank of England completed a 
series of papers on "The Prospects for Sterling: The Capital 
Account" for the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet 
which looked more specifically at where investment in the 
sterling area could be pruned without resort to direct 
controls16. It showed that withdrawing the 1 Special 
Effort* commitment would not have had any real effect since 
the impact of the policy had been offset by high interest 
rates and the CDFC was not working to capacity17. The 
dangers to British influence which might result from large 
scale sterling area borrowing outside the sterling area were 
repeated but the prospects for the sterling area raising 
substantial funds outside London were acknowledged to be
15"0verseas Investment" HMT Paper 25 July, 1956. PRO T230/306.
16Treasury Papers May, June 1957. PRO BT213/96
17,UK Investment in the Sterling Commonwealth1, May 6 1957. PRO 
BT213/96.
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poor18. Finally, cutting back on the £60m committment to 
sterling area development made by the UK through the IBRD 
was considered politically undesireable19. In any case, 
the prospects for UK exports were taken into account in 
allowing releases of the UK subscription to the IBRD so in 
this sense the capital outflow was 1tied*.20
In the end no action was suggested or taken beyond 
letting high interest rates discourage borrowing on the 
London market21. When the Radcliffe Committee questioned 
Governor Cobbold of the Bank of England about the effect of 
investment flows to the sterling area in determining 
interest rate policy he replied "I think that [sterling area 
investment] would certainly be a consideration, that it 
[interest rate] affects investment all over the area" 
however he added that he "would not regard it as ever having 
been a main influence in anything we have done; not 
decisive, but certainly a factor in our minds"22. To some 
extent, then, sterling area investment may have affected 
interest rate policy because there was no other politically
18'Commonwealth Borrowing Outside the Sterling Area', May 7
1957. PRO BT213/96.
19HMT Paper "Sterling Releases to the IBRD" 6 May, 1957. PRO 
BT213/96.
20Note for the Minister of State by the Board of Trade, 26 June 
1956. PRO BT213/67.
21fDirect Investment Summary1, 6 May, 1957. PRO BT213/96.
22Radcliffe Committee Minutes Q 875-76, 26 July, 1957.
sound way of restricting capital flows to the area. This 
point should not, however, be overemphasized given Governor 
Cobbold's hesitation and the many other influences on 
interest rate policy in the 1950s23. Furthermore, in 1957 
the Colonial Office reported that there was little evidence 
that high interest rates had restricted Colonial borrowing 
since the amount of capital raised on the London market had 
increased from £9.5m in 1955 to £11.5m in 1956 and to £15.5m 
by May 1957 during which time Bank Rate had been raised from 
3.5% to 5.5%24. The Colonial Office asserted that Colonial 
borrowing was governed by needs and access to the market and 
that they could afford the higher interest payments25. A 
Board of Trade report noted that while the high interest 
rates had not affected Colonial borrowing there was some 
evidence that Australia and South Africa had been encouraged 
by high interest rates to look elsewhere for capital26.
The pattern that emerges from this survey of the 
official policy toward sterling area capital flows is that 
the Treasury and Bank of England were powerless to limit 
overseas investment for political reasons, although in most
23For an account of the intentions of monetary policy in the 
1950s see J.C.R. Dow, The Management of the British Economy 1945- 
60, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964. p. 252-57.
24Colonial Office note Date PRO BT213/96.
25Ibid_s_
2611 UK Investment in the Sterling Commonwealth", 6 May, 1957. 
PRO BT 213/96.
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cases they believed that this would be a good thing (the 
exception was investment in Middle Eastern oil interests). 
The over-riding political consideration was the cohesion and 
continued stability of the sterling area. Since direct 
controls were impossible, it was hoped that the high 
interest rates would restrict borrowing. Since the policy 
was not obviously targetted specifically at sterling area 
investment it was hoped that the political difficulties 
could be avoided at the cost of a more generous outflow of 
investment than was desired.
Two questions arise from this interpretation of policy.
First, was sterling area investment such a burden on the 
British economy as was commonly supposed both among 
officials and in the contemporary literature? Secondly, 
was the continuation of these capital flows to the sterling
area an important cohesive factor in the system, worth the
perceived burden on the balance of payments and on British 
industry. The next two sections of this chapter will 
address these questions suggesting that, while the capital 
flows were not a very strong cohesive factor, nor were these 
flows an onorous burden on the British economy.
IV. B. The Burden of Long Term Capital Flows
IV.B.i The Volume of Long Term Capital Flows
Tracing the volume and direction of British investment 
in the sterling area employs the arts of speculation and
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estimation to a degree that, while by no means unique in 
economic history, still leaves the working figures at the 
level of rough estimates. The problem with the data is due 
to the nature of the sterling area itself. Because members 
enjoyed unrestricted capital movement among themselves, no 
precise record could be made of the flow of investment 
capital from the UK. Thus David Bensusan-Butt complained in 
1958 that
our own White Papers give figures which are quite 
certainly wrong by large amounts. They are pieced 
together, for the most part from RSA countries' 
own estimates which range from big figures for 
Australia and New Zealand (who have wide 
definitions and elaborate surveys) through to 
wobbly guesses or mere balancing items for South 
Africa and Hong Kong27.
Grants, official loans and other official investment 
could all be accounted for. Capital raised on the London 
market by private companies based in the overseas sterling 
area could also be traced since the Capital Issues Committee 
vetted sterling area as well as domestic applications to the 
market. The gap in the overseas investment figures was in 
the volume of private direct investment by UK firms in 
sterling area branches or subsidiaries. Where this 
investment capital was raised within the parent company 
without recourse to the London market or was raised through 
an issue in the domestic company's name and then sent 
overseas, British exchange control authorities had no record
27D.M.B. Butt, 'Capital Movements within the Commonwealth', 6 
May 1958. PRO T236/4079.
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of the capital flow. The other large omission was in the 
measurement of reinvested profits of sterling area branches 
of UK companies. It was the contemporary belief that 
reinvested profits were substantially underestimated, 
suggesting that the outflow of capital from the UK to the 
sterling area was larger than the official figures 
allowed28. Conan suggested this omission amounted to 
perhaps £200m per year29. Later analysis by Arthur 
Hazlewood refuted the importance of reinvested profits based 
on data available for the period after 195830. From 1958 
onwards, the Board of Trade commissioned a census of private 
overseas investment by UK companies which showed that net 
reinvested profits during this later period were fairly 
insubstantial. This evidence does not, of course, prove 
that such investment was insignificant for the rest of the 
1950*s. It is conceivable that, with some branches in an 
earlier state of development, the proportion of profits 
ploughed back into the enterprise might be higher than when 
the branches had matured. The evidence that is available
28A .R . Conan, Capital Imports into Sterling Countries. 
Macmillan, London, 1960. p. 84., Committee on the Working of the 
Monetary System: Minutes of Evidence. Appendix, HMSO, I960., M. 
Scott, 'What Should Be Done About the Sterling Area?' Bulletin of 
the Oxford University Institute of Statistics. Vol. 21, No. 4, Nov. 
1959. p. 217.
29Conan, Capital Imports, p.84.
30A. Hazlewood, "The Export and Import of Capital" in Worswick 
and Ady ed., The British Economy in the Nineteen-fifties. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1962. p. 176.
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for Australia and New Zealand at least, suggests that the 
proportion of reinvested profits in the 1950s was fairly 
substantial but volatile31. The components of UK 
investment in the rest of the sterling area will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. It 
suffices for the present to recognize the potential for 
error in the estimates of capital flows from the UK due to 
the nature of the sterling area * rules* and the fact that 
private investment accounted for up to 90% of gross 
investment by the UK in the sterling area32.
Estimates of the outflow of long term capital from the 
UK to the sterling area vary widely in the literature 
concerning this period. Shonfield estimated that the net 
total of private and official capital plus government 
grants amounted to perhaps £150m per year between 1952 and 
195633. Conan calculated that capital imports into the 
major non-oil members of the sterling area (ie. 
Australia, South Africa, the Colonies, Rhodesia and
31Annual Bulletin of Overseas Investment : Australia 1960- 
61, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, 1962., 
New Zealand: Report on Official Estimates of Balance of Payments 
1960-61. Department of Statistics, Wellington, 1961. These figures 
were included in the UK Balance of Payments estimates since the 
data were available to the British authorities.
32Radcliffe Committee Minutes, Appendix
33A. Shonfield, British Economic Policy Since the War. Penguin 
Books, London, 1958. p. 125.
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India) from the UK amounted to £2075m between 1946 and 
195834. In an earlier version of this paper he estimated 
that the capital inflow from the UK to these countries and 
territories amounted to £1650m between 1946 and 1955, an 
annual average of £165m for these years and £142m for the 
years 1956-68 if his estimates are consistent35.
With respect to gross capital outflow to the sterling 
area, there are two sets of data which can be compared.
The Bank of England, in evidence to the Radcliffe Committee, 
estimated UK gross investment in the sterling area at 
between £172m and £272m per year between 1952 and 1957 or an 
average of £220m per year36. The estimate of the gross 
total capital outflow to the RSA for 1946-54 was £1621m37. 
More recently, W.P. Michael undertook an exhaustive study of 
capital flows to and from the sterling area for 1950-5438. 
Michael*s figures for gross private investment plus 
government loans amount to £1053m for the years 1950-54. If 
the two sources are consistent, the total gross outflow for 
1946-49 would be £568m. The net figure for the sum of
34Conan, Capital Imports, p. 70.
35A.R. Conan, The Changing Pattern of International Investment 
in Selected Sterling Countries. Essays in International Finance, 
No. 27, Dec. 1956, Princeton University, New Jersey, 1956. p.17.
36Radcliffe Committee Minutes, Appendix.
37Ibid.
38W.P. Michael, Measuring International Capital Movements. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1971.
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inter-governmental loans, private long and short-term 
capital and the balancing item for 1946-49 amounts to a net 
outflow of £574m as recorded in the Treasury balance of 
payments estimates39.
The likelihood is that the Michael figures and the Bank 
estimates are fairly consistent. The Michael data for the 
UK are based mainly on balance of payments figures published 
in the IMF Balance of Payments Yearbooks which in turn are 
compiled mostly from official balance of payments 
estimates40. Furthermore, very little adjustment to these 
figures was required after breaking them down into gross 
values based on partner data. Michael's breakdown of UK 
capital outflow to the sterling area accorded to within 
£25m with sterling area receipts for the five years 
together41. Within the sterling area the estimates are 
less precise but the total volume is comparable to the 
Bank's Radcliffe Committee estimates.
One final indication of the volume of capital flowing to 
the sterling area is to look at the figures compiled by the 
rest of the sterling area for capital imports from the UK 
and used by the British authorities when compiling their 
estimates for the UK balance of payments. The sources of 
data vary widely for each country or territory. Australia,
39UK Balance of Payments. 1946-57. HMSO, London, 1959.
40Michael, Measuring Capital Flows, p. 22.
41Ibid.
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New Zealand and India all published censuses of inflows of 
private overseas investment in industrial or manufacturing 
concerns although these are also incomplete to varying 
degrees. The Australian figures are the most complete, 
covering private direct and portfolio investment42. The 
drawback of the data, as with the New Zealand data, is that 
they were calculated according to fiscal years ending 30 
June rather than the calendar years used by the rest of the 
sterling area. The New Zealand census data has the further 
limitation that it covers only direct investment flows43.
The Indian census results were published in a series of 
articles by the Reserve Bank of India and recorded stock 
values of foreign business investments at the end of 1948, 
1953 and 1955-5844. Capital flow were recorded only for 
1956-58. Comparison of yearly stock figures does not give a 
true picture of capital flows since they include 
revaluations of old investments as well as new capital.
From 1956-58, when it is possible to compare them, the 
changes in stock values underestimate recorded net capital
42Annual Bulletin of Overseas Investment: Australia 1960-61. 
No. 6, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, 
1962.
43New Zealand: Report on Official Estimates of Balance of
Payments 1960-61. Department of Statistics, Wellington, 1961.
44Reserve Bank of India Bulletin. Dec. 1957, Sept. 1958, June 
1959, April 1960.
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inflows.
The Ministry of Finance of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland also compiled estimates of foreign capital 
receipts by both official and private sectors45. The 
results, however, are not broken down geographically until 
1953 and then only into sterling area, dollar area and 
international agencies. The sterling area classification 
includes capital from South Africa although the reports 
state that "most" of the new sterling area capital is from 
the UK while only "small amounts" are from South Africa.
The South African census recorded a stock value of 
investment in Rhodesia and Nyasaland of £90.5m in 195646. 
Before 1953, details of the larger components of the capital 
inflow into Rhodesia and Nyasaland were described so it is 
possible to attribute most of the capital to its country of 
origin.
South Africa published a census of overseas investment 
in 1956 but this recorded only stock values of overseas 
investment as at the end of 195647. Approximate net
45Economic Report. Ministry of Finance, Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, Salisbury, 1954, 1956, 1958, 1958.
46Economic Report. Ministry of Finance, Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, Salisbury, 1958. p. 38.
47South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics. 
Supplement, Dec. 1958.
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figures for British investment in South Africa and the
Colonies is available from the relevant IMF Balance of
Payments Yearbooks for 1950-58.
The Balance of Payments and Census returns tend to
disguise oil investment. Detailed figures, however, are
available from Board of Trade and Treasury papers for
investment in oil in the sterling area based on confidential
company returns for the years 1952-5748. These figures are
Table IV.A.
Partner Data on net Flow of UK Investment 
to Selected Sterling Area Countries
£m
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Colonies 51 63 119 91 122 93 134 152 118
Australia 36 38 89 34 43 55 49 50 54
South Africa
51 55 
Rhod & Nyasaland
24 9 26 2 -10 -20 -10
18 19 18 25 14 25 22 33 40
New Zealand
6 -33 11 0 15 7 2 0 30
India 28 -5 -6 0 -2 -9 -2 -11 12
Total 190 
Oil
137 255 159
58
218
48
173
32
195
44
204
52
244
Source: Colonies, India and South Africa: IMF Balance of 
Payments Yearbook (IMFBPYB),
Australia: Annual Bulletin of Overseas Investment: Australia 
1960-61. No. 6, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics, Canberra, 1962.,
Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Economic Report. Ministry of 
Finance, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Salisbury, 
1954, 1956, 1958, 1958.
New Zealand: New Zealand: Report on Official Estimates of 
Balance of Payments 1960-61. Department of Statistics, 
Wellington, 1961.
48Treasury Paper "UK Investment in the Sterling 
Commonwealth" 6 May, 1957 PRO BT213/96 and "UK Long Term Capital 
Transactions", 12 May 1958 PRO T236/4079.
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presented in the last line of Table IV.A. If these figures 
are accurate, 25-27% of private investment in the sterling 
area during these years was in oil, most of which was 
destined for the sterling Commonwealth.
The results for net capital investment in individual 
sterling area countries in 1950-58 is presented in Table 
IV.A. and covers approximately 80% of official estimates of 
total UK investment in the sterling area as a whole. The 
geographical distribution of UK capital flows must be 
considered approximate but it serves to establish the 
relative orders of magnitude of the receiving countries. 
Thus, the greatest part of UK investment in the sterling 
area was destined for the Colonies, Australia and South 
Africa although the political situation in the latter 
country led to a net capital outflow after 1955.
The UK Balance of Payments for 1946-57. published by the 
Treasury in 1959 offers the most consistent annual survey 
of British investment in the entire sterling area. After 
1952, short term capital flows and errors and ommissions are 
separated from private long term capital along with 
outstanding intercompany balances and intercompany loans.
The data also include intergovernmental loans by and to the 
UK. These figures are presented in Table IV.B. along with 
the relative magnitude of UK investment in the non-sterling 
area. It is clear that by far the greater part of British 
overseas investment in the 1950s was destined for the
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sterling area.
Table IV.B.
Official Estimates of 
Net Long Term Capital Flows 
From the UK to the Rest of the Sterling Area
£m 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Official Donations
18 20 30 24 41 47 41 46 48
Net Government Loans
13 14 11 11 21 19 10 15 34
Private Investment
195 151 150 190 180 110 180 280 220
Total 234 192 199 235 243 175 231 340 302
Investment in rest of world
-113 169 19 40 31 54 51 -87
Grand Total
121 361 218 275 274 239 282 253
Notes: Data for 1950-57 from UK Balance of Payments for
1946-57. HMSO. 1959. 1958 from IMF :Balance of Payments
Yearbook.
These annual estimates can be compared to UK Gross 
Domestic Product to show the relative magnitude of British 
capital exports. The results are presented in Table IV.C.
As a proportion of GDP, UK capital flows to the sterling 
area seem fairly insubstantial, varying between 1% and 1.7% 
only. In the period 1870-1914, when capital exports were 
also popularly considered to be a burden on the economy, 
they comprised 5% of GDP49. Relative to the American 
economy in the 1950's, however, the UK figures appear much 
more substantial. It should also be noted that the UK 
figures cover investment in the sterling area only although
49S. Pollard, "Capital Exports, 1870-1914: Harmful or
Beneficial" Economic History Review Vol XXXVIII, No. 4, Nov. 1985. 
p.489-514. p. 491.
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this accounts for by far the greatest part of total overseas
investment.
Table IV.C.
Long Term 
1950
Capital Flows to the Sterling 
As a Percentage of GDP
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Area
1956 1957
1958 
UK £b 
GDP 11.5 12.8 13 .9 15.1 15.9 17.1 18.5 19.6
20.4
Capital Flow .234 .192 .199 .235 .243 .175 .231 .340
.302
% 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.0 1.2 1.7
1.5
USA $b 
GDP 261.4 302.5 317.9 333.2 331.1 362.5 385.0 404.3
Capital Flow .278 1.6 1.0 .630 .639 .455 2.7 3.6
% 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.9
Source: GDP is at factor cost at current prices from
Economic Trends. Annual Supplement to 1988 edition. USA 
figures from Historical Statistics of the United States. 
Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1960.
A further indication of the relatively large part that 
overseas investment played in the UK economy is evident in a 
comparison of US and UK domestic savings in relation to 
overseas investment. These figures are presented in Table 
IV.D. If
Table IV.D.
Overseas Investment as a Percentage of Domestic Saving
Comparison with USA
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
0.7
12.8
3.2
8.1
2.0
9.5
1.2
10.4
1.2
9.2
0.8
6.1
4.2
6.7
5.4
9.2
Notes: USA statistics from Historical Statistics of the 
United States. 1960. UK statistics from relevant editions 
of Estimates of National Income and Expenditure. HMSO.
domestic and overseas investment were substitutes competing
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for the same funds (as in the Shonfield scenario), overseas 
investment in the UK took up a larger part of available 
resources than did American overseas investment. This 
suggests that the squeeze on domestic investment imposed by 
overseas investment opportunities may have been considerably 
stronger in the UK than in the USA. This would support 
Shonfield's contention "that the British economy is robbed 
of necessary nourishment... as a result of this too vigourous 
pursuit of overseas investment"50. The OEEC in a 1953 
report also blamed low domestic industrial investment partly 
on the need to share available capital with the rest of the 
sterling area51.
IV.B.ii. The Impact of Foreign Investment on the Domestic
Economy
The impact of overseas investment on the donor economy 
is an issue that has occupied the attention of economists 
for decades and a simple judgement is not possible with 
respect to investment in the sterling area. It is, however, 
possible to come to some approximation of whether the effect 
of British investment in the sterling area on the British 
economy in the 1950s was positive or negative. The first 
step is to construct a tentative counterfactual case to 
arrive at the possible effects of a system of exchange
50Shonfield, British Economic Policy, p. 107.
51OEEC, Economic Conditions in the UK. Paris, 1953. p. 16.
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controls which diverted all of British investment in the 
sterling area to gross fixed capital formation at home.
This gives the most optimistic case since it is by no means 
certain that in the event of controls on overseas investment 
all of the capital invested abroad would have been invested 
as productively at home as actual domestic investment. Even 
in this optimistic case, however, the results show that the 
extra domestic capital formation would have contributed 
little to the rate of growth of UK gross domestic product.
The model begins by assuming that Britain*s incremental 
capital-output ratio (ICOR) for the 1950s reflects 
structural aspects of the British economy which determine 
the productivity of capital and is therefore constant. The 
ICOR describes the proportion of GDP devoted to capital 
formation that is associated with a percentage increase in 
GDP52. The inverse of the ICOR is thus a measure of 
capital productivity. Expressed algebraically,
ICOR =  I/GDP_____
Growth Rate of GDP
Where I = gross Capital Formation
GDP = Gross Domestic Product.
ICORs for the UK and twenty-one other countries for the
1950s were calculated by the United Nations Economic
52S. Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of 
Nations Part V, Capital Formation Proportions: International
Comparisons for Recent Years:, Economic Development and Cultural 
Chance. Vol VIII, No 4, Part 2, July 1969. p. 46.
240
Commission for Europe in 196453. A selection of the
results is presented in Table IV.E.
Table IV.E.
Incremental Capital/Output Ratios
1949-59
Rate of Growth Gross Investment
GDP Ratio ICOR
West Germany 7.4 24.2 3.3
Netherlands 4.8 25.0 5.2
France 4.5 20.6 4.6
Sweden 3.4 21.4 6.3
USA 3.3 18.1 5.5
Denmark 3.2 17.5 5.5
Belgium 3.0 16.9 5.6
UK 2.4 16.1 6.7
Ireland 1.3 17.9 13.7
Source; UN Economic Commission for Europe, Some Factors in 
Economic Growth in Europe During the 1950s. 1964, Chap II,
P.17.
Gross investment ratio = Gross Fixed Capital Formation at 
constant (1954) prices / GDP.
In general, a low value of ICOR was associated with a 
higher rate of growth of GDP and vice versa54. The UK had 
the lowest gross investment ratio of the twenty-two 
countries surveyed by the Economic Commission for Europe and 
its ICOR was exceeded only by those of Ireland and Norway. 
The UK also suffered from the lowest rate of growth of GDP 
of all countries except Ireland.
As can be seen in Table IV.F., adding the annual 
investment in the Sterling Area in the 1950s to actual gross
53United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Some Factors
in Economic Growth in Europe During the 1950s. Economic Survey of 
Europe. 1961. U.N., 1964.
54Ibid. . Chapter 7, P. 5.
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domestic fixed capital formation increases the average
investment ratio for the 1950s to 17.7% from 16.1%. This is
about the level of the actual
Table IV.F.
Analysis of Growth Rate of GDP 
In Case of All Sterling Area Investment 
Devoted to Domestic Investment
£m 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
GDFCF 2138 2140 2149 2382 2588 2716 2848 2976 3005
Sterling Area. Investment
234 192 199 235 243 175 231 340 302
Total 2372 2332 2348 2617 2831 2861 3079 3316 3307
GDP (£b)
14.3 14.6 14.5 15.1 15.7 16.4 16.5 16.8 16.8
Investment Ratio
% 16.6 16.0 16.2 17.3 18.0 17.4 18.7 19.7 19.7
Notes: Gross domestic fixed capital formation at constant 
(1954) market prices. GDP constant (1954) prices factor cost 
(source: ECE, Some Factors... 1964).
investment ratios of Greece and Denmark but does not 
approach the level of West Germany. Using the given UK ICOR 
of 6.7, this generates a rate of growth of GDP of 2.6% p.a. 
or only 0.2% p.a. greater than the actual rate for the 
1950s. This still leaves the UK rate of growth below all 
twenty-two countries surveyed by the Economic Commission for 
Europe.
The analysis errs on the side of exaggerating the 
investment ratio to the extent it is likely that some 
selectivity in any controls on investment would be used. 
Official donations and government loans to the Colonies 
would probably not have been included in a policy 
restricting investment in the sterling area. This amounted
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to about £46m p.a. Another likely exception would be 
British oil companies which would surely be allowed to 
continue to exploit their resources to ensure the 
continuation of British supplies for sterling. This 
accounted for a further £47m p.a. Together these two items 
account for close to £100m p.a. of investment in the 
sterling area, which would reduce the investment ratio in 
Table IV.F. to 17.1% with the associated growth rate of GDP 
of 2.5% or only 0.1% higher than the actual.
The accuracy of this analysis should not, of course, be 
overstated55 but the indication is that if the resources 
devoted to investment in the sterling area had been instead 
devoted to investment in the UK, the problem of relatively 
slow growth of the British economy in the 1950s would not 
have been solved. This seems to arise both because the 
volume of investment going abroad was only a small 
proportion of actual domestic investment and because the 
productivity of investment in the UK as measured by the 
inverse of the ICOR was low relative to other Western 
economies56.
W.B. Reddaway, in his exhaustive study of UK direct 
investment overseas, presented a brief account of the
55It ignores, for example, possible multiplier effects of 
increased domestic investment.
56The Economic Commission for Europe survey also points to 
relatively low rates of labour productivity and low rates of 
'technical progress' in the UK as factors correlated to slower 
growth rates. Ibid., Chapter 7, p. 5.
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effects of a short term restriction on overseas 
investment57. His survey of investing companies suggested 
that an increase of £100 in net operating assets overseas 
generated £11 in UK exports in the first instance plus £4 
p.a. worth of exports etc. in subsequent years as a 
'continuing effect'58. His analysis of the effects of a 
reduction in direct investment by these companies of £100 as 
against what they would otherwise have invested produces the 
cumulative effect on the balance of payments shown in Table 
IV.G.
Table IV.G.
Effect of Cut of £100 in Direct Foreign Investment
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Loss to Current A/C 11 11 11 11 11
4 4 4 4
4 4 4
4 4
___________________________________ 4
11 15 19 23 27
Gain to Capital A/C 100____ 100_____ 100______ 100____ 100
Net Gain to BP 89 85 81 77 73
Source: W.B. Reddaway, UK Direct Investment Overseas: Final 
Report, pp. 240-242.
Reddaway's analysis suggests that a restriction on 
direct investment overseas would not be a particularly 
costly way to ease a balance of payments deficit for the 
short term. After several years, however, the policy would
57W .B. Reddaway with S.J. Potter, C.T. Taylor, Effects of UK 
Direct Investment Overseas: Final Report. Cambridge University
Press, 1968.
58Ibid. , p. 242.
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run into seriously diminishing returns as the continuing 
effects of the 'lost' investment accumulated59.
Accordingly, Reddaway's conclusion was that "a policy of 
restriction will bring an easing of the *cash' problem for a 
substantial number of years, but at the expense of making 
the long-run problem worse"60.
Based on Reddaway*s findings, Richard N. Cooper and 
Benjamin J. Cohen analysed the effectiveness of restrictions 
on capital flows as a means of solving short term balance of 
payments deficits in the late 1960s61. Cooper calculated 
the magnitude of alternative policies to improve the UK 
balance of payments by £100m in any given year. Cohen 
extended the analysis by calculating the cost of each policy 
to the national income in the given year. Cohen concluded 
that "so far as Britain is concerned, capital restriction is 
a cheaper means of adjusting the balance of payments than 
either trade restriction or domestic demand management"62.
Some adjustment to the figures is necessary to make the
59The costs to the current account due to lost interest, 
profits and dividends will be estimated later in this chapter.
60Ibid. , p. 338.
61R.N. Cooper, "The Balance of Payments", in Caves & associates 
eds..Britain*s Economic Prospects. Brookings Institution, 
Washington, 1968. pp. 147-197. Benjamin Cohen, "The United Kingdom 
as Exporter of Capital", in Machlup, Salant and Tarshis eds., 
International Mobility and Movement of Capital. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, New York, 1972. pp. 25-49.
62Cohen "The UK as Exporter of Capital", p. 26.
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analysis appropriate for the 1950s which weaken Cohen's
conclusion for this period. Cooper's and Cohen's figures
are presented in Table IV.H. along with alternative figures
for the 1950s.
With respect to demand management, Cooper estimated
that a 0.34% addition in the rate of unemployment would
generate a £100m saving in the balance of payments. Based
on empirical studies, Cohen estimated that changes in gross
output in Britain were roughly double the change in the rate
of unemployment63. Thus 0.68% of GDP represented a
decrease of £245m in 1968 but only £107m in 1954.
Table IV.H.
Size and Alternative Methods 
of Improving The Balance of Payments by £100m
Method Action Size Cost p.a.
1968 1954
Capital Control Non-Discriminatory
Reduction of Private £112m £3m £3-4m
outflows
Trade Control Manufactured Import
Surcharge 4% £45m £20m
Domestic Demand Increase Unemployment 
Management Rate 0.34% £245m £107m
Source: B.J. Cohen, "The United Kingdom as Exporter of 
Capital", Machlup, Salant and Tarshis eds. International 
Mobility and Movement of Capital. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, NY, 1972. For last column see text.
Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of short term 
import surcharges in 1964-65 described by Cohen suggests 
that a 15% surcharge reduced imports only by approximately
63Ibid., p. 46.
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£156m64. On this evidence, the surcharge necessary for a 
reduction on £100m would be about 10%. Cooper, however, 
argued that the short term nature of the controls in 1965 
undermined their effectiveness, and he estimated that only a 
4% surcharge would be required65. Explicit in Cohen*s 
analysis is the short term nature of any of these policy 
alternatives66 in which case the experience of 1964-5 would 
generate a more accurate estimate. In Cohen*s terms an 
import surcharge of 10% would cost the GDP in 1968 £118m 
rather than the £45m he suggests67. The cost of a 10% 
import surcharge in 1954 would be £51m. This indeed 
strengthens his argument that the cost of alternative 
policies is greater than the cost of restricting investment. 
On the reckoning that only a 4% surcharge would be 
necessary, the cost to GDP in 1954 would be £20m.
Based on Reddaway*s estimate of the export generating 
capacity of direct foreign investment, Cooper estimated the 
amount by which capital outflows would have to be restricted 
to generate a net saving to the balance of payments of £100m 
in the year of restrictions68. Both his and Cohen's
^Ibid. , p. 46.
65Cooper, "The Balance of Payments", p. 167.
^Cohen, "The UK as Exporter of Capital", p.43.
67Cohen calculates that a 4% surcharge costs 0.13% of GDP, 
therefore a 10% surcharge would cost 0.325% of GDP 
(4:0.13=10:0.325).
^Cooper "The Balance of Payments", p. 196.
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analysis, however, ignore the 'continuing effects' on the 
current account69. The impact of continuing effects is to 
increase annually the amount by which capital must be
restricted to still generate a net saving of £100m p.a. The
increases are shown in Table IV.I.
Table IV.I.
Investment Restrictions Necessary to Generate 
a £100m Saving to the Balance of Payments
Period Amount of Restriction Loss to Nat.
Year 1 £112m £3•36m
Year 2 £118m £3.54m
Year 3 £124m £3.72m
Year 4 £131m £3.93m
Year 5 £139m £4.17m
Notes: Loss to National Income is based on Reddaway's
estimate of a 3% return on overseas investment net of 
domestic 'opportunity cost' of this investment.
The cost of this alternative policy relative to the 
others is still not fundamentally changed by this addition 
to the analysis. Capital restrictions still appear to be 
the cheapest means of improving the balance of payments 
although the gap between the alternatives has been narrowed 
for the 1950s. What Table IV.I. emphasizes is that the 
amount of investment that would have to be foregone would 
escalate if the policy were maintained for several years.
Another ommission from Cohen's and Cooper's analysis of 
alternative ways to improve the balance of payments is the
69Cohen mentions this in a footnote but does not bring it into 
his analysis.
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relative magnitudes of the variables which would be 
affected70. Investment outside the sterling area was 
already strictly controlled with little room for further 
restrictions. Almost all of the reduction in investment 
would therefore have to fall on capital destined for the 
sterling area. Thus a 4% import surcharge or a .34% 
increase in unemployment are compared with a 62%-77% cut in 
private overseas investment in the sterling area in 1954. 
This would require an almost total embargo on overseas 
investment at the outset to allow for inevitable leaks in 
the system. This level of restriction would prohibit 
replacement and maintenance investment required to keep 
existing capital productive which would further undermine 
the prospects for the longer term balance of payments. In 
addition, if the policy were to be extended beyond a few 
years, this might lead to disinvestment by British firms and 
the loss of overseas assets. The loss to the national 
income would not just be the profits that would have accrued 
in that year but the present value of future profits that 
would be foregone. When judging among possible short term 
remedies to balance of payments problems it is not possible 
to divorce the longer term consequences from the cost of 
each policy. Once the longer term consequences of 
restricting overseas investment are considered, capital
70Cohen mentions this aspect but does not integrate it into his 
analysis. Cohen, p. 40-42
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controls seem a relatively inefficient way to improve the 
balance of payments. Import surcharges may impair channels 
of trade in the medium term but they are administratively 
less costly than capital controls and a relatively more 
flexible instrument of policy that had a precedent in the 
1950s. Unemployment levels in the UK were historically low, 
hovering between l%-2% but a 0.35% increase would account 
for only an 20% increase on the existing levels.
IV.B.iii. The Source of Capital for Overseas Investment 
When discussing the effect of British capital flows 
abroad on the domestic economy, it is important to look at 
the source of finance for the investment.
Table IV.J.
The Financing of Sterling Area Investment
£m 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Savings
1715 1985 2264 2557 2752 2933 3423 3685 3649
GDC 1719 1919 2153 2423 2624 2911 3193 3481 3604
Residual
-4 66 11 134 128 22 230 204 45
Sterling Area Investment
-234 -192 -199 -235 -243 -175 -231 -340 -302
Amount Financed from Foreign Borrowing
238 126 188 101 115 153 1 136 257
Sterling Area Sterling Balances
398 84 -97 284 128 -79 -298 -161 -76
Reserves (drawings + , increases ->
575 -344 -175 240 87 -229 42 13 284
Notes: GDCF = Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
Table IV.J. compares long term capital flows to the 
sterling area with domestic investment and saving. In this 
case overseas investment is treated as a residual to show
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how much was possibly financed from domestic savings. From 
this analysis it seems that investment in the sterling area 
could have been financed from domestic saving only in 1956. 
The implications of this are that the excess of overseas 
investment over saving in the rest of the period had to be 
financed through current surpluses or extraordinary capital 
inflows such as the accumulation of sterling balances by the 
rest of the sterling area.
From 1950-54, the RSA accumulated £797m worth of 
sterling assets and British investment in the sterling area 
not covered by domestic savings amounted to £768m. In these 
five years, then, the sterling area as a whole was providing 
for its own capital within the system. Thus it appears that 
in this period, those sterling area countries accumulating 
sterling assets, thereby indirectly lending their surpluses 
back to the UK, were financing UK overseas investment. As 
noted in Chapter I, an alternative view is that UK overseas 
investment generated the accumulation of short term British 
liabilities. The data thus warrant a comparison of 
investment and sterling balances. Table IV.J. shows that 
this relationship did not continue for the years 1955-58.
In these years there was a net disinvestment in sterling 
assets by the Colonies and the independent sterling area of 
£614m while British investment in the sterling area in 
excess of domestic saving accelerated to £547m for the four 
years together. The external financing for this investment
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had to be found from other sources for these years.
The contemporary interpretation of the source of 
capital for UK overseas investment was that the Colonies 
accumulated sterling balances which financed capital flows 
to the independent sterling area71. In this way the UK was 
in some sense borrowing from the Colonies to lend to the 
independent sterling area who were not forced to reduce 
their claims on the UK in order to finance their own 
development.
Table IV.K. shows changes in sterling balances and
flows of UK investment for those members of the sterling
area for which partner data on capital flows are available.
Table IV.K.
Changes in Sterling Balance Holdings and 
Net Flow in UK Investment 
1950-58
£m
Member Sterling Balances Increase Investment
Colonies 607 943
Rhodesia Nyasaland 48 214
New Zealand 29 38
South Africa -52 127
Australia -86 448
India -666 5
Notes: Sterling balance figures from Monthly Report on 
External Finance, BoE EID3/98-106. Investment estimates from 
partner data, see Table IV.A.
From Table IV.K. it is clear that allegations that the 
Colonies were financing investment in the independent 
sterling area are false since there was a net capital
71 J. Polk, Sterling: Its Meaning in World Finance. Harper
Bros., New York, 1956. p.229., BIS, The Sterling Area. Basle, Jan. 
1953. p. 45., OEEC, Economic Conditions in the UK. p. 25.
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outflow from the UK to the Colonies amounting to some £340m 
during the 1950s. The figures for India reflect her poor 
credit rating in London and the large volume of sterling 
balances in 1950 that were subsequently run down as part of 
India*s development programme.
On the basis of the experience of this group of 
sterling area countries it does not seem that there was a 
positive relation between investment flows and movements in 
sterling balances. This undermines the allegation that UK 
investment in the RSA was directly related to increases in 
sterling balances. This does not, however, refute the 
suggestion that sterling balances were larger than otherwise 
due to capital inflows and that therefore a restriction on 
UK capital exports would have improved the UK external 
•position*. In May 1957, the Treasury undertook a study of 
the volume of government borrowing by the RSA in relation to 
their sterling holdings and concluded that the major 
sterling area borrowers did not have sufficient liquid 
assets available to finance their investment programmes72.
In this case, an embargo on UK capital exports would have 
simply meant a slower rate of development for these 
countries rather than an improvement in the ratio of UK 
reserves to liabilities. Indeed, in this scenario, the 
abandonment of the development plans of these RSA countries
72"Commonwealth Government Borrowing in the UK in Relation to 
Sterling Balances", May 1957. PRO BT213/96.
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would no doubt have hurt the UK current account in the
medium term.
A more detailed breakdown of Colonial borrowing on the 
London market shows the redistribution of surpluses among 
the Colonies. This is shown in Table IV.L. which shows 
increases in sterling balances for selected Colonies from 
1950-55 (the years for which detailed data are available) 
and official borrowing from the London market for these
Table IV.L.
Sterling Balance Holdings and Official London Borrowing
1950-1955
£m
Colony Increase in Sterling Balances London Borrowing
Nigeria 177 6.8
Gold Coast 116 0.0
Hong Kong 64 0.0
Uganda 34 13.1
Malaya 13 4.8
Jamaica 13 6.8
Cyprus 12 7.8
Mauritius 11 4.7
E African Harbour Commn 11 24.6
Sierre Leone 10 3.7
British Guiana 1 2.2
Aden (1950-4) 0 1.3
Tanganyika -4 6.8
Kenya -31 18.7
Notes: Colonial sterling balance figures from J.G. Littler, 
"Sterling Balances of the Colonial Territories", 2 March 
1956, PRO T236/3562. Official borrowing on the London Market 
from Times Issuing House Yearbook.
years. It is apparent that the surpluses of Nigeria, the 
Gold Coast and Hong Kong in part ‘subsidized1 borrowing by 
others such as Kenya and the East African Harbour and 
Railroad Commission. Allegations that the Colonies were 
'exploited' to finance development in the Independent
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Sterling Area must therefore be further ammended to allow 
for this redistribution of surpluses among the Colonies.
The next step in the assessment of the effect of 
investment in the sterling area on the British economy is to 
consider the return from the investment.
IV.C. Returns from Investment in the Sterling Area 
IV.C.i. Exports
W.B. Reddaway's survey of direct overseas investment in 
the period 1956-64 gives the most complete source of 
empirical evidence on the returns to British investment. As 
part of the country analysis, W.B. Reddaway calculated the 
initial and continuing effects of direct investment in seven 
sterling area countries and eight non-sterling countries.
His results are presented in Table IV.M.
Investment in the sterling area countries surveyed 
generated markedly more exports from the UK than non­
sterling area investment both in the initial and continuing 
effects. On average, British direct investment in the 
sterling area countries generated exports equal to almost 
25% of the increase in net operating assets compared with a 
total for all countries of only 9%73. This is no doubt due 
to the fact that most of the sterling area countries were 
less developed than the non-sterling area countries
^The total figure is not an average of the values for all 
countries, but rather an average for the questionaire returns of 
participating companies.
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surveyed. As Reddaway pointed out, this meant that the less
Table IV.M.
Effects of Increase in Net Operating assets of £100
1956-64
Initial Additional Actual Increase in net
Country Exports Exports p.a. Operating Assets 1956-
64
Jamaica 27 9.5 £7. 0m
Ghana n. a. 8.5 £3. 5m
South Africa 18 7.0 £53.0m
Nigeria 39 5.0 £14.6m
Malaysia 35 4.0 £27.5m
Denmark 15 4.0 £6. 3m
India 20 3.5 £84.2m
Germany 2 3.5 £44.8m
Argentina 14 1.5 £14.9m
Australia 8 1.0 £201.2m
Canada 4 0.5 £267.7m
USA 1 -1.0 £133.3m
Brazil 11 -1.0 £8. 9m
France 1 -5.0 £17.3m
Italy 10 -9.0 £8. 0m
Total 9 1.5 £892.3m
Source: W.B. Reddaway, Effects of UK Direct Investment 
Overseas. Final Report. Cambridge University Press, 1968. p. 
216.
developed countries were more likely to import capital goods 
and inputs related to the investment rather than using goods 
produced locally74.
Reddaway further disaggregated the effect of direct 
investment on exports by type of export and by country. The 
interesting aspects of the results for the sterling area are 
presented in Table IV.N.(a) and Table IV.N.(b). In Table 
IV.N.(a) it is apparent that the less developed ex-colonies
74Ibid. . p.217.
show greater dependence on UK exports than the older 
independent sterling countries as reflected in the 
percentage of fixed asset expenditure spent on British 
equipment. This reinforces the conclusion that the effect 
of direct investment on exports of capital equipment was 
closely related to the level of development of the receiving 
country. The exception is investment in South Africa. The 
implication is that investment in sterling area countries 
had more favourable effects on machinery exports than 
investment outside the area because of their lower level of 
development than the non-sterling countries surveyed75.
Table IV.N.(a)
Purchases of Capital Equipment from the UK 
By Subsidiaries
Annual Averages for 1955-64
£m p.a.
(1) (2) (3)
Purchases of Expenditure on
Country Capital Equipment Fixed Assets (1) as % (:
Jamaica 0.3 1.1 26.0
Malaysia 1.4 5.5 25.6
Nigeria 1.1 4.3 25.2
Ghana 0.5 2.1 25.1
South Africa 1.4 6.4 21.3
India 2.3 13.7 16.9
Australia 2.7 25.5 10.5
Total 15 Countries 12.3 129.3 9.5
Source: W.B. Reddawav. Effects of UK Direct Investment
Overseas: Final Reoort. o. 364.
75The non-sterling area countries are? Denmark, Argentina, 
Brazil, Italy, Germany, Canada, U.S.A and France.
Table IV.N.(b)
Purchases of Input Items from the UK 
By Subsidiaries 
Annual Averages for 1955-64
£m p.a
Country
(1)
Purchases of 
Inputs
(2)
Net Operating 
Assets (1) as % (2)
(3)
South Africa
Jamaica
Australia
Malaysia
Ghana
India
Nigeria
12.7
1.0
16.1
3.3
1.5
7.0
2.0
97
8
202
55
25
156
51
13.0
12.1 
8.0 
6.0 
6.0 
4.5
4.0
4.1Total 15 Countries 52.7 1281
Source: W.B. Reddaway, Effects of UK Direct Investment 
Overseas: Final Report, p.365.
Table IV.N.(b) tells a similar story for input items 
although there does not appear to be the same division 
between Colonies
and independent sterling countries for Column (3). South 
Africa and Australia stand out as accounting for more than 
half of the purchases of UK inputs by the sterling 
countries. This probably reflects the fact that many of the 
subsidiaries operating in Malaysia, Nigeria, Ghana and India 
were plantations or mining interests which would not import 
as many inputs due to the nature of the enterprise. Still, 
of those companies surveyed, sterling area subsidiaries 
accounted for 46% of the net operating assets and 83% of the 
purchases of inputs from the UK.
It is interesting to note that imports of inputs to UK 
subsidiaries amounted to more than twice the amount of 
imports of capital goods. The absolute values are, however,
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small relative to total British exports. Subsidiaries* 
imports of capital goods amount to only 7%-8% of UK 
machinery exports to the ex-colonial group and about 3% of 
UK machinery exports to the older independent members76.
It is possible that Reddaway*s results are distorted by 
the type of industry he was able to survey in the sterling 
area countries as compared with the non-sterling area.
Table IV.0. shows the subsidiaries' purchases of capital 
equipment broken down by industry. The geographical results 
would be distorted, for example, if the 'Vehicles and 
Components' companies surveyed all operated in the sterling 
area while the paper companies operated in the non-sterling 
area.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine to what 
extent the geographical distribution of industrial concerns 
distorts the figures. All of the manufacturing companies 
surveyed by Reddaway and listed in an Annex to the reports 
had subsidiaries in several countries, usually both in the 
sterling area and outside, and there is no way of knowing 
to which subsidiary in which country the details of the 
companies' investments pertain. In the case of Vehicles and 
Components, for example, most of Dunlop's and Joseph Lucas' 
subsidiaries were in France and Germany but most of British 
Leyland's subsidiaries were in sterling area countries.
76 Ibid.
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Table IV.O.
Purchases of Capital Equipment and Input Items from the UK
By Subsidiaries 
Annual Averages for 1955-64
%
Purchases of Capital as % Purchases of Inputs as % 
Expenditure on Fixed Assets Net Operating Assets
Industry 
Vehicles &
Components
Textiles
Building Materials 
Chemicals 
Non-electrical 
Engineering 
Food, Drink, 
Tobacco 
Metals & Metal 
Products 
Electrical 
Engineering 
PaDer
20.7%
18.0
14.5
12.6
10.6
10.5
9.7
4.4
2.4
18.5
4.5 
8.4 
2.8
17.2
1.9
3.9
7.6 
0.1
Total Manufacturing 10.5 4.7
Mining 5.2 0.9
Plantations 8.2 1.2
Total 9.5 4.1
Source: W.B. Reddaway, Effects of UK Direct Investment 
Overseas: Final Report. Table VI.1(b), p. 364.
It is somewhat easier to interpret the data for mining 
and plantations. The mining companies* subsidiaries were 
mostly located in South Africa, Malaysia and Nigeria and all 
of the plantations surveyed were located in either Malaysia 
or India. The purchases of capital equipment from the UK by 
these countries all exceeded the 15 country average. This 
was especially true for South Africa, Malaysia and Nigeria. 
The ratios for mining and plantations, however, were much 
lower than for all industries, only 5.2% for mining and 8.2%
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for plantations. Since the ratios for these countries far 
exceeds the 5% and 8% associated with mining and 
plantations, it is likely that the manufacturing 
subsidiaries operating in these sterling area countries must 
have been especially oriented toward importing capital 
goods.
In the case of Malaysia, for example, rubber 
plantations account for 56% of the recorded net operating 
assets. Malaysian subsidiaries* total purchases of capital 
equipment amounted to 25.6% of expenditure on fixed assets, 
while the rubber plantations tended to spend only 18.8% of 
their fixed asset expenditure on British capital 
equipment77. The contrast for imports of inputs is 0.5% 
for rubber plantations and 3.3% of Malaysian subsidiaries as 
a whole78. This suggests that on average Malasian 
manufacturing subsidiaries were much more geared to 
importing capital goods from the UK than subsidiaries in 
other countries.
The same story can be told for India where tea 
plantations accounted for 46% of subsidiaries* net operating 
assets. Imports of British capital goods of Indian tea 
plantations were only 5.2% while the proportion for British
^Reddaway, Effects of UK Direct Investment. Table 1.1, p. 380.
It is not possible from the data to calculate the percentage of 
expenditure on fixed assets by Malaysian subsidiaries was for 
rubber plantations.
78 Ibid.
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subsidiaries in India as a whole was 16.9%79. Imports of 
inputs by tea plantations was ’negligible’80 but the 
proportion for all Indian subsidiaries was 4.5%.
The implications of this analysis are not water-tight 
but they point consistently toward the conclusion that 
direct investment in the sterling area was more successful 
in generating exports of capital goods and British made 
inputs than investment elsewhere. The importance of this to 
the British balance of payments, however, should not be 
overstated since the exports of these goods to UK 
subsidiaries comprised such a small part of machinery 
exports to these countries.
Table IV.P. shows the relationship of UK overseas 
investment to exports in the 1950's as compared with the 
American experience. Line A shows that long term investment 
as a proportion of exports to the sterling area fluctuated 
through the period but the proportion was substantially 
larger than UK investment in the rest of the world or 
American overseas investment. This is especially true when 
shown as a proportion
of GDP. The low figure in Line B is to be expected since 
capital flows to the non-sterling area were more strictly 
controlled
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
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Table IV.P.
UK and USA Net Long Term Investment as a Proportion of 
Merchandise Exports and GDP
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
UK
To Sterling Area
a) KX/X .230 .150 .150 .193 .181 .124 .158 .230
a)/GDP .020 .012 .011 .013 .012 .007 .009 .012
To Rest of the World
b) KX/X -.091 .115 .013 .027 .021 .032 .026 -.043
b)/GDP -.008 .009 .001 .002 .001 .002 .001 -.002
USA
C) KX/X .027 .107 .069 .040 .043 .030 .142 .173
c)/GDP .0001 .0003 .0002 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0003 .0004
Notes: KX = Overseas long term investment 
X = Merchandise Exports 
UK GDP current prices at factor cost, £b. USA GDP current 
market prices, $b. Source; Historical Statistics of the 
United States. Colonial Times to 1957. Bureau of the Census, 
Washington, 1961, Long Term Economic Growth 1860-1970. US 
Department of Commerce, 1973, Balance of Payments of the UK. 
1946-57. HMSO, 1959, Annual Supplement. Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics. Central Statistical Office, 1975.
while exports to the dollar area, especially, were actively 
encouraged. Still, assuming a relationship between in­
vestment and merchandise exports, it appears that investment 
in the sterling area was relatively less efficient in 
generating exports than investment elsewhere by the UK or 
overall foreign investment by the USA. For UK investment in 
the sterling area, £5.69 worth of merchandise exports is 
associated with each £1 of investment while £11.3 of 
merchandise exports is associated with each pound of 
investment outside the sterling area. For the United 
States, £12.7 of exports is associated with each £1 of 
overseas investment.
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Export earnings were, of course, not the only returns to 
expected from overseas investment. Unfortunately the 
measurement of interest, profits and dividends falls prey to 
the same difficulties as the measurement of the capital 
flows themselves since a large proportion of these earnings 
was not officially recorded.
IV.C.ii. Interest, Profits and Dividends
Most of the official capital destined for the sterling 
area was in the form of grants on which no immediate return 
was expected. Official loans such as those offered under 
the CDC carried an interest rate 1% above bank rate,
amounting to between 3% and 6% through the period. Still, 
as is apparent in Table IV.B., private investment accounted 
for most of the investment in the sterling area and 
therefore most of the returns on investment but the rate of 
return is fairly difficult to establish.
W.B. Reddaway*s enquiry revealed that the average annual 
post-tax profitability of UK manufacturing subsidiaries 
operating in the sterling area was 10.4% in 1955-64, but the 
post-tax profitability to the UK stake as a whole in the 
sterling area 9.5%. Still, this is 1% higher than the 
comparable figure for profitability of UK stake in all 
fifteen countries combined81. Reddaway*s results are 
presented in Table IV.Q.
A second source of information is the census returns
81W.B. Reddaway, Final Report. Table IV.5 p. 358.
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of investment in Australia, South Africa and India.
According to the official census for 1950-58, the investment 
income payable to the UK from Australia averaged 10.8% of 
the book value of net
Table IV.Q.
Profitability of UK Stake in 
Direct Investment in Sterling Area Countries
Country UK Stake (£m) Post-Tax Profitability (%)
Malaysia 50.8 19.8
Ghana 24.1 13.4
South Africa 97.0 10.5
Jamaica 5.2 8.4
Australia 156.4 8.0
India 132.4 7.7
Nigeria__________ 49. 5______________________4 .7
Total 515.4 9.5
Source: W.B. Reddaway, Final Report. Table IV.5, p. 358.
assets in Australia of branches of UK companies plus paid up
value of shares, debentures, unsecured notes and other
obligations of Australian companies held by UK companies or
individuals82. These figures include portfolio investment
in Australian companies as well as direct investment by the
UK. The figures are presented in Table IV.R. which also
shows the importance of investment income from Australia to
the total investment income earned from sterling area
investments83.
82Annual Bulletina of Oversea Investment: Australia. 1960-61, 
Canberra.
83Not all of the recorded Australian investment income payable 
would appear in the UK balance of payments since some part was 
retained in Australia.
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Information on investment income from South Africa is 
limited to figures for 1956 which show investment income 
paid to the UK amounted to 8% of the recorded UK-owned 
capital stock in that year according to the 1956 census of 
foreign investment84.
Table IV.R.
Total Income Payable on UK Investment in Australia,
Net Assets of Branches of UK Companies and 
UK Investment in Australian Companies
£m
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
UK Investment (Book Value)
203.8 227.0 244.8 268.9 294.8 333.8 368.0 399.3 428.5 
Income Payable
24.8 22.6 23.8 28.2 31.7 38.4 39.6 39.0 45.3
% 12.2 10.0 9.7 11.5 10.8 11.5 10.8 9.8 10.6
Investment Income from Australia as % of Sterling Area Total 
13.6 10.7 12.4 15.3 16.2 17.5 17.2 17.6
Source: Annual Bulletin of Oversea Investment: Australia, 
1960-61 Tables 20 and 24., Sterling Area total income paid 
from UK Balance of Payments 1946-57. HMSO, 1959.
For India, complete data on investment returns are
available only for 1953 and 1955-58. For these years
investment income payable to the UK averaged 8.8% of
UK-owned capital stock. Investment income payable is
presented in Table IV.S.
From this admittedly sketchy data, returns on UK
investment in the sterling dominions was probably between 8%
and 11% of capital which is roughly consistent with
Reddaway*s finding for these three countries as a group.
841 Final Results of the 1956 Census of The Foreign Liabilities 
and Assets of the Union of South Africa*, Quarterly Bulletin of 
Statistics. South African Reserve Bank, 1958.
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This can be compared with an opportunity cost of a return on
Table IV.S.
Investment Income Payable on 
UK Private Investment in India 
(net of Indian tax)
£m 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
UK Business Investment
n/a 244.9 n/a 282.7 294.5 299.2 298.6 
Income Payable 14.4 21.1 32.3 26.8 31.7 22.9 22.6
% - 8.6 - 9.5 10.8 7.6 7.6
Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin. April 1960 for stock 
of business investment, January 1956, June 1958 and August 
1960 for income payable.
non-industrial investment in the UK of 3%85 yielding a net 
gain of 6% on investment in the sterling area compared with 
3% for overseas investment as a whole.
Table IV.T(a)
Summary of Return to UK Investment 
Percentages
Profits % Capital Goods Imports Input Goods
Imports
Country UK Stake % Increase in Fixed % Operating 
Assets
Malaysia 19.8
Assets
25.6 6.0
Ghana 13.4 25.1 1.5
Jamaica 8.4 26.0 12.1
Nigeria 4.7 25.2 2.0
India 8.8 16.9 7.0
Australia 10.8 10.5 8.0
South Africa 8.0 21.3 13.0
85W.B. Reddaway, Final Report, p. 336.
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Table IV.T.(b)
Summary of Returns to UK Investment 
Effect on Current Account
£m p.a.
Country Profits Capital Goods Imports Inputs Goods
Imports
Malaysia 10.1m 1.4m 3. 3m
Ghana 3. 2m 0.5m 1.5m
Jamaica 0. 4m 0. 3m 1 .0m
Nigeria 2. 3m 1.1m 2 . 0m
India 25. 0m 2. 3m 7 . 0m
Australia 33. 3m 2. 7m 16.1m
South Africa 55. 5m 1. 4m 12.7m
Total 129.8m 9. 7m 43. 6m
Notes: India, Australia and South Africa Profits figures 
from Census data (see text). All other figures from 
Reddaway, Final Report.
In summary, Tables IV.T. (a) and IV.T.(b) present the 
rate of return on UK investment in the' sterling area against 
estimates of the stock of UK investment to arrive at 
estimates of the benefits of this investment to the current 
account. Reddawayfs survey of the absolute value of per 
annum imports from the UK by subsidiaries is added to the 
value of average annual profits. What is revealed in Table 
IV.T.(b) is that, on this sample, profits comprised the most 
important contribution of overseas investment in the 
sterling area, amounting to perhaps 70% of the direct credit 
due to the current account.
From 1950 to 1957 interest, profits and dividends from 
the sterling area amounted to a cumulative surplus of £896m 
or a yearly average surplus of over £112m. This surplus was 
maintained despite escalating interest payments on the 
sterling balances held by sterling area members.
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If continued investment in the sterling area was
Table IV.U.
UK Invisible Account 
Interest, Profits and Dividends
£m
Area 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Sterling Area
Credit 182 212 192 184 196 220 230 221
Debit -49 -56 -79 -88 -94 -112 -134 -130
Net 133 156 113 96 102 108 96 91
Dollar Area
Credit 53 58 57 58 57 67 81 83
Debit -35 -76 -78 -81 -97 -110 -70 -71
Net 18 -18 -21 -23 -40 -43 11 12
Non-Sterling OEEC
Credit 14 14 13 16 25 24 27 29
Debit -20 -18 -28 -29 -28 -31 -38 -32
Net -6 -4 -15 -13 -3 -7 -11 -3
All Areas
Credit 271 305 289 286 310 346 373 361
Debit -112 -158 -198 -211 -231 -269 -259 -251
Net 159 147 91 75 79 77 114 110
Current Balance
297 -419 227 179 211 -73 258 272
Source: UK Balance of Payments 1946-57. HMSO, 1959. 
considered to be a quid pro quo for the overseas members to 
maintain their sterling balances, the direct cost of this 
policy to the current account was interest payments on the 
sterling balances and the direct benefits were interest, 
profit and dividend credits from the UK investment. The net 
interest, profits and dividends from the sterling area might 
thus be considered to approximate the net benefit of this 
arrangement to the current account of the UK balance of
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payments86.
The net direct benefit of some £112m p.a. to the current
account in the form of interest, profits and dividends (see
Table IV.U.) must be set against the debit on the capital
account of the balance of long term investment less
accumulations in sterling balances. The volume of long term
capital outflow to the sterling area in excess of short term
capital inflows in the form of sterling balances is
presented in Table IV.V..
Table IV.V.
UK Capital Account with the Sterling Area
£m
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Sterling Area Sterling Balances
398 84 -97 284 128 -79 -298 -161
Long Term Capital Flows to the RSA
-234 -192 -199 -235 -243 -254 -231 -340
(A) Balance of Long Term and Short Term Capital
164 -108 -296 49 -115 -104 -529 -501
(B) Net Invisible Balance with Sterling Area
133 156 113 96 102 108 96 91
(A) + (B) 297 48 -183 145 -13 4 -433 -410
Source: UK Balance of Payments 1946-57. HMSO, 1959 for long 
term capital, Monthly Report on External Finance, BoE 
EID/98-106 for sterling balances.
Bearing the assumptions of the relationship between
sterling balances and long term capital flows in mind, if
the rationale of continuing investment in the sterling area
was to encourage the RSA to continue to hold short term
sterling assets which in turn were available to finance the
86The approximate nature of this calculation must be emphasized 
since it excludes £30-£60m worth of exports p.a. associated with 
investment in the sterling area.
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long term investment, the policy may be said to have been a 
success from 1950 to 1955. During these years the long term 
capital outflow of £1.357b was met by an inflow of short 
term capital and invisible earnings of £1.426b. By 1956 and 
1957, however, the sterling area sterling balances were 
being run down at a much faster rate due to a decline in the 
RSA balance with the NSA, suggesting that the quid pro cruo 
was no longer recognized and/or that the guarantee of free 
capital flows from the UK was no longer an incentive to 
restrain dollar expenditure.
IV.D. Capital Flows as a Cohesive Factor
The basis of the theory that capital exports were key to 
the cohesion of the sterling area is three-fold. First, 
there was an evident decline in the other components of the 
system. Trade discrimination was being undermined by GATT 
and by the general movement toward freer trade in the inter­
national economy. The practice of maintaining reserves in 
sterling and pooling foreign exchange earnings was also 
weakening as the United States and the rest of the world 
became more important markets both for trade and capital. 
Finally, the traditional alignment with the UK that most 
members had enjoyed in the early post-imperial days was 
dissolving as the dominions grew further away from the UK, 
and Colonial territories approached independence. Free 
access to British capital thus became a relatively more
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important part of the system as the other incentives 
dissolved.
A second piece of evidence that free access to British 
capital was a cohesive factor, at least at the beginning of 
the period, is an episode in 1948-49. At this time, South 
Africa was refusing to supply other sterling area members 
with gold in payment for their exports. In retaliation, 
during the first half of 1949, Britain refused the South 
African government access to the London market through which 
South Africa had hoped to relieve their growing sterling 
shortage. Private capital was also inhibited from flowing 
to South Africa87. Finally, in November 1949 the South 
African government was allowed to float a £10m loan in 
London and two months later it was announced that South 
Africa was to pay gold for all essential imports from the 
rest of the sterling area. This meant South Africa could no 
longer restrict gold payments when she had sterling to spend 
due to capital flows from Britain or export earnings from 
the rest of the sterling area. By starving South Africa of 
sterling through restrictions on capital movements, Britain 
had been able to bring South Africa back into her tradi­
tional role of gold supplier for the sterling area. Access 
to the London market was, thus, an effective sanction 
against South Africa although this was due to the special 
situation of a sterling shortage that would not prevail in
87The Economist. Vol. CLVIII, No. 5554, 4 Feb., 1950. p. 278.
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the case of a member with large sterling balances.
Thirdly, official opinion in the 1950s seemed convinced 
that capital flows were key to the cohesion of the sterling 
area. At the beginning of the period, for example, a 
Colonial Office Programmes Committee Report concluded that 
the dependence of the rest of the sterling area on long term 
British capital was perhaps the most important factor on 
which the UK could rely to keep the system together88.
This belief was echoed in the Treasury-Bank of England 
Sterling Area Working Party Report of 1956 which concluded 
that "any trend which connotes an absolute or relative 
decline of London as a source of capital cannot help but 
weaken in some degree the ties of the sterling area"89.
Whether the free capital movement enjoyed by the members 
of the sterling area really was an important factor in 
maintaining the cohesion of the system through the 1950fs 
depends on the importance of British capital to the sterling 
area recipients. Here again, because of the sketchy nature 
of the records of long term capital movements, any 
assessment must remain incomplete. However, the census data 
available for Australia, New Zealand, India and South Africa 
show the proportion of total foreign capital that originated 
in the UK.
^D.J. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development Vol 
III, p. 38.
89Bank of England copy of the Sterling Area Working Party 
Report, 26 June, 1956. p. 19. BoE OV 44/32.
273
In Australia, British investors accounted for 61% of 
private foreign capital flows through the period with a 
slight downward trend. The USA was the second largest 
source of capital, claiming 30% on average with a slight 
upward trend. In New Zealand, an even larger proportion of 
foreign direct investment came from the UK, averaging 72% 
while dollar area investment claimed only 15% of the total 
with a slight downward trend to the end of the period.
The Indian census data is slightly more complicated and 
is available in detail only for 1956-58. Through these 
three years, the UK share of net foreign investment fell 
from 64% to a net disinvestment. Through the same period the 
American share grew from 28.7% to 159% as it offset the 
disinvestment by the UK. The net figures, however, distort 
the true picture since they are heavily affected by massive 
capital repatriations in the form of compensation for 
nationalization of British interests. In 1958, for example, 
some £16m was repatriated, mostly to the UK, 
as a result of the nationalization of the petroleum 
industry90. Since most compensation payments were to the 
UK, the gross figure for capital flows tells a significantly 
different story, with the UK share of foreign investment 
rising from 66% to 74% from 1956-58 and the American share 
declining from 23% to 18%91. It should also be noted that
90Indian Reserve Bank Bulletin. April 1960, p. 469.
91 Ibid.
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these capital flow figures do not account for all of the 
flow of capital from the UK to India since much of the 
Indian development plans were financed by a rundown of her 
substantial sterling balances. More general information on 
UK capital flows for the period 1948-53 is available from 
comments in the Indian Reserve Bank Bulletin which estimate 
that the UK accounted for 90% of the total inflow of foreign 
business investment in these years92. By 1954-55 this 
estimate had fallen to 70% and by 1956 was 64%93. The 
figures for the UK share in stocks of foreign-owned capital 
reflect this decline. In 1953, the UK claimed 83% of the 
stock of foreign capital in India but by 1958 this had 
fallen to 70% although the absolute value of UK capital had 
risen from £245m to £299m94.
For South Africa, stock values of foreign capital for 
1956 only are available. In this year, the UK was 
responsible for 65% of foreign capital (69% in 
manufacturing). Th USA was a distant second, accounting for 
only 14% of foreign capital95. For all these major 
independent members of the sterling area, then, the UK was 
still the single most important supplier of foreign capital 
with the United States and the rest of the world following a
92Indian Reserve Bank Bulletin. Sept. 1958, p. 1012.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95South African Reserve Bank Bulletin
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distant second through to the end of the period.
Data for the Colonies are less specific but, as expected, 
the evidence available indicates that Britain was the 
largest foreign investor. Between 1949-57 Colonial 
authorities were able to borrow only £llm outside the 
sterling area and private interests only £9m, none of which 
came from private sources96. The British authorities 
actively encouraged private foreign investment in the 
Colonies, including a campaign after 1952 to give the 
Colonies "sex appeal" for the American market on the basis 
that "the American is an emotional creature, and that if one 
can find a 'good cause' the possibilities of tapping his 
pocket are almost endless"97. Discussions with American 
trade officials in London, however, served only to indentify 
the problems of attracting investment to the Colonies rather 
than achieving any real improvement. Wayne Taylor, the 
American adviser, suggested setting up Investment Trust 
schemes which would better suit American tax law. Other 
changes to sterling area tax rules were also suggested along 
with revisions of sterling area exchange control to allow 
repatriation of capital profits98. The Treasury was
96"Non-Sterling Borrowing by the Sterling Commonwealth Since 
1945 (Effectively 1949)", 7 May, 1957. PRO BT213/96.
97Letter from Mr. Flett of HMT to Mr. Christelow of UKSTD, 
Washington, 19 May, 1952. PRO T231/605.
98Notes of meetings at HMT with Mr. Wayne Taylor 10-13 
June, 1952. PRO T231/605.
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unwilling to tailor sterling area tax law to American wishes 
and such changes in the sterling exchange control were 
unlikely. Foreign investors were allowed to repatriate only 
the sterling value of their original capital stake to avoid 
enterprises designed simply to breach currency boundaries to 
allow otherwise illegal exports from hard currency to soft 
currency countries". These discussions suggest that the 
UK was the major private investor in the Colonies.
In both the dependent and independent sterling area 
then, the UK was still the primary market for foreign 
capital which would seem to support the thesis that these 
capital flows were an integral part of the sterling area 
system. The cohesive force of these flows, however, hinges 
on how dependent the sterling area members were on foreign 
capital. A rough calculation based on Morgan*s estimate of 
Colonial capital formation100 and the IMF Balance of 
Payments Yearbook estimates of capital flows suggests that 
British capital accounted for as much as 23% of Colonial 
capital formation. The dependence of the Colonies on 
British capital thus seems evident but the independent 
sterling area was the primary threat to the cohesion of the 
system. Here, the figures available look much less
99HMT note on the 'Need for Controls on Inward Dollar 
Investment', 29 July 1952. PRO T231/605.
100D.J. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development 
Vol IV: Changes in British Aid Policy. 1951-70. Macmillan, London, 
1980., p. 10-11.
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promising.
In Australia and New Zealand British capital amounted 
to an average of only 4% of gross domestic fixed capital 
formation in each year101. According to UK estimates, 
total net foreign long term capital and official donations 
from abroad to India and South Africa comprised only 1.8% of 
GDP for each country by 1958102. The UK share of this net 
figure for India was negative for that year. If the UK 
share in foreign capital in South Africa was the same or 
less in 1958 than in 1956, British capital would amount to 
at most 1.2% of GDP103. This evidence suggests, then, that 
although the UK was the largest supplier of foreign capital 
to the independent sterling area, these countries were not 
overwhelmingly dependent on free capital flows from the UK.
The cohesive role of these continuing free capital 
movements among members of the sterling area must therefore 
be thrown into some doubt. Certainly the 3%-5% of fixed 
capital formation might have been an important addition to 
the economies of the independent sterling members but this 
contribution was certainly not of the order of the 
dependence of the Colonies on continued British investment.
101Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1959 & 1960.
Statistics Office of the United Nations, New York, 1960 & 1961.
102Ibid.
103International Flow of Long Term Capital and Official 
Donations 1951-59. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
New York, 1961. p. 28-29.
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This analysis also serves to put into perspective the degree 
to which sterling area development was accomplished from 
domestic rather than overseas resources.
The weakness of the capital market incentive is further 
illustrated by an episode in 1955 which contrasts with the 
successful sanction against South Africa in 1949-50 
described above. In 1955, India appeared unwilling to peg 
to a fluctuating pound and was accumulating gold reserves, 
against the sterling area 'rules'. Sir Leslie Rowan, second 
secretary at the Treasury, in a draft paper on "Problems of 
the Sterling Area" in October 1955, suggested that if a 
country such as India did not comply with the rules it 
should be ejected from the area or its credit facilities 
should be limited104. M.W. Stamp of the Bank of England 
responded that the political outcry in the UK from such a 
move would be considerable and furthermore that the rest of 
the sterling area was not much impressed by the free access 
to London's capital, especially given the high interest 
rates attached to borrowing in London105. This exchange 
shows that the restriction of capital flows was no longer 
considered as effective a sanction to enforce discipline in 
the system as it had been when used against South Africa in 
1949.
104"PrOblemS of the Sterling Area", 3 Oct. 1955. BoE OV 44/30.
105Paper by M.W. Stamp, 19 Oct. 1955. BoE OV 44/30.
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IV.E . CONCLUSION
The analysis presented above suggests that the UK had 
more to lose from restricting capital flows than the rest 
of the sterling area stood to lose from forgoing this 
capital. Such a policy would have threatened the 
international role of sterling, thus undermining Britain’s 
position in the international economy. Imposing further 
exchange controls would put Britain out of step with the 
general international movement toward convertibility and 
would require a violation of her international commitments. 
This is all, of course, in addition to the loss to the UK 
of visible and invisible earnings associated with overseas 
investment. On the other hand while the RSA took more 
capital from the UK than any other foreign country, it 
comprised a relatively small part of their total fixed 
capital formation.
The evidence also suggests that while the UK thus had 
more to lose from such a policy, they also had less to gain 
than much contemporary opinion supposed in terms of easing 
balance of payments problems and stemming the drain on 
reserves. In this context, any policy of further 
restricting capital flows would have been irrational not 
just because of the political and economic
considerations discussed at the time (ie. cohesion of the 
area and current account benefits) but also because these 
cuts would not have significantly helped the balance of
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payments or the reserves position.
A counterfactual has been presented which suggests that 
the investment in the sterling area did not hamper the 
growth of the British economy because of the small size of 
capital flows to the sterling area relative to domestic 
investment and the relative inefficiency of Gross Domestic 
Capital Formation in Britain. Furthermore, until 1956 the 
part of sterling area investment which could not be financed 
out of domestic savings was available from the accumulation 
of sterling balances by the Colonies. The available 
empirical evidence suggests that the rate of profit and the 
capacity for generating exports was greater for investment 
in the sterling area than for investment elsewhere. The 
losses to the current account from a reduction in overseas 
investment would thus be exaggerated since any capital 
restrictions would have to be focused specifically on the 
sterling area as non-sterling area investment was already 
restricted. Finally, the system of pooling the foreign 
exchange earnings of the RSA and free capital flows to the 
RSA appears to have generated a surplus for the balance of 
payments from 1950 to 1955.
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Chapter V, The Sterling Area and British Domestic and 
External Monetary Policy
In April 1956 George Bolton, Director at the Bank of 
England, wrote that the sterling area "inhibits a flexible 
monetary policy in the UK, is a permanent source of anxiety 
to HMG and, in terms of the annual service, is a constant 
threat to Capital account"1. In this context, Bolton was 
most concerned with the effect of the sterling area sterling 
balances but the operations of the whole sterling area 
system have come under similar criticism from subsequent 
analysts. Thus, as noted in Chapter I, Sidney Pollard has 
asserted that the sterling area was a "specific point of 
vulnerability for Britain"2. He argued that "since its 
reserve was held in the City, the sterling area could be a 
tower of strength to London, but in times of stress it could 
also be a source of weakness, exaggerating the amplitude of 
fluctuations to which London was subject"3. Furthermore, 
in order not to "disappoint those who used the City of 
London as their banking centre, devaluation was ruled out 
repeatedly and much more harmful measures to the economy
1G.F. Bolton "Sterling Balances and Monetary Policy", 4 April, 
1956. BOE C40/690.
2Sidney Pollard, The Wasting of the British Economy? British
Economic Policy 1945 to the Present. Croom Helm, London, 1982. 
p. 34.
3Ibid.
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preferred instead"4. The extent to which these accusations 
were justified is the topic of the present chapter. This 
will be divided into the pursuit of answers to two 
questions, the contribution of the RSA to instability in the 
reserves of the system as a whole and the extent to which 
the sterling area system inhibited British policy with 
respect to exchange rates and interest rates.
V.A. The Sterling Area and Stability of the Central 
Reserves The first issue is to determine the extent
to which the rest of the sterling area (RSA) contributed to 
instability in the area's reserves. To achieve this an 
important but often overlooked distinction must be made 
between the reserves of the sterling area and those of the 
UK alone. As described in Chapter II, the UK was the 
designated holder of most of the foreign exchange earnings 
of the sterling area as a whole. Thus, the monetary 
authorities of the sterling area converted their foreign 
exchange earnings to sterling in London and held the surplus 
after settlement with the UK in short term assets as future 
calls on the central reserves. This 'dollar pooling' was 
designed to conserve the amount of foreign exchange in the 
system since the idle dollars of a member in balance of 
payments surplus with the non-sterling area could be 
withdrawn by another member in deficit.
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The reserves of the area as a whole, however, were 
often referred to as UK reserves in the official statistics 
and therefore in unofficial analysis. Thus a contribution 
to the reserves by a member of the RSA was more likely to be 
referred to as adding to the sterling area reserves while a 
subsequent withdrawal was seen as a drain on UK reserves.
For example, in response to a Treasury request for 
statistics on the 1 sterling area reserves1 the Bank of 
England Statistics Office responded with a table entitled 
"Sterling Area Countries Contributing to or Drawing on the 
UK Gold and Dollar Reserves"5. Of course this point should 
not be overstressed since, as banker to the sterling area, 
the British economy was influenced by fluctuations in the 
economies of RSA members which resulted in contributions to 
or drawings on the central reserves.
Peter Oppenheimer, writing in 1966, argued that "it is 
not possible to measure the independent impact of the OSA on 
London's monetary position in any simple way"6. His 
objections centred on the difficulty of detecting influences 
unique to the UK and RSA balances of payments. Thus he 
asserted that
5"Sterling Area Countries Contributing to or Drawing on the UK 
Gold and Dollar,Reserves" Bank of England Statistical Office, 9 
August, 1957. BoE EID3/114.
6P.M. Oppenheimer, "Monetary Movements and the International 
Postition of Sterling" in D.J. Robertson and L.C. Hunter eds, The 
British Balance of Payments. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1966, pp. 
89-135. p. 115. OSA = Overseas Sterling Area.
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to measure the specific contribution of the OSA in 
a meaningful sense one would have to exclude any 
change in the OSA balance of payments caused 
either by an opposite change in the UK balance or 
by some third factor affecting both UK and OSA 
balances simultaneously. Otherwise the 
distinction between UK and OSA contributors 
remains arbitrary7.
I would argue, however, that the net result of the
interdependence of UK and RSA balances of payments with the
rest of the world is an interesting measure. It is not, of
course, possible to infer from the available figures a
picture of what the UK reserves would have been without the
sterling area. An example of the interdependence of their
balances of payments is RSA raw materials exported to the UK
for sterling and then manufactured by the UK into dollar
earning exports. In this way, the RSA exports have a dollar
earning element that does not appear in their share of the
reserves. The motive for reserve pooling was to capitalise
on the interdependence of the members and on offsetting
responses to changes in the rest of the world. Since the
sterling area included primary producers and manufactures
producers it was hoped that the fortunes of the various
members might move counter-cyclically so that the system
would reduce the amount of foreign exchange required to
maintain sufficient reserves to satisfy current needs. Some
attempt to analyze the observable contributions of the RSA
and the UK to the reserves which was the result of this
7Ibld.
system is necessary to judge its success or failure.
In the Monthly Report on External Finance prepared by 
the Bank of England and the Treasury for the Cabinet 
Overseas Negotiations Committee, quarterly movements in gold 
and dollars held by the Exchange Equalisation Account were 
broken down into their constituent parts and changes due to 
the UK balance with the Dollar Area were separated from 
transactions of each member of the RSA with the Dollar 
Area8. Sterling area transactions in dollars with the non­
dollar area were recorded separately. The figures included 
only gold and dollar transactions going through London and 
ignored changes in gold and dollar holdings of RSA countries 
separate from the central reserves. This series thus 
recorded the identifiable gold and dollar transactions of 
the sterling area. The difference between this and actual 
changes in the central reserves was due to net errors and 
ommissions.
A simple first test of the relative instability of
changes in reserves due to the UK and the RSA is a
comparison of the standard deviation from the mean of
changes in reserves due to the UK balance with the dollar
area compared to that of the RSA balance with the dollar 
area. These are shown in Table V.A. The standard deviation 
of UK balances with the dollar area on a quarterly basis is 
significantly higher than that of RSA balances with the
8Monthly Reports on External Finance 1950-58. BoE EID3/98-107.
Table V.A.
Quarterly Dollar Balances of the RSA and UK
UK $ Bal RSA $ Bal RSA+UK 
Standard Deviation 69.6 31.7 90.9
Mean -29.7 7.4 -22.3
Source: Data from Monthly Report on External Finance. BoE 
EID3/98-107•
dollar area. The observable effect of the UK on the 
reserves was thus more volatile than the contributions of 
the RSA. Moreover, the RSA net contributions to the 
reserves varied more narrowly around a positive mean while 
the UK balances varied more widely around a mean of net 
drawing on the reserves of £30m per quarter. The final 
column in Table V.A., however, shows that the volatility of 
the dollar balances of the RSA and UK combined was 
significantly higher than the UK balance of payments with 
the dollar area alone. On a quarterly basis, the 
fluctuations of the RSA and of the UK tended to move 
together so that movements in the RSA balance of payments 
with the dollar area was indeed "exaggerating the amplitude 
of fluctuations to which London was subject”9.
Figure V.A. shows quarterly changes in the dollar 
balances of the UK, the Colonies and the larger independent 
sterling area countries10. This shows that it was the 
consistent level of dollar earnings by the Colonies that was
9Pollard, The Wasting, p. 34,
10These countries are Australia, New Zealand, India,. Pakistan, 
Ceylon, South Africa, Burma, Eire and Iraq.
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experiences of individual countries in the sterling area. 
With the notable exceptions of Ceylon and India, the 
independent sterling area countries were in net deficit with 
the dollar area. Ceylon maintained a consistent if small 
dollar surplus and India was also in dollar surplus after 
1955, mostly due to aid from the USA.
The drawings by these independent members of the 
sterling area were offset not only by Colonial dollar 
earnings but also by gold sales which are not included in 
Figure V.A. An average of £24m worth of gold was sold to 
the central reserves each quarter during the first five 
years of the 1950s11. Once the London gold market was re­
opened in 1954 more gold was sold and the average quarterly 
sales during 1955-58 was £53m12. Almost all of this 
offsetting gold flow, however, came from South Africa with 
periodic contributions from Australia, Southern Rhodesia and 
British West Africa. Annual gold sales and purchases for 
1950-56 are presented in Table V.B.
South Africa was never a formal member of the sterling 
area reserves pooling system. Instead, South Africa*s hard 
currency deficits were settled out of her current gold 
production and separate gold reserves were kept for this 
purpose. In effect, however, she was a partial member of 
the central reserves since during the 1950s South Africa was
11Monthly Report on External Finance 1950-58. BoE EID3/98-107.
12Ibid.
under various agreements to settle her balance of payments
deficits with the UK in gold and also to reimburse Britain
for the gold equivalent of her deficit in the EPU. As a
result, South Africa's sterling deficits
Table V.B.
Gold Sales (+) and Purchases (-) in UK
$m
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
South Africa 205 187 192 220 349 465 526
Br.W.Africa 28 24 6 - 22 26 21
S.Rhodesia 18 12 2 - 14 18 18
Australia 30 6 - - - - 56
Iraq - - - - - -8 -6
Pakistan - -11 - — — -10 -
Persian Gulf - - - - - - -3
Br.E.Africa - - - - 2 2 2
India — - - — -1 — —
Total 281 218 200 220 386 493 614
Source: "Radcliffe Committee: Sterling Area Countries 
Contributing to or Drawing on the UK Gold and Dollar 
Reserves" Statistics Office, Bank of England, 9/8/57. BoE 
EID3/114.
generated substantial amounts of gold for the central 
reserves in the same way that other RSA members' deficits 
with the UK generated dollars for the central reserves.
Most independent members of the sterling area were 
fairly consistent net drawers on the central reserves 
throughout the 1950s and the sterling area system allowed 
Colonial surpluses and South African gold sales to finance 
these deficits. In this sense the 'dollar-pooling' system 
was a success for overseas members of the sterling area. It 
did not, however, support British dollar deficits. This can 
be seen more clearly in the annual analysis which follows, 
in which the gold cost of the RSA through the EPU will be
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included.
The annual UK Balance of Payments White Papers broke 
down the changes in gold and dollar reserves to their 
constituent parts on an annual basis. The changes 
attributed to the RSA cover net sales to or drawings on the 
central reserves due to
a) Net transactions with the Dollar Area (including 
transactions through UK intermediaries)
b) The dollar proceeds of gold sales regardless of the 
residence of the purchaser
c) Gold and dollar settlements with non-dollar 
countries including the IBRD and IMF
d) Gold sales in the UK for sterling.
The balance of the RSA with the EPU was not included 
separately in these figures although they are easily 
adjusted using the balance of the RSA as a whole with the 
OEEC on the basis that 40% of the sterling balance in the 
Union was settled in gold from 1950-54, 50% in 1955 and 75% 
in 1956-58. The figures are presented in Table V.C.
Here, the UK share of changes in the central reserves 
is calculated as the residual after identified RSA 
transactions are subtracted from the actual reserves changes 
in these years. As a result, the UK share will include 
errors and ommissions. Bearing in mind this limitation, the 
figures are consistent with the
quarterly results that the RSA was a net contributor to the 
central gold and dollar reserves throughout the 1950s, even 
including the deterioration of the RSA balance of payments 
with the EPU after 1955. The Colonial surplus and South
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African gold sales were not sufficient, however, to support 
both the deficits of the independent sterling area and those 
of the UK in 1951, 1952 and 1955. In 1956, the reserves 
only increased due to a £200m IMF loan in response to the 
Suez Crisis.
Table V.C.
Analysis of the Central Reserves of the Sterling Area
1950
Colonies 
a+b+c 131 
Gold Sales
10
1951
165
9
1952
136
3
1953
101
1954
100
9
1955
121
10
1956
111
1957
101
1958
88
Total 141 174 139 101 109 131 111 101 88
ISA
a+b+c 20 
Gold Sales 
90
-63
69
-99
69
-14
78
-72
129
-98
166
-98
220
-38
223
51
227
Total 111 6 -30 64 57 68 122 185 278
Total RSA 
a+b+c 152 
Gold Sales 
100
102
78
37
72
87
78
27
138
23
176
13
220
63
223
139
227
Total 251 180 109 165 166 199 232 287 366
Gold cost in 
65
Total Contrib 
316
EPU (-)
14 11 
of RSA 
194 120
12
187
14
180
18
217
5
237
-83
204
-79
287
Change in Central : 
575 -344
Res
-175
✓
240 87 -229 42 13 284
UK Share 259 -538 -295 53 -93 -446 -185 -191 -3
Notes: a = net transactions with the dollar area 
b = $ proceeds of sales of gold
c = gold and $ settlements with non-dollar countries
ISA = Independent Sterling Area.1 
Gold Sales include only those in London against sterling 
Source: UK Balance of Payments White Papers. For the last 
three years the Balance of Payments data refer to total RSA
only. For these years Monthly Report on External Finance
data is used.
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The essential conclusion from this analysis is that the 
RSA did not pose a measurable consistent burden on the 
central reserves. The dollar pooling system can be termed a 
success for the overseas sterling area since even without 
the gold sales of South Africa, the earnings of the Colonies 
balanced the drawings of the ISA until 1956 although the 
one-sidedness of this 'sharing* of reserves generated 
protests that the more developed members of the sterling 
area were exploiting the Colonies13. The system was less 
successful in offsetting the fluctuations of the UK because 
the balances of the RSA as a whole did not consistently move 
countercyclically to those of the UK. Still, the RSA as a 
whole was not overwhelmingly destabilizing to the reserves 
except perhaps during the reserves crisis of 1951-2. For 
most of the 1950s it was a case of the RSA surplus falling 
slightly when the UK deficit worsened dramatically rather 
than the RSA and the UK going into deficit and surplus 
together.
V.B. The Sterling Balances and Confidence
The second possible contribution of the sterling area 
to the vulnerability of the central reserves was the 
overhang of sterling area sterling balances over the foreign 
exchange reserves of the area. Because of the small ratio 
of reserves to short term liabilities, it was argued,
13For a critique of this view see Chapter II.
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deteriorations in the balance of payments, temporary or 
otherwise, had to be met by 'stop1 phases of heavy-handed 
constraints on the domestic economy. In this way the 
sterling balances restricted the flexibility of British 
policy-makers by exposing the reserves to the constant 
threat of speculative attacks. Thus Jim Tomlinson stated 
that "the great importance of the sterling balances for 
British policy was particularly in focusing so much 
attention on Britain's reserve position"14.
In the ideal functioning of the dollar pool, the 
sterling balances would have been accumulated alongside 
parallel contributions to the central reserves. The 
overhang of sterling balances in the immediate post-war 
period, however, was due to British wartime expenditure in 
the RSA and not from RSA foreign exchange earnings. This 
burden, however, did not manifest itself in the changes in 
the reserves because as the wartime assets of the ISA were 
rundown there was a convenient accumulation of sterling 
assets by the Colonies due largely to their 100% currency 
reserve requirement, the cautious development policy of 
Colonial governors and restrictions on Colonial dollar 
expenditure imposed by Britain. As seen in Chapter II, the 
overall level of sterling balances remained remarkably 
stable throughout the 1950s. The inflated value of the
14Jim Tomlinson, British Macroeconomic Policy Since 1940. Croom 
Helm, London, 1985. p. 51.
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sterling balances during this period, however, gave the 
impression that if the RSA and the UK all went into deficit 
at one time, the RSA could try to cash in their sterling 
balances for gold or dollars from the central reserves.
Since the sterling balances were three to four times the 
value of reserves in this period, the system as a whole 
would be bankrupted. Thus the very existence of large 
amounts of liquid liabilities, which by the 1950s were an 
integral part of the sterling area system, may have 
contributed to the general perception that the British 
reserves were unstable. In fact, a large part of the 
sterling balances were not very liquid since they included, 
for example, statutory currency reserves and sinking funds. 
In a serious crisis of a kind that did not arise in the 
1950s, however, most of this 'hard core* of sterling 
balances could be liquidated. On the other hand, a more 
serious crisis than that which occured in the 1950s may have 
been an opportunity for the UK to suspend sterling area 
convertibility. It will be shown later that it was believed 
by the framers of the ROBOT plan that this time had come in 
1952 but as the crisis receded their case was weakened. 
Although the threat of a run on the reserves was not 
fulfilled, the sterling balances may still have restricted 
the freedom of British policy-makers.
There is little doubt that in the opinion of observers 
both in Britain and outside, the sterling balances posed a
296
serious burden on the British economy. Thus, there was 
periodic pressure from the American State Department for the 
British authorities to * solve' the sterling balances 
•problem1 either by enforced funding or by agreements on 
their gradual expenditure, because they were considered an 
obstacle to Britain reestablishing a freer trade and 
payments policy. The Bank of England and the Treasury also 
subscribed to the view that the sterling balances presented 
an unpredictable burden on the British economy. George 
Bolton's assertion that the sterling balances restricted 
British policy and posed a threat to the reserves was cited 
at the beginning of this chapter. His view was echoed in 
the Bank by L.P. Thompson-McCausland who stressed that the 
ratio of reserves to sterling balances represented the true 
external 'position' of the British economy. In the 
Treasury, concern with the sterling balances centred around 
several unsuccessful attempts to estimate the 'hard core' of 
balances which could be relied upon not to be a potential 
drain on the central reserves.
Since, in the event, the sterling balances did not have 
a directly destabilising impact on the British economy in 
the 1950s, the main questions relating to the effect of the 
sterling balances on British policy are whether the 
existence of these liabilities actually made destabilising 
speculative capital flows larger than they would otherwise 
have been, and to what extent British policy was restricted
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by the existence of the balances. The second aspect will be 
dealt with in subsequent sections of this chapter. With 
respect to the first question, it is impossible to construct 
a reliable counterfactual measure of speculative flows since 
speculators' opinion of the danger of the sterling balances 
is impossible to isolate from their reaction to other 
weaknesses of the British economy. Some insight, however, 
is possible from events in the 1960s.
As will be seen in Chapter VI, during the 1960s a 
network of short term central bank credits provided 
consistent support against unpredictable and destabilising 
drawings on sterling balances. Public awareness of these 
short term lines of credit, however, did not overcome the 
persistence of speculative flows. Thus, a guarantee of the 
UK's ability to survive an attempted run on the reserves 
would probably not have been enough to eliminate the strains 
on the balance of payments in the 1950s either. It is 
unlikely that it was the threat of the sterling balances 
being run down without an adequate cushion of short term 
assets that was the major destabilizing force for overseas 
speculators.
A further consideration in assessing the contribution 
of the sterling area to confidence is that the published 
reserves did not cover the total of official dollar assets 
held by the EEA. They excluded a small amount of non-dollar 
currencies, a significant amount of dollar securities which
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had been accumulated during the war, and the British quota
in the IMF. As of the end of October 1958, the market value
of the dollar securities held by the EEA was $875,219,941
distributed over 9.5m shares of 198 American
corporations15. Of these, about half of the value were
invested in the eight corporations shown in Table V.D.
Table V.D.
Dollar Securities Held by EEA 
Market Value on 31/10/58
Company Number of Shares Mkt Value
(*000s)
Shell Oil 1,917,777 134,244
General Motors 2,410,398 84,665
Amerada 681,912 61,372
Eastman-Kodak 465,126 48,605
State Oil New Jersey 662,954 34,142
Ingersoll-Rand 328,068 25,589
International Paper 271,772 24,799
State Oil Indiana 596,670 24.314
Total 437,730
Source: Note by Statistics Office of Bank of England, "Annex 
IV: Assets" for Dennis Rickett and the Radcliffe Committee, 
25 February, 1959. BoE EID3/19.
These securities supplemented the published reserves by a 
full 28% in 1958. The Radcliffe Committee expressed its 
desire to have the value of these securities published 
periodically "so as to convey a more adequate picture of the 
reserve position"16. The Bank of England resisted such 
suggestions on the basis that there were no plans to
15Statistics Office, Bank of England, "Annex IV Assets", 25 
February, 1959. BoE EID1/19.
16Reoort on the Working of the Monetary System. HMSO, 1956., 
p. 227. The Committee were only allowed to reveal that these 
securities amounted to between $750m and $lb.
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liquidate the securities and their value would fall if they 
did. Also, a regular account of these assets might be 
embarrassing to the government since the value of British 
national reserves would be seen to be affected by the 
vagaries of Wall Street17.
The reluctance to publicise the real level of foreign 
exchange reserves on the basis that these assets were not 
really liquid mirrors the fact that the liabilities due to 
the sterling area had a significant (if unquantifiable) hard 
core of illiquid assets as well as those whose market value 
would fall in the event of large scale liquidation. Both 
the American shares and the hard core of sterling balances 
would presumably be sold off in an unprecedentedly severe 
crisis. In such a crisis the IMF quota would also be drawn 
on to forestall bankruptcy. The publication of the total 
sterling balances and the secrecy surrounding the total 
British reserves thus seem inconsistent. By 1958, $318m of 
these securities were pledged as security to the American 
Import-Export Bank and a further $91m to the IBRD against 
loans18. In the eyes of Britain's creditors, therefore, 
these assets were considered liquid enough to act as loan 
security. Still, this meant that only half of the value of 
the shares, or $166m, was free to be set against the
17Statistics Office, Bank of England,"Annex IV: Assets" 25
February, 1959. BoE EID1/19.
18Ibid.
sterling liabilities to the sterling area.
V.C. The Sterling Area and Exchange Rate Policy
It is possible that the damaging demand management
techniques used during the 1950s could have been avoided if
the exchange rate rather than the reserves had been allowed
to carry the burden of balance of payments. The Radcliffe
Committee reviewed the fortunes of floating exchange rates
in the 1920s and 1930s and concluded that
This experience has been sufficient to demonstrate 
both the inconvenience of a fluctuating pound and 
the impossibility of altering its value without 
regard to the interests of other countries which 
use sterling as an international currency. Either 
course of actions intimately concerns the other 
members of the sterling area and would confront 
them with awkward dilemmas of policy. The 
preservation of a fixed rate of exchange 
undoubtedly offers the best prospect of avoiding 
strains and stresses within the sterling area, 
except perhaps in highly abnormal conditions when 
the entire world economy is seriously out of 
balance and the area as a whole is under 
persistent pressure in its balance of payments 
with the non-sterling world19.
Despite this firm statement by the Radcliffe Committee 
there were two major episodes in the 1950s when a flexible 
exchange rate was seriously considered. The first was the 
now famous ROBOT plan of 1951-2 and the second was during 
negotiations for the Collective Approach at the end of 1952. 
After these two approaches to convertibility had been 
abandoned, the policy of the Bank of England and of the
19Report on the Working of the Monetary System. HMSO, 1956. p.
257.
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Treasury turned to an administrative route to convertibility 
at fixed rates. This is discussed in Chapter VI. A closer 
look at the role of the sterling area in the abandonment of 
these flexible exchange rate policies will go some way to 
establishing to what extent the sterling area inhibited 
policy in this regard.
The history of the ROBOT plan for convertibility 
devised by George Bolton, T.L. Rowan and R.W.B. Clarke has 
been well described elsewhere20. Briefly, ROBOT in its 
final form called for the establishment of external 
convertibility at a variable exchange rate which would be 
allowed to float around the par value of $2.80\£ between 
unpublicised boundaries of $2.40\£ to $3.20\£ supported by 
the Exchange Equalisation Account. Only the central banks 
and governments of the Commonwealth would be informed of 
these boundaries. Non-resident sterling balances would be 
blocked except for 10% which would be classified as
t j
'external* sterling and would be convertible. All current 
earnings of sterling after the implementation of ROBOT would 
also be freely convertible. Not less than 80% of sterling 
area sterling balances would be funded in low interest 
securities, making them unavailable for current transactions 
and inconvertible. The remaining 20% would be freely 
convertible subject to continued exchange control by
2°see e.g., Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery; British 
Economic Policy 1945-51. Methuen, London, 1985. pp. 234-271.
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sterling area authorities. There was to be no change in 
arrangements with Colonial members of the sterling area 
whose balances in any case were tied up for the most part in 
currency funds and other fixed obligations. Finally, the 
London gold market would be re-opened at a freely 
fluctuating market rate. Residents of the rest of the 
sterling area would be denied access to the market, except 
for gold producing members.
For present purposes the most interesting requirement 
was the funding of sterling area sterling balances. The 
Chancellor, R.A. Butler, when presenting ROBOT to the 
Cabinet argued that "the funding of sterling balances, 
though it may initially be a shock for the holders would 
remove the greatest potential danger to the sterling area 
reserves and would strengthen confidence in sterling"21. 
Enlarging on the disadvantages of the plan the Chancellor 
recognised that a unilateral decision to fund the balances 
"would be a shock to the Commonwealth members of the 
sterling area and might bring one or two of them to the 
point of deciding to leave the sterling area altogether"22. 
The Chancellor speculated that Pakistan, experiencing 
political difficulties, and Ceylon, a consistent dollar 
earner, might resist further restrictions on the use of
21Record of Cabinet meeting February 28, 1952 transcribed by
Mr Forman-Brook, 21 March, 1952. PRO T236\3242.
22Ibid.
their sterling balances and break their ties with the 
sterling area if not with the Commonwealth. It was expected 
that New Zealand would accept funding as a decision of the 
UK government, South Africa would welcome ROBOT for the re­
opening of the gold market and India would agree if she were 
assured that she would still get sufficient capital for 
development plans. Australia was the major obstacle since 
her sterling balances were large and liquid. It was 
acknowledged at the Cabinet meeting that Australia "would be 
hard hit by it but her government must realise that she was 
over-spending and could not expect to go on doing so. It 
was conceivable though unlikely, that she might seek 
independence of the sterling area"23. India, Pakistan,
Ceylon and South Africa were under agreements blocking part 
of their balances, although generally not as much as the 80% 
called for in ROBOT. The Cabinet asserted that from the 
point of view of the sterling balances
the most significant gain would be the restraint 
imposed by this plan on Australia's use of her 
sterling balances? for her drawing rights were not 
at present the subject of any agreement and her 
overseas expenditure constituted the greatest 
current threat to the stability of the sterling 
area"24.
In this sense, ROBOT was a convenient way to unilaterally 
solve the sterling balances 'problem'.
On the 24 March 1952 Prime Minister Churchill minuted
23 Ibid.
24Ibid.
the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggesting that the UK
should instead negotiate limits on the drawing down of
sterling balances before looking to 'free' sterling25. The
blocking of sterling balances was thus suggested as an
alternative response to the immediate crisis rather than
convertibility at flexible rates. The advice from T.L.
Rowan for the Chancellor's reply was that
if there was not mention of convertibility there 
could be no hope of any success of such 
negotiations and it would merely further weaken 
the pound, while on the other hand, there could 
certainly not be any mention of convertibility 
because this would result in major losses to the 
reserves through advance manipulation of funds 
etc26.
Thus, any formula to block the sterling balances would have 
to be subject to protracted bilateral negotiations with the 
relevant members unless sterling convertibility was related 
to the proposals to show the necessity for the UK to act 
secretly and unilaterally. The sterling Commonwealth had 
shown themselves committed to early convertibility at the 
recent Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meetings in London 
and they were unlikely to accept a restriction on their 
freedom without a significant cruid pro cruo along these 
lines. This point was reiterated in a draft speech prepared 
for the Chancellor to present to the Cabinet at the
25Minute from Winston Churchill to R.A. Butler, 24 March 1952. 
PRO T236/3242.
26Memorandum from T.L. Rowan to R.A. Butler, 25 March 1952. PRO 
T236/3242•
beginning of April 1952. The Chancellor was to conclude "I 
think we should defer any action on the sterling balances 
until I have been able to put before my colleagues [in the 
sterling area], and secure their agreement to, proposals in 
the field of convertibility"27. The prospect for blocking 
the sterling balances was thus transformed into a selling 
point for ROBOT.
Still, the possibility that the sterling area members 
would not accept unilateral 80% funding of their sterling 
balances was a serious obstacle to ROBOT when the plan was 
first presented to Cabinet in February 1952. One 
disadvantage of the 80% funding plan was that it required 
re-opening the hard-fought agreements with India, Pakistan 
and Ceylon with the possibility of losing Pakistan and 
Ceylon, at least, from the sterling area. Furthermore, 
Australia was not realistically in a position immediately to 
fund 80% of her balances since a large part was committed 
for import contracts concluded before the recent round of 
Australian quantitative import restrictions. Finally, any 
such funding agreement would require a catastrophe clause to 
allow members to draw on their sterling balances for 
Unforeseen eventualities* such as pre-zero commitments and 
Indian food imports in times of famine.
In March 1952, after Robot had been deferred by the
27|,The Position of Sterling", Paper for Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 4 April 1952. PRO T236/3243.
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Cabinet, Flett, Thompson-McCausland, Jones and Snelling of 
the Bank of England devised an alternative to the funding 
proposal of Robot which avoided many of the difficulties 
raised in the Cabinet meeting in February28, Their report
proposed to leave the agreements with India, Pakistan and
1
Ceylon intact and to get the other members to freeze their
hard core of sterling balances in the same pattern. Most of
this hard core was currency reserves and agreement would
have to be reached on the proportion of sterling balances
this comprised. The figures offered by Flett are presented
in Table V.E. The total amount of sterling area sterling
Table V.E.
Alternative Sterling Balances Proposal
£m
Country Hard Core (to be blocked) Total %
Australia 140 337 42
New Zealand 25 50 50
South Africa 20 68 29
Southern Rhodesia 7 14 50
Ireland 50 68 74
India 520 568 92
Pakistan 54 143 38
Cevlon 30 58 52
Total 846 1306 65
Notes: India, Pakistan and Ceylon figures represent currency 
reserves and blocked balances existing at the end of 
February 1952 from "The Position of Sterling" Draft paper 
for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 4 April, 1952. Others 
from M.T. Flett report for T.L. Rowan, "Robot and the 
Commonwealth Sterling Area", 31 March, 1952. PRO T236/3242.
balances blocked under this alternative scheme would be
about £850m which was £200m less than under the original
28Report by M.T.Flett to T.L. Rowan, "Robot and the 
Commonwealth Sterling Area", 31 March, 1952. PRO T236/3242.
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Robot scheme. The disadvantages of this extra liquidity 
were outweighed by the advantages of avoiding fresh 
negotiations with India, Pakistan and Ceylon, avoiding the 
pitfalls of a catastrophe clause and, most importantly, the 
proposals were more liable to be accepted since they 
required only an acknowledgement that a hard core of 
sterling balances existed29. With this proposal it was 
hoped the danger of the sterling balances posing a serious 
obstacle to a convertibility plan along the lines of ROBOT 
was reduced.
Whether the sterling area would have acquiesced to this 
restriction on their ability to use their sterling balances 
is, perhaps, doubtful. The final column of Table V.E. shows 
the different treatment which would have been accorded to 
members of the sterling area. Thus, South Africa was 
treated quite gently with only 29% of her sterling balances 
blocked while New Zealand and Southern Rhodesia would be 
requested to forego the use of 50% of their sterling 
balances. This disparity may not have been an obstacle to 
the agreement, however, since India, Pakistan and Ceylon had 
agreed to arrangements which treated each differently 
according to their circumstances. A more serious obstacle 
to the alternative formula for the sterling balances was the 
fact that there would have to be perhaps lengthy 
consultation with the members concerned in order to
29Ibid.
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establish an agreed proportion of illiquid assets before 
convertibility was announced. This released the threat that 
the plan for sterling convertibility would be leaked 
internationally causing speculation against the pound.
There was also the danger that the sterling area countries 
themselves would take advantage of their knowledge to switch 
a large proportion of their balances out of sterling assets 
in anticipation of blocking agreements. The extent of 
necessary prior negotiations was minimised since the 
agreements with India, Pakistan and Ceylon would not need to 
be revised. New Zealand, Ireland and Southern Rhodesia were 
unlikely to present difficulties. South Africa, it was 
hoped, would welcome the re-opening of the gold market as a 
quid pro quo and was in any case under more or less formal 
agreement to restrict the use of her sterling balances to 
settle her dollar account. Australia still posed a serious 
obstacle but she was relatively gently treated in M.T.
Flett1s figures shown in Table V.E. with 42% of her sterling 
balances to be blocked. This alternative formula, then, 
offered some hope of success.
What should be emphasized when considering the role of 
the sterling area in this early plan for convertibility at a 
flexible exchange rate is that, far from providing a 
possible excuse for abandoning Robot, the prospect that 
ROBOT would solve the sterling balances problem was 
considered in the Treasury to be a positive encouragement
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for ministers to accept the plan. In this sense the 
sterling area was an incentive rather than an obstacle to 
ROBOT.
The sterling area also featured positively in the early 
development of ROBOT. At the first stages of ROBOT planning 
in January 1952, Otto Clarke noted that "it was pretty clear 
from the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting official 
discussions that South Africa and Ceylon would not continue 
permanently in an inconvertible sterling area; nor will 
Malaya and the Gold Coast when they get their freedom"30.
This argument was also taken up by C.F. Cobbold, Governor of 
the Bank of England, writing in support of convertibility at 
flexible rates to the Chancellor in early February. He 
argued that given the atmosphere at the Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers meetings and the deteriorating reserves position 
it was doubtful if the sterling area could survive on 
exhortations to 'put their houses in order1 and on 
infrequent aid from the USA for the next eighteen months31. 
The UK was responsible for sterling and had a responsibility 
to the RSA as keeper of the central reserves. If the 
decision was that the sterling area was unable to survive in 
its present state, then it was up to the UK to take early 
action to protect the pound, perhaps by reviewing the fixed
30R.W.B. Clarke, 25 January 1952. PRO T236/3240.
31C.F. Cobbold to R.A. Butler, 13 February 1952. PRO
T236/3240•
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parity to the dollar32. When it came time to present Robot 
to Cabinet the Chancellor reiterated this argument that "at 
the recent meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers it had 
clearly emerged that sterling could not survive on an 
inconvertible basis and this plan would be regarded as a 
major step on the road to convertibility"33. The sterling 
area, therefore, featured in Robot in two positive ways. 
Robot offered to satisfy the growing pressure from the RSA 
for convertibility and it also promised a solution to the 
sterling balances problem which was considered the major 
drawback of the sterling area system for the UK.
The opponents of Robot were concerned less with the 
obstacles presented by the sterling area system than with 
the effect of flexible exchange rates on the domestic 
economy and on relations with the EPU. It was assumed that 
there would be little difficulty in persuading RSA members 
to continue to peg to a flexible pound. Members who refused 
would be removed from the list of scheduled territories and 
treated as foreigners with their balances completely blocked 
and restrictions placed on capital flows from the UK. The 
effect of flexible rates on the domestic economy, however, 
was seen as both an economic and political obstacle.
With the burden of adjustment to balance of payments
32Ibid.
33Mr. Forman-Brook*s record of Cabinet meetings on 28 and 29 
February, 1952. 21 March 1952. PRO T236/3242.
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disequilibria borne by the exchange rate rather than the 
foreign exchange reserves, domestic price and employment 
levels would bear the brunt of adjustment. If the exchange 
rate fell very low, import prices would rise, disturbing 
inflation rates especially for food and raw materials. Lord 
Cherwell argued that exports were constrained by supply 
problems as much as price competitiveness so the 
depreciation of sterling would not have a balancing 
beneficial effect on export revenue and imports would have 
to be reduced further through quantitative restrictions to 
the point where industry would suffer34. Domestic 
employment and prices would be squeezed until balance was 
achieved. This, according to Churchill, was the "main 
anxiety" about Robot35. The abandonment of the 
governments public commitment to price stability and full 
employment would seriously undermine the government's 
political credibility. Lord Cherwell, the main opponent of 
the scheme, argued that this was politically impossible and 
that the government would eventually be forced to intervene 
to soften the strain on the domestic economy36.
A second major objection was that with sterling a
34Minutes of Cabinet Meetings, 28 and 29 February, 1952. 
Transcribed by Mr. Forman-Brook. PRO T236/3242.
35Winston Churchill to Leslie Rowan, 17 April, 1952. PRO 
T236/3243•
36Lord Cherwell to Winston Churchill, "Setting the Pound Free", 
18 March, 1952. PRO T236/3242.
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'hard* currency, other countries might discriminate against 
British exports as they did against American exports and the 
UK might have to respond by intensifying quantitative 
restrictions. The result would be a decline in trade among 
non-dollar countries. This reduction in world trade would 
be reinforced by the fact that the UK would have to pull out 
of the EPU after convertibility, probably causing the 
dissolution of the EPU and the reversal of Europe's trade 
liberalisation policies37.
The third major obstacle was the disruption of 
Britain's international political relations. Europe and 
America were liable to be hostile to the damage to the EPU. 
Furthermore, Robot contravened the IMF rules of the 
adjustable peg. It was thought that the Americans would 
welcome the re-introduction of convertibility but would 
probably object to the flexible rate since it did not fit in 
well with these existing international economic institutions 
operating under American influence38.
The Robot plan for flexible exchange rate 
convertibility could have foundered on any of these three 
obstacles as the urgency of the reserves crisis receded.
The most decisive factor was the lack of unanimity at the
37"External Sterling Plan" prepared by Overseas Finance 
division of the Treasury for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 4 
April, 1952. PRO T236/3243•
38Mr. Forman-Brook's record of Cabinet meetings on 29 and 29 
February, 1952. 21 March, 1952. PRO T236/3242.
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outset, which made the adoption of a revolutionary and risky 
departure from current economic and political policy 
impossible. After the initial deferral of Robot at the end 
of February, the economic situation eased and the spirit of 
crisis passed, making a dramatic change in policy even more 
remote.
Interestingly, there is evidence that Mr. Menzies, the 
Australian Prime Minister, was briefed on ROBOT while on an 
official visit to Britain in May and June 1952. The plan 
was outlined in a secret brief prepared for the Chancellor's 
discussion with Menzies. Instead of compulsory funding of a 
fixed percentage of the sterling balances, the Overseas 
Finance divisions's alternative proposal to leave existing 
agreements with India, Pakistan and Ceylon in tact was 
coupled with the gentle proposal that "we might ask for 
public statements from Australia and the remaining dominions 
that each of them did not contemplate drawing down its 
balances below a stated minimum"39. Unfortunately, the 
there is no record of the meeting between Butler and Menzies 
on Robot.
The Collective Approach to convertibility developed in 
the second half of 1952 was the last significant attempt to 
devise a return to convertibility at a flexible exchange 
rate. The Collective Approach was devised out of the ashes
39Brief prepared by T.L. Rowan for R.A. Butler, 26 May, 1952. 
PRO T236/3243.
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of the ROBOT plan. Under the plan, European currencies and 
sterling would go convertible together to spread the burden 
of possible speculation and it was hoped that the USA would 
supply a support fund for the countries involved. The plan 
was devised in close consultation with the rest of the 
sterling area and the final proposal was presented in the 
conclusion to the Commonwealth Economic Conference of 
December 1952. The sterling area countries objected to the 
fact that only non-resident sterling was to be convertible, 
to the gradual removal of quantitative import restrictions 
and to the prospect of alienating the American government. 
Perhaps the most dangerous objection, however, was 
resistance to the plan to establish sterling convertibility 
at a flexible exchange rate. The Indian delegates, 
especially, refused to commit themselves to maintaining 
fixed parity between the Rupee and a floating pound. If 
sterling area countries chose to break the link to sterling, 
they were likely to be absorbed into an American sphere of 
economic influence, pegging to the dollar and re-orienting 
their trade toward America. At the end of the sterling area 
consultations in December 1952 the RSA authorized the 
British to approach the USA with the Plan but the future of 
a flexible rate in the Collective Approach was left 
unresolved.
The question of a flexible sterling exchange rate 
within fixed boundaries of 3% on either side was discussed
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at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting at Istanbul in 
1955. By this time Commonwealth delegates had received 
directions from their respective governments and were 
willing to give tentatitive commitments on pegging to a 
flexible pound. Only India refused to give positive 
assurance that they would peg their currency to sterling 
after convertibility achieved through a Collective Approach.
By this time, however, the Collective Approach was 
already effectively dead as a route to convertibility.
Indian resistance to a flexible sterling exchange rate was 
no doubt a possible threat to the success of the Collective 
Approach but it was not the cause of its failure. The 
Collective Approach to convertibility was a non-starter 
because of its reliance on American and European cooperation 
to an extent that was not forthcoming. Thus, the Americans 
were told they would have to provide a support fund for 
convertibility through the IMF and were also required as a 
prequisite to revise their national economic strategy by 
proving themselves committed to 'good creditor' policy and 
reducing their surplus with the rest of the world. The 
Europeans were expected to follow the UK and adopt 
simultaneous convertibility according to a British timetable 
to strengthen the chances of success for sterling. Not 
surprisingly, the Collective Approach met with a cool 
response when presented to America and Europe in early 1953.
The Americans had avoided commitment on the
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Collective Approach pending the completion of the Randall
Commission on External Monetary Policy which was finally
presented to Congress in January 1954. In the short section
at the end of the Report devoted to currency convertibility,
the Commission concluded that
it does not favor a "dash” for convertibility, or 
letting the currency Mfind its own level", since 
such a method presents the danger of a vicious 
circle of inflation and would require larger 
reserves than may be available to prevent currency 
depreciation from getting out of hand40.
The Report continued, however, to state that it was
"sympathetic to the concept of a ‘floating rate1" but
qualified this with the priviso that "whether a country is
strong enough externally and internally, to administer such
a system effectively involves a judgment which only the
country in question could itself responsibly make"41.
Furthermore,
a strong internal economy, willing and able to 
control its money supply and its budget as 
safeguards against inflation, sufficiently mobile 
to make the best use of its resources, and able 
and willing to save in order to increase its 
productivity and improve its competitive position 
in world markets, is a prerequisite to 
convertibility42.
That the UK economy did not meet these criteria was
suggested in the conclusion that "to restore full
convertibility in sterling, Britain's reserves must be
40Report of the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy. 
Washington, D.C., January, 1954., p. 73.
41Ibid.
42Ibid.
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strengthened”43. The Americans were hostile to the 
suggestion that sterling would adopt a flexible exchange 
rate because it represented a departure from the conditions 
of the international payments system designed at Bretton 
Woods in 194444. Thus, in the Randall Report it was stated 
that "the commission feels it should not sponsor any 
measures that might wreck the Union [EPU] before there is 
something better to put in its place"45. The Commission, 
thus recommended "a gradual and controlled approach to full 
convertibility"46. If floating convertible had been put to 
the test it is likely that American opposition would have 
proved more serious than Indian reluctance to maintain a 
fixed rate with sterling47.
The purpose of examining these two episodes was to 
put into context the role of the sterling area as an 
inhibiting factor in the determination of exchange rate 
policy, by identifying the obstacles to adopting a flexible 
exchange rate policy. It has been shown that the sterling 
area figured only marginally in the failure of Britain to
43Ibid., p. 74.
44A .P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic 
Special Relationship. Wheatsheaf, 1988., p. 149.
45Randall Commission Report, p. 74.
46Ibid.
47There was a dissenting Minority Report by D.A. Reed and R.M. 
Simpson which advocated a speedy return to convertibility and the 
gold standard. Minority Report. Commission on Foreign Economic 
Policy. Washington, D.C., January, 1954.
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adopt a flexible convertible pound. Taking the burden of 
adjustment on the domestic economy rather than on the 
reserves would require political sacrifices that were not 
acceptable in the 1950s. Trying to avoid this pressure on 
employment and prices by limiting the fluctuation of the 
pound and collecting an international foreign exchange 
reserve through a stabilisation fund* sponsored by the 
Americans required a level of cooperation from the Americans 
and the Europeans that was also not feasible.
This does not tackle the option of a devaluation to 
another fixed rate. This option was repeatedly dismissed by 
the British authorities, in part because it would mean a 
reduction in the value of RSA foreign exchange reserves held 
as sterling. While the rhetoric surrounding the resistance 
to devaluation centred on the need to consult the sterling 
area and the need to take their interests into account48, 
it must be remembered that the UK had not found this to be
an obstacle to the devaluation in 1949 nor were they to find
it so for the devaluation of 1967.
In the environment of excess demand which characterised
the British economy in the 1950s, moreover, it was very
uncertain that a devaluation would have solved the problems 
of the British balance of payments. With only 1.5% 
unemployment during the 1950s, the prospects for increasing
48See for example the quotation from the Radcliffe Committee 
at the beginning of this section.
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the supply of exports to inprove the current surplus seemed 
remote. A price adjustment would not improve the supply 
problems of the British economy which contributed to the 
weak competitive position of British exports. Meanwhile, 
increases in the prices of imports would contribute to 
inflationary pressure. Thus, in the 1950s ”it did not 
require much imagination to foresee the risks of creating 
more inflationary pressure on the heels of a 
devaluation"49.
Nor, indeed, could devaluation alone be considered a 
solution to balance of payments problems. A devaluation in 
the 1950s would have required accompanying measures to 
restrict demand in order to make the devaluation effective 
by preventing domestic inflation from eroding the price 
advantage. In this sense devaluation may have strengthened 
the need for deflationary demand management techniques 
rather than releasing the domestic economy from such 
restrictions. Nor, certainly, is devaluation to another 
fixed exchange rate a cure for speculative pressure since 
confidence in the new rate would depend on faith in the 
government's ability to effect more structural changes in 
the internal economy to avoid a further devaluation.
Finally, a devaluation to another fixed rate would have 
disappointed not only those who held sterling as their
49A. Cairncross and B. Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline: The 
Devaluations of 1931. 1949 and 1967. Blackwell, 1983. p. 159.
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reserves, but also the hopes for re-establishing sterling as 
an international currency. If the decision had been taken 
to abandon this goal, the sterling area system would not 
have proved an obstacle. Indeed, unilaterally blocking 
sterling balances and capital flows to the sterling area 
would have offered a quick way to retire from the 
international economy. The problem in the 1950s was that it 
was believed that the sterling balances could not be blocked 
without abandoning these external ambitions for sterling 
unless sterling was convertible, and convertibility was not 
immediately possible given the reserves position unless it 
was done at a flexible exchange rate. A flexible 
convertible exchange rate which might have allowed a 
solution to the sterling balances problem while maintaining 
an international role for sterling was rejected because of 
the domestic and international political obstacles this 
presented. Devaluation was ruled out, not because of 
Britain's obligations to the sterling area (indeed C.F. 
Cobbold argued that Britain's obligations to the sterling 
area meant that she should adopt a convertible currency 
system at flexible rates) but because it would mark the end 
of Britain's ambitions for sterling to regain its 
international status.
Having established that the sterling area was a very 
weak factor restricting the range of external monetary 
policy options it remains to analyse the effect of the
321
sterling area on domestic monetary policy in the 1950s.
V.D. The Sterling Area and Domestic Monetary Policy 
V.D.i. The Sterling Balances and Government Debt
The sterling area affected the British monetary system 
through the practice of pooling foreign exchange reserves 
and holding sterling assets in return. These balances were 
held as UK Treasury Bills, UK Government securities,
Dominion and Colonial securities or as deposits at 
commercial banks.
Table V.F.
Sterling Area Sterling Balances (£m)
Licruid Securities_________________________Total Dom/Col
0-5 yrs 6-10 yrs 11-15 yrs >15yrs 
Central Banks
1954 1040 314 126 76 57 1613
1955 896 384 74 73 41 1468
1956 762 432 43 76 42 1355
1954 93 218 156
Crown Aaents 
175 210 852 179
1955 79 230 215 216 171 911 178
1956 96 270 161 253 183 963 180
East and West African Currencv Boards
1954 32 77 37 31 6 183 2
1955 61 74 40 21 2 198 2
1956 77 94 12 22 2 207 2
West African Marketina Boards
1954 36 9 - 37 31 113
1955 18 12 32 22 12 96
1956 3 11 31 22
Totals
12 79
1954 1201 618 319 319 304 2761 181
1955 1054 700 361 332 226 2673 180
1956 938 807 247 373 239 2604 182
Percent of Total
1954 43 22 12 12 11 100 7
1955 39 26 14 12 9 100 7
1956 36 31 10 14 9 100 7
Source: 1Overseas Sterling Holdings of Certain Holders* BoE 
EID1/19.
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In response to a request from the Radcliffe Committee 
in December 1957, the Bank of England prepared a schedule of 
the type of sterling asset held overseas from 1954-195650. 
Table V.F. shows the data collected. The figures cover 
about 75% of total sterling balances held by countries. 
Information on the other 25% was supplied in confidence to 
the Bank of England by commercial banks whose holdings were 
not broken down by type of asset for the 1950s. The 
proportions of the holdings of commercial banks were known, 
however, for the pre-war period. Assuming that these 
proportions held for the post-war period, Table V.G. shows 
the distribution of sterling area sterling balances in 1957.
Table V.G.
Breakdown of Sterling Balances by Type of Asset 
As of 30 June, 1957
Official Bankers' Returns Total
Curr and Dep a/c 6% 95% 28%
Advances — -15% -4%
UK Treasury Bills 30% 11% 26%
Other Bills - -8% -2%
HMG Securities 64% 17% 52%
Source: J.I. Mutch Statistics Office, Bank of England, 
24/10/57. BoE EID1/19. Bankers* Returns are pre-war 
proportions.
From this analysis, the Bank of England felt confident 
that about half of the sterling balances were held as 
securities and half in liquid form. Of the liquid assets,
50M •R .D•, Statistical Office, Bank of England, *0verseas 
Sterling Holdings of Certain Holders*, 16 December, 1957. BoE 
EID1/19. Only the aggregate totals were passed on to the Treasury 
and the Radcliffe Committee.
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half were deposit and current accounts and half were held as 
UK Treasury Bills51. The data do not allow a complete 
separation of sterling area and NSA holdings by type of 
asset so they include NSA sterling balances as well as 
sterling area balances. Chapter II, however, showed that by 
far the greater part of countries' holdings of sterling 
balances were held by the sterling area.
Table V.F. shows that overseas holders of British 
government securities provided a steady demand for medium 
and long term government securities. This is important in 
the context of the Government's attempts in the 1950s to 
fund the short term public debt. If any trend may be 
discerned from these three years alone, it is that there was 
an increased preference for short term securities, 
especially by the central banks. According to evidence 
submitted to the Radcliffe Committee by the Treasury, 
overseas official holdings of market securities accounted 
for 11% of the total outstanding in 1956 and 1957 compared 
to 2% in 193952.
Overseas official bodies also provided a stable market 
for UK Treasury Bills. In 1951 overseas official holdings 
accounted for 45% of total outstanding bills outside the
51J.I. Mutch, Statistics Office, Bank of England, 24 October. 
1957. BoE EID1/19•
52"Debt Management", Memorandum of the Treasury for the 
Radcliffe Committee. Memoranda of Evidence. Volume I. . p. 111. The 
volume of securities excludes nationalized industries.
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public sector. This proportion declined to a steady one 
third for 1952-1957 and fell to one quarter in 195853. 
Official overseas holdings of Treasury Bills maintained a 
fairly constant proportion of total sterling and non­
sterling area sterling balances. The proportion varied 
between 21% and 27% of total sterling balances.
The effect of changes in sterling balances is described 
in the Radcliffe Committee Report and in evidence to the 
Committee54. The Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA) 
routinely lent its sterling holdings to the Exchequer. When 
RSA countries exchanged their foreign exchange earnings for 
sterling the EEA reduced its holdings of sterling by drawing 
on their loan to the Exchequer. The Exchequer in turn 
offset the decline in its sterling assets by selling 
Treasury Bills or other securities to the RSA monetary 
authorities. In effect the Exchequer borrowed the sterling 
to purchase the foreign exchange from the RSA countries 
themselves. When the RSA cashed in their sterling holdings 
for foreign exchange, the EEA1s and the Exchequerfs holdings 
of sterling increased and the Exchequer could either reduce 
the floating debt or place a correspondingly smaller amount 
of debt with the domestic market55.
53Report of the Radcliffe Committee, p. 356, Table 35.
54Ibid.. p. 34 and Minutes of Evidence by C.F. Cobbold, P.K. 
O'Brien and H.C.B. Mynors Q. 962-971 26 July, 1957.
55Memorandum by the Treasury, "Exchequer Management", Memoranda 
of Evidence, p. 82.
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When increases in sterling balances were the result of
sterling surpluses rather than foreign exchange surpluses,
the transactions did not go through the EEA. Instead they
allowed the Exchequer to raise net new debt outside the
domestic banking system. If the sterling balances were
cashed in for sterling through a direct sale of the assets,
the domestic market would have to absorb the Treasury Bills
or securities. This in turn could make it more difficult
for the Exchequer to place debt in the domestic market.
Thus the sterling area could affect the government's budget
policy. In evidence to the Radcliffe Committee P.K.
O'Brien, Chief Cashier of the Bank of England, asserted that
I think there is a prima facie probability if they 
[the sterling area] were selling Treasury Bills on 
a large scale we should have a problem, at any
rate for a time, to replace those Treasury Bills,
or, if they were selling gilt-edged securities, to 
find new holders56
If the running down of sterling balances implied a British
balance of trade surplus, however, there could be greater
domestic savings to absorb the extra government debt.! The
effects of a rundown of sterling balances against sterling
were, therefore, unpredictable.
An important goal of monetary policy in the 1950s was
to reduce the burden of the floating debt and especially to
reduce the liquidity of commercial banks by restricting the
volume of Treasury Bills in the domestic banking system. In
56Radcliffe Committee, Answer to Q 967, 26 July 1957, Minutes 
of Evidence, p. 56.
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evidence to the Radcliffe Committee the Treasury alleged 
that it had been pursuing an active policy of encouraging 
the sale of Treasury Bills overseas as part of its 
deflationary policy57. Increases in sterling balances were 
thus used to borrow outside the domestic banking system. 
Figure V.C. shows the levels of Treasury Bills held by 
overseas official holders, UK clearing banks and others.
Only in 1951/2 were changes in overseas holdings very
57"Monetary Policy and the Control of Economic Conditions", 
Radcliffe Committee, Memoranda of Evidence, p. 95.
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dramatic. During the run on reserves in the financial year 
1951/52, overseas official holdings of Treasury Bills fell 
£564m. Combined with a serial funding operation in November 
1951, this allowed the Exchequer to redeem £1.3b of floating 
debt58. India assisted the funding operation by taking 
£100m of securities in exchange for Treasury Bills59. From 
1952-1954 overseas bodies accumulated Treasury Bills to a 
peak of £l.lb worth in the second quarter of 1954. The 
pattern for the rest of the period is of a gradual but 
steady decline in overseas official holdings offset by an 
increase in clearing bank holdings and other holders 
measured from the annual peaks.
Overall, it seems that after 1954 the domestic market 
absorbed the overseas sales plus extra borrowing 
requirements of the Exchequer. The total private market 
Treasury Bills outstanding increased by £732m between 
December 1951 and December 1958, while overseas official
holdings decreased by £280m over the same period. It is not
possible, however to isolate the effects of sterling balance 
movements in the 1950s on the governments' borrowing power.
V.D.ii. The Sterling Area and Interest Rates
A more easily identifiable way in which the sterling
58|lExchequer and Banking Figures" Radcliffe Committee,
Memoranda of Evidence. Appendix 2, p. 56.
59Bank of England, Statistics Office note 5 January, 1956. BoE 
EID3\32.
area could have affected British policy was with respect to 
interest rates. This question has two aspects? the cost to 
the balance of payments of servicing sterling area debt (an 
encouragement for lower interest rates) and the need to keep 
sterling assets relatively attractive to overseas investors, 
including the sterling area (an encouragement for higher 
interest rates).
Figure V.D. shows movements in the Bank Rate and in
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long, medium and short term government security yields and
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Treasury Bill rates during the 1950s60. The government’s 
interest rate policy can be seen to have drawn both Treasury 
Bill and short term rates along, reflecting the tightening 
of the money market in November 1951, the subsequent 
relaxation from 1953-1955 and the violent tightening from 
1955 to the end of 1957. Long term interest rates were much 
less volatile although these rates also responded to the 
rapid credit restraint from 1955-58.
Figure V.E. shows the volume of interest payable at an 
annual rate on official sterling balances based on the 
interest rates and yields in Figure V.D. The figures are 
based on the breakdown of the sterling balances by type of 
asset presented in Table V.F. Thus, Treasury Bills are 
assumed to comprise 30% of sterling balances throughout the 
1950s, short term securities and medium term securities 25% 
each, and long term securities 10%. The final 10% is 
assumed to have resided in cash deposits and Dominion and 
Colonial securities. The graph shows that interest payable 
on medium and long term securities was fairly stable until 
1955 when medium term yields responded to British monetary 
tightening. Alogether, amounts payable on this type of 
security amounted to about £35m p.a. until 1955. The cost 
of servicing overseas holdings of Treasury Bills is more
60Long term rates are defined as 2 1/2% Consols? Medium rates 
are for 3% Savings Bonds 1965-75 for 1951-58 and 2 1/2% Savings 
Bonds 1964-67 for 1950; Short term rates are for securities 
maturing in 3-5 years.
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dynamic. The interest payable amounted to only about £8m 
p.a. in 1951 but reached a peak annual rate of £54m in the 
fourth quarter of 1957. As noted above the volume of 
overseas official holdings of Treasury Bills followed a 
gradually declining path from a peak of £l.lb in the second 
quarter of 1954 to a trough of £0.8b in the first quarter of 
195861. The increase in interest payable on Treasury Bill 
holdings after 1955 was therefore entirely due to the
61At the same time the proportion of Treasury Bills in total 
sterling balances remained fairly constant.
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increase in interest rates from 1955,
Figure V.F, plots the total interest payable at annual
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rates and movements in Bank Rate showing the close 
correlation between movements in short rates and the cost of 
servicing the sterling balances. In the Radcliffe Committee 
Report it was estimated that a 1% rise in Bank Rate 
immediately cost the balance of payments about £15m provided
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that other short term interest rates followed62. This 
pattern can be seen to be roughly correct in Figure V.F. It 
was noted by the Committee that the short term capital 
inflow which might be expected to offset this cost to the 
current account generally failed to materialize because it 
was in turn offset by hedging in the forward exchange 
market63. Capital would only flow to the UK if the 
interest rate differential between London and other centres 
was greater than the discount on the forward sterling 
market. General confidence in the strength of sterling was 
thus an equally important factor in generating capital 
flows.
The cost of servicing the sterling area debt can be 
broadly classified into four periods. In the years 1950-51, 
before monetary policy was reactivated, the annual cost of 
the sterling area liabilities amounted to about £60-70m 
p.a.. From 1952-54, after interest rates became more 
volatile and when sterling balances were rising, the annual 
interest payments to the sterling area rose to about £85m 
p.a.. The year 1955, with its dramatic increase in the cost 
of credit, was a period of acceleration in the annual rate 
of interest payments to the sterling area although the 
volume of sterling area sterling balances was declining by 
this time. By 1956-58 the annual cost of the sterling
62Radcliffe Committee Report, p. 152.
63Ibid.
balances was running at a rate of £13Om p.a. or twice the 
amount in 1950-51 despite the declining volume of debt 
outstanding. These figures are generally consistent with 
the balance of payments estimates of interest, profits and 
dividends paid to the RSA64. It should be noted that 
interest payments to the sterling area did not pose an 
immediate drain on the central reserves since they could be 
accumulated as additional sterling balances. They did, 
however, present a potential if not an actual burden on the 
reserves.
There was contemporary concern at the level of payments 
due abroad as a result of the governments* strict monetary 
policy. Thus, George Bolton at the Bank of England 
suggested in 1956, after the Bank Rate had reached 5 1/2% 
and interest payable was about £130m p.a., that an agreement 
should be negotiated at the upcoming Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers meeting to eliminate interest payments on monetary 
reserves held in sterling by RSA governments and central 
banks65. His suggestion was to establish a fixed 1% rate 
of interest payable on monetary reserves with a gold 
guarantee of 250 shillings per ounce for existing Treasury 
Bill and cash holdings. This, he argued, would make the 
sterling balances more valuable to the holders since they
^UK Balance of Payments. 1946-1957. HMSO, 1959.
65George Bolton, "Sterling Balances and Monetary Policy", 4 
April 1956. BoE C40/690.
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could be considered as good as gold which in turn would make 
membership of the sterling area more attractive66. It is 
hard to see the advantage for the RSA in this arrangement. 
The monetary reserves of the ISA were freely convertible for 
current purposes through the central reserves, subject only 
to their needs and their self-restraint excercised through 
exchange control. The gold guarantee would presumably also 
only be effective in the case of continued restraint in 
calling on the central reserves since a wholesale cashing-in 
would quickly exhaust London*s gold supply.
The proposal seems to have fallen on deaf ears at the 
Bank of England. L.K. 0*Brien, Chief Cashier, responded 
almost a month later suggesting that as the new assets would 
be limited to Treasury Bills rather than securities not much 
would be saved67. At this time, Treasury Bills were 
costing the government about £50m p.a. according to Figure
V.E. He also argued that holders of the balances would 
disinvest their holdings which would be an embarrassment to 
the government. Thus, the plan would encourage holders to 
move out of British government debt into the new gold- 
guaranteed, low interest asset, depressing the government*s 
borrowing power. The third objection was that, having 
extended this privilege to the RSA, it might not be possible
^Ibid.
67L .K . 0*Brien to George Bolton, 23 April 1956. BoE C40/690.
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to refuse such guarantees to NSA holders as well68.
In a memorandum to the Radcliffe Committee, the 
Treasury noted that the cost to the current account of 
increases in interest rates was indeed a consideration in 
deciding whether to rely on interest rates in conjunction 
with direct controls rather than interest rates alone69.
The sterling balances thus discouraged using interest rates 
in favour of direct controls on credit. Equally important, 
however was the fact that confidence in sterling was at 
least as important as interest rate differentials in 
attracting funds to London since most hot money was hedged 
in the forward market for sterling.
The second question regarding interest rate policy and 
the sterling area is whether the government was encouraged 
to have higher interest rates than otherwise to ensure that 
the RSA continued to find sterling assets an attractive form 
for their reserves. Such an argument seems to have more 
credence when referring to non-sterling area investors than 
with respect to the monetary reserves of sterling area 
countries. By far the greater part of the sterling assets 
held by the RSA were held by central monetary authorities or 
other official bodies. The primary motive for these 
countries to hold their assets in sterling was not to earn a
68 Ibid.
69|lMonetary Policy and the Control of Economic Conditions", 
Radcliffe Committee, Memoranda of Evidence. Volume I. p. 96.
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competitive interest rate but rather as a future claim on
the central reserves of the sterling area or the resources
of the UK. This was especially true for the Colonial
authorities whose reserves made up the greater part of total
sterling area balances by the mid 1950s. These Colonial
monetary authorities had no legal alternative but to hold
their currency reserves and sinking funds in sterling.
It is more likely that the sterling area system may have
encouraged higher interest rates than otherwise in order to
price the RSA governments out of the London capital market
in an effort to restrict the outflow of capital which was
considered damaging to the UK balance of payments. In
evidence to the Radcliffe Committee, R.S. Sayers suggested
to C.F. Cobbold, Governor of the Bank of England, that
The fact that there is no other control by Britain 
of the investment of UK sterling in the sterling 
area might seem to be an advantage of using the 
interest rate rather than other weapons70.
After some hesitation, Cobbold replied
I think it is a relevant consideration. I would 
not regard it as ever having been a major 
influence in anything we have done? not decisive, 
but certainly a factor in our minds71.
The sterling area system in this case, then, may have been a
factor encouraging higher interest rates. This point should
not be over-emphasized, however, given the many perceived
domestic motives for raising interest rates in the 1950s.
70Evidence to the Radcliffe Committee. 26 July, 1957, Q 875.
71Ibid. response to Q. 876.
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V.E. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the effect of the sterling 
area system on the stability of the central reserves and on 
important aspects of UK external and domestic monetary 
policy. While the sterling area system did contribute to 
the instability of the central reserves, the practice of 
pooling reserves smoothed out fluctuations among RSA 
members. The destabilising effect was between the RSA as a 
whole and the UK. Throughout the 1950s, however, the RSA 
was a net contributor to the central reserves.
It is sometimes argued that the adoption of a flexible 
exchange rate or a devaluation would have allowed Britain to 
avoid many of the strains of this decade. The examination 
of the role of the sterling area in the proposals for such a 
policy revealed that it was political obstacles rather than 
Britain's obligations to the sterling area which ensured the 
rejection of these policies. Pollard's assertion that it 
was "those who used the City of London as their Banking 
centre" which inhibited external monetary policy is not, 
therefore, fully justified.
With respect to domestic policy, there is some evidence 
that the sterling area may have contributed both to a 
tendency to keep interest rates low and also to keep them 
high. The net influence on balance is not identifiable 
given the many other influences on the experiment of 
interest rate policy in the 1950s.
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Chapter VI, Alternatives to the Sterling Area in the 1950s
When considering alternative policies which might have 
been chosen in the 1950s it is important to avoid launching 
into ahistorical speculation. It is no use stringing together 
a long series of 'what if1 scenarios which do not take account 
of the historical context of the period if the purpose of this 
type of analysis is to give insight into what actually occured 
and the context in which decisions were taken. In this sense, 
the present chapter does not set out to apportion blame or to 
describe what 'might have been1 but merely to examine some of 
the alternatives available to policy-makers at the time and to 
determine why another course was not chosen.
During the 1950s there were almost persistent complaints 
about the management of the sterling area system. Mostly they 
asserted that the present system was unsustainable due to the 
overhang of sterling balances over reserves and the relative 
freedom of RSA members to call on the reserves to settle their 
foreign exchange needs coupled with the freedom of capital 
flows to the RSA.
The more imaginative of this group of critics offered a 
fairly wide selection of alternative policies for the 
governments of the time1. Generally, these fell into three 
categories? dispensing with the international role of sterling
1B.J., Cohen, The Future of Sterling as an International 
Currency, Macmillan, 1971. Chapter 10 offers a good summary of 
alternative policies suggested.
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and the sterling area, reinforcing the sterling area into a 
more discriminatory bloc, and introducing more flexibility 
into external monetary policy while maintaining the sterling 
area system and the international role of sterling.
VI.A. Winding up the Sterling Area
The concern of those who advocated winding up the 
sterling area was the perceived strain that it imposed on the 
British balance of payments due to the persistence of the 
sterling balances problem coupled with the large volume of 
uncontrolled long term capital flows to the sterling area. 
This group hoped to eliminate the sterling balances problem* 
by dispensing with the reserve role of sterling. They also 
believed that restricting investment in the sterling area 
would reduce the current surplus necessary to bring the 
balance of payments into equilibrium and would release capital 
for domestic investment. Prominent among this group were 
A.C.L Day and Andrew Shonfield2.
The sterling balances problem and long term investment 
were closely related since if capital flows to the sterling 
area had been restricted it was believed that this would 
reduce the willingness of RSA countries to maintain the level
2A .C .L . Day, "What Price the Sterling Area?, The Listener. 
Vol. LVIII, No. 1495, 21 Nov. 1957. pp 824-5, 846 and "The World 
Liquidity Problem and the British Monetary System", Memoranda of 
Evidence submitted to the Committee on the Working of the Monetary 
System. Vol 3, pp. 71-76. A. Shonfield, British Economic Policy 
Since the War. Penguin, London, 1958. Chapter Ten, fA Way Forward*, 
pp.251-280.
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of their sterling balances. This reflects a view of the 
sterling area as essentially an informal exchange of interests 
between the RSA and the UK under which the RSA agreed to 
maintain their sterling balances and in return the UK offered 
privileged access to the British capital market for 
development purposes.
By the time Day, Shonfield and others were writing, the 
crisis of Suez and the exchange crisis of 1957, neither of 
which was directly related to Britain's balance of payments 
position, had highlighted the possibility that Britain's 
overseas interests were overextended. In response, proposals 
for alternative policies focused on insulating the British 
economy from external disturbances.
In a 1957 radio broadcast, written up as an article for 
The Listener. A.C.L. Day introduced his proposal for winding 
up the sterling area3. His plan was to impose exchange 
control on capital movements to the RSA in order to limit this 
drain on the balance of payments. In turn, the Government 
would have to negotiate funding arrangements to secure the 
sterling balances. Day argued that although the danger of a 
massive withdrawal of sterling balances had not been realized, 
the threat itself was destabilizing and liable to increase as 
Colonies attained independence. Therefore, the securing of 
sterling balances alone should have improved confidence4. The
3A .C .L. Day, "What Price the Sterling Area?".
4Ibid.
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largest holders of the sterling balances (eg. Malaya and 
Ghana) would be offered privileged access to the London market 
in return for a funding arrangement. This would give the less 
developed holders an assured source of development capital and 
would allow the drains on the UK to be predictable and 
controlled, removing the element of uncertainty and 
speculation. The independent members of the sterling area 
(ISA) would be given a guarantee of the gold or dollar value 
of their sterling balances in return for an agreement to limit 
withdrawls. These funded balances would be drawn down over an 
agreed period of 10-15 years. British investment in these 
countries would then be closely restricted. There was, then, 
discrimination in the treatment of holders based on the size 
of their balances and their need for development as perceived 
by the British authorities. Day also invisaged repaying some 
of the balances immediately, "raising the dollars by calling 
up private British holdings of dollar securities, as we did 
early in the war"5.
Andrew Shonfield proposed his plan for winding up the 
sterling area as the backround for a more general Five-Year 
Plan to expand production in the British economy6. The 
details for dealing with the sterling area system were 
generally the same as those presented by Day. Shonfield 
agreed that foreign investment "should be clawed back for
5Ibid.
6Shonfield, British Economic Policy Since the War. pp265-274.
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domestic use"7 and also recognized that in the absence of 
capital from London, RSA countries would want to have fairly 
liberal access to their balances and that this would strain 
British resources. He therefore endorsed Day's suggestion for 
an exchange rate guarantee for RSA sterling balances in return 
for limits on their withdrawal.
Shonfield put more emphasis on reinforcing the reserves 
by "taking into the currency reserve the readily realizable 
[foreign] securities in British ownership"8. If the British 
government were to take control of existing private overseas 
investments, Britain would have a stronger "bargaining hand" 
to negotiate limits on withdrawals of sterling balances by 
announcing that British-owned assets in the RSA would be sold 
at the same rate as RSA sterling balances were run down9. As 
Australia, for example, ran down her sterling balances, the UK 
would sell an equal amount of British owned Australian assets 
in the USA to cover the drain on the central reserves10. 
Thus Australia would end up with either diversified reserves 
or fewer reserves overall depending on the circumstances of 
running down the sterling balances? the UK reserves would not 
be affected and the USA would acquire Australian assets.
7Ibid., p. 265. The possible benefits to UK domestic capital 
formation of cuts in overseas investment were dismissed in Chapter 
IV.
8Ibid.. p. 269.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., p.272
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Shonfield's vision of nA Way Forward'1 for the British 
economy entailed a level of Government intervention in British 
business that was not likely to be forthcoming. Confiscation 
of private foreign assets would have proved politically 
difficult in peacetime. Nor did the value of British 
investments in RSA countries always approximate the value of 
British liabilities. Furthermore, the nature of these assets, 
mostly direct private investment rather than securities, 
suggested that their value when sold in the third market would 
be significantly less than the compensation required from the 
government for the British owners.
These proposals would also have proved difficult to 
negotiate with the ISA. An exchange guarantee for the value 
of the sterling balances in return for limited access to their 
foreign exchange reserves would not have excited much 
enthusiasm in the 1950s. As noted in Chapter II withdrawals 
of sterling balances by RSA members tended to be in response 
to fluctuations in their own balances of payments rather than 
for exchange rate speculation or diversification. 
Furthermore, the arrangements with India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
immediately after the Second World War had shown that formal 
agreements limiting the amount of withdrawls were not 
enforceable in a time of crisis.
A.C.L. Day amended his proposal in a memorandum to the 
Radcliffe Committee in May 1958, adding a new solution to the
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sterling balances problem11. Day suggested that the 
liabilities could either be made less liquid for the holders 
(along the lines of his earlier suggestion) or alternatively 
another agent could be asked to take over the short term 
liabilities in return for a long term claim on the UK. He 
noted that the second option would be easier to negotiate and 
suggested either the IMF could play this role or, if America 
would not agree, a European/Commonwealth Bank developed out of 
the EPU could take over the balances. In Day's proposal the 
IMF would issue gold certificates in exchange for the foreign 
reserves of members and so create an international currency. 
This would eliminate the unstable influence of two major 
reserve currencies competing for the allegiance of 
international central bankers. In turn "the IMF would be able 
to issue more certificates than it held in gold, and would 
then be operating as a fully fledged international central 
bank"12. Day explicitly designed this system on the pre-1914 
gold standard model with the IMF at the centre rather than the 
Bank of England13.
The UK would exchange the short term liabilities to the 
RSA for a single long term liability to the new institution
11A.C.L. Day, "The World Liquidity Problem and the British 
Monetary System", Memoranda of Evidence submitted to the Committee 
on the Wording of the Monetary System. Vol. 3, pp. 71-76.
12Day, Memorandum to Radcliffe Committee, 1958.
13Ibid.
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which could be gradually extinguished without affecting the 
liquidity of the RSA's foreign reserves. Day recommended that 
the British argument to the IMF could be that nothing had yet 
appeared to replace the international banking function of 
sterling but that the burdens of central banking had become 
too heavy for the UK. On the other hand, the withdrawal or 
cancellation of the sterling balances would have a severe 
effect on world liquidity and payments. The time had come, 
therefore, for an international solution to the sterling 
balances problem14.
The possibility of expanding the role of the IMF to solve 
the problems of imbalance in the international economy was 
raised again after formal convertibility of sterling had been 
established. Immediately after 1958 the seemingly infallible 
strength of the American economy came into serious doubt as 
the American balance of payments fell into deficit for the 
first time since the recession of 1953-4. The strain on the 
American and British balances of payments of supporting the 
international reserve role of their currencies inspired 
several plans to eliminate the problem. In a statement to the 
Joint Economic Committee of the American Congress, Robert 
Triffin expounded his plan to get rid of national currencies 
in international reserves15. The plan was similar to Day's
14Ibid.
15R. Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis? The Future of 
Convertibility. Yale University Press, 1960.
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and in fact Triffin noted having discussed Day's proposals 
with him in Spring 195916. As in Day's plan, countries would 
agree to keep their international reserves as deposits at the 
IMF with exchange rate guarantees and receive interest 
payments on these deposits. The new international reserve 
deposits would thus have the security of gold and the interest 
earning incentive of foreign currency reserves.
One year later James Meade published a similar proposal 
calling for the pooling of reserves in the IMF in return for 
gold certificates and an undertaking by members to hold only 
gold certificates as national reserves in the future. The IMF 
would affect exchange rates between currencies using its 
foreign exchange holdings to lift the burden of exchange rate 
control from domestic monetary authorities, allowing them to 
be free to pursue goals of full employment, price stability 
and economic growth without worrying about the balance of 
payments17.
In 1964, Meade amended his plan so that, unlike Triffin's 
proposals, the new system would specifically exclude the 
absorption of existing sterling and dollar balances into the 
IMF so there would be no increase in the scale of the Funds 
assets18. Instead, the national currencies contributed by
16Ibid. . p. 158.
17J.E. Meade, "The Future of International Trade and Payments", 
Three Banks Review. June 1961, No. 50, pp 15-38. p. 33.
18J .E . Meade, "The International Monetary Mechanism", Three 
Banks Review. Sept. 1964, No. 63, pp. 3-25. p. 22.
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members in the normal functioning of the Fund would be 
considered deposits of members and liabilities of the IMF, and 
would be used to settle imbalances between members by 
accounting adjustments of their deposits with the Fund. The 
risk of a run on existing sterling or dollar balances would be 
prevented by limiting the amount of the possible change in the 
gold exchange rate to 1/6% per month or 2% per year19. In 
addition, gold value guarantees might be made by the USA and 
UK for balances of their currencies held by other national 
monetary authorities20. These examples of later proposals 
similar to those suggested in the 1950s are included to show 
the continuity of the type of plans offered as solutions to 
problems in the international payments system.
Attractive though this type of arrangement appeared both 
to contemporaries of Day and Shonfield and to later analysts, 
there are several problems with it. First, the UK position 
would not necessarily have been much improved by the exchange 
of short term liabilities to the sterling area for a long term 
liability to the IMF. Even if repaid over a period as long as 
twenty years, the drain on the balance of payments would have 
amounted to over £100m p.a.. This is considerably more than 
the UK had to settle with the RSA in any year during the 1950s 
except 195721. In addition, there was the long run rate of
19Ibid., p. 23.
20Ibid.
21In 1957 RSA sterling balances were drawn down by £161m.
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interest to consider which may well have been even greater 
than the existing rate since the rate paid by Britain to the 
IMF would have had to meet or exceed the rate the IMF paid to 
the RSA except in the unlikely event that the RSA were 
persuaded to forego the interest on their assets.
Thirdly, there was the consideration that under the 
sterling area system it was fairly certain that the UK would 
never have to repay 100% of the sterling balances since a 
large proportion were currency reserves or statutory funds, 
some part of which at least would remain in sterling. A 
wholesale diversion of trade from the UK to the non-sterling 
area was unlikely to occur so the need for sterling reserves 
of some size would continue. If the sterling area were 
formally wound up, however, the entire burden would have to be 
borne within a fixed period.
The prospects for an international clearing union along 
the lines of Day’s plan were not too promising in the 1950s. 
By this time there appeared to be consistent international 
debtors and creditors which would undermine the system22. 
This, for example, had emerged as an important problem of the 
EPU as Britain moved into consistent deficit against the 
surpluses of Germany and Belgium. With this precedent, such 
an international central bank would appear to surplus
22The persistence of creditor and debtor status was 
subsequently thrown into doubt when the USA balance of payments 
deteriorated after 1958 but in the 1950s the perception was 
different.
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countries, such as the USA and Germany, as merely a way to get 
them to finance the deficits of the UK and the sterling area. 
This type of proposal was to have greater international appeal 
after the USA began to suffer from the burden of maintaining 
a reserve currency with a weak balance of payments in the 
1960s.
Finally, given the failure of the UK to fulfill the 
undertaking to fund, block or write off the sterling balances 
under the terms of the 1947 Anglo-American Financial 
Agreement, it was unlikely that Congress and the American 
public would support a plan that smacked of 'bailing out1 the 
UK. During the 1950s the American public was believed to be 
suspicious of British motives in international economic 
negotiations, the perception was that the UK was trying to 
take advantage of her weak position to gain more money from 
the USA.
The Radcliffe Committee took note of A.C.L Day's proposal
in its Report and agreed that an expansion of the role of the
IMF "should be a principal object of policy"23. The Report
noted, however, that while a plan to expand the IMF into an
international central bank was attractive,
an arrangement of this kind, requiring 
international agreement would be extremely 
difficult to negotiate and does not appear to us 
likely to be of immediate and substantial 
assistance to sterling.24
23Radcliffe Committe Report, p. 247.
24Ibid. Para 663, P. 242.
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The Report went on to conclude, as noted above, that such an 
arrangement "might, indeed, oblige the United Kingdom to 
discharge her external liabilities more quickly then would 
otherwise be necessary”25. Furthermore, blocking or funding 
the sterling area sterling balances would reduce the liquidity 
of the RSA and, therefore, their ability to achieve relatively 
free trade and payments relations with the rest of the world. 
Since the Committee's concern was for the general liquidity of 
the international payments system they opted for increasing UK 
reserves through current account surpluses rather than 
decreasing liabilities as a longer term solution to the UK 
reserves position26 and this remained official policy for the 
next ten years.
As for the second aspect of these proposals to wind up 
the sterling area, the imposition of capital controls on 
British investment in the RSA, the analysis in Chapter IV 
showed that these capital flows were not damaging to the 
British economy and that such controls might have had serious 
longer term effects on the UK balance of payments.
To conclude this discussion of the feasibility of winding 
up the sterling area it is necessary to examine the 
arrangements which effectively achieved this ten years later 
in order to see whether there was an opportunity for the UK to
25 Ibid.
26Ibid. . pp. 247-8.
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organise such a solution in the 1950s. The Basle Agreement of 
1968 was a formalisation and extension of arrangements 
operating under the auspices of the BIS through which the 
central banks of Europe and America had agreed to offer 
eachother short term swap arrangements to cushion 
extraordinary capital flows. The UK was a primary beneficiary 
and was able to draw a total of £325m from foreign central 
banks in 1961 in return for sterling. In November 1964, the 
banks provided the UK with a swap limit of $3000m, of which 
less than half was actually used. In the same year the UK 
then drew $1.4b from the IMF to repay the central banks. In 
the next two years, further arrangements were agreed and 
further drawings made. Throughout the 1960s, then, the UK was 
'insured* against destabilising drawings on sterling 
balances27.
The Basle agreement of September 1968 represents the 
ultimate 'solution' to the sterling balances 'problem' and 
arguably marks the end of any pretentions of sterling to be a 
true reserve currency. Under the arrangments, the RSA 
countries agreed to maintain a specified proportion of their 
reserves in sterling in return for an exchange rate guarantee 
in terms of dollars. The BIS central banks in turn pledged an 
additional $2b worth of support for drawings on ISA sterling 
balances due to reductions in their foreign exchange reserves
27That this insurance did not eliminate speculative capital 
flows is noted in Chapter V.
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as a whole. The credit was specifically not to be used for 
drawings of NSA holdings. In addition, the ISA was encouraged 
to put part of their diversified reserves on deposit at the 
BIS so that "the sterling area itself should make a 
contribution to the financing of the facility"28. The 
agreements with the RSA governments were for three years with 
provision for an extension of a further two years in most 
cases. In effect, the Basle Facility removed the threat of a 
speculative rundown in RSA balances through diversification of 
reserves since a fixed proportion had to be maintained in 
sterling. At the same time, crisis funds were available in 
case the RSA's total reserves fell drastically due to balance 
of payments problems.
In the cases of Australia and New Zealand, the agreement 
was open to review if the UK imposed further restrictions on 
capital exports to these countries. In 1966 The Bank of 
England had announced a programme of voluntary restraint on 
direct British investment in Australia, New Zealand and South 
Africa. The restrictions were based on an American model 
designed to restrain capital exports without imposing further 
exchange controls. In February 1965, the Americans had 
imposed a similar policy of 'voluntary restraint* on capital
28The Basle Facility and the Sterling Area. Cmd 3787, HMSO, 
London, October 1968. The participating countries were Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA.
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investment in 'advanced' economies29. American firms met 
with government officials to develop investment programmes and 
to review the essentiality or future export value of their 
planned investments.
By 1968, then, the UK had imposed controls on capital 
flows to the sterling area and had effectively removed the 
threat of a wholesale run on the sterling balances due to a 
diversification of reserves or to deterioration in the RSA 
balances of payments. The obvious question is why such
international cooperative efforts at dismantling the sterling 
area's more dangerous aspects did not happen ten years 
earlier. The first obvious difference between 1967 and 1957 
is the convertibility of sterling30. The acceptance of de 
jure convertibility on the part of both Britain and Western 
Europe was probably a necessary prerequisite to such 
international currency cooperation. It must be remembered 
that the Basle Facility grew out of ad hoc arrangements to 
support all the newly convertible currencies of the early 
1960s. Other countries made use of the lines of credit but 
sterling's special weaknesses put it in persistent danger and 
made a more permanent arrangement necessary. As noted above 
it is unlikely, given the atmosphere of the 1950s, that the US 
congress would have voted for such liberal support for an
29The Economist. February 13, 1965, Vol. CCXIV, No. 6338. p.
667.
30From 1955, sterling was de facto convertible but for
political purposes the de jure convertibility is more important.
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inconvertible pound.
The extension of longer term and more formal suppport 
was dependent on the UK negotiating agreements with the RSA 
countries to block their sterling balances. There were more 
obstacles to such negotiations in the 1950s then there were by 
1968. One important consideration was the changed political 
struture of the sterling area by 1968. From the end of the 
1950s and through the 1960s most of the Colonial members of 
the sterling area gained independent status (see Table VI.A.) . 
By 1968 only some West Indian Colonies and Southern Rhodesia 
were under direct British control. In the mid-1950s over half 
of the RSA sterling balances were still in Colonial hands, 
accumulated under the Colonial monetary system and under the 
restrictions on dollar expenditure enforced by the British 
authorities. The largest holders of sterling balances were 
also those Colonies closest to independence,
Table VI.A.
Dates of
Independence of British Colonies
Malaya 1957
Ghana 1957
Singapore 1959-65
Nigeria 1960
Tanganyika 1961
Kuwait 1961
Uganda 1962
Jamaica 1962
Zanzibar 1963
Kenya 1963
Zambia 1964
such as Malaya and the Gold Coast. It would not have been 
politically possible to formally approach these territories on
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the brink of independence and demand that they forego or delay 
plans for future development. Not only did the UK have a 
moral obligation to her dependencies but such an approach 
might itself have precipitated the move to independence and 
accelerated the running down of the balances. Giving exchange 
rate guarantees only to the ISA holders and excluding the 
Colonies would have posed political difficulties at home as 
well. Such a limited arrangement would not in any case have 
dealt with the major part of the threat of the sterling 
balances which was that the newly independent members would 
quickly take the opportunity to accelerate development 
spending. In this sense the British authorities were forced 
into inaction since negotiations to restrict the spending of 
these large and volatile sterling balances could not really 
begin until independence had been achieved. The 1968 solution 
to the sterling balances problem thus depended on the changed 
political structure of the sterling area.
The other achievement of the 1960s was the long-awaited 
imposition of restrictions on capital flows to the sterling 
area in 1966. At first glance the UK capital account with 
respect to the RSA seems remarkably similar in the 1950s and 
1960s. In the period 1950-57 the official figures showed an 
average net outflow of private long term capital to the RSA of 
£180m p.a. In the 1960s it was somewhat higher, averaging 
£220m p.a., accelerating to 1965 as the UK's overall balance 
with the RSA deteriorated. There were, however, special
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circumstances in the 1950s which would have undermined a 
programme of voluntary restraint such as that imposed in 1966. 
During most of the 1950s the ’advanced* members of the 
sterling area, which the 1966 programme targetted, still had 
some sterling balances which could be drawn on in the event of 
a forced decline in British investment. Furthermore, in the 
1950s British investment was much larger proportion of foreign 
investment in the sterling area. For example, during the 
1950s the UK supplied 60% of the capital inflow to 
Australia31 but by 1966 Britain supplied only 39% while the 
USA contributed 46% despite capital controls of its own32. 
What these changes in the sterling balances and investment 
patterns of the sterling area imply is that by the 1960s the 
restrictions imposed did not carry the same risks with respect 
to a run on the sterling balances both because the controls 
did not pinch as much and because the level of sterling 
balances of targetted countries was not as high as they had 
been in the 1950s.
The weakness of the voluntary restraint programme in the 
1960s, however, does not recommend it to the 1950s. In 1964 
and 1965, the two years before the restraint was announced, 
long term private capital flows to the RSA were about double
31Annual Bulletin of Overseas Investment: Australia 1960-61. 
No. 6, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, 
1962.
32S. Strange, Sterling and British Policy; A Political Study 
of an International Currency in Decline. Oxford University Press,
1971., p. 94.
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the level of the previous three years (see Table VI.B.). In 
1966, the year the programme began, the volume of investment 
fell considerably but recovered almost to the 1965 level in 
1967 despite the continued call for restraint. Given some 
time lag between the planning and implementation of investment 
programmes, it seems that the voluntary restraint programme 
had little effect on the UK balance of payments.
Table VI.B.
UK Long Term Private Capital Flows to the RSA
1961-1968
£m 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
133 117 124 216 252 187 244 263
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook.
The most important difference between the 1960s and the 
1950s was the position of the United States. Throughout most 
of the 1950s the USA was able to run balance of payments 
surpluses with a relatively comfortable ratio of reserves to 
short term liabilities. By the 1960s, however, the American 
situation looked less secure and by 1966 short term assets no 
longer covered short term liabilities. Susan Strange argues 
that the growing weakness of the American balance of payments
was an important incentive for the Americans to prop up
sterling33. If the RSA countries continued to diversify 
their reserves into dollars, America would end up accumulating 
overseas liabilities which would prove difficult to repay if 
the USA was in deficit. Instead "to leave the prime liability
33Ibid. , p. 283-84.
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with Britain, leaving it to Britain to borrow (if necessary) 
to meet the liability was a prudent defensive or precautionary 
measure of economic policy for the United States”34. She 
concluded later that such direct American assistance in 
recurring sterling crises in the 1960s "would not have been so 
prompt had the dollar itself not been comparatively weak”35. 
In the 1950s this prerequisite was not met.
VI. B. Reinforcing the Sterling Area
The proposals to reinforce the sterling area were 
generally related to a desire to solidify the Empire into a 
stronger and more cohesive economic and political bloc. The 
policies were also a defensive response to the failure of the 
UK to perform as well in the post-war international economy as 
in the pre-war period. Leo S. Amery’s alternative policy,
for example, was based on the assumption that the American 
economy had grown to such a size that its dynamic pattern of 
economic fluctuations created an "international imbalance"36. 
The solution which he sought was the creation of a second 
economic bloc strong enough to correct this imbalance. The 
natural bloc for Britain to develop in this regard was the 
Commonwealth. Europe was not a viable alternative since it
34Ibid, p. 284.
35Ibid, p. 293.
36L.S. Amery, A Balanced Economy. Hutchison and Co., London,
1954., p. 8
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was considered 'over-industrialized' already and its 
production was competitive with that of the UK so that the 
potential benefits for the UK of this association were not 
great37.
The consolidation of the Commonwealth into a powerful 
economic bloc would be achieved by denouncing GATT and the 
"procrustacean policy of non-discrimination"38 and pursuing 
instead a closer discriminatory relationship with the 
Commonwealth and secondarily with Europe. This could be 
achieved first by encouragement of emigration from the UK to 
the Commonwealth to hasten development there and secondly by 
establishing a system of preferential tariffs. Amery linked 
capital flows to preference by noting that "if the Dominions 
want the investment it is to their interest to help create 
that surplus [in the UK] by their own purchases from this 
country" and that "to assure the market for the production 
resulting from the investment by giving preference to those 
products is only a prudent insurance on our investment"39.
Amery was certainly not alone in his desire for closer 
Commonwealth links to counter influences from the American 
economy. In December 1951, the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe set up a Working Party of journalists, bankers and 
officials to pursue
37Ibid. . p. 194.
38Ibid. , p. 202.
39Ibid. , p. 196.
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a study of methods for achieving a closer 
coordination between the economies of Member States 
of the Council of Europe and those of the overseas 
countries having constitutional links with them40.
The proposals which were developed became known as the
Strasbourg Plan which recommended greater integration of
Europe and the Commonwealth in both trade and payments. On
the trade front the Council recommended the establishment of
a new preferential system within GATT whereby the Commonwealth
and the OEEC would offer eachother secondary preference, more
beneficial than to the rest of the world but not as
preferential as among members of the Commonwealth41. As in
Amery's proposal, it was argued that the Most Favoured Nation
clause in the GATT, while designed to promote trade
liberalization actually inhibited the reduction of tariffs by
making selective tariff relaxations impossible42. The Plan
also recommended the establishment of a European Bank to work
closely with the IBRD to channel development funds to the
Commonwealth. This would include contributions from European
countries that did not have their own dependent territories.
The final recommendation of the Plan perhaps gives away
40Council of Europe, The Strasbourg Plan. 27 August, 1952.,
p. 9.
41Recommendation and Order of the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, The Strasbourg Plan, p. 128. This system of graduating 
preferences was modelled on a proposal by L.S. Amery in the forward 
to the Preparatory Documents for the Commonwealth Conference 
organized by the European League for Economic Cooperation, May
1951. The Strasbourg Plan. Report of the Working Party, p. 32.
42Ibid., p. 32.
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its purpose most clearly. This was the provision to extend 
long term bulk purchase contracts for Commonwealth raw 
materials. The aim was to increase production of food and raw 
materials by guaranteeing a market for producers and, of 
course, to guarantee a supply of these products at stable 
prices for European consumers43. This was an important 
concern in 1951 when the shortages of raw materials and the 
resulting high prices were pinching the industrialized 
economies of Europe. By order of the Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, the Ministers of the Commonwealth were to be 
presented with the recommendations of the Strasbourg Plan at 
the upcoming Commonwealth Economic Conference in November 
19 5244. When the time came, however, the Commonwealth 
ministers were preoccupied by the Collective Approach to 
convertibility and the meeting refused to meet with the 
representatives of the Council of Europe, claiming pressure of 
time45.
These two proposals give examples of the type of plans 
offered for reinforcing the sterling area into a competitive, 
defensive economic bloc. The goal was to insulate the members 
from fluctuations in the American economy through protective, 
discriminatory restrictions. The plans varied in their
43Ibid., p . 34 .
44Ibid. , p. 129.
45Minutes of the Third Meeting of Ministers, Committee on 
Finance and Trade, 1 December, 1952. PRO T236/3094.
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attitude to Europe, some including and some excluding it from
the Commonwealth bloc. The common thread, however, was the
use of preferential tariffs and increased exchange control
restrictions to create a barrier behind which it was hoped the
UK and its partners would flourish.
The promotion of Imperial Preference and the
strengthening of Commonwealth ties had been an important plank
in the Conservative Party's political platform for some time.
The Conservative Party policy paper for 1950, This Is The
Road, declared that
the greatest possible development of Empire Trade 
is our aim. We offer Empire producers a place in 
the United Kingdom market second only to the home 
producer. We claim the right to maintain whatever 
preferences or other special arrangements may be 
neccessary46.
The last provision was a specific attack on the No New 
Preference (NNP) rule of the GATT which prevented the UK from 
increasing Imperial Preference by increasing tariffs on non- 
Commonwealth imports only. The election program for the 1951 
election, Britain Strong and Free, declared the Conservative 
party "the Party of Empire", pledged to "retain Imperial 
Preference and uphold the right to grant and receive such 
preferences as are mutually agreed with Empire countries"47. 
By the 1955 Election, however, Conservative Party policy
46This is the Road: The Conservative and Unionist Party's
Policy. General Election 1950. the Conservative and Unionist 
Central Office, 1950. p. 18-19.
47Britain Strong and Free. Conservative and Unionist Central 
Office, London, 1951. p. 12.
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emphasized the "move towards a world-wide system of freer 
trade and freer payments" in order to "re-establish sterling 
in a position so strong and respected that it can play its 
full part as a major international currency"48. There was no 
mention of Imperial Preference but it was noted that "this 
policy is in harmony with our Commonwealth trade relations and 
the Commonwealth countries themselves pursue it"49.
There had been strong political support for the abolition 
of the NNP Rule in both the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords from the beginning of 1952. In April, Lord Balfour of 
Inchrye called for an end to the GATT limitations on 
increasing Imperial Preference. He suggested that this be 
done unilaterally, without consulting the rest of the 
Commonwealth or other members of the GATT but that this should 
be followed by an 'Imperial Economic Conference' and a 
detailed investigation into the resources of the Commonwealth 
and Empire50. Lord Ogmore responded from the Labour side 
warning that the interests of the Dominions did not 
necessarily lie in Imperial Preference, although he asserted 
that "we on this side believe that Imperial Preference should 
be retained"51. Lord Hawke raised the possibility of
48Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1955. p. 15.
49 Ibid.
50House of Lords Official Report, Hansard, 2 April, 1952, Col.
1296.
51Ibid. , Col. 1300-01.
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combining greater Imperial Preference with a pledge to 
convertibility to satisfy the USA and the sterling area 
countries, concluding paradoxically that "if we are to move in 
any way towards convertibility... It is absolutely necessary 
that we should have the power to discriminate"52. Lord 
Cherwell, Paymaster General, also spoke of the possible 
reluctance of other members to increase Imperial Preference 
given the high international demand for their exports, 
concluding that "it is by no means certain that all the other 
members of the Commonwealth are itching to increase Imperial 
Preference"53. After Cherwell's speech, Lord Balfour 
withdrew his motion.
Without even entering into debate over whether such 
measures would inhibit or expand the growth of the members of 
such a defensive bloc, or, indeed, if Europe would be willing 
to join if invited, this type of alternative policy founders 
on the obvious obstacle that by the 1950s, the rest of the 
sterling area would not have agreed to reinforce relations 
with the UK and eachother at the expense of North America and 
Europe.
The Imperial Preference system had been established in 
1931 in an atmosphere of general economic depression when 
there were international surpluses of the raw materials 
produced in the Empire. A preference in the British market
52Ibid. , Col. 1313-14.
53Ibid. , Col. 1322.
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which encouraged purchases from the Empire could be of
significant benefit to the producers of these goods when the
UK had a choice of sources of raw materials. In this
environment, the preference offered to British manufactured
exports by overseas Empire countries was worthwhile and the
system could operate as a mutual support group in times of
slack demand. During the Korean War boom, this motive for
preference disappeared. With the increased demand for raw
materials, it became a sellers’ market and preference in the
British market meant little to producers. In return the
preferences offered on imports of British manufactures
appeared more costly.
In the 1950s the reactivation of Imperial Preference to
create a meaningful protective barrier was never truly
feasible. At the Commonwealth Economic Conference of December
1951 the members of the sterling area resolutely set their
future on the liberalization of trade and payments. Thus,
while agreeing to impose discriminatory restrictions on trade
to meet the immediate balance of payments crisis the statement
from ministers at the end of the conference declared that
It was agreed that while emergency measures to stop 
the immediate drain upon the gold reserves were 
necessary and inevitable, they could only be 
palliatives. A lasting solution of the sterling 
area's problems must be found in order to prevent 
the recurrence of crises, to make sterling strong 
and to establish the economies of member countries 
on a sound and stable basis. These aims can best 
be achieved when the world-wide trade of the 
sterling area is on a substantially higher level 
than at present, when sterling is freely 
convertible into all the main currencies of the
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world and its position need no longer be supported 
by restrictions on imports54
In the newly independent members of the sterling area 
such as India, Pakistan and Ceylon, there was a distaste for 
Imperial Preference for political reasons. To the population 
of these countries the system smacked of Colonial exploitation 
to support British industry55. During trade negotiations 
between the UK and Pakistan in 1951, for example, Pakistan had 
insisted on a reduction of the level of preference between the 
two countries56. Pakistan's exports at the time were limited 
to raw jute, raw cotton, tea, hides and skins, all of which 
were in great demand internationally so a preference in the 
British market was not of much benefit.
In Australia, a broad campaign among Australian 
businessmen began around 1952 to lobby for a reduction of 
preferences offered to British manufactured exports. The 
arguments were that the preferences offered to Australian 
goods in the British market mostly took the form of specific 
duties which had eroded with inflation since 1932 while the 
preferences granted on British goods tended to be ad valorum. 
Furthermore, the preference on British manufactured imports 
presented an obstacle to the aspirations of Australian
54Report of the Preparatory Meeting of Officials, Annex I, 
January 1952., 15 October, 1952. PRO T236\3086.
55'The Views of the Commonwealth on Commonwealth Integration', 
16 July, 1952. PRO BT11\4976.
56'Effect of GATT on UK-Pakistan Negotiations of 1951', 18
April, 1952. PRO BT11\4976.
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business and government to develop secondary industry to 
establish a more balanced economy57. The campaign was 
finally successful in 1957 when negotiations with Britain 
reduced preferences on British goods. As for the other 
independent members of the sterling area, New Zealand tended 
not to express strong views on Imperial Preference and South 
Africa offered very few preferences to British goods in any 
case.
At the end of 1952, the ISA got the opportunity to 
express their views on Imperial Preference. The Commonwealth 
Economic Conference of November 1952 and the Officials' 
Preparatory Meeting which preceeded it in September are 
illustrative of the resistance of the ISA to reinforcing the 
discriminatory economic relationship of the Commonwealth. As 
part of the Collective Approach to convertibility, quotas were 
to be replaced by tariffs. If quantitative restrictions were 
to be eliminated after convertibility Britain would have to 
increase tariffs on non-sterling imports at least in the short 
run which would require new tariffs on imports from the 
Commonwealth under the No New Preference (NNP) rule of GATT. 
At the time, the UK imposed no tariffs on a wide range of 
Commonwealth imports and to introduce tariffs would require 
new legislation which, it was believed, would provoke 
considerable opposition in Parliament. To solve this problem 
the British delegation called on the Commonwealth members to
57The 'Anti-Ottawa file'. PRO BT11\4982.
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support an application to GATT to abolish the NNP Rule to 
allow an increase in the preferential margin on trade within 
the Commonwealth58.
As might be predicted, the response of the ISA was not 
favourable. Jayawardena of Ceylon began the discussion by 
noting that increasing preferential margins was inconsistent 
with the aims of the Collective Approach, which were to 
enhance multilateral trade and payments. Also, as a primary 
producer, Imperial Preference was unneccessary to the Ceylon 
economy59. Duetsch of Canada noted that other preferential 
trading blocs might develop if the NNP Rule were abolished, 
which would not be in the interests of the sterling area60. 
Ashwin of New Zealand and Van de Waal of South Africa, 
although supporting the removal of NNP in principle, raised 
the objection that including such an amendment of GATT in the 
Collective Approach would jeopardise the negotiations with the 
USA, thus endangering the success of the Collective Approach 
itself61. Melville of Australia argued that increased 
preferences for Australian exports was not very appealing for 
the Australian population since exports outside the sterling
58Minutes of Commonwealth Economic Conference, Preparatory 
Meeting of Officials, Committee on Trade Policy, 26 September,
1952. PRO T236\3085.
59Preparatory Meeting of Officials, Commonwealth Economic 
Conference, 26 September, 1952. PRO T236\3085.
60Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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area were becoming more important and her producers must be
prepared to face world competition62.
Despite this fairly consistent lack of enthusiasm for
enhancing Imperial Preference as part of the Collective
Approach, the Cabinet insisted that the proposal be pressed
again at the Commonwealth Ministerial meetings. At the last
meeting of officials Cohen, speaking for the British
delegation, noted the disapproval of the proposal among ISA
representatives but told them that
he would judge that his Ministers would regard the 
removal of the No New Preference Rule as an 
essential part of those proposals. They could not 
contemplate having to explain to their public that, 
as a first result of the convertibility operation, 
it would be necessary to put duties on Commonwealth 
goods and that Commonwealth countries would have to 
put duties on UK goods, wherever tariffs had to be 
adjusted upon the removal of quantitative 
restrictions.63
In a letter to R.A. Butler, Peter Thorneycroft, President of 
the Board of Trade noted that he and Butler were agreed that 
the case for abolishing the NNP Rule must be put very strongly 
to the ministerial conference as a measure to strengthen 
sterling and British exports and to be consistent with 
Conservative party policy64.
Accordingly, the sixth meeting of Ministers was devoted
62Meetings of Heads of Delegations, Commonwealth Economic 
Conference, 3 October, 1952. PRO T236\3085.
63Minutes of Preparatory meeting of officials, Committee on 
Trade Policy 26 September, 1952.
64Letter, Peter Thorneycroft to R.A. Butler, undated (late 
November/early December 1952). PRO T236\3098.
entirely to the question of Imperial Preference65. The 
attitude of the ISA governments had not changed since the end 
of the Officials1 meetings a month before. The
representatives of New Zealand, South Africa, Pakistan and 
Ceylon repeated that an increase in preferential margins was 
inconsistent with the goals of the Collective Approach and 
that this was liable to provoke the USA and jeopardise the 
success of the negotiations. Sir Chintamen Deshmukh of India 
went on at some length that the Indian government preferred 
quotas to tariffs in general and that Imperial Preference was 
politically unpopular in India. Also, he objected to making 
a permanent change in GATT to cover a transitional period in 
the Collective Approach. He also took up Canada's point that 
the removal of the NNP Rule would encourage other preferential 
blocs and undermine the freeing of trade barriers. Menzies of 
Australia gave a lengthy if inconclusive speech emphasizing 
the need to maintain or increase the freedom of adjustment of 
preferences to correct inequalities which had emerged over the 
years since 1932. He obviously alluded to the need to adjust 
Australian preferences toward the UK. Only Southern Rhodesia 
came down firmly on the British side, praising the Imperial 
Preference system and supporting the abolition of the NNP 
rule. In the end, the issue was relegated back to a committee 
of officials and Commonwealth support was won for a limited
65Sixth meeting of Ministers, Commonwealth Economic Conference,
3 December, 1952. PRO T236\3094.
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approach to GATT to allow that if the UK needed to raise 
duties on goods that were currently entering duty-free from 
the Commonwealth, the UK would not have to introduce new 
tariffs on Commonwealth trade66. This was done at the GATT 
meeting in Geneva in 1953 and was accepted on the condition 
that no Commonwealth country would gain a competitive trade 
advantage thereby67.
The lack of enthusiasm for Imperial Preference reflected 
an antipathy to reinforcing the economic ties of the 
Commonwealth at the expense of trade with the rest of the 
world. What the Conference showed was that where Imperial 
Preference conflicted with the eventual achievement of 
multilateralism in trade and payments, it was the latter which 
took precedence. The reluctance of the RSA to broach the 
topic in GATT reflected a desire not to antagonise important 
future trading partners and sources of development capital. 
Thus the Confidential Annex’ to the Commonwealth Economic 
Conference, designed to inform British ministers, noted that 
"at one time some Commonwealth delegates actually seemed to 
admit that they would prefer to see the UK impose duties on 
Commonwealth goods at present admitted free rather than risk 
raising in GATT the principle of the No New Preference
Minutes of the Ninth meeting of ministers, Commonwealth
Economic Conference, 8 December, 1952. PRO T236\3094.
67Amery, A Balanced Economy, p. 188.
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Rule"68.
This unwillingness to antagonize the non-sterling area
had been recognized in an earlier report by R.W.B. Clarke
submitted to the Cabinet in June 195269. Clarke asserted
that the only condition where Imperial Preference would be
attractive was if the American market were closed for ISA
goods. He concluded, "the hard fact is that the US is
economically more important to them [the ISA] then the UK, for
USA can provide for their development while UK cannot"70.
The 'community of interest1 for the sterling area lay in
promoting the strength of sterling and therefore
convertibility, and in promoting development by cooperating to
attract American investment and a high level of world trade to
benefit all71. P.Liesching of the Commonwealth Relations
Office, commenting on earlier drafts of this paper, argued
that Clarke had not gone far enough. Thus he minuted that
it seems to be very clear that intensification of 
discrimination within the sterling commonwealth as 
a long term policy would contribute practically 
nothing to the objectives of other sterling area 
countries and that it would not appeal to them at 
all.72
68'Confidential Annex' to the Commonwealth Economic Conference, 
December 1952. PRO D035/6489.
69Report on External Economic Policy, 24 June, 1952. PRO 
D035/6488.
70Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72Letter P. Liesching to Otto Clarke 26 June, 1952. PRO 
D035/6488.
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This rather strongly worded policy paper does not seem to have 
influenced ministers very much in their expectations for the 
Commonwealth Economic Conference four months later.
With Imperial Preference facing such opposition in 1952, 
it is unlikely that deeper economic integration of the 
Commonwealth could have been successful. Nor did the 
prospects for Commonwealth integration revive as the demand 
for raw materials slackened after 1952 and a buyers* rather 
than a sellers' market returned. The political resistance of 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon to Imperial Preference persisted as 
did Australia's determination to lower preferences on British 
goods. The reduction in raw material prices only strengthened 
the determination of most ISA countries to develop balanced 
economies. As the British capital market grew tighter, so 
access to the American market became more important. Whatever 
the economic advantages or disadvantages of reinforcing the 
sterling area for the UK, the political and economic interests 
of the ISA denied this alternative policy any chance of 
success.
VI.C. The Administrative Approach to Convertibility
The two major proposals to alter the international 
payments system while maintaining the sterling area and 
ambitions for strengthening the role of sterling have been 
discussed in Chapter V. The ROBOT plan of early 1952 was
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dropped from the policy agenda relatively quickly, essentially 
because of the political as well as economic obstacles it 
faced. The Collective Approach to Convertibility which 
replaced it was retained in the vocabulary of British policy 
through the 1950s but it had ceased to be a viable alternative 
by March 1953 when the Americans and Europeans failed to 
support it. The policy chosen by the British authorities was 
what might be termed an administrative approach to freer trade 
and payments. Thus, the obstacles to external convertibility 
were gradually removed from 1953 to 1955 until sterling held 
by non-residents was de facto convertible. This section of 
this chapter will trace the progress of this ad hoc approach, 
highlighting the alternatives abandoned along the way.
Vl.C.i. Unification of Transferable Sterling
With the growing respectability of the transferable 
market and after the disappointing international response to 
the Collective Approach in March 1953, British policy 
increasingly began to focus on the transferable market as the 
next step to freer trade and payments. Even before the 
Collective Approach was submitted to the rest of the sterling 
area, however, the cumbersome and inconsistent nature of the 
transferable and bilateral areas had been attracting attention 
within the Bank of England.
On 24 November 1952, E. Crawshaw, who was to take up the 
cause with missionary zeal, wrote to Bloomfield,
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If convertibility is not to come as a result of the 
Commonwealth Conference, I suggest that we should 
tidy up our present arrangements by scrapping the 
Transferable Account system and bilateral accounts 
for most countries and merge them all into a 
non-dollar area within which sterling can be 
t r a n s f e r r e d  f o r  a l l  p u r p o s e s 73
The existing system posed a considerable administrative
burden, offered little real protection for sterling, hindered
UK traders while providing easy profits for bogus traders and
was a discredit to UK Exchange control74.
No direct response to Crawshaw's paper is available but
he does not appear to have been discouraged and papers on the
same theme continued to appear through the next twelve months,
in which increasing emphasis was laid on the disadvantages
under which UK merchants operated because of the transferable
market discount. Thus in October 1953 Crawhaw expressed the
despair now common in the Bank that
we already have a non-dollar area and all that 
remains is for the Treasury to decide whether it 
shall be recognized that our own merchants may do 
what other merchants are doing or whether we should 
maintain the present facade and leave our own 
merchants under a permanent competitive disadvantage75
By the time that Crawshaw submitted this last plea to 
Bloomfield, the idea of a non-dollar, non-sterling world had
^Letter from E.Crawshaw to Bloomfield, 24 November 1952. BoE 
OV44/9.
74 Ibid.
^Note by E. Crawshaw, 16 October 1953. BoE OV44/9.
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been more fully developed. On 26 March, 1953, in the fallout 
from the failed mission to the US for support for the 
Collective Approach, George Bolton drew up a list of immediate 
policy suggestions to sustain the momentum toward 
convertibility. The international suggestions were four. 
First, hardening up the system for EPU settlements by 
increasing the gold:credit ratio. The second was to allow 
free transferability of sterling among members of the EPU 
(Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal and France were still under 
bilateral sterling arrangements). The third suggestion was to 
allow free arbitrage among EPU currencies and the fourth was 
to widen the transferability of sterling in the non-dollar 
world generally76. This set of proposals became known as 
'Operation Momentum1 which emphasizes that their purpose was 
to salvage the convertibility drive from the rubble of the 
talks in Washington.
Of these proposals, the first and second met with 
Treasury opposition. The British were already under pressure 
from the European creditors of the EPU (Germany, Switzerland 
and the Low Countries) to increase the gold:credit ratio of 
EPU payments but they apparently felt such a step would be too 
costly to the reserves since the UK was in deficit with Europe 
and a significant hardening of the EPU would represent de
76Note by George Bolton, 26 March 1953. BoE OV44/60.
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facto convertibility of sterling to gold for Europe77. The 
Bank of England disagreed but the Treasury prevailed78. The 
second proposal, free transferability of sterling within the 
EPU was greeted as a less provocative step. Sterling was 
already fairly freely transferable through the Treasury's 
powers to grant administrative transferability to bilateral 
accounts. Furthermore, the German Deutsche Mark had become 
freely transferable on 19 February, 1953. The Treasury, 
however, held back on the grounds that this step would have 
been a purely technical change which would not improve the 
payments situation but might have had adverse effects on 
confidence in sterling. The bilateral European countries 
were, in any case, not very willing to accept sterling and 
increased transferability might have leaked more sterling to 
the cheap markets.
The third international component of 'Operation Momentum' 
was the only one immediately brought into practice. On 18 May 
1953, the UK concluded a set of agreements with European banks 
to allow arbitrage among the currencies of Britain, Germany, 
Switzerland, Belgium, France, Denmark and the Netherlands79.
^See J. Kaplan and G. Schleiminger, The European Payments 
Union: Financial Diplomacy in the 1950s. Clarendon, Oxford, 1989. 
p. 191-3 for the European debate on the hardening of the EPU.
78,Progress on Operation Momentum', 10 September 1953. BoE 
OV44/61.
79Kaplan and Schleiminger, The EPU. suggest that the main 
effect was to train foreign exchange dealers in advance of 
convertibility, p. 194.
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The arbitrage was originally limited to spot transactions but 
was extended to the forward market in October. The fourth 
suggestion, widening the transferable sterling area, at first 
appeared destined for the limbo category of policies 'under 
discussion'80.
On June 6, 1953 as the US evasions on the Collective
Approach continued, Bolton submitted a note on 'The Next
Stage' in which he recommended that if the US had not come to 
a decision on the Collective Approach by the September
IMF/IBRD meetings, the UK should go off on another tack to 
bring freer trade and payments. He made clear that his 
thinking was increasingly focused on a possible
dollar/non-dollar world81. Five days later L.J. Menzies, 
deputy chief cashier at the Bank, had sketched out a plan 
which condensed sterling into two categories: American
account sterling and Transferable sterling. This step was to 
be accompanied by the re-opening of the London gold market for 
transactions in American account sterling. The danger of an 
increase in cheap sterling transactions was dismissed on the 
grounds that sterling would have become a more useful and 
attractive currency which would offset the effects of 
increased supply in the transferable markets82.
80Note on Progress on Operation Momentum, 19 June 1953. BoE 
OV44/61.
81 George Bolton, 'The Next Stage', 6 June 1953. BoE OV44/60.
82Note by L.J. Menzies, 11 June 1953. BoE OV44/60.
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Of the two parts of Menzies* plan, the reopening of the 
London gold market was the least controversial. London was 
the traditional centre of the world's gold trade but it had 
been spread across New York and various European centres since 
the closure of the London market. The move would also get 
operators back in practice for the eventual move to convert­
ibility and it was expected that sterling would be 
strengthened83. These advantages were all in addition to the 
most obvious one, that the earnings from such transactions 
would return to the six London firms which traditionally ran 
the London gold market. The British authorities were also 
under pressure from South Africa which, frustrated with the 
lack of progress on convertibility, was making noises about 
opening its own free gold market in June 1953.
In a status report on Operation Momentum in mid-July 
1953, the Treasury emerged as the major obstacle to Bolton's 
proposals84. The Treasury had held back on the unification 
of the non-dollar, non-sterling world and had authorized 
transferability within the EPU only to the extent required to 
give effect to the May arbitrage arrangements. George 
Bolton's frustration was expressed in a note to the Governor 
in October 1953 entitled 'The Consequences of Inaction' in 
which he stated that "although it is not a characteristic of
^Telegram to T.L. Rowan and Robert Hall in Washington, 27 
January 1954. BoE OV44/61.
84Status of Operation Momentum, 15 September 1953. BoE OV44/61.
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the British to make a virtue of consistency, the growing 
freedom in foreign trade is completely inconsistent with the 
inflexibility of the controls over the use of non-resident 
sterling"85. He alleged that this inconsistency frustrated 
exports and encouraged disrespect for British administration. 
Furthermore, the multilateral circulation of sterling, which 
was essential to convertibility, was impeded and UK merchants 
suffered a competitive disadvantage.
Meanwhile, in November 1953 Bolton submitted to the 
Treasury a plan to achieve convertibility which was an 
alternative to the Collective Approach86. In a note to E.W. 
Playfair, Bolton suggested a two stage approach. In Stage I, 
authorized banks would be notified of the unification of all 
non-resident, non-dollar sterling. Payments with the Dollar 
Area would continue under the existing restrictions while all 
payments among non-residents outside the dollar area could be 
freely made in sterling or local currency for current and 
capital transactions. As part of Stage I, the UK would "call 
off the hunt against cheap sterling"87. Thus, there would be 
no exchange control barrier on transactions among 
non-residents at less than the official rate. Sterling area
85'The Consequences of Inaction1 by George Bolton, 23 October 
1953. BoE OV44/61.
86Letter from G.Bolton to E.Playfair (HMT) 'Steps Toward 
Unification of Non-Resident Sterling', 3 November 1953. BoE
0V44/19.
87Ibid.
merchants would not be prohibited from transactions where 
cheap sterling was somewhere involved as long as the merchant 
himself was not dealing at less than the official rate. UK 
merchants would also be allowed to purchase goods from any 
origin, including the dollar area, for sterling payable to 
transferable account as long as the goods were then sold 
outside the sterling area. UK merchants would thus be allowed 
to buy dollar goods from the transferable account area for 
sterling for re-export if that was the cheapest source of 
supply. In this way the sterling area was still obliged to 
deal at official rates but could take advantage of cheap 
sterling transactions among non-residents. This somewhat 
hypocritical position was justified on the grounds that con­
trols on non-resident transactions were not working anyway and 
UK merchants might as well get their share of the profits83.
Stage II of Bolton's plan provided for the unification of 
the expanded transferable area and the dollar area, which he 
prescribed should occur within six months of the completion of 
Stage I. In the meantime, the Bank would intervene 
unofficially in the transferable market in New York to bring 
the rates together89. Stage II was somewhat more
controversial than Stage I so discussion focused on Stage I in 
isolation. By being separated from the second part of 
Bolton's plan, the unification of non-resident, non-dollar
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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sterling was no longer considered an alternative to the
Collective Approach. This was the formal position insisted on
by the Treasury. In the paper recommending unification to the
Chancellor on 19 November 1953, Rowan emphasized that
we have agreed with the Bank that these proposals 
about non-resident sterling do not by themselves 
imply any need to modify the objectives of the 
Collective Approach or the methods by which the 
Collective Approach is brought into operation90
By 19 November 1953, the Bank and the Treasury had agreed
on the desirability of unification of the bilateral and
transferable sterling areas. The Chancellor was advised that
the move was consistent with what were now termed the UK's
'long term' objectives for convertibility via the Collective
Approach91. It was clearly in the direction of establishing
one external value for sterling and would probably reduce the
risk of the major move to convertibility when it came. It was
also expected to have a beneficial effect on sterling's
international status. The markets were buoyant at the end of
1953 so it would represent a movement from strength. This had
always played a large part in the UK's plans for
convertibility and was considered an important prerequisite
for success. It was also hoped that unification would
eliminate the complicated network of restrictions and simplify
i
the use of sterling, making sterling more useable and
90Paper for the Chancellor by T.L. Rowan, 19 November 1953. BoE 
OV44/19.
91Ibid.
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attractive and therefore more valuable, perhaps increasing the 
buying power of UK importers. Sterling area exporters stood 
to benefit from a hardening of the transferable rate since 
this would reduce the competitive edge at which continental 
exporters could offer sterling goods. No objections were 
expected from the RSA or Canada. The report also noted that 
unification would benefit UK exporters because they would no 
longer be so restricted in the payment they could receive92.
The Treasury accepted that unification posed some risk of 
an increase in cheap sterling transactions. This was 
dismissed, however, on the basis that the volume of such 
transactions was determined by the supply of "loose sterling" 
on the market which was a result of the sterling area's 
balance of payments. The supply of sterling to the trans­
ferable market was constantly replenished through the 
extension of sterling credits through the EPU to cover the 
sterling area's deficit with Europe. The Bank requested that 
all mention of a possible increase in cheap sterling deals be 
removed from the paper sent to the Chancellor although this 
was not in fact done93.
Rowan's paper also addressed the danger that establishing 
a single transferable market for sterling might make it more 
difficult for the UK to avoid intervening in the unofficial 
exchange markets to prevent the rate going too low. If the
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
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rate fell, cheap sterling transactions would increase and the 
pressure on reserves might force the UK to react. Presumably 
this pressure would be increased after unification because 
attention would be focused on this one rate as a rival to the 
official rate and because it would be easier for the 
authorities to intervene against a single rate. This danger 
was dismissed, however, on the basis that the strength of 
sterling could be expected to increase rather than otherwise 
after unification as long as sound internal policies were 
continued94. The unification of bilateral and transferable 
sterling, then, was accepted by the Treasury on the 
understanding that intervention in the market would not be 
necessary. This, certainly, was the impression that the Bank 
was trying to sell.
Unification was to be presented as a technical 
reorganization rather than a significant departure from 
current practice. It did not actually affect the
convertibility of sterling since payments from transferable 
account to dollar account were still restricted. There was, 
then, no need to consult the sterling area on the decision and 
no grand announcement would be made. The announcement was to 
be camouflaged by the re-opening of the London gold market at 
the same time. It was hoped that such an approach would ease 
the transition and prevent any shocks to confidence95.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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The Bank and Treasury immediately pushed ahead with the 
Plan. On 24 November Rowan cabled the British embassy in 
Washington about the proposals and by the end of the month the 
final drafts of cables to the Dominion central banks and to 
the transferable sterling countries were ready to be sent out. 
By 30 November 1953, the plan could have been implemented 
within a week of authorization by the Government96. At this 
point, the plan was stalled. A Commonwealth Economic 
Conference had been called for January 1954 and the Chancellor 
decided to delay unification until after the conference. It 
was considered undesireable for such a policy to appear to 
have emerged from the Commonwealth talks so the announcement 
was postponed to February or March 195497. The Treasury, 
without any objections from the Bank, wanted the decision to 
be viewed as an exclusively British one and not as a joint 
sterling area decision. This was in part due to the desire to 
avoid publicity for the move. It was also meant to signify 
the independence of the UK in determining sterling policy. 
Sterling, after all, was the national currency of the UK and 
rules governing its use were the sole domain of the British 
government. This contrasts with the policy a year earlier of 
presenting the Collective Approach proposals for 
convertibility as a product of sterling area discussions.
96Final Draft of Cable to Dominion Central Banks, 30 November 
1953. BoE OV44/19.
97Letter from E.Playfair (HMT) to E.Cohen (BoT), 18 December
1953. BoE OV44/19.
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This contrast reflects the different nature of the two 
proposals. The Collective Approach depended on a widely 
spread base of support which sterling area unity behind the 
plan would reinforce. Unification on the other hand was a 
unilateral decision by the UK to remove UK payments 
restrictions in the general interests of freer trade and 
payments. The sterling area did not play a significant role 
in the chances for the policy's success nor, therefore, in its 
development. In fact, however, unification would affect the 
sterling area through relaxation of the controls on their 
merchants, as well as through the possible impact on sterling 
area reserves and the international status of sterling. Given 
that sterling area merchanting was centred in London, most of 
the effects of external convertibility on the RSA were 
indirect.
The timing of the Commonwealth Economic Conference in 
Sydney provided an opportunity for the Chancellor to mention 
the proposal discretely to the rest of the sterling area and 
a brief was prepared by Coppleston of the Bank on 17 December 
195398. The administrative nature of the change was 
emphasized to the sterling area delegates. It was not to be 
considered a part of the Collective Approach or any move to 
convertibility and so was "not in any case a matter for joint
98Brief for Sydney Delegation on Unification of Non-Resident
Sterling, 17 December 1953. PRO T231/699.
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Commonwealth decision11". The delegates were assured that 
the effect on sterling area exports would be favourable and 
that the transferable sterling rate would be firmer. No great 
objections were recorded among the sterling area members, 
perhaps because, contrary to the Chancellor's advice, they did 
consider it to be progress toward convertibility at last. In 
any case, the conference was preoccupied with development 
finance. In the final communique the delegates reaffirmed 
their commitment to the Collective Approach and in the short 
term they pledged to maintain firm internal policies to 
strengthen the reserves100.
On 26 January 1954, in a discussion between E.W. Playfair 
of the Treasury and George Bolton, the date for unification 
was tentatively set for the last week of February so as to 
precede the March budget and the OEEC meeting of the same 
month101. Bolton later remarked that there were signs of 
considerable progress on freedom of payments among other 
members of the OEEC. Germany had already unified DM accounts 
and was reducing dollar discrimination. The Dutch were 
allowing traders to retain foreign exchange for longer periods 
and there was talk of removing exchange control between the
" ibid.
i°°Teiegram from Sydney to London, 15 January 1954. BoE 
OV44/61.
101Report of a discussion between Playfair and Polton, 26 
January 1954. BoE OV44/62.
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Dutch and Belgian monetary areas102. These developments 
brought pressure on the UK to act so "that the UK should not 
find itself in the position of apparently following European 
initiative"103.
By 9 February, the Treasury had postponed the date again 
until 22 March. The Chancellor seems to have been influenced 
by advice from Strath and Robert Hall who wanted to delay the 
plan for a further year. A note on a Bank visit to the 
Treasury on 11 February reported that "Strath and Hall are now 
campaigning against unification on the grounds that we shall 
need all the weapons of control if an American recession 
develops"104. At the end of this T.R. Siepmann scribbled 
"somebody should go down in a bathosphere and see how much of 
unification can be salvaged from these depths"105. Since the 
existing exchange controls were not effective, the Bank 
argued, the dangers of removing them were not particularly 
great and would not represent the real loss of a defence 
against fluctuations in the American economy106.
Finally, at a meeting between Treasury and Bank officials
102 * Sterling and Western Europe’, 23 February 1954. BoE 
OV44/62.
103Report of a discussion between G.Bolton and T.L.Rowan (HMT) , 
4 February 1954.
104GMW (BoE) note of a visit to HMT, 11 February 1954. BoE 
OV44/19•
105 Ibid.
106Report of a meeting between the BoE and HMT, 2 March 1954. 
BoE OV44/62.
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with the Chancellor on March 2 1954, the date to introduce 
unification and to re-open the gold market was firmly set for 
March 22. On 12 March the Dominion finance ministers were 
cabled that the plans discussed at Sydney were to be 
implemented as of that date. Supportive telegrams were sent 
in reply including one from Graham Towers of the Bank of 
Canada reading simply "Congratulations"107.
Unification was introduced, as planned, with a minimum of 
fanfare. By the end of March, the transferable rate had 
strengthened, fulfilling the optimistic predictions of the 
Treasury and the Bank. The rate climbed three cents to $2.78 
in March and then to a decade peak of $2.79 through April and 
May. Reserves were bolstered by sales of Russian gold to the 
re-opened London market and the balance of trade through the 
Spring was improved over the same period in 1953. The trade 
deficit for the first six months of 1954 was £46m compared to 
£146m in 1953.
Vl.C.ii. De Facto Convertibility
On April 26 1954, one month after unification, Bolton 
warned Rowan at the Treasury that, while official and 
unofficial rates were close for the time being, a widening 
between them would have serious consequences for confidence in 
sterling and the UK authorities would be forced to intervene.
107Telegram Bank of Canada to Bank of England, 17 March 1954. 
BoE OV44/19.
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Since this would contravene IMF rules, the UK should apply 
immediately to the USA and IMF to release the UK from her 
fixed rate obligations and take advantage of the healthy 
economic atmosphere to take the further 'technical' step of 
intervening in the gold and exchange markets to manage a 
fluctuating Transferable sterling exchange rate108.
On May 5, Bolton faced a rather hostile meeting at the 
Treaury on his suggestions and he was aked why he appeared to 
be advocating a floating rate109. Bolton's reply was that 
before the unification of transferable and bilateral sterling, 
floating inconvertible might have been viewed as an 
alternative to convertibility. Now that unification was 
completed and the Treasury was committed to convertibility, it 
could only be considered a transitional step. Intervention 
thus got tangled up with the ongoing battle over fixed versus 
flexible exchange rates. Intervention would be tantamount to 
a floating rate for sterling since the transferable rate would 
not need to be restricted within the 1% margins enforced under 
the IMF agreements. Bolton saw intervention in the 
transferable market as an intermediary stage toward flexible 
rates as well as convertibility "thus slowly moving by degrees 
from a fixed control system into a convertible and fluctuating
108Note from Bolton to T.L.Rowan 'Sterling Exchange in the 
Transitional Stage', 26 April 1954. BoE OV44/62.
109HMT/BoE meeting on 'Sterling Exchange in the Transitional 
Stage', 5 May 1954. BoE OV44/63.
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system”110.
In the May meeting, the Treasury objected to intervention
on the grounds that the Commonwealth would have to be
consulted over a fluctuating rate and, as had become apparent
in the Collective Approach negotiations, many members might
not be supportive. Furthermore, the Chancellor objected that
when unification had been sold to him, he had been "assured
that this would not commit us to intervening in the
transferable account market"111. A week later Rowan expanded
on the Chancellor's position, writing that the Chancellor was
concerned that further significant moves towards 
convertibility should be timed with full regard to 
the need to maintain accord with our Commonwealth 
and European collaborators and to secure adequate 
fulfillment of the conditions for convertibility 
laid down at the Commonwealth Economic 
Conference112
There were also moral implications involved. Supporting the 
transferable market was in part rejected "since this appears 
tantamount to assuring a relatively favourable rate for 
unauthorized conversions"113.
By June, the buoyancy of the transferable market had 
evaporated under the pressure of rumours of a devlauation and
110Letter from Bolton to Cobbold, 24 September 1954. BoE 
OV44/64.
111Meeting on 'Sterling Exchange in the Transitional Stage', 5 
May 1954. BoE OV44/63.
112Letter from T.L. Rowan to G. Bolton, 11 May 1954. BoE
OV44/63.
113Ibid.
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the indefinite postponement of convertibility. From June to 
September, the reserves fell by £116m and the transferable 
rate in New York fell to $2.74. There was a brief reprieve in 
September after the Chancellor's speech to the IMF/IBRD 
denying rumours that convertibility at a fluctuating rate was 
imminent but by November the transferable rate was down to 
$2.71, allowing commodity shunting to take place. On October 
6, the Governor of the Bank of England reported to Playfair 
that he "had impressed upon the Chancellor the importance of 
taking explicit action on Exchange Control relaxations etc. 
and giving up the writing of long memoranda upon 
convertibility"114. Bank impatience with the Treasury 
intensified as the external position of sterling deteriorated.
On December 21 1954, M. Stevenson of the Bank wrote to 
Rowan summarizing the Bank's position on the recent 
developments in the transferable market115. The unification 
of the transferable and bilateral areas was evidently not 
sufficiently thorough to remove completely the disadvantages 
under which UK merchants continued to suffer. Business was 
being diverted from those London commodity markets which were 
still prohibited from accepting sterling in exchange for 
dollar goods. When unification was completed in 1954, there 
had been some relaxation in the controls governing the London
114Note of a conversation between Playfair and Cobbold, 6 
October 1954. BoE OV44/64.
115M. Stevenson note to T.L. Rowan, 'Points made in Discussion 
with Bank on 17 Dec. 1954', 21 December 1954. PRO T236/3969.
393
commodity markets. Those commodity merchants which had been 
authorized to accept sterling from EPU countries were allowed 
to extend this to all of the transferable area but the 
commodities concerned were primarily coffee and cocoa which 
tended to be sterling area commodities anyway. No new 
allowances had been made for sterling sales of cotton, sugar 
or grains. The London wheat market, especially, seems to have 
suffered from competition of continental markets dealing in 
Transferable sterling116. One final drawback of the existing 
system was that if the transferable market continued to grow, 
there would be de facto convertibility at a freely floating 
rate outside the control of UK authorities.
Stevenson's note went on to suggest a series of possible 
policy options. The UK could take a step backward by making 
illegal the settlement of invisible debts to the sterling area 
using transferable sterling, or by restricting the rights of 
transferable account countries to use sterling only for 
current transactions. Both these options represented 
significant departures from the road to freer trade and 
payments and might shake confidence in sterling. A third 
option was to restrict credit to foreigners both to reduce the 
supply of sterling and restrict speculation. This, however, 
would conflict with the need to promote UK exports. Another 
group of policy options would liberalize exchange controls in 
the UK to attract sterling to London and away from markets in
116Ibid.
394
New York and Europe. Thus the UK commodity markets could be 
allowed to deal in sterling against dollar goods to divert 
sterling back to the UK. Secondly, the UK could allow 
purchases of gold against transferable account sterling in the 
London market. This would attract transferable sterling to 
London but would offer a means for converting all non-resident 
sterling through gold. Thirdly the Government could open a 
transferable market in London. This posed insurmountable 
technical difficulties in first obtaining permission from the 
IMF for dealing in multiple exchange rates, then maintaining 
the distinction between the two markets in London and it 
involved official recognition of the unofficial market in 
sterling. One final policy option was the resurrection of 
Bolton’s suggestion to intervene in the market to bring the 
transferable rate up to the official rate. This, it was 
noted, would be tantamount to government supported 
convertibility and "would certainly need IMF approval117.
In an attached note, Stevenson reported that he had been 
approached by Woodrow of Australia regarding the UK attitude 
to the transferable market. The Australians had expressed a 
desire to sell their gold for transferable sterling where the 
price was five to seven shillings more per ounce than the 
official market. This appears to have startled both the
117Ibid.
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Treasury and the Bank118. Woodrow was told that while 
exchanges of gold for transferable sterling would be tolerated 
among foreigners such practice by members of the sterling area 
"would clearly be upsetting", since it represented a breach in 
discipline and threatened the central reserves of the sterling 
area. Woodrow was also warned that entering the transferable 
market would divert gold and dollars from Australian reserves 
and the UK would not feel obliged to allow Australia to 
exchange sterling on the official market to make this up119.
In the third week of January, 1955, the Bank came back on 
the offensive with a bundle of three policy papers for the 
Treasury. In the first, Governor Cobbold noted that the 
conditions for the Collective Approach were not realizable in 
the next year "and probably not for some time after that"120. 
In the meantime, the exchange position was "beginning to lag 
behind what is actually happening in foreign exchange markets 
throughout the world"121. Cobbold estimated that the 
resulting weakness of sterling was sustainable for perhaps two 
or three months but certainly not for a year or longer. He 
suggested a series of immediate measures which included 
keeping the official and transferable rates together without
118Report of a discussion of M. Stevenson with Woodrow 
(Australia), 20 December 1954. PRO T236/3969.
119Ibid.
120Paper by C.F. Cobbold 'Exchange Policy1, 20 January 1955. 
PRO T236/3969•
121 Ibid.
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a formal act of commitment to avoid embarrassing the 
government. The rates of both types of sterling should be 
allowed to fluctuate within the range of $2.70 - 2.90. The 
IMF should be approached for informal permission to extend the 
flexibility of sterling in this way "as an installment of the 
Collective Approach"122. Cobbold further suggested parallel 
steps for security sterling to facilitate capital movements 
and resurrected the idea of limiting the amount of sterling 
credit passing through the EPU to the transferable market.
A second paper, prepared by L.J. Menzies gave startling 
examples of the growing strength and repectability of the 
transferable market123. Apparently, not all London banks 
were aloof from the market and an example was given of a 
financial delegation from the Netherlands Antilles that had 
recently quoted offers for transferable sterling which had 
been made to them by a London bank. Also, in mid January 
1955, a London merchant bank had been allowed to establish an 
agency in London to deal in transferable sterling for 
non-residents. Foreign central banks were also patronizing 
the market. Japan and Uruguay had both been reported to be 
reducing their sterling shortage through the market and France 
had been buying transferable sterling. In February 1955 Fred 
Connolly at BIS wrote that "the thought arises whether it is
122 Ibid.
123L.J. Menzies 'The Outlook for Transferable Sterling1, 20 
January 1955. PRO T236/3969.
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not a very strange thing for the main market in sterling to be 
left to the mercy of the international dealers while all the 
official ammunition in cash and know-how is spent in the minor 
field of operations in London"124.
The Bankfs third paper reviewed the position of security 
sterling. Security sterling was the blocked proceeds of non­
resident sales of sterling securities and was quoted on the 
New York market. The Bank suggested opening a market in 
London to allow non-residents to purchase foreign securities 
through security sterling. This would then allow London to 
take over the lucrative security business which was currently 
passing through the free markets in Hong Kong and Kuwait. To 
allow the market to function, UK bankers and stockbrokers 
would have to be allowed to deal in transferable sterling 
against dollars125.
The conflict between the Bank and the Treasury on further 
steps toward supporting the Transferable sterling rate was due 
to the Bank*s belief that the strain in the transferable 
market was primarily due to technical obstacles rather than 
the underlying balance of payments troubles of the sterling 
area while the Treasury tended to attribute the difficulties 
in the transferable market in early 1955 to the sterling area 
balance of payments. There was no disputing that the balance
124Letter from R.G. Connolly to Parsons, 4 February 1955. BoE 
OV44/10•
125HMT paper 'Capital Sterling1, 24 January 1955. PRO 
T236/3969.
of payments position of the sterling area deteriorated in
1954. In the second half of 1954, the rest of the sterling 
area incurred a deficit with the non-sterling world of £15m. 
This was the first appearance of such a deficit since the 
disastrous winter of 1951. Over the whole of 1954, the rest of 
the sterling area incurred a current account deficit of £308m 
with the UK compared with £160m in 1953 and a surplus with the 
non-sterling world of only £22m against £212m in 1953. This 
left a deficit in 1954 of £286m with the rest of the world. 
The Bank believed that this weakness in the sterling area 
balance of payments could only manifest itself in foreign 
exchange markets after a six month delay. The weakness of 
sterling must therefore have been due to the technical problem 
posed by the transferable market. Thus Cobbold asserted that 
"the strength of sterling is being sapped away, materially, 
because payment to the sterling area is increasingly made 
through cheap sterling and psychologically because of the 
existence of an active market in cheap sterling at a 
considerable discount"126. By February the Treasury was 
convinced.
On February 16, Bank Rate was increased by 1% to 5.5% and 
the next day hire purchase arrangements were further 
restricted and the Capital Issues Committee was advised to 
consider only urgent applications. On the same day authority
126C. F. Cobbold 'Exchange Policy', 20 January 1955. PRO 
T236/3969.
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was given to the British negotiators in the EPU to acquiesce 
to an increase in the gold credit ratio to 75%. One week 
later, after the Transferable sterling rate had continued to 
fall, the Chancellor cabled the UK Treasury and Supply 
Delegation in Washington that permission had been given for 
the EEA to bring the transferable rate up to meet the official 
rate and the Commonwealth Dominions were informed of the 
decision. By the end of February the transferable rate had 
been raised four cents to $2.76\£1.00. Fred Conolly of the 
BIS described the operation as "some monster pulled up from 
the depths" with the "seaweed and barnacles" of various black 
markets clinging to its back127. De facto sterling 
convertibility at the fixed official rate had been achieved.
VI.D. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the major categories of 
alternative policies that the British government might have 
chosen in the 1950s and described the path toward sterling 
convertibility that was actually followed. A dramatic and 
assertive policy of either winding up the sterling area or 
reinforcing it into a discriminatory bloc must be dismissed. 
Winding up the sterling area unilaterally by defaulting on the 
sterling balances was not politically possible and the 
international economic implications were not necessarily
127Letter from F.G.Connolly (BIS) to G. Bolton, 15 February
1955. BoE OV44/10
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favourable. This would have invited retaliation in trade 
policies and probably seizure of British assets abroad. The 
type of negotiated settlement which was finally achieved in 
the 1960s through the Basle Facility was not possible in the 
1950s given the structure of the international economy at the 
time. The Americans had yet to feel the burden of supporting 
a reserve currency with a chronic balance of payments deficit 
and they had little to gain from supporting the pound as an 
alternative to the dollar. Furthermore, the acceptability of 
such an arrangement for the RSA countries depended on the 
changed structure of the sterling area system by the 1960s.
Reinforcing the sterling area into a more discriminatory 
Imperial bloc would not have been acceptable to other members 
of the sterling area. In the early 1950s this was due to the 
strong international demand for their raw material exports. 
After the Korean War boom, when it was accepted that there 
would not be a perpetual shortage of raw materials and when 
the advantages of preference in the British market reappeared, 
the RSA resisted reinforcing sterling area relations at the 
expense of their connections with the USA. The interests of 
the RSA lay in development of industry and the attraction of 
American capital, neither of which were consistent with a 
division of the international economy into a 'Two World1 
system.
In the end, British policy might appear to have followed 
an ad hoc approach to freer trade and payments. The final
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section of this chapter, however, shows that the policies 
taken were chosen deliberately and with a continuity of 
purpose by the Bank of England based on the belief that one 
way to strengthen the British balance of payments was to 
remove the restrictions on the use of sterling. If sterling 
were easier to use and more attractive, this in itself was 
assumed to help British exporters since if more countries were 
willing to hold sterling and settle their international 
transactions in sterling, British exports would become more 
attractive. The administrative measures of 1954 and 1955 also 
relieved British importers and merchants from the 
disadvantages that the system of controls had imposed.
The policy to re-establish sterling as an international 
currency was not merely for the benefit of London's financial 
sector and the prospect of invisible earnings. Although the 
interests of British merchants were frequently cited, the 
strength of sterling was also believed to be important to 
visible earnings on the current account and the willingness of 
overseas holders to maintain their sterling balances which 
would ease the pressure on the capital account. In the Bank's 
view, strengthening sterling thus promised to strengthen the 
balance of payments on current and capital account. By 1955, 
the Bank's contention that the periodic weaknesses in sterling 
were due to these technical obstacles as much as the 
underlying balance of payments of the sterling area was 
accepted in the Treasury.
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Given that freer trade and payments was the goal of 
British policy, the administrative approach to convertibility 
bore several advantages. By following a series of technical 
steps, this approach avoided an open confrontation with the 
rest of the sterling area and so did not upset sterling area 
relations. In the end the rest of the sterling area did not 
play a part in the gradual achievement of convertibility. 
After asserting this as their goal at the end of 1951, they 
were excluded from the process except for their negotiations 
over the fated Collective Approach. After the Collective 
Approach, therefore, sterling policy ceased to be a genuine 
sterling area issue.
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Chapter VII. Conclusions
This final chapter will draw together the conclusions 
of the various aspects of the sterling area investigated in 
earlier chapters and fit the general picture which emerges 
into the traditional view of the sterling area. The 
evidence of this study points to the necessity for a 
revision of the traditional judgement of the effect of the 
sterling area on British policy.
A general weakness of the UK economy in the 1950s was 
the instability of the balance of payments. As noted in 
Chapter I, the balance of the existing literature has been 
firmly of the view that short term sterling liabilities 
were excessive and destabilizing to the British economy. 
Based on more complete and detailed data of the volume and 
distribution of the sterling balances than has hitherto 
been available, the analysis in Chapter II showed that 
fluctuations in the RSA sterling balances were not the 
unpredictable or volatile element in the British balance of 
payments that most writers on the topic have suggested. 
From these figures it is apparent that increases in 
holdings by the Colonies offset declines in the sterling 
assets of the independent sterling area. Of the Colonial 
sterling balances, about 70% were either statutory currency 
reserves or government reserves which indicates that the 
increase was to a large extent due to Colonial monetary and 
fiscal policy.
Britain's failed attempts to reduce the volume of
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these outstanding liabilities through ammendments to 
Colonial monetary systems and increased development 
spending, outlined in Chapter II, suggested that these 
liabilities were generally illiquid and thus did not 
present a continuing danger to the adequacy of the central 
reserves. The conclusion must be, therefore, that the 
stability of the overall total of outstanding UK 
liabilities was not accidental. In fact, the inter­
relation of the sterling area 1 rules* and Colonial economic 
policy provided for the stability of the system to an
extent that was underestimated by contemporaries.
Since the sterling balances were associated with 
Colonial policy, however, they did not reflect a genuine
reserve role for sterling. The analysis has thus supported
Susan Strange*s conclusion that the sterling area system 
allowed sterling to retain the appearance of a reserve 
currency role after the reality had disappeared1. The 
review of British policy toward the sterling balances and 
the preoccupation of the authorities with finding a way to 
secure them has shown, however, that the Bank and the
Treasury were not lulled into a false sense of security and 
that they were aware that the sterling balances did not 
reflect an ongoing reserve role for sterling.
The analysis of movements in sterling balances in 
Chapter II also revealed that it was the UK*s balance of 
payments with the non-sterling area that led to
1S. Strange, Sterling and British Policy? A Political Study 
of an International Currency in Decline. Oxford, 1971. p. 69.
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deteriorations in the ratio of reserves to liabilities. 
This was due to the RSA's persistent balance of payments 
surplus with the non-sterling area and deficit with the UK. 
Increases in sterling balances were accompanied by equal 
contributions of foreign exchange to the central reserves 
by RSA members. When sterling balances were drawn down, 
they were used to settle in sterling with the UK. Given 
the consistent surplus of the RSA as a whole through the 
1950s, reductions in sterling balances improved the ratio 
of reserves to liabilities. A worsening of the reserve to 
liability ratio would only have occured if the RSA had been 
running down their sterling balances in order to diversify 
their reserves. While Australia began this process in the 
1950s, this did not occur on a large scale until after 
sterling was devalued in 1967. The external 'position' of 
the British economy thus depended on the UK's own balance 
of payments with the non-sterling area.
The question of stability was also addressed in 
Chapter V using quarterly balance of payments data. Again, 
it was determined that it was the UK's own balance of 
payments rather than the balance of payments of the RSA as 
a whole that created most of the instability in the central 
reserves. Furthermore, the sterling area made a net 
contribution to the central reserves over the period, thus 
contradicting the common perception that the RSA was a 
burden on the reserves. The RSA did exaggerate the adverse 
movements in 1951-2 but in the crises of 1955, 1956 and 
1957, the RSA was a net contributor to the central
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reserves. It was noted that this surplus was increasingly 
dependent on sales of Middle Eastern oil and South African 
gold. The evidence presented in Chapter V suggested that 
the adverse effect of the sterling balances on confidence 
in sterling may have been exaggerated both by contemporary 
observers and by subsequent writers. This leaves the 
underlying weakness of the British economy as the main 
generator of destabilizing capital flows.
The long term capital flows from the UK to the rest of
the sterling area were shown in Chapter IV not to have been 
the significant drain on the British economy that many 
commentators have assumed. Empirical evidence suggested 
that it was the low productivity of British capital 
investment rather than its volume that inhibited British 
economic growth. Furthermore, the volume of investment 
going overseas was small relative to domestic capital 
formation. In this context it is unlikely that any long 
term advantages would have accrued from the imposition of 
capital controls. This is especially true given the 
evidence that investment in the sterling area generated 
greater returns than investment in the rest of the world. 
For controls to have been effective in the short term, it 
was seen that a virtual embargo on investment in the 
sterling area would have been required. This, in turn, 
would have had severe effects on the longer term prospects
for the UK balance of payments.
The relation of investment flows to sterling balances 
was examined in Chapter IV and the evidence undermined the
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allegation that enforced Colonial savings financed 
investment in the independent sterling area and also the 
suggestion that investment flows merely financed increases 
in short term British liabilities through increases in 
sterling balances. Investment tended to flow to those 
members with small liquid resources at their disposal so a 
restriction on capital flows from the UK would not have 
decreased sterling liabilities. The apparently illiquid 
nature of most of the sterling assets during the 1950s also 
suggests that the accusation that the UK was borrowing 
short term and lending long term is misleading. In fact, 
most of the outstanding 1 short term* liabilities were 
considered longer term assets by their holders.
Finally, on the issue of trade relations, the balance 
of evidence supported the position that the importance of 
UK trade to other members of the sterling area declined 
during the 1950s and discrimination in favour of the UK 
became the exception rather than the rule. The increasing 
competitiveness of the overseas sterling area markets 
suggests that after the mid-1950s, the prospect of UK 
exporters being 'featherbedded* by soft markets was fading.
It was asserted in Chapter I that the UK economy was 
undergoing a fundamental realignment in its relationship 
with the rest of the world during the 1950s. The evidence 
in this thesis has suggested that this is especially 
apparent with respect to the UK's relationship with the 
rest of the sterling area. By the middle 1950s a change 
was apparent in the structure of the sterling balances, in
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the trade relationships of the sterling area and in the 
direction of British sterling policy in general. From 1955 
the process of accumulation of sterling balances was 
reversed, the reliance on the UK as an export market was 
declining for most members, the London capital market 
tightened up and, although the volume of investment 
continued to expand, the members of the RSA were encouraged 
to look elsewhere for foreign capital. Thus, the 
traditional components of the sterling area system were all 
eroded through this period and the tools of British 
management of the sterling area became obsolete. The
mid-1950s also marked the beginning of the deterioration of 
the RSA balance of payments with the non-sterling area so 
that the surplus necessary for the proper functioning of 
the system came to depend on South African gold sales and 
Middle Eastern oil exports rather than on more traditional 
RSA raw material exports. By this time, the British 
authorities had abandoned hopes of coordinating sterling 
area trade policy or sterling area-wide programmes of 
domestic demand management. The course of efforts to 
coordinate sterling area trade and domestic demand policy 
was surveyed in Chapter III which showed the declining 
interest of both the RSA and the UK in this pursuit after 
the second round of trade restrictions in 1952. After the 
Collective Approach collapsed, UK balance of payments 
policy focussed increasingly on getting the British economy 
in order independently of the RSA by relying on fiscal and 
monetary controls to affect the external balance. The
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increasing reliance on domestic restrictions after 1952 was 
thus due to the virtual abandonment of a common sterling 
area policy rather than part of Britain!s management of the 
system. Through the mid-1950s convertibility became the 
driving force of British external economic policy. 
Convertibility of sterling at the existing exchange rate 
was encouraged by the RSA but it was primarily a policy 
goal of the UK and it was pursued and achieved 
independently of the sterling area system.
It was noted in Chapter I that the sterling area had 
many of the characteristics of a currency area discussed in 
the theoretical literature. The benefits of such a system 
include the elimination of speculative capital flows, 
reserves pooling and increasing the usefulness of money by 
reducing transactions costs. With respect to the first
benefit, speculative capital flows among members were 
virtually eliminated except for a brief period in 1949-50 
when it was believed that the Australian pound would 
revalue to a par with sterling. Chapter V showed that the 
overseas members of the sterling area enjoyed the benefits 
of reserve pooling and economized on the volume of reserves 
necessary to support their surpluses and deficits as a 
whole. This was because movements in their balances with 
the rest of the world in part offset eachother so that 
while some members were consistent drawers on the central 
reserves, others were consistent depositers. The UK 
benefitted from the system insofar as the RSA were net 
contributors to the reserves since the UK was a persistent
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drawer. Still, much of the Economy' in reserves was 
forced through restrictions on dollar expenditure due to 
the general preoccupation with the absolute size of the 
central reserves.
The question of improving the usefulness of money is 
less easy to assess. Certainly, there would be some 
economies of scale through having half the worldfs trade 
denominated in sterling and there were no doubt fewer 
transactions costs associated with trade between sterling 
area members where there were no exchange controls, 
compared with trade with the rest of the world. Chapter 
III showed, however, that there is little evidence that the 
system generated new trade relationships amongst RSA 
members. Most of the trading relationships were on a 
bilateral basis with the UK and with regional trading 
partners. It is possible, however, that trade along the 
lines of these traditional patterns was expanded due to 
lower transactions costs.
Against the benefit of lower transactions costs for 
members must be set the costs of enforcing the restrictions 
on the non-sterling area. Thus the sterling area system 
can be seen either as allowing the freer use of sterling 
among some countries or as necessitating cumbersome 
controls against the rest of the world. Without the 
sterling area it would still have been necessary for the UK 
to maintain exchange controls in the post-war period and 
this thesis has shown that the sterling area did not 
inhibit the process of relaxation of restrictions on trade
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and payments. The first interpretation of the sterling 
area, that it allowed greater freedom in the use of 
sterling and thus reduced transactions costs, must thus 
dominate. Certainly, one of the justifications for the 
sterling area system used by the British authorities was 
that it allowed for greater use of sterling in 
international transactions than would otherwise have been 
the case.
If the sterling area system had not emerged from the 
Second World War, it is likely that the independent members 
of the sterling area would have pegged their exchange rate 
to another major currency such as the US dollar, thus 
joining a different currency area. Only India briefly 
considered floating their national currency against both 
the dollar and sterling. This was in the context of the 
Collective Approach discussed in Chapter VI and can be seen 
more as a political bargaining tool rather than a viable 
economic plan. Through the end of the 1950s and the 1960s 
it became apparent that some Australians believed that they 
were part of the wrong currency area and made efforts to 
realign the Australian economy to the USA. There was no 
serious consideration, however, of any member defining a 
currency area by their own political boundaries in the way 
that Canada did during this period. Whether this implies 
that being part of a currency area was optimal for members 
of the RSA, however, requires further research.
Among the costs of a currency area, the most important 
is the loss of economic sovereignty associated with fixed
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exchange rates. Chapters II, III and IV have shown that 
the tools of British management of the sterling area (free 
capital flows from the UK, acceptance of short term 
liabilities and unrestricted imports), did not impose major 
costs on the UK economy. Chapter V showed that the 
sterling area system did not significantly inhibit UK 
economic policy. The balance of payments constraint of the 
UK economy during the 1950s was the effort to maintain the 
fixed exchange rate between sterling and the dollar rather 
than between sterling and the various currencies of the 
RSA. Furthermore, as by far the largest economy in the 
sterling area, the UK could lead policy as a 'key currency1 
country and it was up to the RSA countries to adjust their 
economic policy to that of the UK. The growing 
unwillingness of the RSA countries to do this was beginning 
to drive the system apart by the end of the 1950s. The 
interesting aspects of the cost of the currency area 
association are thus in the policy choices of the RSA 
members rather than those of the UK. This issue is beyond 
the scope of this thesis but suggests that research into 
the experiences of the RSA members will provide some 
interesting insights into the functioning of the sterling 
area in this period.
The most important aspect of the sterling area as a 
currency area is where it fell short of the theoretical 
prerequisites. A primary weakness of the sterling area was 
the lack of common economic policy goals after the end of 
the dollar shortage. The RSA's ambitions for developing
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secondary industry, especially in Australia and India, and 
for more basic economic development in the case of the 
Colonies, did not coincide with the British interest in 
maintaining these countries as a source of supply of raw 
materials and foreign exchange. This was especially 
evident in Chapter III which described the end of the hopes 
for a triangular balance of trade, the abandonment by the 
RSA of discrimination in favour of the UK and the 
increasing emphasis in UK policy on restraining internal 
demand. The efforts at coordinating sterling area demand 
management failed because the policies appropriate to a 
developed industrial economy like the UK, which emphasised 
price stability and balance of payments equilibrium, were 
not appropriate for countries which put more emphasis on 
development and growth. Of course, the British economy may 
have been better served if growth had been higher on the 
list of priorities but this debate must centre on the 
ranking of British policy options. Chapter V and VI showed 
that the sterling area system did not interfere with the 
choice of UK policy priorities.
The experience of the sterling area emphasises the 
importance to the successful functioning of a currency area 
of common economic goals with respect to growth rates and 
development. The institution of a currency area itself 
cannot be expected to generate complementary economic 
policy among its members. Rather, a commitment to common 
economic goals must be a prerequisite to the formation of 
the system. Even in this case, however, these goals may
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change with time. In the early post-war period the 
sterling area members shared a common need to contend with 
the international dollar shortage but as this receded, the 
motivation of the sterling area association eroded.
Members continued to maintain fixed exchange rates but the
exceptions to the freedom of current and capital
transactions multiplied and the policy emphasis of some 
members shifted to Europe and the USA. To the list of 
prerequisites for a successful currency area should perhaps 
be added that they have a similar level of economic
development. Although this may lessen the complementarity 
of members* production and trade, the coordination of 
policy in the longer term will be more assured.
Implicit in most of the critiques of the sterling area 
is the recommendation that the system should have been 
avoided in some way. Only a minority of writers have 
suggested detailed proposals for how this might have been 
accomplished. The main categories of suggested
alternatives were reviewed and dismissed in Chapter VI. 
The negative assessments of the sterling area have not, in 
general, taken into account the dismantling costs to the 
British economy that would have been necessary to have 
effected a swifter break from the pivotal role that Britain 
had historically played in the international economy. This 
thesis has concluded that the abandonment of the sterling 
area system would have incurred costs which would not have 
been compensated for by the benefits from such an abrupt 
change in policy.
415
The impression is left that the contemporary observers 
and subsequent writers have expected too much from the 
sterling area system and that this has coloured their 
assessment of its merits. Underlying their critiques is a 
cost benefit approach based on the assumption that the 
sterling area should have offered a positive return to 
justify its continued existence. The fact that there was 
little evidence of substantial economic benefit has led 
them to look for ways in which the system must have 
undermined the British economy. The sterling area did not 
solve the problems of the British balance of payments but 
the evidence in this thesis has shown that the sterling 
area did not have a consistent detrimental effect either.
The literature surveyed in Chapter I showed that many 
critics of the sterling area system have suggested that the 
only apparent advantage of the system was international 
prestige, but the archival evidence presented has indicated 
that the Treasury and the Bank of England were aware that 
the sterling area system did not generate prestige for the 
British economy and that the controls on the use of 
sterling which defined the system brought sterling into 
disrepute. This was reflected in the continued search for 
ways to introduce sterling convertibility and by the 
gradual abandonment of discriminatory trade controls as an 
instrument of sterling area policy after 1953.
Also apparent in the archival material, however, was 
the belief that the sterling area system was the economic
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arm of the Commonwealth. Still, predictions that 
individual RSA members might leave the sterling area (for 
example, in connection with ROBOT) did not imply that they 
would leave the Commonwealth. Sterling area issues did 
provide an opportunity for regular consultation among 
members of the Commonwealth, but the declining relevance 
and increasing banality of the Commonwealth Economic 
Conference pronouncements suggests that these meetings did 
little to reinforce Commonwealth solidarity by the end of 
the 1950s.
An alternative view that is more consistent with the 
evidence is that the sterling area was seen as an obstacle 
to the re-establishment of confidence in sterling rather 
than the basis for this ambition. Thus, the problems of 
the sterling area balance of payments needed to be 
'overcome1 before the international usefulness of sterling 
could be re-established. As the 1950s progressed, the 
interests of the UK and the RSA diverged and the prospects 
that this goal could be achieved through a coordinated 
policy became more remote. As economic development became 
a priority for the independent members of the sterling 
area, they grew more resistant to restrictions on foreign 
exchange expenditure and less willing to accept higher 
priced British goods. This was reflected in declining 
trade discrimination and a slower rate of accumulation of 
sterling balances.
The sterling area system allowed an international role 
for sterling beyond that which it might have had if these
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countries had pegged to the dollar, but the sterling area 
was not the basis from which it was hoped that sterling 
would regain a truly international status. Suggestions 
that the sterling area should be expanded as a way to 
increase the use of sterling internationally were quickly 
dismissed. The route to convertibility, on which the 
international role of sterling depended, was eventually 
achieved by UK administrative measures. The other members 
of the sterling area were left watching events from the 
sidelines after the death of the Collective Approach in 
1953.
It is important for the conclusions of this thesis 
that it is based on an acceptance of the status quo in 
1950. There has been no attempt, therefore, to postulate 
the possible effects on the history of this period if 
radically different choices had been made in the immediate 
post-war period. How the British authorities faced the 
challenges of the postwar era cannot be divorced from the 
history of Britain's pre-eminence in the international 
economy. The historical role of the UK as the centre of 
international capital and trade flows makes the conclusions 
of the present study even more relevant since the decline 
of the UK as a major trading power and as a capital market 
is particularly striking in this study of sterling area 
relationships in the 1950s.
After the Second World War, the leadership of the UK 
in the international economy was reduced to a regional role 
centred on the sterling area. Previous studies have
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assumed that the UK maintained its leadership within the 
sterling area at some cost to the domestic economy and to 
the freedom of policy choices. This thesis has presented 
evidence that the effect of the sterling area system on the 
British economy and on British policy has been exaggerated. 
Furthermore, the essential instruments of British 
management of the sterling area became ineffective through 
the 1950s, thus causing the erosion of British leadership 
during this decade. The main conclusion is that after the 
middle of the 1950s the UK was no longer 'managing' the 
sterling area. The balance of payments problems that were 
the focus of British economic policy in this period cannot 
be attributed to the existence of the sterling area.
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